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Abstract
Different stimuli have been used for doing philosophy with children (P4C/PwC), either 
specially designed for this reason, such as Matthew Lipman's novels or not, such as 
picture-books and works of art. Nevertheless, there is a gap in justifying philosophically 
the role of stimuli with in the context of the theory and practice of a philosophical 
community of inquiry. This gap is the subject of my conceptual research which aims at 
constructing a theory of what a stimulus is and its particular role within a philosophical 
inquiry.
In this thesis, philosophy is viewed as a way of life that contains both, generative and 
evaluative aspects and it is explored how it links with the epistemological 
presuppositions of philosophy with children. The nature of the stimulus is explained in a 
more pragmatic framework and it is fully distinguished from behavioristical use. It is 
argued that a stimulus is suitable for doing philosophy with children if the engagement 
of individuals with it generates catalepsy (a sense of grasping) and moments of 
epiphany, that can lead to Eros for further inquiry. It is claimed that this is possible when 
the narrative structure of the stimuli matches with the narrative understanding of the 
individual when engaging with the stimulus.
Zymotic thinking, a new term introduced in this thesis which refers to a mixture of 
critical, creative and emotional thinking that matures through a fermentative process in 
time is a way to explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life with 
generative and evaluative aspects. Consequences of zymotic thinking such as mapping 
of individuals' experiences, activating self-corrective thinking and adopting diatheses of 
openness and alertness are introduced as ways that explain how stimuli are linked with 
philosophy are also used to explain the connection between the stimuli and philosophy.
The philosophical points of this thesis are illustrated and supported further by: a) 
empirical examples of philosophical inquiries with children and adults, b) the reflective 
analysis of existing stimuli for doing philosophy with children and stimuli that came from 
children's experiences, and c) the offering of a sample of the author's stories that could 
be used as stimuli for doing philosophy with children.
"All children enter school as question marks 
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To set any educational aim it is required to 'picture' in one's mind the desirable type of 
the 'educated' person and the broader social context this educated person will be part of 
(Moore, 1982). It is also necessary for people to be convinced 'why' education is good 
for them to pursue. In other words people need a good 'narrative' about education that 
will motivate them to find meaning in their life (Postman, 1996). In different historical 
periods there have been different ideals of the good citizen and the ideal world that 
have shaped the aims of education. For instance, being brave and physically strong 
was important for people trained to become warriors and defend their country or even 
expand its borders.
Nowadays, one of the first priorities is to realise before it is too late that we are visitors 
on the "Spaceship Earth" which needs to be maintained if we want to maintain 
ourselves too (Postman, 1996). As there are no authorities to show to people how to do 
so, a degree of tolerance towards diversity among people, a willingness to collaborate 
and learn from each other and a genuine care for preserving ourselves and others seem 
to be necessary. This presupposes that citizens are able to think critically and evaluate 
the situations they face, think creatively about new possible solutions that could make 
the world better and collaborate with each other. Education should aim at elaborating on 
children's thinking and to develop reasonableness.
Philosophy is by nature an activity that requires people to think critically. However, often 
it has been perceived as an abstract and academic activity that is out of children's 
reach. Matthew Lipman, an American philosopher, introduced philosophy in the 
classroom, and he suggested that "philosophy for children" (P4C) can enable children to 
develop their thinking further which consists of parameters such as critical, creative and 
caring thinking (Lipman, 2003). Critical thinking refers to one's ability to judge whether 
information received stands to reason and is based on criteria such as principles, laws, 
values, facts, rules and definitions (Lipman, 2003). Critical thinking entails also 
sensitivity within a context (e.g. special conditions and limitations that each situation 
upon judgement forces people to think about) and people's willingness to reflect and 
self-correct when there are good reasons for doing so (e.g. flaws and weaknesses in
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thinking) (Lipman, 2003; Gregory, 2007a; 2007b). The chances are that people, who get 
used to questioning, explaining, clarifying or identifying their and other people's 
thoughts, are less likely to accept information passively and unconditionally.
Creative thinking refers to the ability to think 'outside of the box' or as Lipman describes, 
think in an imaginative, holistic, inventive and generative way and come up with new 
and fresh solutions to an existing problem or to see problems that others take for 
granted (Lipman, 2003).
Caring thinking involves being affectious, appreciative, active, empathetic and sensitive 
to others as one's thinking and decisions should bear in mind the impact on others 
(Lipman, 2003). It gives 'sensitivity' to thinking, aiding tolerance to others' views, and 
politeness and tactfulness when expressing possible opposition to others' ideas.
Collaborative thinking (Sutcliffe and William, 2000) refers to the skill of joining different 
people's ideas together, building on each other's ideas and through this synthesis 
making a step forward to developing new knowledge. It is a process that involves 
people in retaining or abandoning their initial thoughts for the construction and sake of 
bigger ideas. In my perception, it seems that collaborative thinking is a synthesis of 
many people's critical, creative and caring thinking that also may increase their well 
being.
Thus, critical and creative thinking serves in developing open-minded and independent 
thinkers. At the same time, caring and collaborative thinking contribute to a person 
becoming more //ite/tlependent (Sutcliffe and Williams, 2000). Ideally education 
nurtures the kind of people, either children or adults, who are strong independent 
thinkers able to reason well and in parallel sensitive to other people's points of view and 
willing to change their mind (if there are good reasons for doing so).
As a researcher, with teaching experience and a philosophical background, I was 
inspired by 'philosophy with children' which combines at least two different disciplines:
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philosophy and children's education - and demands an interdisciplinary approach. 
Focusing on the philosophical presuppositions of Matthew Lipman's work and 
reconstructing it philosophically (Nikolidaki, 2005) enabled me to have an understanding 
of how philosophy and children can benefit from each other. Achieving a scholarship 
with the Academy of Athens for studying philosophy abroad enabled me to dig deeper in 
philosophy with children1 under the supervision of academics with a high reputation in 
the field. After much personal reading, practice of philosophy, discussions with my 
supervisors and others in the field of philosophy with children (professors from other 
universities, students, theoreticians and practitioners of philosophy for children in 
Europe, Australia and United States) potential topics that needed further research 
emerged2 .
Rationale
Among these subjects, it seemed that there was no clear identification of what the 
purpose is of using a stimulus, which could be Lipman's novels, a picture-book, a piece 
of art and many others3 when doing philosophy with children. I wondered what is it that 
makes a story, a piece of art or anything else worthy as stimulus for philosophy. Is the 
stimulus necessary for philosophical discussion to start? From my experience as a new 
practitioner there were cases where the stimulus was completely ignored. This 
happened especially within a community of inquiry still inexperienced and not yet 
sensitive as to observe and make the most out of the stimulus. But is the stimulus only a 
starting point, with no need to pay further attention to it and explore it further 
theoretically?
1 One restriction that I had from the Academy of Athens is that my research should be philosophical and not empirical. Even though 
this initially discouraged me as I felt stronger in doing empirical rather than purely philosophical research, it was a challenge to learn 
working under a philosophical discipline. A more theoretical Ph.D. could also work as a bedrock for future research in more 
educational settings.
2 For instance, the role of the teacher as a facilitator within a philosophical community of inquiry was a potential subject for further 
research.
3 See chapter 3
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There is extensive literature about stimuli that have been used in doing philosophy with 
children4 , some pedagogical criteria of selecting them and records of children's 
dialogues that occurred using various stimuli. Nevertheless, there seems to be a gap in 
a philosophical justification for the use of stimuli and how individuals' engage with 
them5 . Attending some modules from a course in creative writing at the University of 
Wales, Newport in parallel with my other studies enabled me to study the stimuli used 
for doing philosophy with children from another perspective: as a creator of stimuli 
myself.
Aims
What is missing, according to the literature review6 of the various stimuli that have been 
used in doing philosophy with children, is the development and formulation of a theory 
about the stimuli that attempts an in-depth philosophical analysis of what a stimulus 
should be and how the different philosophical underpinnings influence its perception. 
The aim of this research is both descriptive (what a stimulus is) and normative (what a 
stimulus should be) (Moore, 1982). On one hand it critically presents how stimuli have 
been used already when doing philosophy with children and on the other hand I 
examine how stimuli should be regarded and what criteria should be taken into 
consideration for their selection.
Research questions that will be addressed are as follows: 
o What is the nature of a stimulus?
o Is a stimulus necessary for doing philosophy with children? 
o What makes a teacher or a child attracted towards one stimulus, but repelled by
another?
o What is the nature of an individual's engagement with the stimuli? 
o Can stimuli be linked with philosophy outside the classroom?
4 See chapter 3
5 For more details about the research gaps, please, see chapter 3.
6 See chapter 3.
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o Can children offer stimuli and philosophise about them?
o Is it possible (and if so what are the presuppositions) for using a stimulus
philosophically in a mixed group of adults and children? 
o How is the stimulus linked with my perception of what philosophy is?
Method
The word 'method' means moving towards a goal, or at any rate in a secured direction: 
it means "going-after" (Natorp 1912c: 199-200). The ways in which one 'goes after' a 
goal reflect the different methods that can be used. Wittgenstein highlights that "there is 
not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" 
(P1 133). Bearing this in mind, the methodology used is a combined deductive (primary) 
and inductive (secondary) approach (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). The first 
case refers to the conceptual analysis of the meaning of the concept 'stimulus' and 
other key terms that are linked with it. The second case refers to the analysis of the 
empirical elements of the 'stimuli through my reflective practice.
The pursuit of the method is preceded by the hypothesis (Natorp, 1912). The 
investigation of the nature of the stimulus makes sense if what is understood as 
philosophy in this thesis is firstly identified. The main hypothesis of this thesis accepts 
philosophy as a way of life with both generative and evaluative aspects. This hypothesis 
is first checked and justified through argumentation and then applied to explain the 
properties of the concept 'stimulus' (Descartes, 1968). The end of this process is the 
construction of a theoretical structure of words, phrases and visual representations that 
offers a new understanding of what a stimulus should be within the tradition of doing 
philosophy with children.
Conceptual Analysis
The philosophical (conceptual) analysis of the concept 'stimulus' consists of breaking 
down its parts and other key terms that are linked with it so as to gain a clearer
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understanding of what is meant by the term (Beaney, 2003). This is a two phase 
process. The first phase, the 'analytic', begins with clarifying a collection of beliefs about 
what a stimulus is and removing any vagueness, imprecision, confusion and complexity 
(Hager, 2003). For example, the word 'stimulus' is linked with behaviourism and one 
task of the conceptual analysis is to show in what ways the use of stimuli within the 
context of philosophical inquiry in this thesis is different from behaviouristic approaches. 
It is also explained why the term stimuli should be nevertheless still used.
To understand the concept of stimulus it is necessary to study it through other key 
concepts that are linked with it. Apart from the explanation of what each concept means, 
it is also argued how these concepts interconnect and how their linking offers an 
understanding of the nature of the stimulus. The stimulus is approached as a form of 
engagement with individuals that leads to the development of forces of attraction or 
repulsion, and there is argumentation over the reasons of this approach. The 
conceptual analysis aims to describe the nature of these powers and the kind of 
engagement achieved.
The metaphorical use of words is also another instrument used by conceptual analysis 
to clarify further the concept of stimulus. The fitting of the concept 'stimulus' within the 
understanding of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life is 
also a task left to conceptual analysis. The use of Venn diagrams enables describing 
visually the different ways of engaging with a stimulus. Also, other diagrams enable the 
visualisation of the concepts connected with a stimulus.
After the analysis of what a stimulus is, there is a need for the reconstruction of the 
stimulus in terms of the results of its analysis which is a "constructive" and "synthetic" 
process (Hager, 2003). More specifically, in the synthetic phase, the elements of the 
original conceptual framework and the necessary vocabulary are defined, and through 
this the main tenets of the theory for the stimuli are deduced (Hager, 2003).
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Reflective practice
Philosophy, contrary to science, investigates nothing, if by investigation it is meant a 
deliberate process of gathering empirical data (Adler, 2004). The philosophical 
conceptual analysis is a deductive way to understand stimuli. However, achieving a 
better understanding of them is only possible if stimuli are not isolated from empirical 
use. Especially if the research tries to promote philosophy as a way of life, analysing 
stimuli and their nature without placing them into their everyday reality would be a 
methodological mistake. Even though this thesis does not aim at undertaking a large 
scale empirical research, it does, however, incorporate an element of praxis; some 
examples of the researcher's reflective practice which provide a richer illustration that 
either proves or disproves the previous conceptual analysis. My reflective practice 
focuses on three different parameters:
a) Observations and previous experience as a teacher in Greece
Before coming to the UK, I had been working as a teacher with children aged 4-6 at 
schools in Crete (2006-2007). Already familiar with philosophy for children, I had 
collected material from a variety of philosophical discussions with children's using 
various stimuli. Particularly, this material included:
o Spontaneous dialogues that emerged from children's experiences and stimuli 
that they brought into the discussions. These dialogues had been either 
recorded7 or written down immediately after they had taken place.
o Material produced by children such as picture-books and drawings which either 
inspired a philosophical discussion or were made by the children afterwards as a 
follow up activity.
o Photographs of children that I had taken during discussions and activities about 
stimuli.
7 As a teacher I used to ask from parents, in the beginning of each school year, their written permission to use children's 
photographs, drawings and material they produced along with recordings of the dialogues we had for research reasons.
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o Transcripts of children's dialogues and thoughts as they were expressed to me. 
Some of this material is included in Appendices 4 and 5. I often direct the reader to the 
appendices for more concrete examples that illustrate the theoretical arguments 
developed in this thesis.
I now look at this material differently in the light of my new gained insight and 
understanding of philosophy with children as a result of my readings, observations and 
practising of philosophy with children after I came to UK. Some of this material became 
particularly interesting for illustrating ideas about viewing philosophy as a way of life and 
appreciating the stimuli that emerged from children's own experiences. The aim of the 
analysis of the dialogues is to show how the discussion about certain stimuli taken from 
children's own experiences can stimulate children's philosophical thinking.
b) Conducting philosophical inquiries with children and adults using different 
stimuli
In order to test the impact that stimuli have on children and whether my conceptual 
analysis of stimuli stands to reason I used some of them in philosophical inquiries with 
groups of children or mixed groups of children and adults. Particularly, I conducted 
philosophical inquiries using a variety of picture-books with:
o Children aged 4-5 and children aged 9-10 at a local school in Cwmbran (South
Wales) once a week from March to May 2008 (2 different groups). 
o International students from the University of Wales, Newport once a week from
November 2008 to April 2009. 
o Children aged 8-10 at an after-school philosophy club at a local school in
Caerleon (South Wales) once a week from February to May 2009. 
o A mixed group of adults and children at a local library as a voluntary activity once
a week from January to May 2010.
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Philosophical inquiries were also conducted with first year undergraduate students from 
the Philosophy and Religious Studies department at the University of Wales, Newport 
once a week from October to April 2008-2009 and October 2010 to April 2011. Stimuli 
for these inquiries came from students' reflections on lectures on Ethics they were 
receiving.
Some of the dialogues were recorded, transcribed and analysed after asking permission 
of the teachers and the children's parents I collaborated with8 . The analysis of the 
dialogues aimed to show how the discussion about certain picture-books can enable 
children's philosophical thinking that is based on their critical thinking (e.g. reasoning, 
making judgements, giving examples and counter examples, giving definitions and 
clarifications), emotional thinking (e.g. being aware of their emotions when reasoning, 
caring for not insulting others with their contributions) and creative thinking (asking 
questions, generating new ideas, using words metaphorically etc).
I also kept a research logbook, completed immediately each inquiry had finished which 
contained:
o The questions that were raised and the one that had been selected for
philosophical discussion.
o Notes from each inquiry concerning the philosophical elements that emerged. 
o My observations and comments related to my understanding of children's
responses. 
o My pedagogical reflections on facilitation and critical commentary about my
selection of the stimulus.
This logbook has been an important source of data to inform my conceptual analysis of 
the nature and role of stimuli for inquiry. Extracts from my logbook have been included 
in this thesis and indicate my own progress and changed understanding of the role of 
stimuli when doing philosophy with children.
8 Please, see the appendix 9 for the ethical forms that the participants voluntarily completed.
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c) Experience from writing stories
Attending modules (writing fiction, advanced fiction and scriptwriting) from the creative 
writing course for undergraduate students at the University of Wales, Newport improved 
my English and offered me the opportunity of writing stories in English. Although writing 
stories is not a type of method, it seems as if a circular ongoing process has taken place 
which has enriched my understanding of what a stimulus is. The more I participated in 
the modules for creative writing, the better I understood the role of stimuli from the 
creator's point of view. Also, the better I understood the role of stimuli (through theory 
and practice), the better my stories became. As it will be shown in the following 
chapters, understanding that a good stimulus for doing philosophy should create 
catalepsy (a sense of grasping) with children enabled me to find ways of writing stories 
that can create such situations.
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Structure of my thesis
The first chapter introduces what I understand by 'philosophy'. Philosophy is primarily 
the activity of philosophising and not just an academic activity. It is suggested that the 
aim of philosophy is achieving eudemonia. Philosophy is understood as: a) a generative 
force, b) an evaluative force and c) a way of life. This chapter provides arguments that 
show to what extent philosophy is a generative and evaluative force and how it can be 
perceived as a way of life.
The second chapter is devoted to philosophy for/with children. It is divided into two 
parts. In the first part, there is an introduction to what philosophy for/with children is. 
There is also a discussion as to whether children can do philosophy and whether it is 
genuine philosophy. Philosophy with children is different from academic philosophy but 
despite the differences, I argue that it is still philosophy. I mostly support my ideas 
through a literature review drawing on publications located in the field of philosophy for/ 
with children. It is argued that there is not just one 'philosophy with children' but there 
are different approaches depending on their different philosophical underpinnings. To 
explain my position further, I refer to different possibilities of categorising philosophy 
with children, including my approach and approaches suggested by Maughn Gregory 
and Clinton Golding, both philosophers with a particular interest in philosophy with 
children. I argue that the latter models lack viewing philosophy for children from the 
children's point of view. In the second part of this chapter it is examined what a child is, 
and whether children and philosophy, as a generative and evaluative force and as a 
way of life, are compatible.
Chapter three is devoted to a literature review of various stimuli that have been used 
for doing philosophy with children. I divide them into two categories: a) those specially 
designed for doing philosophy with children, such as Lipman's novels and manuals and 
b) not specially designed P4C material, which can be textual (e.g. picture-books) or 
non-textual (e.g. works of art, pieces of music). The stimuli are compared with each
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other in terms of their strengths, weaknesses and points of discussion when doing 
philosophy with children, and it is examined whether the existing stimuli fit into the 
scheme of philosophy as a generative/ evaluative force and as a way of life. I argue that 
there is a relationship between the kind of stimuli (specially designed or not) and the 
facilitator's approach to what philosophy is and the pair of forces either of attraction or 
repulsion that is created between the stimuli and the teacher who selects them. The 
chapter ends by identifying the gaps in the literature review in dealing philosophically 
with questions that concern stimuli, such as what is the role of the stimulus, what makes 
a stimulus attractive to children and/or the teacher. I leave hints about the element of 
love towards the stimulus and the need of getting stimuli that come from children's 
everyday life and are linked to their own experiences.
In chapter four the nature of the stimulus is explained in a more pragmatic framework 
and distinguished from the way it is used in behaviouristic psychological theories (the 
dualistic model). The engagement of individuals with the stimulus generates forces of 
either attraction or repulsion towards the stimulus. I argue that people are in a state of 
cafa/epsyjust before the forces of the stimulus come into play. Catalepsy is understood 
as a sense of grasping and immediate perception of a situation. The metaphor that 
describes catalepsy best is Socrates' stingray. Catalepsy can lead the person either to 
Eros (love and attraction) or to Thanatos (repulsion and abandonment) towards the 
stimulus. The idea of Eros is further analysed conceptually by referring to other key 
concepts related to it, such as the sense of being hidden, the sense of desire and the 
sense of the lack of eudemonia. Finally, it is examined whether Eros and Thanatos, as 
forces, fit with the idea of philosophy as generative and evaluative forces and 
philosophy as a way of life. I offer reasons for why educators should use stimuli when 
doing philosophy with children and put forward the idea of the pedagogical triangle 
(stimulus, teacher/facilitator, and children).
In chapter five it is argued that the narrative structure of the stimulus and the narrative 
understanding of individuals' engagement with the stimulus is an important criterion to 
explore a stimulus philosophically. For the stimuli that are selected by the teacher and
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presented to the children, I argue that the narrative form of the stimuli can be further 
analysed into concrete characteristics that make them philosophically interesting. My 
investigation is focused on picture-books with many examples from books by Browne, 
Sendak, Tan, Popov and others. I identify as criteria the illustration of the book (use of 
shapes, colours and details), the text (use of metaphors, playing with the words) and the 
combination of text and illustration, and connect these with philosophy as a generative 
and evaluative force and as a way of life.
In chapter six, it is argued that Eros is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for a 
stimulus to be philosophically suitable. A stimulus should create moments of epiphany 
which are connected with the narrative structure of the stimulus and the narrative 
understanding of the individuals engaging with it. Then, I answer the question how 
stimuli and philosophy as a generative force link together. I explain what the 'opening' of 
a stimulus means and how it is linked with Eros, the moments of epiphany and, in 
general, with philosophy as generative force. I introduce zymotic (fermentative) listening 
as the main way of opening a stimulus. Listening zymotically is understood as a way of 
thinking. It requires listening creatively, critically and emotionally but it is more than the 
sum of its parts. It is a fermentative process in which the stimulus excites ideas in 
people's minds, then these ideas 'settle down', after which people are able to evaluate 
them and through this process of evaluation self-correct and therefore change. The 
stimuli play the role of the 'ferments'. I explore here the idea of naivety in approaching a 
stimulus and letting one's self open to the generation of new ideas resulting from this 
process. It is argued that zymotic listening can lead to developing creative attitudes, the 
use of creative techniques, the asking of questions, a metaphorical use of language and 
a building on each others' ideas. The latter making other ways possible of opening a 
stimulus up even further philosophically.
Chapter seven answers the question how stimuli and philosophy as an evaluative force 
link together. It is argued that there are two types of evaluations: a) about the stimulus 
and b) about the person (children or the teacher). The first type of evaluation refers 
mostly to the selection of the stimulus and what makes it go through a process of Eros
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or Thanatos, as explained in previous chapters. As for the second type of evaluation, 
through the stimulus the focusing 'in 1 and 'out' of individuals' thinking is enabled. The 
evaluation refers to the individuals' engagement with the stimulus which: a) enables the 
mapping of the individuals' experiences through his/her engagement with a stimulus, b) 
provokes emotions within the individual and, c) activates the individual's reflective 
thinking about the ideas generated which can possibly lead to self-correction and to 
applying philosophy in everyday life. An example has been taken up to illustrate the 
evaluative aspect found in stimuli. It exemplifies children's self-correction during a 
philosophical inquiry based on a stimulus that came from children themselves.
In chapter eight it is argued that philosophy as a way of life is possible if it is connected 
with human action and if it develops certain diatheses within people, such as being in 
Eros, being tolerant and open to something new and being in a state of alertness. It is 
claimed that stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of life if: a) they can create a 
sense of catalepsy that leads to Eros and to moments of epiphany, b) are connected 
with human's (and therefore children's) actions, and c) they enable the development of 
certain diatheses with the people involved (e.g. becoming tolerant and open). The last 
part of the chapter concentrates on how children's philosophies as a way of life are 
possible and includes examples which show that philosophy with children goes beyond 
the classroom.
Chapter nine of this thesis includes a sample of stories that I have written which 
attempted to combine literature with philosophy. The chapter focuses on how 
philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and philosophy as a way of life match 
with both my experience of writing stories and the content of the stories. This is 
illustrated by two examples of stories that concern the philosophical elements they 
contain and the impact they had on children when the stories were presented to them. 
The chapter ends with explaining how my stories fit into the field of philosophy with 
children and in what ways they are different from Lipman's material or from picture- 
books.
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Finally, chapter ten wraps up and critically reflects on the ideas of the whole thesis 
concerning its originality, its strong points, its limitations and the possible interest that 
could generate to particular groups of people. The thesis gives also directions for further 






The aim of this chapter is to set the framework of what I understand by philosophy. It 
will be argued that philosophy has generative and evaluative aspects meaningful if seen 
as a way of life that combines both theory with practical life. This will become the 
bedrock for the rest of the thesis which examines the role of stimuli when doing 
philosophy with children.
1.1. Introduction - What is philosophy?
Etymologically philosophy is a Greek compound word that comes from the words 'philo' 
(cpiAoc;) and 'sophia' (oocpia) and means 'love of wisdom'. It is difficult to reach a 
consensus in giving a definition of what is conceived as love of wisdom and therefore as 
philosophy. It is also difficult to agree on which is the best method of 'loving wisdom', or 
in other words what the necessary and sufficient conditions of the activity of 
philosophising are.
Much philosophical research is devoted to the reconstruction and critical commentary of 
the ideas of great philosophers. This is one aspect of philosophy which is mostly of a 
historical nature. The history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophy as it 
reflects on ways of philosophising in different periods of time and ways of making sense 
of the world, others and oneself. The reflective construction of the historic moments of 
philosophy as depicted in the texts of great philosophers, is what links philosophy with 
its historical tradition (Markis, 1996). Philosophy, however, should not restrict itself to 
the university classes of an elite group of people involved in a hermeneutic analysis of 
the ways of philosophising as they appear in such texts9 . Instead, more attention should 
be paid to how philosophy firstly began, as a way of making sense of human actions 
and the world we live in.
9 It should not also leave the door open to mystic, paranormal and other new age beliefs that are untested and not evaluated to 
replace philosophy (Barnes et al,2008). Barnes et all (2008) discuss their research about people's beliefs in paranormal ideas.
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People's actions include a series of incremental steps, each one being an event 
(Hornsby, 1980). The purpose of these events reflects a person's everyday philosophy. 
It answers the 'why' of an action. An action makes sense for a person when s/he knows 
why s/he chooses to do a certain action rather than another. Choosing means that the 
person is exposed to different alternatives and has the freedom to think first and then 
select one action from another. What makes an action meaningful is the underpinning 
philosophy that reflects the person's subconscious and conscious thinking.
My understanding of philosophy which I will follow throughout this thesis is threefold: 
Philosophy is viewed as a way of life 10 which has generative and evaluative aspects. 
Life is practical, as individuals have to deal with everyday procedures and take 
decisions, but it is also theoretical (e.g. when people think about how to improve their 
lives, imagine how life can be different, daydream and want to change the way things 
are). Practical and theoretical life merges together and often it is difficult to distinguish 
one from another. A mainly practical life can be mechanical and procedural. A mainly 
theoretical life is not realistic and can lead to isolation. Philosophy also has a theoretical 
and a practical side which is reflected in its generative and evaluative elements. It is 
through the generation of new ideas and their critical evaluation that philosophy 
becomes a theoretical way of life, but it is also in the same way that philosophy 
becomes a practical way of life. As with life, also these two forms of philosophy are 
merged together but they are both expressed through its generative and evaluative 
aspects.
The generative aspect of philosophy is what makes people wonder and ask 
philosophical questions and what allows them to enter others' 'worlds' (Brann, 1993). 
What, however, distinguishes philosophical questions from scientific ones? The
10 Socrates was the first who saw philosophy as a way of life and he took it to the extreme by preferring to end his life than living 
without practising philosophy with young people (Apology 28e4-29b1).
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questions scientists ask (excluding the procedural ones 11 ) arise from the practical need 
to answer the big questions that philosophy sets out. For example, cosmology's ultimate 
aim is to answer questions such as 'what is the universe?' or 'how and when did it 
begin?' which reflect people's curiosity about the origins of life. This is where philosophy 
begins; in wonder12 (Plato, Theatetus, 155d Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b12) - as a kind 
of perplexity about the world as it is and why it is. The first step is to realise our 
perplexity and form it as a question (Matthews, 2003a). This generative aspect of 
philosophy is important for giving inspiration and motivation for human action to take 
place13 . Science is an intentional human action that applies specific methods so as to 
answer philosophy's questions.
The second aspect of philosophy is the evaluative one that examines the truth and 
validity of human action (through science or not), whether this has been achieved and 
what should have been done differently. After the evaluation of an action, new questions 
will be generated and new human action will happen. This is an ongoing process where 
generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy follow each other generating human 
actions, evaluating them and leading to their progress. In practice, the generative and 
evaluative aspects of philosophy are merged together.
Philosophy as a generative and evaluative force has a final purpose; to give meaning to 
human action, and therefore life, and make people live in harmony with themselves and 
others in eudemoniau. Eudemonia is usually translated as happiness and flourishing, 
but it also refers to being at ease with one's conscience. It is a Greek compound word 
and etymologically comes from eu (=good) and daemon (=spirit, deity) which can be 
literary translated as keeping the daemons contented and peaceful. Throughout this
11 By procedural I mean questions that refer to particular methods or instruments that can be used instead of others so as to 
conduct a scientific research.
12 The Greek work that explains wonder is TO euuci^iv (to thaumazein) Plato, Theatetus, 155d Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b12)
13 It is obvious that basic needs such as having food come first in motivating human action. What philosophy does, however, is to 
enable the person be conscious and reflective of the action that has already been taken or will be taken in the future.
14 Aristotle in his Nicomahean Ethics (1095a15-22) understands eudaimonia as doing and living well which is the highest good (or 
virtue) for humans.
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thesis eudemonia is understood as 'being at ease' with the intrinsic 'daemons' which 
leads to a mental state of happiness and flourishing. Eudemonia is achieved by leading 
an examined way of life based on reflecting on the decisions made and the way one's 
life is conducted.
One may question why an unexamined way of life is not worth living 15 . Can one not 
philosophise and just live? What is wrong with a cat that lies on a comfortable sofa, the 
heating is on and a plate of food is waiting when she is hungry? Is it not a form of 
ewdemon/a16? It is also questionable whether an examined life is a more flourished life 
and whether philosophy can make one's life miserable instead.
As a response to the questions in the previous paragraph, it can be argued that the 
opposite to an examined life is living habitually without reflecting or discussing upon 
actions. This, h owever, m eans depriving ourselves from making choices based on 
reflecting critically on our life and changing it if necessary. It also means leaving 
ourselves exposed to influences or, even worse, manipulation by others and following 
their lifestyle without thinking whether this is morally or otherwise justifiable. Achieving 
eudemonia is possible by being able to examine life and choose between alternatives.
The generative part of philosophy is based on reflection and dialogue with others and it 
requires freedom to imagine, wonder, contemplate and question. Reflection can take 
the character of imagining, wondering and coming up with ideas. Dialogue is necessary 
in communicating these ideas with others and through it coming up with even more. The 
reason why we need others is that through dialogue with them we can: a) clarify or 
illuminate aspects of our unclear or opaque thinking by listening to what others think, b) 
help others understand themselves through what we say, c) create a new
15 There is a humorous dilemma about who is better off between a dissatisfied human and satisfied pig, and a dissatisfied Socrates 
and a satisfied fool (Mill and Sher, 2001).
16 We do not know what eudemonia for a cat is as we do not have access to a cat's internal thoughts and self examining. We 
cannot tell for sure if cats have thoughts and if so if their thinking system is similar to human's.
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understanding of things due to the combination of our different thoughts and d) plan 
action that benefits both parts and leads to better communication 17 .
The evaluative part of philosophy needs to be justified through the same methods, 
which are the reflective, self-corrective and dialogical processes. The reflection here 
does not refer only to a personal re-thinking of what we do. It is also considered as a 
'meta-stance' of our actions and our thoughts upon our actions. The Socratic model 
helps here to understand the philosophical dialogic process (philosophising) through the 
Elenchus™ and Plato's midwifery method. Wittgenstein is also helpful in understanding 
philosophy as an activity that clarifies what can and cannot be said through language 
(Hacker, 1986). Precision in what is said is the common ground between the two 
philosophers, even if explicated differently. Surely, Socrates did not reflect on language 
as something in between us as 'thinking beings' and reality. Like Wittgenstein, however, 
Socrates still craved for precision in his interlocutors, giving arguments to support their 
opinions, even if he never referred to precision in current linguistic terms.
The diagram below as shown in figure 1.1 summarizes the model of philosophy as a 
generative force, an evaluative force and as a way of life. The cogs show the 
interdependency between the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy with 
living philosophically. The reason that the 'philosophy as a way of life' cog is bigger than 
the others highlights the importance of connecting philosophy with people's everyday 
lives and experiences.
17 Plato wrote dialogues instead of philosophical texts so as to show the communicative character of philosophy in making 
meaning. Matthew Lipman's novels that are used in doing philosophy for children were inspired by Plato's dialogues and mainly 
consist of dialogues among the fictional heroes who are children.
18 Elenchus is a mode of argument for exposing inconsistency within the interlocutor's beliefs rather than an instrument which 
establishes an objective truth or falsehood of a statement (Vlastos,1982). The Elenchus proceeds as it follows: a) Socrates' 
interlocutor asserts p where p=what the interlocutor believes, b) Socrates tries to elicit the interlocutor's agreement over further 
premises, for instance q and r. c) Socrates, through questioning make the interlocutor agree that the premises q and r lead to not p, 





Philosophy as a 
way of life
Figure1.1: The Interdependence of the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy with living 
philosophically
1.2. Philosophy as generative force (creativity and imagination)
Is philosophy an imaginative process? An argument to support this is to investigate if 
the structure of our conceptual system is imaginative. This structure is reflected in 
language since language is used when we think. Therefore, if it is somehow proven that 
language has an imaginative structure, so does philosophy. Our conceptual system is 
highly metaphorical; the way we think and what we experience is, to a certain degree, a 
matter of the metaphors we use in our language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For 
instance, we tend to understand an argument in terms of war which is depicted in our 
language 19 ; we can actually 'win' or 'lose' an argument, 'attack' an argument or have an 
'indefensible' argument (see: Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.4). What a metaphor (or a 
simile or an analogy) does, according to Richards (1936), is to link a topic and a vehicle 
through a common ground. The topic is what the metaphor is about, the vehicle is the 
means by which the speaker refers to the topic and the ground is the sum of possible
19 Another impressive example is that we use spatial prepositions in a very metaphorical way. For instance, conscious is up while 
unconscious is down (up already/ fell asleep), more is up while less is down (e.g. my income rose last year/ the number of errors he 
made is incredibly low), good is up while bad is down (e.g. things look up/ things are at all time low) and so on (Lakoff and 
Johnson,1980, p.15-17).
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attributes shared by the topic and vehicle (Williams, 2002). In the sentence "This 
argument is demolished", the topic is the argument, the vehicle is the demolishing and 
the ground is what the attributes 'argument' and 'demolishing' have in common (e.g. 
falling down).
These metaphors can be used as a vehicle20 for us to transfer from one domain of 
knowledge to another. Metaphors do not teach us anything new, they just illuminate in a 
different way something that we already knew, and make us therefore think differently 
about the object of our thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Owen, 2001). The 
effectiveness of a metaphor depends on how convincing the criteria of similarity among 
the things under comparison are. Philosophy also uses metaphors, similes and myths to 
create meaning which is an imaginative process. Plato's cave simile, Socrates' role as 
midwifery, stingray and gadfly21 , Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box and philosophical 
illness22 , Thomas Reid's botanic or mineralogical model as similes of moral thought23 
and Richard Rorty's mirror, are some well known metaphors through which meaning is 
created and better understanding achieved. Metaphors create images and they serve to 
penetrate deeper into the reality of experience and a sense of profound depth that 
sometimes is not described by words (Gregory, 1995). Imagining Socrates as a 'gadfly' 
(as in Plato's Apology) enables someone to achieve a better understanding of Socrates' 
role in his society as the one who: managed to keep the others alert, was continually 
'buzzing' and trying to extract philosophical truths from the others - in sum, disturbing 
others like a gadfly. Similes and metaphors can be used as stimuli for further 
imaginative thinking, which could give birth to a new understanding of the world, us and 
others.
20 The sentence here uses already the metaphor of a vehicle!
21 In Plato's Theatetus, Socrates describes his method and himself as the one who practises it as midwifery. Applying this 
metaphor to the teacher is the one who enables children to give birth to the truth. In Plato's Meno the metaphor used for Socrates is 
the Stingray (79e-80d). Applying this to the teacher, he is the one who numbs everybody including himself (Murris,2009). Finally, 
Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as gadfly, the one who stirs up people(30e).
22 Curtis (1993) has used this metaphor so as to investigate whether philosophy for children is a kind of philosophy that 
Wittgenstein would accept. What Curtis achieves with his article is to highlight the generative aspect of philosophy. A new 
understanding of philosophy with children is achieved when it is examined by wearing the glasses of Wittgenstein's approach of 
what is philosophy.
23 For more analysis, see Pritchard, 1993.
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There are also other arguments to support the imaginative character of philosophy. How 
new thinking is generated is a mystery. How can we imagine something that does not 
yet exist? Langer, as quoted by George Kneller, claims that "suddenly we see things 
that were already there" (1965, p.6). We have called it creativity, imagination, 
enlightenment, 'eureka' moments and illumination, but still it is not explained how this 
change in thinking happens. How did Friedrich Kekule reflect on his dream about the 
snake that seizes its tail24 and applied it to chemical chains which opened the road to 
aromatic chemistry that did not exist before? How did Marie Curie discover Radium? 
What these people seem to have in common is that they all worked hard on their 
subject, were well informed and open to stimuli that could make them think 
imaginatively. A human's mind does not simply store facts, but in a complex way 
memories, information, emotions and intentions curl around a new fact, they blend and 
merge together making and breaking connections until something new is generated 
(Egan, 1992). It is like a fermentative process where some basic ingredients merge 
together but their final product is different from the total sum of all the ingredients 
together25 . The more exposed people are to stimuli and information (which prevents 
ignorance), the more are the chances for thinking creatively and imaginatively (Egan, 
1992). What philosophy as a generative process really does is to rearrange ideas by 
using reason and 'staying within the cultural box' (Haynes, 2005, p.85).
24 The dream of a snake seizing its own tail helped Kekule discover the Benzene molecule in which organic compounds have a 
circular rather than a linear structure. That's how Kekule describes his dream: 'During my stay in Ghent, I lived in elegant bachelor 
quarters in the main thoroughfare. My study, however, faced a narrow side-alley and no daylight penetrated it....I was sitting writing 
on my textbook, but the work did not progress; my thoughts were elsewhere. I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again the 
atoms were gambolling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered 
more acute by the repeated visions of the kind, could now distinguish larger structures of manifold conformation; long rows 
sometimes more closely fitted together all twining and twisting in snake-like motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had 
seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke; and this time also I 
spent the rest of the night in working out the consequences of the hypothesis'. Rothermich, M and Zipprich, N. NO DATE. Friedrich 
August Kekule:A Scientist and Dreamer. http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/chemistry/institutes/1992/Kekule.htm. Accessed on 
01/08/2010.
25 There is a great variety of interpretation of humans' creativity and below I give some examples: Plato in Ion traces inspiration- 
imagination to an external, divine source. Immanuel Kant (1911) links creativity with genius and claims that it cannot be taught 
because it is unpredictable. Charles Darwin understands creativity as an evolutionary force (Michalko, 1998) and as a cosmic force 
(Whitehead, 1929).
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Philosophy sets the broad question 'what is a child?' Branches of science such as 
psychology, education, medicine and sociology separate this big question into pieces 
that can be empirically tested. The questions that remain unanswered by science are 
either nonsense, poetical or philosophical. Unanswered questions show the boundary of 
our knowledge. Our imagination is what pushes this boundary further. This imagination 
can either be nonsense when, for instance, it asks questions that do not make sense 
(e.g. 'Does the child need a lolomor to exist?' makes no sense because 'lolomor' is a 
made up word with no meaning26), are poetic (e.g. the question 'Oh, child how many 
times have you crawled towards the paths of neglect?' does not make sense but it can 
possibly create an aesthetic or imaginative response) or philosophical (e.g. 'What 
makes this child a child?'). From this point of view it appears that philosophy, at least for 
its question generating aspect, is an imaginative process. Philosophical questions show 
which answers do not exist (yet).
The normative character of philosophy can be imaginative. The 'ought' and 'should' 
questions or statements that philosophy sets are normative. Philosophy suggests how 
things should be (e.g. how we should live). 'Should' depends on what is considered as 
ideal and according to this 'ideal', how people 'should' act. However, the ideal is not 
experienced. One imagines what is ideal therefore the 'should' comes from the 'territory' 
of imagination. What a 'should - statement' does, is to put imagination in a reasoned 
frame. 'Should-statements' shape logically the ideal that comes from the realm of 
imagination.
Furthermore, when a person thinks of something for the first time, s/he creates the logic 
of thinking about it (Paul, 1993). Aristotle's Organon, which explains the different ways 
of deductive reasoning, was first of all a creative and imaginative task. It was Aristotle 
who imagined new assumptions and questioned differently the modes of thinking and
26 In this example, the word 'lolomor' could have a meaning if, for instance, it was a code name to refer to something else we would 
not like other people to fully understand. Therefore, it depends on the context a word appears within and the agreements that have 
been done over its meaning.
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their evaluation afterwards and finally came up with his Aristotelian logic. Similarly, it 
can be argued that morals are, to an extent, imaginative as a person needs first to 
imagine the consequences of his/her actions and then act morally (Tompkins, 2009). 
Even though the imagination of others is insufficient for being a moral agent, it is the 
first step towards recognising the presence of others in our decision making.
Philosophy is situated at the boundaries of thinking, because it either creates questions 
or evaluates the action already taken and generates again further questions. What 
'punches holes' into the boundaries and allows something new (or a new rearrangement 
of existing ideas) to occur is not explained yet, maybe because it comes from what 
people have not yet thought of, or is nonsense. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tr. 7) said that 
people must pass over those things we cannot speak of as they belong to the world of 
the mystic or silent. However, imagination is the way to allow part of the world of silence 
to speak for itself. Imagination is the key to transcend conventional ideas (Egan, 1992). 
Kieran Egan argues that "accepting conventional representations is to fail to make 
knowledge one's own, is to keep it inert rather than incorporate it into one's life" (Egan, 
1992, p. 48). Therefore philosophy as a generative force is not only the key to moving 
beyond what is known, but to make what is to be investigated as part of our life. As 
Felicity Haynes puts it:
It is the struggle between reason and imagination to present the 
unpresentable, something that exists just outside the boundaries of 
knowledge (Haynes, 2005, p.88).
Philosophy does so not only by pushing our thinking, but also our emotions27 to the 
boundaries.
Philosophy as a method, reflective or dialogical has an imaginative character. It can be 
argued that all the paths of human's thinking are "generally possible, but not all are 
equally probable" (Davies, 1980, p.32). The very imaginative ideas that cannot be 
somehow accommodated and assimilated with existing knowledge may be left out as
27 Schertz (2007) argues that an effective systematic pedagogical approach to educating for empathy should be based on dialogue 
and should allow the sharing of affective states among the peers.
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ideas 'not equally probable' to happen. Philosophy is the one that creates these ideas 
as a generative force and evaluates them afterwards. Philosophy examines whether it is 
possible to describe reality; it has, therefore, a 'meta-stance' element as it accepts that 
making meaning is a human endeavour. Perceiving reality and reality itself are not 
necessarily the same things (Rorty, 1980). In the first case reality is filtered through the 
person who perceives it (for instance philosophy reflects on the language people use 
when they think about reality) and in the second case, reality is as it is without human's 
involvement28 (this means that reality in an objective way can be an 'it is' or 'it is not' but 
we can never know for certain) (Powell,1998). What people understand as reality is 
what they imagine reality to be. This is partly achieved through people's reflection, 
which is a method of philosophy. The different reflective processes show the different 
imaginative ways people have to understand things in reality.
The dialogical method of philosophy requires imagination to think of other possible ways 
of understanding something. The way we listen is the first step for creative thinking. 
According to Gemma Corradi Fiumara (1995), listening is thinking29 . It is, what she calls, 
"the other side of language" (Fiumara, 1995). In order to philosophise, one needs to 
'listen' to oneself as part of reflection and to others. The listening indicated here is both 
creative and critical. It is creative thinking because it enables people to link each others' 
ideas together and produce new ones, and critical because people need to listen well 
and evaluate what they have listened to. These aspects are merged together in a 
process of fermentation that enables the person to listen creatively to themselves and to 
others, evaluate what has been listened to and take decisions that lead to actions. In 
other words, fermentation of the creative ideas in people's minds and their evaluation 
afterwards leads to developing a better thinking over time.
28 There is a big debate whether'thinking' can be an object of our thinking. Post-modernism rejects the possibility of'thinking' as an 
object of our thinking because we already use our thinking to describe what thinking is. We cannot get out of our thinking
(Powell,1998)
29 According to Piaget (1929) children in their first stage of thinking development usually answer that they think with the mouth and 
the ears. It is fascinating how Fiumara's philosophy of listening as thinking is so close to children's perceptions which Piaget would 
dismiss as not philosophical at all.
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Understanding others involves a degree of 'getting into someone else's shoes'. Since 
we can never be literally someone else, what remains to us is, through dialogue, 
imagining how things could be from a different perspective. This is what Hall, quoted in 
Gregory (1995, p.38), names as "imaginative representation", referring to the fact that to 
communicate our different experiences of reality we need to have somehow the same 
intuition over what we describe, so as to achieve mutual understanding. For example, 
when we compare two things as similar we do not base this on an objective 
characteristic, but on the fact that both people who are involved in the discussion will be 
able to see things from a similar point of view.
When we exchange ideas, the different philosophies people bring to their ideas and 
actions need to be 'bridged' - what Splitter and Sharp (1995) call "translation". In our 
efforts to communicate we try to find common understandings and common contexts. 
It's not only important how metaphors, analogies or similes are used, but also in which 
context. It is possible that the use of words is different in different environments. For 
instance, we use words sometimes in different environments than where we find these 
words traditionally. It is as if you move an armchair from the sitting room to the kitchen 
and expect from it to play the same role (Baker and Hacker, 1983; Warburton, 1992). 
What would happen if the same armchair was moved to a museum and from an 
everyday used object, it turned into something for an exhibition? It is a traditional 
philosophical mistake to think that words have the same connotation, in all contexts, 
everywhere, without taking into consideration connotations changing according to the 
environment each word is used in (Baker and Hacker, 1983, 229). That's where logic 
and imagination meet. We first try to imagine what the other says to us and then 
through critical analysis we explore the logical implications of someone's philosophy 
and assess its truth and value, which results in a rejection or acceptance of a new idea. 
This linking of ideas and making sense of different philosophies is one of the 
imaginative aspects of philosophy. Rorty (1989) claims that imagining what others say is 
also a matter of idiosyncrasy and how similar idiosyncrasies people who exchange their 
ideas have is required to understand each other.
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Each person, through reflecting creatively and critically can create other logical possible 
thinking worlds (1 st level). Each individual, within a philosophical community of inquiry, 
can communicate his/her thinking worlds with others. By exchanging, and constructing 
new ideas other possible worlds may be created (2nd , 3 rd ...nth level). The more people 
are participating, the more complex the representation of the different thinking worlds 
created is. This process takes time and may lead to the transformation or the 
reconstruction of the actual world (Pickard, 1979). Creativity is both a process and a 
product. However, the creative process does not necessarily guarantee the creative 
product (Pickard, 1979).
1.3. Philosophy as an evaluative force
Philosophy as a generative force enables people to wonder and come up with new 
ideas and questions, but lacks evaluation. It does not tell us whether a question has an 
answer, whether this answer is true and/or can be applied. Philosophy as an evaluative 
force does not necessary lead to what is correct but shows the way of how to argue 
about it and how to distinguish among answers that are more defensible than others 
(Glaser, 2007). This is how people become more conscious about their justification and 
making of decisions. The better (in moral terms) the decisions one makes, the more of 
an impact they have on people's lives (Borg, 1994). This is one way the evaluative 
aspect of philosophy has a practical impact on people's everyday lives; it enables 
people to examine their life and make it more meaningful. As Borg (1994) argues the 
criteria for evaluation are subject to how people conceive reality31 .
The accumulation of different information seems to be one step to understanding more 
an action or thought. However, this does not mean that the action or thought is 
necessarily true. Meaningfulness and truth are not necessarily identical; what is true 
may be meaningless and what is untrue may be meaningful (e.g. telling a lie can be 
meaningful if this lie prevents somebody from committing suicide). Communicating with
31 A good summary of this concerns Truth theories' (pragmatist, coherence, correspondence, redundancy, semantic theory) and 
how one's perception of truth influences the way one thinks and makes judgements (Borg, 1994).
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each other and exchanging different empirical truths may lead individuals to find what is 
mutually true, even if only temporarily the case. A certain degree of agreement is 
required even when disagreeing. Gareth Matthews observes that "one cannot do 
philosophy with someone whose concepts and belief system one does not share-at 
least in substantial part" (Matthews, 1993, p. 159).
Reflective or meta-cognitive thinking, as it is sometimes called, is "thinking about 
thinking"32 and has its roots in John Dewey's philosophy. According to Dewey, reflective 
thinking is an "active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed 
form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support knowledge" (1933, p. 118). 
Reflective thinking seems to be a critical movement that a person consciously does 
when s/he deliberately or persistently holds back and thinks carefully again about 
his/her own or somebody else's thinking with the aim to evaluate it. It interconnects all 
the other thinking skills33 (such as giving reasons, listening to others, asking for 
evidence, offering examples) and makes them meaningful (Splitter and Sharp, 1995). It 
also checks the validity, function and accuracy of the thinking skills, including the 
identification of the assumptions and premises they are based on (Laverty and Gregory, 
2007; Gregory, 2004; 2006). If reflective thinking does question such assumptions then 
it opens up a space for correction and improvement. It can lead to self-correction which 
is part of the evaluative role of philosophy: when it seeks to examine the nature of 
thinking, especially when it includes matters of judgements or decision-making with the 
ultimate aim of a quest for meaning.
Reflective thinking is evaluative but not necessarily self-corrective and does not indicate 
that a person either alone or as a member in a community of inquiry34 has to change
32 Daniel et al (2005) understand self-corrective thinking as a metacognitive thinking where one express a statement of changing 
perspective. Splitter and Sharp (1995) analyse in great detail the idea of self-corrective thinking.
33 A well known example of organizing thinking skills is Bloom's taxonomy. According to Bloom critical thinking is hierarchically 
structured at different levels. A person first learns (knowledge) then understands (comprehension), applies what have learnt 
(application), analyse (analysis) what learned into parts -premises and synthesizes (synthesis) into a whole and finally evaluates 
what has been learnt (evaluation) (Bloom,1956). The final stage of Bloom's taxonomy, the evaluation equates to reflective thinking.
34 Community of inquiry was introduced by Charles Pierce in the context of science as an ideal community of researchers who if 
infallible they would agree, through inquiring, on what is true. Dewey (1938) introduced this idea in the context of education.
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necessarily his or her mind. It seems that reflective thinking is a broader term when 
compared to self-corrective thinking. If a person holds the same views after being 
exposed to different ways of thinking, this does not mean that the person is necessarily 
rigid or unwilling to listen to alternative points of view and change. S/he may have 
reflected but simply did not find that the alternative views are more convincing than the 
previous ones s/he had.
Reflecting on "reflecting on reflection" as a meta-cognitive activity is just nonsense as it 
does not serve people to find what is true and meaningful in their lives. Wittgenstein 
would add here that the wrong use of everyday language can lead to the creation of 
philosophical problems that are like a disease and serve no meaning. Reflecting on 
questions such as "what is truth" or "what is 'is'" is meaningless. Such questions, often 
seen as fundamental philosophical problems are for Wittgenstein not philosophical 
problems at all; they lack meaning and are nonsense. According to the early 
Wittgenstein, the bad use of language can create pseudo-philosophical questions35 . 
Most of the sentences of philosophy are products of philosophers' inability to 
understand the logic of language (Tr. 4.003).
Through reflection one should purify words from anything metaphysical (P.I. 119) which 
is what we lack and that's why we use mistakenly words in a nonsensical way (P.I., 
122). It seems to me that Wittgenstein's main purpose of philosophy has a 'negative' 
character: it is to clarify what cannot be said through language. Philosophy, through 
reflection can get rid of grammatical confusions and the misuse of words (P.I. 90). This 
is where Wittgenstein and the Socratic 'Elenchus' could have something in common. 
Even though Socratic philosophy does not have a linguistic focus like Wittgenstein's 
philosophy, they both care about what meaningfully can be said. Socrates Elenchus has 
a 'negative' character too. Through reasoning people get rid of their false beliefs and 
when purified they are free to partake in dialogue and find out what is true.
35 Philosophy should not also make its own languages as Rudolf Carnap, and logico-positivist philosophers (Vienna Circle) would 
agree, as it is another way to create pseudo-philosophical problems instead of trying to solve the ones that already exist.
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What is challenging here is to combine a more pragmatic approach about self- 
correction with the Socratic Method as a way of enabling the evaluative role of 
philosophy. Firstly, Socrates reassures that philosophising is for everybody, not just an 
elite minority. According to Socrates (Apology, 29d-30a), the only restrictions for 
somebody to attend a philosophical discussion is that they speak the same language 
and start the conversation from real beliefs instead of just an hypothesis (Vlastos, 1996; 
Gorgias, 500b; Plato, Crito, 49d). Starting from real beliefs36 serves in: a) finding good 
reasons to support these beliefs and convince others of their truth, and b) changing our 
beliefs when there are good reasons for doing so and therefore changing ways of 
looking at things or living, as knowledge and praxis are connected (Vlastos, 1996). This 
Socratic idea can be connected with American Pragmatism and particularly with the 
ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. The later regard knowledge as the product of 
construction and of agreement between people (who create a research community of 
inquiry) based on people's justified beliefs through experimentation and observation 
(knowledge as warranted assertability37). However, this knowledge is only temporary 
and can change when different data prove to be more applicable and suitable for certain 
situations. One substantial difference between Socrates and the American 
Pragmatists38 refers to what is considered as truth. For the Pragmatists, truth is an 
agreement on something between the people who agreed upon it. For Socrates, truth is
36 Sophists claimed that there are only opinions that can change - knowledge is not possible. Socrates, did not agree with the 
checking of a mere hypothesis if it lacks interest because it does not reflect how people act (Protagoras, 333b8-c9). He believed that 
knowledge is possible only if we have a method and both interlocutors seek what is true for both them and the others. («Koivov yap 
EUOIVE SOKET Kdi h,uTv eTvai ayaSov TOUTO» Plato, Phaedo 63d 1).
37 Warranted assertability' is a term introduced by Dewey to indicate the conditions under which a belief can be checked as true 
through constant self-correcting process of a group of people (who ideally should be infallible) that consist a community of inquiry. 
Knowledge is gained by relating logic with experience (Blackburn, 2008). More can be found about children's communities of 
inquiries in Dewey,1990 and Dewey,1965.
38 (American) Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that was taken up by Charles Sander Peirce, William James and later on by 
John Dewey who transformed it further. The main idea of pragmatism is that 'efficacy in practical application - the issue of 'which 
works out most effectively'- somehow provides a standard for the determination of truth in the case of statements, Tightness in the 
case of action and values in the case of appraisals' (Honderich, 1995). A belief is true if the belief works satisfactorily in the widest 
sense of the world. Truth is temporary, susceptible to change and not final.
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the anamnesis39 of what the soul knew but forgot upon its birth. Through testing and 
examining people's beliefs, people can find truth again40 . What comes from the 
combination of Pragmatism and Plato's epistemology is that one needs to know, even 
temporary, what is true in order to be able to act upon it. However, this should not stop 
the examination of what is considered as truth.
Socratic questioning or 'Elenchus' is a way of checking people's claims to his/her 
knowledge on a subject or concept as part of the evaluative role of philosophy. Let's 
take as an example Plato's 'Euthyphro' dialogue to see how Elenchus works in practice. 
Euthyphro took his father to court with the charge that he did not take care for his 
workers and that therefore an accident had occurred. The dialogue is about "what is 
piety?" The Socratic Elenchus has the following steps: Euthyphro is asked to give a 
definition which reflects his belief of what piety is. The first definition that Euthyphro 
offers is rejected by Socrates as it is only an example of piety (5d). Euthyphro agrees 
that piety is what is pleasing to the gods (6e-7a). After Socrates ensures that Euthyphro 
fully agrees with his statement he starts arguing that there are premises Euthyphro did 
not take into account which contradict his own definition so Euthyphro needs to refine 
his definition again and agrees that 'What all the gods love is pious, and what they all 
hate is impious' which makes Socrates ask "Is that which is holy loved by the gods 
because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by gods?" (10a). Euthyphro tries to 
support himself providing counter arguments which are false until he needs to change 
again his definition and finally quit as he has another appointment!
The Elenchus as a method is helpful to make sure that everyone understands, to a 
certain extent, what is meant with a particular concept. Another example of Elenchus is 
found in Plato's Meno, where a slave boy with Socrates help presents the Pythagorean 
Theorem. Wittgenstein's philosophy is different from Plato's as he believes that the
39 Plato starts his theory of anamnesis in Meno (86b) and develops it further in Phaedo. He understands the soul as immortal that is 
continuously incarnated. The soul as incarnated, after birth, forgets the knowledge she had in its immortal state. Knowledge is the 
result of the incarnated soul's anamnesis (recollection) of its previous immortal state.
40 Socrates' midwifery enables people's soul remember the knowledge they already knew but had forgotten (Meno, 82b-85e). The 
theory of anamnesis as a way of acquiring knowledge is mostly developed in Plato's Phaedo (72e-77a).
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meaning of a concept depends on the context in which it is used (P.I. 43). The process 
of Elenchus, however, could be used as a way of checking people's use of language, 
even if its result would not be an absolute and unchangeable truth as Plato would have 
regarded it. Elenchus generates perplexity and perplexity is a useful instrument as it 
helps clarify the language we use in our thinking and communications (Plato, Sophist 
229e-230e). Perplexity is not just an 'obstacle' that does not allow us to understand 
something; it is also the starting point to seek solutions (Matthews, 2003a). Through the 
Socratic Elenchus (especially if done within a community of people so that each can 
learn from the way others think) people realise the implicit beliefs or prejudices they 
bring to their understanding of a concept. Being aware of the shortcomings of thinking 
and making an effort to ameliorate them, makes communication with others possible.
In what ways can the Elenchus process be linked with the evaluative aspect of 
philosophy applied in educational practice? The psychological part of the Socratic 
Elenchus needs to be taken into serious consideration, and the educational challenge is 
to create an environment in which people's beliefs can be explored rigorously without 
people feeling offended. The feeling of 'being numbed', after 'being touched by a 
stingray41 ', may discourage children from expressing their ideas at all out of fear that 
they are seen to have got 'it' wrong. It can also discourage teachers as they may find it 
difficult to deal with the cognitive uncertainty (Haynes, 2008) and the fear of not being in 
control of the content of a philosophical discussion (Haynes and Murris, 2008). This is 
especially important in an educational system that focuses on right answers instead of 
presenting and representing knowledge as an ongoing process constantly open to 
revision (Haynes and Murris, 2008). As Albert Kelly (1995) highlights, rationalism 
belongs to the past and with it the certainty of knowledge: both adults and children need 
to learn to live in conditions of uncertainty and change and cope with it. The problem is 
that if the Elenchus causes greater perplexity, then how can children and teachers find 
a way to solve their perplexity? On the other hand, Matthews (2003a, pp.53-55) 
wonders "if they know how to find their way to solve their perplexity, are they really 
perplexed?"
41 For stingray metaphor see page 36 and footnote 21
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The acknowledgement of emotions as modes of people's thinking and means of 
evaluating situations (Solomon, 1993; Nussbaum, 1990) can be connected with the 
Socratic Method. In order to achieve eudemonia in a constantly changing world people 
need to think well. However, thinking well includes being able to sense situations and 
taking the morally right decisions. Being emotionally sensitive is another way of 
evaluating situation, solving conflicts, and understanding others. This is what Daniel 
Goleman (1996) defines as "emotional intelligence". Emotions are linked with everyday 
reality and are part of how people experience and evaluate the world. Taking emotions 
into consideration could 'update' the Socratic Elenchus in the pursuit of self-correction 
and the process of understanding others and their motives. Evaluating the philosophical 
quality of a dialogue is not only checking for the correct use of arguments, but as Thecla 
Rondhuis claims "philosophy is open to all attacks from the rational as well as from 
passion, astonishing, and imparting a degree of spiritual and intellectual uncertainty to 
the researcher" (2007, p. 17).
1.4. Philosophy as a way of life
Who would be interested in a philosopher who claimed that philosophy had nothing to 
do with life? (Romano, 2000). The generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy help 
people in how they think, speak and communicate through dialogue. This theoretical 
aspect of both generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy I will link with how to live 
one's life. Philosophy should not be practised merely for its own sake otherwise it 
becomes one more activity that only sharpens people's thinking skills (Ennis, 2001). 
Philosophy as a way of life is something more than the sum total of the evaluative and 
generative aspects of philosophy.
Since philosophy is the love of wisdom, philosophy as a way of life entails the seeking 
of wisdom. Philosophy as a way of life is not simply a theory but "a unitary act, which 
consists in living logic, physics, and ethics" (Hadot, 1995, p.267). The person who
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desires to acquire wisdom does not already possess wisdom, as s/he is not a sage42 
(Hadot, 1995). In philosophy as a way of life, the search for wisdom is not for the sake 
of knowledge as a theory but for the sake of improving oneself and one's everyday life 
and achieving eudemonia. What makes the philosopher different from others is that s/he 
intentionally justifies her/his experience. S/he lives and at the same time reflects on 
her/his life. As Hadot puts it:
It is the love of this wisdom, which is foreign to the world that makes the 
philosopher a stranger in it (Hadot, 1995, p.57).
How would life be if we all tried to live philosophically? People would:
o act more meaningfully for themselves and towards others,
o be ready to consider other alternatives or imagining new ones and act upon
them, 
o realise that cooperating and sharing with others and the environment is the best
way to ensure well being, 
o become more caring and concerning towards ourselves and others by being
more tolerant and sensitive to what is different to us; 
o develop their higher order thinking43 which would enable them to see the logical
links between generating ideas and reflecting on them (Paul, 1992); 
o be constantly, as Pierre Hadot (1995, p.270) states in a state of 'becoming 1 and
committed to change instead of sticking rigidly to fixed ideas.
Philosophy as a way of life is part of human's experiences. According to Dewey, 
experience is "the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and 
environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into 
participation and communication" (Dewey, 2005, p.22). These two aspects can come to
42 Diotima in Plato's Symposium, claims that wisdom is not a human state, but only divine as it is a state of perfection. Therefore, 
the person is in a state of progress towards acquiring wisdom and in a state of becoming.
43 Higher order thinking is a complex thinking that consists of being able to think critically, creatively and also caringly towards the 
others (Lipman,2003). Higher order thinking is systematic from the point of view that the person's mind does not think aimlessly 
wasting its energy. On contrary, the person becomes aware of the critical and creative dimensions of his/her thinking and makes an 
effort to improve them (purposeful thinking) (Paul,1993; Paul,1992).
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light through philosophy and art; through living an experience and then reflecting upon it 
and making it something valuable and distinguished. Dewey claims that:
Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature 
and environing condition is involved in the very process of living. Under 
condition of resistance and conflict, aspects and elements of the self and 
the world that are implicated in this interaction qualify experience with 
emotions and ideas so that conscious intent emerges (2005, p.36).
This means that from the whole of experience people have as living creatures, there are 
parts that can be separated out as distinct events that have physical, emotional and 
intellectual impact. These moments of experience appear as the result of different 
emotions and thoughts that act as forces of resistance and conflict. Philosophising is 
what unifies these forces and makes people understand parts of their experience as 
particularly meaningful to them. In other words, philosophy enables people to become 
conscious of their life experiences as a series of what is done and what has been 
undergone (Dewey, 2005). Art is a way of depicting this consciousness and 
transforming it into something new, which can become a new experience.
Contrary to Plato, who believed that knowledge is fixed and unchanged44 (Theory of 
Forms45), knowledge can be understood as a temporary human construction that
44Platonic philosophy aims at the critique of falsity. Plato distinguishes the world (cosmos) into two levels: a) the world of senses 
which is changeable and b) the world of ideas which is stable- fixed- unchangeable. According to Plato the world of senses is not 
true («ra aiaSrvra ovra TaAavTEuovrai UETQ^U TOU uq OVTOC; KQI TOU 6vioq» Republic,479c-d). On the other hand ideas are eternal and 
unchanged by time and space. For everything that is found in the world of senses (idols) there is a true idea of it in the world of 
forms- ideas. For Plato, philosophy is the seeking of truth. Plato elaborates on the etymology of the word truth (aletheia) («a» 
OTEpr|TiK6 + «Ar|9r|»/ a + lethe), according to which aletheia means the uncovering of lethe (oblivion). Psyche in Plato does not 
create ideas but discovers them because of the world of senses. The things of our sense are the reflections of the eternal ideas that 
belong in the world of forms. If psyche discovers the ideas through their reflection on the world of senses, then psyche already 
"knows" a priori of these ideas, so it can recognise them through their reflection on the world of senses. Plato claims that the psyche 
remembers the ideas when it recognises their reflections on the world of senses (anamnesis theory). According to Plato, psyche 
was in the beginning up in the heavens when it came to know the real beings- ideas (world of forms). After birth, psyche was 
captured in a human body and forgot the real things- forms of the world of forms- ideas. This oblivion was consolidated due to the 
false impressions of the world of senses. Due to the fact that the real ideas- forms are forgotten, psyche considers as real ideas the 
world that is perceived through the senses.
45 Plato in Meno and Phaedo refers to his theory of forms in many Socratic Dialogues. Plato also discusses the discovery or 
"recollection" of knowledge that is hidden in soul. In Republic Plato develops his theory further. In Book III 402a-403e the education
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changes as humans are in constant interaction with their social and natural environment 
(Dewey, 1981). In this case truth is not discovered once and for all. What is true does 
not refer only to us but also to others as we are not alone in this world, but in a constant 
interaction with others and the broader environment. In order to communicate we need 
to find truths in common and vice versa. To find truths in common, we need to 
communicate and dialogue with each other. Human beings are fallible. This is because: 
a) they have not reached a consensus on what is true and b) they cannot know the 
consequences of their actions. What is considered as truth for a person or for a group of 
people in a certain historical period may change after further information, dialogue and 
reflection and then ceases to be true. This is especially the case with truths that comes 
to us subjectively, intuitively or empirically. As for logical truth, it seems that it is not 
fallible as it reflects the logical structure of our thinking. It is, however, a human 
construction and if humans are fallible, then so are their constructions. Philosophy as a 
way of life has the character of a constant conceptual search of what is true, even 
temporarily. It also involves acting upon it and evaluating the action in terms of its truth 
and its updated validity.
Human life can be defined as the timeline between one's birth and death (Kazantzakis, 
1960). Philosophy does not change this process. What philosophy as a way of life can 
change is the attitude ('diathesis') one has towards this timeline. This diathesis can refer 
either to setting aims or fulfilling them so as to achieve eudemonia. Life by itself is not 
meaningful. It is not even a sequence of facts. People are the ones who understand it 
as a sequence of facts (e.g. being born, going to school, finding a job, and getting 
married) and an evaluation of these facts which is reflected in the narrative structuring 
of people's experience. People understand and explain their experiences in terms of a 
narrative with a beginning, middle and end. What philosophy as a way of life can offer to 
people is to make them aware of the narrative structuring of their own life; both 
concerning its process and the aims they set out and the ethical, political and 
epistemological evaluation of it. Acquiring a better understanding of one's self and the
and the Eros which motivates the pursuit of the Forms is discussed. The allegory/simile of the cave is developed in book VII, (514a- 
520a).
52
world does not only come about through thinking, but also through acquiring life 
experiences and most importantly through narrating and critically examining such 
experiences. Philosophy as a way of life aims at the Socratic "knowing thyself. Self- 
knowledge is an aim of philosophy that can help justify our actions by making explicit 
and justify what we want to be and as a result achieve eudemonia.
There are many examples that illustrate what philosophy as a way of life can mean in 
practice. Socrates exemplified with his death that philosophy is a way of life when he 
refused to stay alive without philosophising (Apology 28e4-29b1). He pointed out that 
the unexamined life is not worth living (Apology, 38a5-38a6). The central concern of 
philosophical research for Socrates was not so much nature, but human beings - their 
self-knowledge and knowledge about how to live a good life morally speaking (Gorgias, 
492d, 500c). The Elenchus that Socrates put to his interlocutors aimed to give an 
answer to the fundamental question "how we should live?" (Vlastos, 1996, p.34). 
Socrates, through questioning, wanted not only to test his interlocutors' ways of 
thinking, but also their ways of living and how consistent their living was to their thinking 
(Protagoras, 333b8-c9).
The Stoics46 gave another example of philosophy as a way of life. Their philosophy was 
not only a set of beliefs, but a way of life that involved practice (spiritual as/ces/s47). 
Therefore their philosophy merely addressed the self and their being (Hadot, 1995). The 
spiritual exercises that the Stoics offered helped people develop the attitudes (diathesis) 
that were in accordance with the philosophy they perceived. Such attitudes were the 
attention to the present moment (prosoche), careful listening (akroasis) to others and 
self mastery (enkrateia) (Hadot, 1995). Like the Stoics, the Epicureans48 also had an
46 Stoicism is a philosophical movement of the Hellenistic period that took its name from the porch (Stoa) in Athens, where the 
members of this school of philosophy met each other and where their lectures took place. However, their name stoic means also 
calm which is something that Stoics presented in their philosophy. See more about Stoicism in the STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (page edited by Dirk Baltzly) 2010. Stoicism. [WWW], http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/. Accessed on 
20/05/2010).
47 Marcus Aurelius (1997) in Meditations give many examples of spiritual exercises that help people live philosophically and learn 
more about themselves by 'digging within' (EvSov aKdmc).
48 Epicureanism is a philosophical movement of the Hellenistic period established by Epicurus
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understanding of philosophy as a therapeutic process that focuses on people curing 
themselves from unnecessary needs in their everyday lives49 . Epicurus in his Principal 
doctrines tried to answer the big questions that puzzled people, such as what death is. 
He achieved this by making people not frightened of death as death is not experienced 
in life and after life one cannot experience death 50 (Bailey, 1926). As Epicurus describes 
in his Letter to Menoecus, Epicureans could enjoy life because he had removed the fear 
of death through reasoning.
It is obvious that the content of each philosophy described above is different. However, 
what these philosophies as ways of life have in common is the following: Firstly, they all 
have a common origin; they begin in love (Eros51 ) with a particular way of life that each 
philosophy proposes as the right one to conduct. Being in Eros with a particular way of 
life involves both a state of passion52 which attracts the person to a particular way of life 
and a reasoned awareness of one's choice53 to conduct a certain way of life 
(Kierkegaard, 1941; Sartre, 1948). The reasoned awareness and the choice indicate 
that one is not just attracted to a way of life but one has chosen it, is aware of it and can 
provide reasons for the choice of a certain way of life. The reasoned awareness towards 
a particular way of life is necessary because people "do not have instincts enabling and 
compelling them to be perfect [therefore] virtues are reasoned, reflective, deliberate 
rather than spontaneous" (Blitz, 2007).
Secondly, they are all embedded into human action. These philosophies are not just 
theories of thinking or speaking so as to convince others but mainly they present 'an art
49 What Stoics and Epicureans have in common is that they are not only philosophers who established Stoicism and Epicurean 
philosophy, but also lived according to their philosophies and as such are genuine philosophers (Hadot,1995),
50 Epicurus argument goes like this: "death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of 
sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds 
to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who 
has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. [Death] does not then concern either the living or the dead, since 
for the former it is not, and the latter are no more" (Epicurus,1926).
51 Eros was the Greek semi god of love and desire. For a more thorough analysis of Eros see chapter 4.
52 Kierkegaard (1941) claims that "it is impossible to exist without passion" and means that only by engaging with people or 
situations that give birth to passions can people gain sense of their own selves as existing beings.
53 Sartre (1948) claims that the role of choice in human life is fundamental.
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of living' (Shusterman, 1997). Since philosophy as a way of life is the product of one's 
passion and reasoned awareness of one's choice, then one's philosophy reflects one's 
life. There is a connection between a philosopher's life and his/her theory about life. As 
Friedrich Nietzsche has said, philosophy is a kind of autobiography that justifies one's 
vision (Shusterman, 1997).
Finally, these philosophies establish certain attitudes and dispositions (diatheses) in 
people. Through reflection and dialogue54 , people listen to others' ideas, reflect on 
them, generate new ideas, compare ideas and, if necessary, self-correct and set new 
standards in living. People change, begin to know more about themselves and evaluate 
what is important in their life and what is not. In other words, these philosophies provide 
people with a meaning in life.
1.5. Conclusion
In this chapter philosophy is understood as both a theoretical and practical activity 
connected with people's everyday lives. The generative aspect of philosophy is what 
makes individuals wonder and ask questions, which generates further human action. 
The evaluative aspect is the one that examines the truth and validity of human thought 
and action. The purpose of both aspects is to give meaning and enhance quality of life. 
Both aspects are based on human reflection and dialogue.
To justify that philosophy is an imaginative process, it was examined whether the 
structure of our conceptual system is imaginative. In this thesis it is argued that our 
conceptual system is highly metaphorical, which is reflected in how we use language. 
The generative aspect of philosophy develops the wondering nature of philosophy, 
making people ask questions and pushing their thinking to its boundaries. Philosophical 
questions show which answers do not exist (yet). Furthermore, the normative character
54 Dialogue is a zetetic method' which could be translated as the method through which one looks for something (Hadot,1995, 
p.63).
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of philosophy can be imaginative as the 'ought' and 'should' statements require 
imagination to set standards of what is ideal. Logic is also based on imagination. For 
instance, when something is thought of for the very first time, its logic is established 
upon imagination. Philosophy as a reflective or dialogical method also has an 
imaginative character. When people reflect on reality they reflect on what they have 
imagined reality to be. As for the dialogical method of philosophy, it requires imagination 
to think of other possible ways of understanding some situation or others' points of view.
Philosophy as an evaluative force does not necessarily lead to what is correct but 
shows the way of how to argue and how to distinguish between answers that are more 
justifiable than others and how to take the best possible decisions. The evaluative 
aspect of philosophy has the character of reflective or meta-cognitive thinking which can 
lead to self-correction. It also has the character of clarifying what is said through 
language. In this thesis it is attempted to combine a more Pragmatic approach about 
self-correction with the Socratic Method as a way of supporting the evaluative role of 
philosophy. The Socratic idea that philosophy is for everyone on condition that people 
speak the same language and share their actual beliefs matches with the Pragmatistic 
ideas of constructing knowledge upon agreement of a community of researchers who 
are infallible. The Elenchus is necessary so as to make sure that everyone understands 
to a certain extent what is meant with a particular concept. The process of Elenchus, 
however, could be used as a way of checking people's use of language, even if the 
result is not an absolute and unchangeable truth, as Plato claims it. Through the 
Socratic Elenchus (especially if done within a community of people so that each can 
learn from the way the others think) people become aware of the implicit beliefs or 
prejudices they bring to their understanding of a concept and as a result may self- 
correct. The acknowledgement of emotions as modes of people's thinking and 
evaluating situations helps to make the connection between adopting a Pragmatist 
approach about self-correction and using the Socratic Method to do so.
Philosophy as a way of life is something more than the sum of evaluative and 
generative aspects of philosophy because its aim is for people to live better in moral
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and social terms and reach eudemonia. Philosophy linked with everyday life could 
improve individuals' lives in terms of: a) meaningful actions and abilities to think in a 
higher order, by considering alternatives or imagining different ways that life could be 
conducted, b) communicating with others so as to ensure well being, and c) becoming 
emotionally more caring and concerning towards ourselves and others. Philosophy as a 
way of life is part of individuals' experiences and has the character of a constant 
conceptual search for what is true, albeit temporary. Many examples from the history of 
philosophy as a way of life, such as indicated by Socrates and the Stoics, show that 
philosophy as a way of life requires love (Eros) towards a particular practical way of life, 
is embedded into human action, and its method is based on reflection and dialogue with 
others and the establishment of certain attitudes and dispositions (diathesis) in people.
After setting the framework of how philosophy will be conceived throughout this thesis, 
there is a need to check whether the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy 
along with the idea of philosophy as a way of life are possible and compatible with doing 
philosophy with children. To answer this we need first to check how different 
philosophical traditions have viewed this possible connection between philosophy, child, 
and childhood. These will be the main points of discussion for the second chapter.
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CHAPTER 2




This chapter aims to show how philosophy as described in chapter one is connected 
with philosophy for children. First there is a brief description of what philosophy for 
children is and how it started. To understand philosophy for children, one needs to look 
at its epistemological base. However, there is not just one. The different ways of doing 
philosophy for/with children reflect the different epistemologies that lie beneath. This 
chapter examines the categorization of these epistemologies according to Gregory and 
Golding, seeks similarities and differences between them, contrast them with each other 
and with what is considered as philosophy in this thesis and highlights possible gaps in 
these categorizations that this thesis aims to cover. Not only do the different 
epistemologies reflect differences in what is considered as philosophy but also 
differences in what is considered as a child. The second aim of the chapter is to show 
what is considered as a child for this thesis and how the child can be linked with 
philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and with philosophy as a way of life.
2.1. Introduction: What is Philosophy for Children (P4C)?
Philosophy for Children (P4C) was presented as a form of applied philosophy in 
educational settings, created by Matthew Lipman in the early 1970s when he realised 
that schools provide children with large amounts of information, but not with the 
cognitive skills required to think and reason well. Lipman believed philosophy is an 
appropriate tool to guide children's natural curiosity, through the educational process 
and develop children's higher order thinking, putting emphasis on the parameters of 
critical, creative and caring thinking (Lipman, 2003). He introduced philosophical 
thinking to elementary students through a series of novels (with accompanying 
manuals55) whose main characters are children.
55 See more in chapter 3 of this thesis.
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Since then, the idea of doing P4C has expanded, incorporating a variety of either 
different methods or styles of philosophising with children (PwC), or the use of different 
stimuli such as picture-books (Murris, 1992; Sprod, 1993) and works of art56 . There is 
also a shift from doing philosophy for children to doing philosophy with children. The 
preposition with underlines the communicative character of philosophy where children 
are mutually responsible for creating philosophy rather than 'accepting' philosophy 
made for them57 . P4C is the ideal space where multiple ways of thinking known as 
critical, creative, caring and collaborative thinking can flourish58 .
'Philosophy for/with children' brings two different concepts together: philosophy and 
childhood. This coexistence makes room for two questions relevant to the nature and 
value of philosophy for children:
a) Can children do philosophy?
b) Is 'philosophy for/with children' 'real' philosophy?
The answer to the first question depends on what is conceived as philosophy, what is 
conceived as a child and whether there are any possibilities for those two different 
'parameters' to co-exist. One type of argument against philosophy with children focuses 
on the 'nature' of philosophy as not appropriate or accessible to children. For instance, 
Kitchener (1990), White (1992), Wilson (1992, 1993) and Fox (2001) mostly understand 
philosophy as a practice in academic institutions and as a corpus of knowledge which is 
not accessible to children59 . It is argued that 'Philosophy for/with Children' approaches 
do not teach philosophy and tend to identify philosophy with the ability of questioning, 
enquiring and being critical (Wilson, 1992). Children may enjoy questioning and 
discussion but this is not the same as doing philosophy. Richard Kitchener (1990)
56 Alternative educational materials and approaches have been devised since Liprnan's original materials. See more about the 
different stimuli used in philosophy with children in chapters
57 Throughout this thesis P4C will be used only to refer to Lipman's material.
58 More about these kinds of thinking see chapter 2 of this thesis.
59 Fox (2001) argues against doing philosophy with children. He claims that children are made for action, do not have the patience 
for discussion, and questions their ability for thinking abstractly and recognising subtle connotations in meanings. Murris (2001) 
responds to Fox by e.g. referring to Egan and to the losses of adult philosophers in their thinking (e.g. freshness, creativity, poor 
listening skills). She also argues that when children find an activity meaningful they are able to philosophise.
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argues that children are only able to do 'concrete' philosophy, and they cannot extract 
one general principle (for instance an ontological one), which they could apply in other 
situations. For instance, children may discuss about 'cats' or 'computer games' and not 
extract general principles out of them. What lies beneath these ideas is that philosophy 
is mostly considered as an academic activity which requires abstract and elaborated 
thinking that not all people have, let alone children.
The other type of arguments against doing philosophy with children focuses on what a 
child is and how the 'deficiencies' of children's thinking deprive them from doing 
philosophy. Jean Piaget's (1926; 1929) developmental theory excludes children from 
being able to think abstractly which reinforces the thesis that philosophy, viewed as an 
abstract activity is not accessible to children60 . To argue in favour of children's ability to 
do philosophy, White (1992) claims that children should be able to demonstrate not only 
the ability to think reasonably, but also the ability for higher order reasoning. The lack of 
children's experiences as necessary for doing philosophy is also pointed out. However, 
experience is not accumulated necessarily by age and children can have experiences 
that some adults will never have (Murris, 2001).
Historically childhood has been perceived as: a period which can be characterised by a 
difference of size and age61 , an incomplete stage, a preparatory stage for adulthood and 
only lately as a value of itself and as a preparatory stage for adulthood (Friquegnon, 
1997; Kennedy, 2006). The child, as conceived by Aristotle is an immature human who 
has an immature soul (Politics, Book 1. Chapter 13 I260a4) is incapable of happiness 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1. lx.10) and cannot make choices (Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book 3. li. 2). According to Aristotle, childhood is the process of becoming an adult62 . 
Therefore, a reason that could justify as to why children cannot philosophise is because 
they are conceived as inferior to adults: children are conceived as immature and 
underdeveloped, whereas philosophy, as a complex way of thinking, requires maturity.
60 Bruner (1983), however, claims that the nature of infant cognitive equipment has a very systematic and abstract character.
61 In Medieval times children have been viewed as "little adults" that are different from adults in terms of age and size (Aries, 1962).
62 Aristotle's ideas as far as childhood is concerned are included in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics (Chambliss.1982).
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This model of perceiving children could be characterized as dualistic since it 
understands children and adults as belonging in two distinctive categories: philosophy is 
permitted to one category (adults), but excluded from the other (children).
Viewing the child as a 'noble savage' as portrayed in Jean Jacques Rousseau's Emile 
or On Education (1969), that is innately good and gradually degenerated by society63 , 
does not encourage philosophical thinking either. In Emile (Book I) it is written that 
"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man." However, leaving the child to develop without too 
much parental intervention in the name of allowing children freedom, does not allow the 
child to learn and benefit from adults' experiences and to take responsibility.
Childhood may be characterized by a kind of dependence which is analysed as 
paternalism from the parents towards the child and a 'sense of belonging' from the 
children towards the parents (Schapiro, 2006). Therefore, this dependence does not 
allow children to do philosophy as it requires independent thinking. Even though Tamar 
Schapiro accepts that children have this sense of belonging while adults do not, she 
does not explain that this sense is mainly created by adults since they are the ones that 
the children see from birth. This dependence is established mainly by the 
developmental difference64 between adults and children that prevent children from being 
responsible for their decisions. Is that dependence sufficient to prevent children from 
being involved with philosophy? The answer is no. The fact that the child is not totally 
independent does not make it less of a person who has no "right to inquire" (Lipman, 
1993a p.144; Matthews, 1993). Even though children's being is dependent on others to 
look after them, this does not mean that their thought is dependent too.
63 In Book II of Rousseau's Emile it is suggested that the children should grow up in its physical environment encouraged to acquire 
experience not through books but mainly through the interaction with the world with an emphasis on developing the senses (Book II)
64 This is possibly due to developmental differences which can be either physical (Adults are stronger than children so naturally 
they can protect and defend them) or moral (Adults often believe that they are in the best position to tell what is good for their 
children from what it is not).
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There is evidence, both empirical and conceptual, to suggest children can do 
philosophy. Lev Vygotsky's and Jerome Bruner's theories bring to light contrary 
evidence to Jean Piaget's theory (Bruner, 1983). Furthermore, empirical research that 
has focused on the conditions under which Piaget's experiments on children's abilities 
for conservation of matter and their egocentricity, has given examples of children who 
can decentre their thinking and think from different points of view (Donaldson, 1978; 
Gelman, 1969; McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1974; Hughes, 1975). Research in the field 
of P4C extended to a wide range of children's ages and different educational settings 
indicates that children are able to dialogue and think abstractly in a critical and creative 
way (Lipman and Bierman, 1980; Topping and Trickey, 2007; Jackson, 2004; Daniel et 
al, 2002; Daniel and Michael, 2000; Lebuis et al, 1993; Barry et al, 2001; Palermo, 
1995; Morehouse, 1995; Splitter, 2007a; Jenkins and Lyle, 2010). Meta-research in the 
field of philosophy with children that evaluates the quality of the research done in P4C 
and the criteria for its evaluation is also available65 (Tock Keng Lim, 1998; Rondhuis 
and Van Der Leeuw, 2000; Cebas and Moriyon, 2004; Reznitskaya, 2005; Tozzi, 2009).
Apart from the empirical research, Egan (1988; 1993) reminds us of the 'other half of 
the child' which has been neglected and forgotten in education: children's imagination 
and fantasy as a way of thinking. Even before the age of seven, children are able to 
think in abstract terms as they understand powerful binary concepts (e.g. good/ bad, 
beautiful/ ugly) and through them make sense of their experiences (Egan, 1993). 
Children, in order to make sense of a story, need to know where the story goes and also 
the abstract concepts contained within it. They have a full understanding by the end of 
the story which shows that children have the ability to understand the whole (Egan, 
1993). Children, therefore, are able to think abstractly but also can concentrate on
65 Reznitskaya (2005) refers to methods and tools which could be used in order to evaluate empirical research in the field of 
philosophy with children. Cebas and Moriyon evaluate the empirical research in philosophy with children in terms of the 
methodology that has been used, the ways of analysing the empirical data and the deficiencies these researchers have. 
http://sophia.eu.org/Research/What%20we%20know%20about%20research%5B1%5D.pdf. accessed on 20/10/2008. Ronduis and 
Van Der Leeuw (2000) also critically examine research done in philosophy with children.
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'concrete' details, which shows a great ability for observing and making meaning of 
things that adults can easily ignore66 .
There is much conceptual argumentation in favour of children's abilities to think 
philosophically which questions both whether philosophy is really a 'special' activity 
allocated only to adults and whether children's skills are adequate for doing philosophy. 
Therefore the arguments in favour of doing philosophy with children point out: a) the 
benefits that philosophy can have in children's thinking development (Lipman et al,1980; 
Lipman, 2003; Costello, 1995; Fisher, 2003), b) the kind of concepts that philosophy 
analyses which are not a monopoly for adults (Lipman, 2003; Splitter and Sharp, 1995; 
Splitter, 2003; 2006a), c) the ways of philosophising that are most suitable for children 
(Hand and Winstanley, 2008), d) the imaginative character of children's thinking and 
how their understanding can enhance philosophy (Murris, 2000a; 2000b; 2001; Haynes, 
2008) and e) the reciprocity of philosophy and children and how they can benefit from 
each other (Gregory, 2002a; Kohan, 1999).
'Philosophy for/with children' is certainly different from academic philosophy, but 
academic philosophy is not the only legitimate way of doing philosophy (Murris, 2000a; 
Golding, 2006a; Golding, 2006b). P4C has no correlation with philosophical jargon used 
when studying the history of philosophy or with learning by heart what philosophers 
have said and what their answers are to core philosophical questions. However, there is 
no need for distinguishing between 'formal' (or academic) philosophy and informal 
philosophy, and there is no good reason why these two 'different' kinds of philosophy 
cannot co-exist in a way that would be suitable even for very young children to 
comprehend (Worley, 2009). 'Philosophy for children' is based on collaborative inquiry 
(Splitter and Sharp, 1995; Cam, 2006a) and it can be characterized as a philosophical 
pedagogy that can strengthen children's thinking abilities67 . Its collaborative dimensions 
could also benefit academic philosophy.
66 For a concrete example see chapter 5.
67 Cam (2006b) offers a whole pedagogy used as a 'toolkit' from which it is clear that philosophy is viewed as a process that 
strengthens children's thinking.
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Moving to the second question referring to whether 'philosophy for/with children' is 'real' 
philosophy, an argument that justifies it as philosophy is suggested by Laurence Splitter 
(2000a; 2000b; 2002) and Splitter and Ann Sharp (1995). According to them, P4C is 
'real' philosophy because of the concepts that are involved and the method used. As for 
the concepts examined, such as 'beauty', 'truth', 'lying', 'good' they are common, which 
means that they can be discussed by anyone and do not require special knowledge; 
they are central to our lives throughout the centuries because they are part of everyday 
language68 . They are also contestable which means that there is not one way of 
defining them - they are 'fuzzy' at 'the edges', because of their abstract nature. As for 
the method, it highlights the activity of philosophising which is what Socrates first 
claimed philosophy to be. Summarizing, what makes children's philosophy real is the 
dealing with philosophical issues (concepts), the use of philosophical methods, skills or 
commitments necessary to philosophise (Evans, 1978).
Clinton Golding (2000a; 2006b) views philosophy in school as a chance for children to 
get involved with philosophy. Children are given the opportunity to make sense of 
questions and concepts that are important to them. Golding (2006b) picks out five traits 
that make philosophy in school a unique educational programme. These traits provide 
us with a deeper understanding of what philosophy in schools does and can be 
summarised in five words: aim, content, process, culture and teacher. According to him, 
the aim of philosophy is to help children make sense of the world around them. 
Philosophy's content consists of rich concepts, such as the ones mentioned above, 
along with philosophical questions that children bring to the classroom and are derived 
from their quotidian life. The process involves delving into philosophy's content through 
children's thinking as they engage with cognitive activities, such as inquiring, 
questioning, reasoning, evaluating and reflecting. The pedagogical environment 
(culture), which makes this possible, is the 'community of inquiry' and the teacher is the
68 Concepts children are sometimes interested in, have not always been the subject of adult philosophy, e.g. what is a 'toy' or what 
is 'boring'? However, these topics do not make the potential philosophical discussion less philosophical.
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one who will instigate a philosophical inquiry by coaching and guiding a group of 
children philosophically.
The difference between Golding and Splitter and Sharp is that Golding understands 
philosophy for children as an educational programme (application of philosophy), whilst 
Splitter and Sharp view it as a genuine form of philosophy. What, however, is not taken 
into consideration is that there is not just one 'philosophy for/with children' - either as a 
genuine form of philosophical practice or as an educational programme. There are 
different approaches to philosophy with children depending on their epistemological 
assumptions. Therefore, the same term may mean different things.
2.2. Ways of approaching P4C epistemologically
In order to portray the different ways of doing philosophy with children, I will borrow 
Maughn Gregory's (1995) contrast of three different and broad epistemological positions 
and consider the implications of each position for philosophy for children. These 
positions refer to:
o realism,
o first-order non-realism and
o second-order non-realism.




Although these two different types of categorizations are not exclusive, they are 
selected because they provide a good understanding of how the different 
epistemological positions underpin philosophy with children. My attempt here is to find 
where these positions overlap, what their similarities and differences are and contrast 
them with my consideration of what is philosophy and how it could be linked with
66
philosophy for/with children. Therefore, the reader will be able to see where the theory 
portrayed in chapter one stands within these positions and how it can influence what is 
considered as philosophy for/with children.
2.2.1 Realism/ First-order non-realism/ Second-order non-realism
Realism
Realism accepts that there is a distinction between the world and people's 
understanding of it. Therefore, according to realists the world exists and is independent 
of people's minds and understanding69 . Since the world is independent of people's 
understanding, it is objective. The realists differentiate from each other, with the 
dogmatists who accept their ideas of what is the world uncritically, while the reasoned 
realists examine and test their views first (Gregory, 1995). Gregory places Lipman in the 
latter category. As realists rely on what is objectively good, it is easy for them to set 
goals about what they expect from the education of their children. What is expected of 
children is to know what is 'good' and 'true' about the world70 . The aim of education for 
these philosophers is to rectify children's possible superstitions and false beliefs passed 
on by their parents. The philosophical community of inquiry is a place for children where 
they will accept, understand, believe, act upon what is true and develop the reasoning 
that will enable them to justify their beliefs.
An example of a realistic approach in the field of philosophy for children is introduced 
with Catherine McCall's Community of Philosophical Inquiry method (CoPI). CoPI is 
based on using logic and philosophical reasoning to distinguish between what is real 
and what, sometimes mistakenly, people understand to be real. One aim of the CoPI 
method is to help children reveal errors in their thinking towards what is real, therefore,
69 See Realism at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ accessed on 17/04/2010.
70 Realism in education has been supported by many philosophers such as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon and John 
Locke.
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the more and different styles of thinking among children, the better the chances of 
revealing how a theory can be distant from what is reality (McCall, 2009).
In a realist community of philosophical inquiry it is possible that some members accept 
different ideas as more reasonable and convincing than the ones they brought with 
them. This is where a dogmatist would not accept the community of inquiry as an 
appropriate educational procedure, because certain ideas are true, no matter what is 
said to the contrary in a community of inquiry. Reasoned realists, however, overcome 
this difficulty. They do not expect children to accept truth uncritically but they are 
confident enough that their reasoning about what is true will convince others (Gregory, 
1995). The community of inquiry is the place to convince others with reasoning about 
what are true statements about the world.
How can philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life be 
associated with a realist practitioner of a philosophical community of inquiry with 
children? A realist would not accept philosophy as a generative or imaginative process. 
Imagination is already out of reality's realm; it deals with possibilities (possible realities) 
rather than actualities. Imagination leaves room to multiple interpretations of what is or 
could be real, which do not match with a realist's ideas. As far as the evaluative aspect 
of philosophy is concerned, it is more likely that it would be accepted by a reasoned 
realist, but only in terms of evaluating whether something is objectively true. Philosophy 
as a way of life could be understood by a realist as a pursuit in everyday life of what is 
true and living accordingly.
Non-realism
Contrary to realism, non-realists believe that what humans understand as reality is not 
necessarily what reality 'really' is. Non-realism makes a clear distinction between what 
is understood as real and what is real. Reality for non-realists, as Gregory (1995) 
claims, is always illusive. This means that non-realism tries to prove how humans can
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be fallible in understanding the world as it is, due to certain conceptual structures of 
people's thinking, the language constraints, the value laden systems people use to 
organise what they perceive as reality and their experiences (Gregory, 1995). There are 
differences within non-realists which distinguish them into two different subcategories72 .
First-order non-realism
The first-order non-realists agree that people's conceptions may be limited, but they do 
not distort human understanding of reality. Therefore, first-order non-realists accept that 
the world exists and that it is independent from human understanding. Borrowing 
Rorty's mirror metaphor about the apprehension of what is reality; first-order non- 
realists can open a window to the world and have a different point of view from what 
they had before opening it. The more windows opened, the more light gets into the 
room and the more broader and deeper their understanding of the world is (along with 
accessing the world from different points of view) (Rorty, 1980). This presupposes that 
the first-order non-realists accept an existing reality independent from human 
understanding73 . What distinguishes first-order non-realists from realists is that the first 
believe that "complete comprehensiveness is practically, if not theoretically, 
unattainable" (Gregory, 1995, pp.31-40).
The community of inquiry method, in a first-order non-realists group, has a more 
pragmatic character as shown by pragmatist philosophers such as Peirce, James and 
Dewey. The community of inquiry becomes a place where children change from being 
passive learners of what is considered as objectively true to active researchers who do 
not take things for granted (Gregory, 1995). This presupposes the acceptance from first- 
order non-realists of two different systems of reality, the private one which contains
72 For similar categorization of non-realists to first and second-order see Realism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ accessed on 17/04/2010.
73 The use of certain terms like non-realism and differentiation of realism such as internal realism can be confusing. Internal realism 
claims that, "although the world may be causally independent of the human mind, the structure of the world its division into kinds, 
individuals and categories is a function of the human mind, and hence the world is not ontologically independent" (Curtis Brown, 
1988, p. 145-155). Even though the name is 'internal realism' it could be characterised as first-order-non-realism.
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individuals' experiences, feelings and thoughts (personal reality) and a public one, 
which is what is agreed by people as objectively correct, therefore acceptable (Splitter 
and Sharp, 1995). The skills of translating one's reality or interpreting others' thoughts 
into one's language and thinking system are necessary skills, so as to bring equilibrium 
between what is public and personally true. The idea of 'self-correction' in this case has 
not the character that would be present in a realistic inquiry where one corrects one's 
views according to what is objectively correct, but "incorporating 'personal and partial' 
views to broader, more public views" (Gregory, 1995).
The first-order non-realist teacher plays the role of the facilitator who asks open-ended 
questions and creates a supportive environment (Lipman et al, 1980; 1988a). The 
'community of inquiry' with its characteristics and values that members of a 
philosophical inquiry share, such as emotional regulation, non-egocentricity, loyalty, 
listening to others, building on each others' ideas and self-correction, is the path that 
leads them to a mutual agreement over what is true (Sharp, 2007a; 2007b). This 
agreement is temporary and subject to further change. The community of inquiry is the 
place where an idea accepted by members (public) makes sense if it is close and 
translatable to one's private truths and vice versa, one's private truth is accepted and 
recognised in what is publicly regarded as true. In other words the community of inquiry 
enables both 'thinking together' and 'thinking for oneself (Splitter and Sharp, 1995; 
Splitter, 2000a; 2000b). The Pragmatist approach is very popular within the philosophy 
for children field (Lipman, 2003; Sharp, 2007b; Echeverria, 1993). Returning to the 
'window' metaphor, in a community of inquiry people, when expressing their ideas, 
show the view from their own 'window'. However, by communicating with others they 
are invited to see the world through the 'windows' of others and by putting all the 
windows together a more complete picture of the world-as-it-is emerges.
How would first-order non-realists cope with philosophy's generative and evaluative 
aspects and with the idea of philosophy as a way of life? The ideas of first-order non- 
realists would match with the generative aspect of philosophy. The idea of openness 
that first-order non-realists adopt is a core idea in understanding philosophy as a
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generative force. Listening to different perspectives and opening different windows to 
the world is a creative and generative approach of philosophy, as depicted in chapter 
one. The translation is also a creative and imaginative process as it requires from 
people to 'get into other people's shoes' and see things from their point of view 
(window)'. As far as the evaluative aspect of philosophy is concerned, first-order non- 
realists accept a kind of dualistic system between private and public truth, whereby 
public truth is the product of agreement among different people's private truths derived 
from private experiences, thoughts and feelings. Self-correction is a form of evaluation 
which tries to bring equilibrium between individuals and the public sense as to what is 
right and true.
Second-order non-realism
What distinguishes first-order from second-order non-realists is mostly a matter of the 
degree of extent to which conceptual frameworks are commensurable (Gregory, 1995). 
The second-order non-realists reject the possibility of translation among the different 
structures of thinking, language, value-laden systems or even cultures. The metaphor of 
the different spectacles one wears and cannot take off (the spectacles refer to ones 
style of thinking, language used, value system adopted), not only prevent, but also 
distort (or misinterpret) an understanding of what reality is (Gregory, 1995).
According to second-order non-realists, the problem of incommensurability is what 
prevents the understanding of what reality is (Gregory, 1995). Gregory (1995) claims 
that this is because: a) people with radically different conceptual frameworks fail, even 
partly, to communicate and therefore to translate, interpret and finally understand each 
others' ideas and beliefs, b) the process of comparing different conceptual frameworks 
and examining them through each other's points of view does not guarantee that there 
will be any synthesis or any meaningful synthesis of the different components, c) the 
lack of communication and interpretation of radically different ideas leads to the distrust 
of reason and the acceptance of the idea 'these are the rules we play by' and d) a 
society with a dominant viewpoint (which could be political, ethical, social etc) may not
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understand members with radically different points of view or even give them the 
opportunity to express these differences (Gregory,1995). What is basically disturbed 
here is the equilibrium between public and private understanding of what is true.
A philosophical inquiry among a group of second-order non-realists would have the 
character of exploring different systems of values and beliefs that different people have. 
As the second-order non-realists have an approach that these are the rules we play by, 
reason and rationality are only tools for understanding other people's positions, without, 
however, providing any kind of final authority. Such a community where almost 
'anything goes' and 'there are no right and wrong answers' (Stanley, 2004) would be 
characterised by a high degree of relativism and skepticism which affect any attempt of 
evaluation. This could lead children to disappointment and passivity as their ideas would 
only be discussed but never evaluated (Gregory, 1995).
What is written above makes it obvious, that second-order non-realists would not agree 
with the idea of philosophy as an evaluative force, but would have no problem in dealing 
with philosophy as a generative force - on the contrary. Communication in an inquiry 
with second-order non-realists has the characteristic of an imaginative process that 
enables one to invoke one's same intuition in another person. In this case, philosophy is 
a kind of inspiration that comes from the use of symbolic reference to describe what is 
conceived as reality by a person. The metaphorical language and the imagery, and not 
necessarily reasons, become tools that serve to deepen understanding of what is 
perceived as reality and the words used to describe what is reality. This leads, 
therefore, to a deeper understanding of the conceptual systems themselves that 
different people use. As for the stimuli used, in the case of second-order non-realists, it 
seems that encouraging art, e.g. poetry, fine arts, pictures, photographs, helps to 
explore each others' frameworks.
72
2.2.2 Dualism/ Relativism and Critical Pluralism 
Dualism
According to dualists, knowledge and values are objective, certain and absolute 
(Golding, 2009). Since both knowledge and values are objective and absolute, they are 
universal and unchanging. Knowledge and values are also unquestionable and can be 
accepted by all as they are assured to be objective. This happens because, by 
definition, dualism introduces binary and contrary categories that both knowledge and 
values fall within. This categorization enables dualists to make sense of the world. 
Examples of dualistic binary categories are right and wrong, truth and falsity and good 
and evil. Dualism stands also for similar positions such as "dogmatic absolutism" (Paul 
and Elder, 2002, p. 10) and "egocentric epistemology" (Daniel, 2008, p.39).
A philosophical inquiry run by a dualist would aim to correct answers and any 
disagreement that deviated from what is absolutely true. The process of an inquiry 
would enable children to get the right answers and the final outcome should be a class 
with people who all agree with what is correct, right and finally true.
The difficulty that a P4C inquiry with dualists would face is that there is not much room 
for different interpretations and tolerance of different ideas (Daniel et al, 2002). Golding 
(2009) claims that dualist students in an inquiry seek for right and wrong answers and 
they are ready to abandon the inquiry as long as they have got the right answers. This 
attitude can lead to a superficial, restrictive and sometimes even illusive knowledge of 
the world. The dualists will not bother to examine the possible 'grey' solution as it is 
inadequate and not absolute. The fear of relying much on external authorities rather 
than testing critically what these authorities portray is also evident in a dualist 
community. Language used among students can prove the presence of dualism. For 
instance, phrases such as 'tell us which is the right answer' or 'that's wrong' show a 
dualist behavior, which may lead to the abandoning of philosophy as a waste of time, if 
dualists understand philosophy as not giving right or wrong answers (Golding, 2009).
Dualism shares similarities with realism as they both adopt a binary categorical system 
by which they understand the relationship between them and the world. This binary
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categorical system for realism is the distinction between what reality is and what one 
understands as reality. Dualists understand that reality is separate from the person's 
understanding of it; therefore reality stands unchangeable and absolute. Thus, a realist 
would accept the binary dualistic categories of right/wrong, correct/ incorrect and good/ 
evil as reflecting what the world is like independent of our understanding of it.
Like realists, dualists would not accept the value of philosophy as a generative force. It 
would seem useless since the right answers are clearly defined, unchanged and 
absolute. The evaluative aspect of philosophy would have the character of testing 
children's ideas in a community of inquiry towards what is objectively correct.
Relativism
The opposite of dualism, is relativism, and relativists claim that there is no objective 
knowledge, only beliefs. For relativism there is no absolute truth. Great tolerance over 
what different people understand as true and reciprocity which is displayed as a 
tendency of a mutual sharing of ideas is often shown within a relativist community of 
philosophical inquiry (Daniel et al, 2002). This leads to a wide classification of different 
perspectives, even contrary to each other, as true since their truth is contextualised. As 
contexts differ, so are the 'truths' that are generated.
A philosophical inquiry run by a relativist would show great tolerance towards different 
points of views that each member brings into a discussion. The aim of a relativistic 
inquiry is the expression of personal opinions and listening to others' personal opinions 
that reflect different ideas and experiences (Liptai, 2005; Bosch, 1998b). As they do not 
believe that there is one absolute truth, there is no need for evaluating the different 
opinions as right or wrong. For relativists, there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers so 
'anything goes' (Stanley, 2004). This tolerance could even reach apathy, as people take 
for granted that people are free to express their ideas no matter whether they stand to 
reason or not (Golding, 2009). As there is not an absolute truth, truth becomes a
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subjective issue ('true-for-me') (Golding, 2009). Any disagreement between the 
members of a relativistic community of philosophical inquiry could be characterized as a 
personal attack towards one's freedom to state one's ideas. The language used in a 
philosophical inquiry shows people's epistemology. Expressions such as 'this answer 
maybe is right for you but not for me', 'it's all about opinions', 'it was good to hear from 
you all', 'all our ideas were really interesting' show a relativistic approach towards a 
community of inquiry (Golding, 2009).
The main disadvantage of a relativistic inquiry is its unconditional tolerance. Being 
tolerant and liberating children by the constraints of getting something scholastically 
right or wrong can make them very creative. However, accepting uncritically everything 
people are saying can lead to apathy and not practising reasoning (testing the ideas of 
others whether or not they stand to reason) or to nihilism (there is nothing true to 
believe and act upon). The evaluative aspect of philosophy would not be accepted by a 
relativist. It is debatable whether philosophy as a generative force would also be 
accepted. Relativists are willing to listen to other people's opinions so there can be an 
effort of imagining and getting to another's' position, however, if a relativist is in a state 
of uncritical acceptance, s/he may just listen to others, without really trying to think 
creatively.
Relativism could be associated with second-order non-realism in terms of very much 
emphasizing the importance of creative means of expressing ideas. Second-order non- 
realism agrees that there is not an external reality and people's understanding distorts 
what is reality, as they understand reality wearing certain spectacles that they cannot 
take off. Therefore, second-order non-realism rejects anything that exists objectively 
and 'outside' of people's thinking and understanding. Since individuals' understandings 
are not objective and common for all, then there is not a way of evaluating objectively 
what one believes as true. Therefore, if there is not an objective (even not an intra- 
subjective) way to evaluate a statement as true or not, then it is relativism, and second- 
order non-realism is associated.
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Critical Pluralism
Critical Pluralism tries to solve the problems that dualism and relativism create in a 
philosophical community of inquiry. In Aristotelian terms critical pluralism appears to be 
the golden mean between dualism and relativism. Critical pluralism believes neither in 
an absolute objective truth nor in a total subjective truth. It aims to help people 
understand a situation and judge well. This means being open to other people's ideas. 
The knowledge constructed for critical pluralists is fallible, temporary and plural. It has 
mostly the character of making meaning and connecting each others' ideas rather than 
discovering a truth. This meaning, however, is subjected to logic and to inter-subjective 
perspectives (Golding, 2009).
It seems that the way that personal and public truth link together pass through the 
process of assimilation and accommodation, as they were perceived by Jean Piaget 
(1929). Assimilation refers to new knowledge, through new experience, acquired and 
added into one's current position, whereas the idea of accommodation refers to the 
transformation of already existing positions, in order to make sense of the new 
experiences, views and ideas one confronts.
To achieve a critical pluralistic philosophical inquiry is a complex task, but it is enabled 
when the facilitator leaves aside his/her ideas and becomes as tolerant and neutral as 
possible, asking probing and challenging questions that make children think, encourage 
children to listen carefully to others, link their ideas together, disagree with each other 
and provide reasons for their disagreements or agreements (Scolnicov, 1978; 
Baumgarten, 1993). This, however, presupposes that the facilitator is not a strong 
dualist or relativist, but rather neutral or, following Socratic terminology, a good 'ma/a 74'. 
Children with a dualistic approach can achieve a better understanding if they are 
encouraged to find the answers and solutions by themselves and by listening to others 
and contrasting their ideas with others (Golding, 2009). On the other hand, relativists
74 Maia in Greek is the one who enables a woman to give birth to her children. Maieutics is Socrates' method which was inspired by 
the profession of Socrates' mother; she was a maia.
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can move towards critical pluralism if they realise that apart from being willing to listen 
to others and think openly, it is necessary to test answers as to whether they stand to 
reason or are applicable.
Critical pluralists seem to have similarities with first-order non-realists as they both try to 
find a way that different ideas can be expressed, but at the same time these ideas are 
subjected to critical evaluation. Similarly, critical pluralists would accept philosophy as 
both a generative and evaluative force. The problems with Gregory's and Golding's 
categorization explained above arise when the facilitator and the members of the 
community of inquiry have totally different approaches of what is true and real. For 
instance, what would happen if a realist facilitator runs a community of inquiry whose 
members are mostly first or second-order non-realists and vice versa. Would this 
facilitator favour the realist children as their ideas would match with his/her75?
Realism and dualism appear to share similarities with each other. Both dualism and 
realism, comparing to what is defined as philosophy in chapter one, would agree with 
the evaluative aspect of philosophy, but not with the generative as it would appear to be 
a waste of time seeking alternative truths that deviate from what is objectively defined 
as true. First-order non-realism and critical pluralism seem to have the same 
epistemological base but portrayed in different words. Both seem to agree with 
philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects. As for second-order non-realism and 
relativism, they would both disagree with philosophy as an evaluative force.
The epistemology of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force seems to be 
closer to the epistemology of first-order non-realists and critical pluralists. However, 
what they both lack or do not refer to explicitly is the applicability of philosophy in 
everyday life. Both critical pluralism and first-order non-realism do not explain explicitly 
what philosophy is for. Is philosophy an opportunity to exchange ideas with the aim of
75 Snyder (2006) shows that there is no difference between the teaching style and the philosophy of an experienced teacher. For 
instance, a constructivist teacher uses more an inquiry based approach in a classroom whereas a teacher with a didactic philosophy 
tends to create a teacher- centred classroom.
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practising critical and creative thinking within the time schedule of a school activity? Is 
philosophy one more 'lesson' to add to the curriculum77?
What differentiates the approach of philosophy as depicted in chapter one from critical 
pluralism and first-order non-realism is that philosophy does not stay within the school 
environment but aims to become 'a way of life'. Viewing philosophy as a way of life 
means that philosophy is more than an effective way of teaching thinking skills, but also 
has a practical application in everyday life. Philosophy is the activity of thinking about 
thinking, but philosophy as a way of life also refers to how this thinking can become 
action, therefore how people move from thinkers to doers or how thinkers and doers are 
merged into the same person.
Apart from the view of philosophy for children as a mental tool that strengthens thinking; 
it could become and be seen as a way of life78 . Children should be able to apply the 
philosophy they practice in other aspects of their lives in or outside of school. Therefore, 
children's abilities to think philosophically should apply to many decision-making 
moments that emerge in their lives. The ability to ask questions, think logically about 
situations and wonder are not limited within the school classroom. Judging whether a 
television programme is good enough, reflecting on a bedtime story, or wondering over 
everyday problems and being allowed to influence the decisions adults make on their 
behalf are some implications of philosophical thinking outside of the school. Thinking 
collaboratively and caringly can lead to a lifestyle that can promote peace and progress 
in every aspect of human life. Caring thinking, for example, prevents strong independent 
thinkers from becoming arrogant and insensitive to other people's thoughts and needs, 
but also it includes a distribution of power in society to include the child's voice.
77 There is a question whether philosophy should be taught on its own or all the subjects of curriculum should be taught under a 
philosophical perspective. For instance, Brooker (2009) offers an example of how children (Key Stage 3) approach history by 
following a community of inquiry approach.
78 See chapter 1.
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So far we have silently consented in viewing 'Philosophy for/with Children' from the 
adults' point of view. What I describe above depicts a promising programme or 
approach which enables children to become better thinkers according to what adults 
consider as better thinking. Therefore children, through philosophising, adopt tools that 
adults use, such as asking questions, clarifying, giving examples and counter examples, 
analysing, finding faults in reasoning etc. so as to resemble adults thinking. But could 
'Philosophy for/with Children' mean something more than that?
From the child's point of view 'Philosophy for/with Children' could be the place where 
children can freely speak and exercise their right to be listened to. Children feel free to 
express their thoughts and reflections no matter how illogical or unreasonable they may 
seem, according to adults' criteria. From this perspective, 'Philosophy for/with Children' 
can be a place where adults listen carefully to children's voices and enrich their own 
thinking. Adults can find out whether children's thoughts and questions are deeply 
philosophical (Haynes, 2002), or investigate other ways of thinking that possibly they 
lack or have forgotten (Egan, 1988). In other words, philosophy with children can be a 
place for adults to reconstruct their own childhood or access the child they also are, and 
through it grasp a deeper understanding of what children's thoughts are. Listening 
'philosophically' to children (Haynes, 2008) with an open mind and a willingness not 
only to find what might be potentially philosophical in children's contributions, but also to 
acquire their understanding enables adults to understand children's thinking and 
through this enrich the content of philosophy.
Is a commitment to a particular epistemology necessary? Even though my approach 
seems to bear similarities with critical pluralism and first-order non-realism79 , I would not 
recommend any epistemological position as more 'correct'. This is because such an act 
would be a limitation in the possible ways of philosophising. As the epistemological 
positions outlined above are not exhaustive, this ensures that nothing is excluded in the 
future in relation to new ways of philosophising that may come into being. Committing
79 See p.76 of this chapter
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ourselves to one epistemology would mean blocking possible further research on 
philosophizing which goes contrary to the spirit of this thesis.
However, the philosophical community of inquiry, no matter what epistemological 
positions and values its members have, needs to be a space where people will be free 
to express their ideas, be listened to and listen to others. To achieve this, openness, 
mutual respect and rejection of indoctrination seem to be already values brought into 
the community of inquiry, so as to assure an otherwise "value-free" space in expressing 
and testing ideas (Lipman, 2003; Costello, 2000). These values are self evident since 
without them a community of inquiry cannot exist.
2.3. Are children and philosophy as a generative force and an 
evaluative force and as a way of life compatible?
Apart from asking whether children can do philosophy or not there is also another 
question to answer. Why are we now only interested about philosophy with children? 
One reason could be the changes in society in terms of economic, political and cultural 
development and its maturation to accept children as critical and individual thinkers that 
share the same world and have the right to speak and be listened to (Kennedy, 1994). 
Karl Marx in his work Critique of the Gotha programme argues that "human nature and 
human society are not fixed once and for all; they are both constantly developing into 
new forms that are not fully predictable in advance" (Friquegnon, 1997, p. 15). The 
society of the future and the Individuals, who compose it, will, to some extend, define 
themselves by their choices and creative actions (Friquegnon, 1997). It seems that in a 
constantly changing society children and adults should respect each other's thinking 
and build on each others' ideas so as to create a better understanding of the world and 
solution that assure both adults' and children's 'well of being' (Kennedy, 2006) and 
philosophy is a way to achieve this.
Bearing also in mind Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1964) ideas of exploring the irrational 
and integrating it into an 'expanded reason', the liberation of children from the
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constraints that Piaget noted, Egan's ideas about the losses in adults' thinking and the 
discussion about freedom, mutuality and children's rights notes a recovery of children's 
status. Philosophy with children helps in strengthening this status even more81 . There is 
no need to view children and adults as binary opposites, but as complementary whose 
aim should be the mutual understanding of themselves and the finding of solutions that 
serve both and maintain life in the world 82 (Postman, 1996).
In respect to the generative aspect of philosophy, children's questions such as "How 
can we be sure that everything is not a dream?" or "Why is it better for three people to 
be selfish than for one?" are the products of "genuine ignorance and profound naivety", 
urging children to ask for solutions (Matthews, 1980, p.73). Even if children are not 
natural philosophers, as Matthews perceives83 , their ignorance and naivety trigger their 
imagination and make them ask philosophical questions which is the base of philosophy 
as a generative force.
Children seem not only to understand the metaphorical structure of our language but 
they are also able to create their own analogies (Vosniadou and Ortony, 1983; Winner, 
1997). Children can also learn from metaphors as they provide vivid visual associations 
between the topic and the vehicle used for a metaphor (Williams, 2002, p. 17). 
Children's memories are improved by metaphorical associations (Buzan, 1995; 
Vosniadou and Ortony, 1983). If empirical research shows that children are capable of 
understanding and creating metaphors, then philosophy as an imaginative process
81 "The idea of learning to philosophise in schools assumes that children only fully blossom in school when encouraged to take 
active and deliberate steps to seek responses to the questions about existence they raise at a very early age" (UNESCO.2009, p. 
14).
82 Postman (1996) portrays the idea of earth as a vulnerable space capsule that human should take care of (Earth caretakers). 
Saving the planet is ensuring our life on Earth, therefore it is a win-win situation. Global consciousness could be both subject for 
philosophical inquiry but also an educational aim.
83 There is a strong critique of Matthews' idea that children are natural philosophers. John White (1992) claims that what makes a 
question philosophical is the intention rather than its verbal form. Children, according to White (1992) ask questions because they 
want to learn the correct use of English words, however, he seems to deliberately dismisses children's spontaneity to ask 
philosophical questions rather than asking for grammatical reasons. Michael Hand (2008) seems to provide us with more sound 
arguments why children are not natural philosophers: He claims that: a) children ask various questions, e.g. about the past or how 
things work but that does not convert children to natural historians or scientists and b) it is not the asking of questions that make 
someone a philosopher but mostly the kind of the questions asked, their purpose and the method used.
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would be another stimulus to develop their imaginative thinking. Metaphors link with 
humour and playfulness (Fisher, 2007a), as both are part of children's ways of life.
The generative aspect of philosophy as described in chapter one sets the 
presuppositions for people who want to practice it. Such presuppositions refer to an 
open-minded attitude, the ability to think creatively, the willingness for testing, 
hypothesising, playing with ideas and asking questions. Finally, all these presupposition 
are based on people's freedom to think and the expression of their thinking. Are all 
these presuppositions met by children?
The generative aspect of philosophy requires a questioning attitude. Asking questions 
touches the borders of what is known and links the known and the unknown. This 
uncertainty forces people to draw new lines in thinking, find new paths and try to 
understand what is yet unknown. Such curiosity is characteristic of young children. 
Children ask in order to understand the world around them. Their freshness and 
inventiveness of mind lead them often to questions that even mature adults do not state 
so clearly (Matthews, 1994).
Unless influenced by adults, children have no prejudices that could limit their ability to 
open their minds84 . Philosophy as a generative force requires the 'opening' of minds 
and 'thinking outside of the box'; it involves playing with new ideas, testing them, and 
hypothesising (Haynes, 2008; Fisher 2003, 2007b; Murris and Haynes, 2000b). It is an 
imaginative process. This is one way children acquire new experiences in their life. 
Children test ideas, play with them, repeat them, think in metaphors so as to establish 
habits and think imaginatively (Murris and Haynes, 2000a). Children are familiar with 
playing with ideas through their play, games, role play and the reading of fairy tales and 
other stories.
The evaluative aspect of philosophy matches also with the child from the point of view 
that often evaluation requires imagination. However, critical thinking sets boundaries to
84 Larosa and Bettmann (2000) give more details on how parents can transfer prejudices to children and how to amend mistakes.
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creative thinking. If the generative aspect comes close to children's nature, then it is a 
constraint on their thinking. The evaluative aspect is often similar to what children have 
been taught mainly by adults. They are already familiar with constraints. Children are 
also familiar that certain rights do not waive duties. If this is the case then evaluative 
thinking which entails critical thinking and making judgements makes thinking more 
rigorous. Children can 'go crazy' with ideas but they understand that not all creative 
ideas are applicable and that the next step is to critique which of these ideas are to be 
used or not and which stand to reason. What is important for the facilitator here is to 
listen to what children consider as reasonable and not directly impose on them what 
adults regard as reasonable85 .
Children need self-reassurance that they are autonomous enough to do things on their 
own and can take initiatives and accomplish the tasks they begin successfully86 
(Erikson, 1959). The sense of autonomy and gaining control over taking initiatives and 
being competitive can be reinforced by philosophy as an evaluative force. Philosophy, in 
this case, provides children with the thinking tools that can help them take decisions, 
critique their ideas and judge whether they stand to reason. Taking it further, children 
that are able to judge well will feel more confident, independent, proud, responsible for 
their thinking and this will put in motion a virtuous circle, which will also continue to be 
demonstrated in certain behaviours.
Philosophy as an evaluative force enables children to find ways so as to reflect, express 
their thoughts into words and check for the validity of what they say. As a linguistic 
activity it allows people "to agree in the language they use [which] is not agreement in 
opinions but in form of life" (Wittgenstein, P.I. 241). Especially for children coming from
85 See more about the idea of reasonableness in chapter 6 when I refer to critical listening.
86 Erikson (1959) discusses the different crisis that one faces in different stages of one's life. Thus, the toddlers come through the 
second stage of being able to assert their will which can either be successful so children become autonomous, or unsuccessful, so 
children feel shame and doubt. As preschoolers the children come through another crisis, which refers to their ability to accomplish 
certain tasks. Children who succeed acquire a sense of initiative which makes them autonomous and help them proceed further, 
whereas children who are unsuccessful feel shame and quilt. For children aged 7-12 the crisis they encounter depends on whether 
they are successful in showing competence or not. Upon successful overcoming of this crisis the child feels productive while, 
unsuccessful completion of this stage leads them to inferiority.
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lower socio-economic environments with restricted language codes (Bernstein, 1964; 
1971) they can amend through philosophical inquiries any linguistic deficiencies87 . As 
philosophy does not seek necessarily to find 'nice' words to express thoughts, but is 
focused on finding the ones that describe one's ideas accurately, philosophy could be 
one way of bringing equilibrium between expressing thoughts in a much better linguistic 
way because it uses everyday language. Through it children from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds make themselves understood, use the vocabulary that enables them to 
express their thoughts and finally make them feel that they are accepted not just for 
their ability to make themselves clear to others. Finally, philosophy as an evaluative 
force prevents children from becoming nihilists (in the case that everything goes without 
any judgements) or absolutists (follow uncritically a certain opinion as the only correct 
one) because both reflect an inability to take responsibility for one's own thinking 
(Golding, 2009).
Both the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy employ two pairs of forces: 
assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1929). This is what children do naturally 
anyway: They get more information that changes their thoughts (assimilation) and at the 
same time the children change so as to be able to incorporate the new information 
(accommodation). Is philosophy as a way of life applicable to the lives of children? Can 
they lead a philosophical way of life? My tentative answer at this stage is 'Yes 1 but not 
necessarily in the same way that a philosophical life is understood by adults. We cannot 
expect children to work and reflect on philosophers' texts. We can expect, however, 
from them to take action that is meaningful and true for themselves and others. Children 
can both philosophically reflect on their thoughts and get involved in a dialogue with 
others. Philosophy with children as a way of life does not necessarily happen in the 
classroom during an inquiry. It is not simply a discourse in a classroom and has no
87 Bernstein was an educator and sociologist who was interested in the poor performance of students coming from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds. He found out that the children's poor performance is due to the different language used in school and 
their homes. Bernstein (1971) claimed that the way language is used in a specific class of society affects the way people assign 
significance and meaning to what is said. A linguistic code can show the social identity of the person who uses it. According to 
Bernstein (1971) this code can be elaborated or restricted. The elaborated code expresses explicitly all thoughts which the restricted 
code is taken for granted. The elaborate code can secure a better understanding of what is said while in the restricted code 
misunderstandings may occur as it is not clear that the words are used in the same way to create meanings.
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value if it becomes another school subject and not transferred into children's everyday 
life. However, children cannot live philosophically if adults do not listen to them, 
encourage them to philosophise by providing stimuli and by taking advantage of 
stimulating situations that enables wondering (e.g. during shopping, playing computer 
games or swimming). The role of education is to highlight children's philosophical way 
of life, which can start in school and continue after that. This is possible by providing a 
stimulating education, freedom of thought and the chance to reflect on the 
consequences of their praxis, instead of telling them constantly what they should do and 
what to think.
2.4. Need for stimuli
Philosophy with children as a way of life can be understood as being both reactive and 
proactive. Reactive means that children are able to deal with situations they face in their 
everyday life by applying the skills and attitudes acquired through philosophy. Proactive 
means that children can predict and solve future situations because of their 
philosophical thinking.
To establish philosophy as a way of life and to include the generative and evaluative 
aspects, the role of stimuli is catalytic. The teacher as facilitator needs to be sensitive 
enough so as to acknowledge and take advantage of the stimuli that children 
themselves bring into the inquiry. In cases that children are not ready yet to bring in 
their own stimuli, the facilitator should be able to carefully select the stimuli that could 
lead to a philosophical inquiry, but also be aware to stop selecting them when the 
children are able to do so, on their own.
Children need to encounter stimuli that will 'trigger' their thinking and will make it easier 
to come up with new thoughts or thoughts they had, but never before offered. Stimuli 
are the 'tools' that can enable children to express their potentials. According to 
'Darwinian Theory', it is the use of tools and the cooperative patterns that developed the
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technical and social life of humans (Bruner, 1966). Similarly, the stimuli and the 
discussion about them with others are the ways to make children think better. Stimuli 
can be dealt with in both a reactive and proactive way. Reactive refers to recognising 
and dealing with the stimuli that emerge from children and could be philosophically 
interesting. Proactive refers to offering stimuli to children that will strengthen their ability 
to philosophise, be more sensitive to problems and take action towards their solution.
2.5. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was: a) to argue for my conceptualization of philosophy for 
children, b) to examine the different epistemologies of various philosophy for children 
and c) to examine whether philosophy as described in chapter one (generative aspect, 
evaluative aspect, philosophy as a way of life) is compatible with philosophy for children 
and with what is considered as a child.
Borrowing Gregory's and Golding's categorization helped in highlighting how the 
different epistemological positions that different practitioners in P4C accept influence 
what is considered as philosophy for/with children. According to Gregory, there are 
three different main traditions that influence the aims and the processes within 
philosophy for/with children: Realism, which accepts that the world exists independently 
from people's understanding, first-order non-realism that claims that the 'real' world 
exists but depends on people's understandings, and second-order non-realism which 
argues that people's understandings may distort what is real. According to Golding, 
philosophy for children could be based on dualism, which states that there is an 
ontological separation between people's minds and the world, relativism, which 
assumes that all opinions are true (personal truth) and critical pluralism, which is a 
position between dualism and relativism.
I have argued that there is an overlap between the different systems of categorization 
offered by Gregory and Golding. As far as the relationship of these epistemologies is
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with the generative and evaluative aspects of philosophy described in chapter one, 
realists and dualists would accept the evaluative aspect of philosophy, but not the 
generative one. Relativists and second-order non-realist would possibly accept the 
generative aspect but not the evaluative. Philosophy as a generative and evaluative 
aspect seems to share similarities with Critical Pluralism and first-order non-realism. 
However, another aspect has not sufficiently been considered, philosophy as a way of 
life, or in other words how philosophy for children can be something more than a 
reasoned dialogue among children within the confines of classroom walls
In the final part of this chapter I examined in what ways children and philosophy as a 
generative and evaluative force and as a way of life match. Children and philosophy as 
a generative force connect as they both presuppose an open-minded attitude towards 
the new, a playing with new ideas, the ability to hypothesize and to probe questions, 
and finally to think in metaphors for establishing meaning. The evaluative aspect of 
philosophy is what teaches children to think about their thinking and to test their ideas 
for applicability and reasonableness.
Through the process of assimilation and accommodation, children learn to adjust to the 
world they live in. Philosophy as a way of life can enable this process in two ways: by 
being proactive (giving children carefully selected stimuli to encourage philosophical 
thinking) and reactive (recognising the philosophical ideas that children bring to the 
classroom from their everyday life). Such stimuli are either selected by the facilitator or 
by the children themselves.
The chapter ended with an argument for the need of stimuli in order to establish 
philosophy as a way of life. The next chapter illustrates how a selection of stimuli (also 
reflecting the different philosophical traditions within P4C/PwC) have been used in 
classrooms and what stimuli are required for practising philosophy as a way of life with 
generative and evaluative aspects.
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CHAPTER 3




This chapter aims to answer the question whether the stimuli that have been used for 
doing philosophy for/ with children in the field share aspects of the philosophy that has 
been viewed in the first chapter. These stimuli have been categorised into those that 
were particularly designed for doing philosophy with children, such as Matthew 
Lipman's novels and those that were not designed with doing philosophy with children, 
such as children's literature. Particularly, this chapter will investigate whether the 
generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy, along with the view of philosophy as a 
way of life are reflected in the stimuli as far as their purpose, content and the way they 
have been used are concerned.
3.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present the main stimuli that have been used for doing 
philosophy with children and investigate whether generative and evaluative aspects of 
philosophy are reflected in them, as far as their purpose, content and the way they have 
been used is concerned. To enable this process, stimuli will be separated into two 
categories: those that have been intentionally designed for doing philosophy for 
children, such as what is called the P4C programme, developed mainly by Matthew 
Lipman and those that have not been intentionally designed, and have been used. The 
latter category includes children's literature, works of art, pieces of music and various 
stimuli that come from children's everyday experiences. This broader category could be 
further separated into subcategories, such as those that are text-based and those that 
are not.
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3.2. Stimuli specially designed for doing philosophy with children 
3.2.1 Novels and short stories
There are stimuli purposely written for doing philosophy with children such as Matthew 
Lipman's novels and manuals88 . Lipman (2003, p. 101; 1996a) and Ann Margaret Sharp 
(1992; 1995, pp.53-54) view the text of their novels as:
a) a model of community of inquiry which is performed by the characters of the story 
in a story form, with a text based on Plato's style of dialogues89 ,
b) a 'place' which reflects the values and the achievements of past generations,
c) a link between the individual and the culture,
d) a platform for critical reflection on concepts that are meaningful and interesting to 
children and also subject to philosophical investigation,
e) a 'place' to depict human relationships, especially in terms of logical relations and
f) a process of showing model communities of inquiry with the educational purpose 
of an internalization of the thinking behaviours displayed by the fictional 
characters.
Lipman's creative project comprised of philosophical themes and (more importantly) 
ways of philosophising as portrayed in the Platonic dialogues in a context that could be 
conceived by children. Lipman wrote firstly 'Harry Stotlemeier's discovery'90 and 
continued with the same children's characters (representing different ways of thinking) 
in subsequent novels. This gave a sense of continuity and familiarity with the 
characters, which may help the readers identify themselves with the novels' 
protagonists.
88 Matthew Lipman was the first to write novels for doing P4C accompanied by their manuals. Harry Stotlemeier's Discovery was 
his first novel written for P4C addressed to 5-6 grade children and analysing mainly Logic problems. Other novels followed such as 
Lisa (concentrated mainly on ethics), Suki (concentrated on aesthetics) and Mark (focused on Social-political issues) for 7-10 grade 
children, Pixi, Kio and Gus, for 3-4 grade children and 'Elfie' for K-2 grade children. Ann Margaret Sharp wrote novels for younger 
children such as the Doll's hospital and Geraldo and accompanying manuals which were co-authored with Laurence Splitter.
89 See examples of Socratic dialogues in Meno, Euthyphro, Symposium (2005)
90 This is a creative anagram of Aristotle's name.
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The writing of the novels was definitely a creative and generative process for Lipman. 
Lipman thought creatively because he translated academic philosophy into everyday 
language that could be used with children. Writing the novels was also an evaluative 
process, since Lipman had to think critically what to include and what to leave out, 
taking into consideration children's interests and the possibilities of identifying with the 
historical and social context in which the children of the novel grew up. Lipman applied 
philosophy as a way of life by creating a 'world of thinking out loud' for children, who 
through dialogue would be provoked to philosophise about their everyday life 
experiences. The characters within the stories are models of thoughtful behaviour for 
young readers. However, the fact that the writing process of the novels had a creative 
and evaluative philosophical aspect for Lipman does not necessarily guarantee that it 
involves a creative process for the younger readers.
Lipman (in an interview he gave to Eulalia Bosch) explains why one should use novels 
to do philosophy with children:
M.L.: In this way philosophy is more accessible, because stories are 
easier to read than philosophy textbooks. Narratives create a 
particular momentum that makes you want to read the next page, 
something that never happens with a textbook. On the contrary, 
one's eyes get tired; one's mind goes away... Textbooks do not allow 
that. Textbooks always add more and more information, while novels 
have an organic unity. Every element works simultaneously in order 
to create a characteristic moment of inquiry. The fictitious children in 
the novels are exploring, they are investigating and inquiring. They 
try to discover the meanings they need. In this sense, the text is 
important as a tool which facilitates the inquiry. Children, of whatever 
age, may want to learn and maybe they do not know how to do it. 
They need to learn how to learn, and, maybe, for that, they need to 
be in front of a model which shows this clearly. If the book shows this 
process, it may be easier, once in the classroom, with real children, 
that everybody will be able to start to think by himself. And the 
model, understood in those terms, is an emblem, a standard to which 
one can refer because it shows and explains and does not just try to 
tell. (Bosch, 1998a, pp. 1 -4)
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Still Lipman does not move away from the textbook since he is prescriptive about what 
are the correct ways for reasoning. However, what differentiates Lipman's novels from 
textbooks is that he introduces this reasoning through narrative (Lipman, 2003); 
therefore the different ways of reasoning are portrayed by the characters of the novels 
instead of being given as ready-made products to children. Below are some questions 
to consider which inspired other educationalists and philosophers to develop Lipman's 
idea.
Are stimuli specifically designed for doing philosophy with children able to help children 
view philosophy as a way of life and as a way to unfold philosophy's creative and 
evaluative aspects? I will use following example from Lipman's Elfie to explore this 
question. When Elfie asks the question "why do we go to school?" (Lipman, 1988c, 
p. 17) one can imagine a real child asking exactly the same question. The same 
happens with Jess who wonders, referring to her doll "where was Roller before she 
came to the toy shop?" (Sharp, 2000, p.3). Such a question can provoke discussions 
about one's origin - whether one is a person or an object. There are other examples of 
deliberately philosophical questions, such as Kathy's question "Can time go 
backwards?" and a deliberately given response in the form of a question "What kind of 
dumb question is that?" (Lipman, 1988c, p.9). Lipman had a strong academic 
philosophical background which is clear by the way in which he deliberately 'injected' 
philosophical themes and questions into his novels. There is nothing wrong in 
deliberately posing questions, what seems wrong is the assumption that these 
questions are the only philosophical ones and that they should be used as a prescriptive 
guide by the facilitator. Most importantly the facilitator needs to pick the philosophical 
aspect of the questions that children raise by themselves. The idea of all educational 
materials is to teach something, however, if this material is aligned with children's 
interests and needs, then the learning and teaching process is easier and enjoyable for 
children91 .
91 Even with mathematics that someone can claim they do not come naturally to children, if they are taught embedded in particular 
examples from children's life, they are better understood.
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Lipman's novels and other purposely written materials for doing philosophy for children 
have been criticised as being artificial92 and not reflecting children's interests and 
needs93 (Daniel, 1998). As for the content, the novels cannot be easily adapted to 
different cultures with different values, curricula, educational systems and teachers' 
roles from those in America94 (Reed and Johnson, 1999; Liptai, 2005; Daniel, 1998). 
Critical thinking cannot be studied in the abstract and outside children's experiential and 
cultural context95 (Sharma, 1995),
Regardless of the deliberate artificiality and cultural specificity, Lipman's P4C novels are 
still popular stimuli for doing philosophy with children in many parts of the world. This 
fact indicates that either there is something qualitative about the novels, or that 
Lipman's novels as a first introduction for doing philosophy with children are so well 
'promoted' that people in other countries prefer to translate them (regardless of the 
possible problems that may occur in translation) and experiment with philosophy for 
children by using stimuli that are 'tried and tested'. My answer is that there is a need for 
distinguishing between the novels and the manuals that accompany the novels96 . The 
latter are very informative and perhaps less culturally specific than the novels. It might 
be because of the manuals that Lipman's material is still very popular. Any alternatives 
that could 'replace' them should be: a) of better quality than Lipman's material so as to 
find supporters, b) well promoted as an alternative so as again to find supporters, and c) 
portray a different philosophical perspective from the one that Lipman offers.
92 Lipman et al (1980) admits that he purposely did not want his work to be a work of literature because he did not want students to 
be seduced by the literary ways of writing, on the contrary he wanted them to concentrate on good reasoning.
93 Juuso (2007) supports Lipman and suggests that he (Lipman) has created a new genre of children's literature: the philosophical 
story. Lipman, according to Juuso (2007), aims at returning to the fundamental roots of philosophy through turning children to 
philosophical concepts that are within their reach. However, later on in his dissertation, he critiques Lipman's narrative style of 
writing in the third person as if the narrator (Lipman) knows everything.
94 Laurence Splitter (1992), nevertheless, made an effort to adjust Harry Stottlemeier in Australia94, so as to make it updated and 
current to another social context. Lena Green (2000) also encouraged teachers in South Africa to create their own materials that 
could be adjusted to African Culture. However, using Lipman's material as an example for African teachers to get an idea of what 
philosophy for children is can lead to the imitation of Lipman's material as is the case with Green's material. The stories are similar 
but American names have been replaced for African names. Thus, the material used are not linked to African children's experiences 
and culture.
95 Lim (2003) has used Asian local tales, comics on Confucius and Lao Tzu as stimuli to do philosophy with children in Singapore.
96 See next section in which it is explained what manuals are.
93
There are many alternative stimuli used for doing philosophy for children which deviate 
from the idea of Lipman's novel/manual format. For instance, Cathrine McCall's novels 
describe the same story97 , the everyday life of a family, from the points of view of 
children in 'Laura and Paul' (1992) and of parents in 'Changes' (1993). Philip Cam's 
thinking stories is a collection of short stories, not linked together, but each of which can 
be explored philosophically.
Philip Cam wrote a series of Thinking Stones 1,2 and 3 (1993, 1994, 1997) which 
consist of an anthology of short stories specially written for doing P4C and are 
accompanied by manuals that elaborate upon them. Cam followed the same pattern 
that Lipman introduced. What is different, however, is that the stories stand on their 
own, are not connected with each other as is the case with the episodes in Lipman's or 
Sharp's novels. Cam's idea was to respond to one of the critiques concerning the sheer 
volume of the P4C programme that may put off educators and children to work with 
them (Cam, 1995).
97 For instance, McCall's novels (1992;1993) remind one of John Burningham's picture-book Come away from the water Shirley 
(1977), where one page describes the world of adults that does not change greatly, while the opposite page describes the colourful 
and instantly changing world of Shirley's fantasy. It also reminds one of Anthony Browne's picture-book Voices in the park' (1998), 
which presents the same story viewed from four different perspectives but in less space and with rich images. Even though McCall's 
approach is philosophically interesting as it shows how reality is differently perceived, it lacks immediacy, as one needs to read the 
two books and think consciously whether there is a kind of connection between the two novels. As the reading of the novels does 
not happen instantly, this element of telling the same story from different perspectives may be lost.
94
EXERCISE: What's Possible?
We can make sense of many things that could not actually happen. Take Superman. 
No one could really do what Superman does, I guess, but we have no difficulty in 
making sense of him. Yet some things that couldn't happen also don't make sense. 
You couldn't find a square circle, for instance. The idea of a square circle doesn't 
even make sense.
So some things could happen and other things couldn't really happen. Some 



















In which box(l, 2, 3 or 4) would you place each of the following, and why?
a. A talking turtle
b. A person who wakes up to find that he is 70 years older than he remembers
	being the day before 
c. An old man who becomes a boy 
d. A tree that becomes fully grown overnight, 
e. A person remembering something that happens in the future 
f. Changing the future 
g. Changing the past 
h. Time travel
34 Tommy and the Time Turtle
Figure 3.1: Exercise from the manual that accompanies Cam's Thinking stories 1
The short stories in comparison to the novels: a) can be read in their entirety during one 
lesson, and b) it is likely to remain fresh in children's memories (Costello, 1988; 1992). 
Children know the beginning, middle and end of the story which helps them grasp a 
sense of unity and completeness and make critical judgements since the readers know 
the purpose of the story (Egan, 1997; Fisher, 2003). Robert Fisher (1995) seems to
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agree with Cam's attitude towards creating philosophical material and expands the idea 
by re-writing well-known folk stories (1996b), poems (1997a) and games (1997b) for 
thinking98 .
3.2.2. Manuals that accompany novels and short stories
Lipman, Sharp, Splitter and Cam provide teachers with manuals which help them make 
the most of each story and explore them philosophically with children. The manuals are 
full of exercises and discussion plans on certain concepts that are embedded in each 
chapter of the novel. These manuals help the facilitator to: a) ask philosophical 
questions that are derived from an academically philosophical tradition, b) get familiar 
with the methodology and discipline of philosophy, c) open the space to philosophical 
debate by presenting alternative points of view and supporting them logically with 
arguments, d) focus on specific problems and seek a solution or judgement, and e) 
examine abstract concepts related to children's interests through the inquiry (Lipman 
1996a, p. 12; 1996b, pp.64-67). The following table explains roughly how each novel is 
related to its manual:
98 Folktales and legends are materials not purposely designed for doing philosophy but could be used for philosophy with children. 
Folktales, fairy tales, proverbs, jokes are also suitable stimuli for doing philosophy from both a philosophical and educational point of 
view. They offer people moments of joy, ambiguity in meanings (therefore room for multiple interpretations), diversity, provenance 
(from the point of view that they are expressions of a whole community and not a particular individual), and "a legitimate way to 








A manual accompanies a novel and follows the novel's 
division into chapters and episodes
  For each chapter: leading ideas are isolated (e.g. truth, 
beauty)
  For each leading idea: The manual offers discussion 
plans and exercises
  Each discussion plan is a list of questions that explore 
further the specific leading idea and in a logical order, 
form easy to more complex.
  The exercises explore further the leading ideas in a 
playful way. For example, a list of statements is given 
to children and they have to judge them as true/false/ 
____not sure, justifying their answer.______________
Figure 3. 2: How Lipman's novels and manuals are linked together
Below there is an exercise on the concept of Freedom (Lipman and Sharp, 1982, 
p.235):
EXERCISE: Freedom
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If you agree, 
why? If you don't agree, why not?
Agree/ Disagree?
1. We are free if no one tells us how to live,
2. We are free if we make up and follow our own rules for how to live.
3. We are free when nothing gets in our way.
4. We are free if we think we're free.
5. We are free when we can do what we think well.
6. We are free if we are healthy.
7. We are free if we are intelligent
8. We are free only when everyone is free.
9. We are free if we are ourselves.
10. We are free when all the above statements are combined.
Figure 3.3: Exercise from Lipman's manual: Looking for meaning that accompanies Pixie
The use of this exercise as a game with children - especially if the subject of freedom is 
raised by children - is educationally a useful idea; however the use of similar exercises 
as the only way to do philosophy needs to be questioned. The exercises and the 
discussion plans are examples of philosophy prescribed to children and not philosophy
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that is made by or with the children. Lipman (and not the children) has thought 
creatively about concepts of freedom. The same critique applies to Lipman's discussion 
plans that:
...consists of a group of questions that generally deal with a single 
concept, relationship (such as a distinction or connection) or problem. 
The questions may form a series, in which each builds upon its 
predecessors, or they may form a circle around the topic so that each 
question focuses upon the topic from a different angle. We can speak 
of these two families of discussion plans as cumulative and 
noncumulative" (1996a, pp.65).
Regarding the manuals, they have been considered as too directive and simplistic 
(Reed, 1999). To illustrate, the question 'what is truth' in the manual that accompanies 
'Elfie' is divided into sub questions pre-arranged that claim to analyse further the 
concept (e.g. is truth a word/ a thing/ a bird/ a colour? Is truth rich/ happy?) (Lipman, 
1988c, pp. 325-327). Lipman knows how to approach such questions, but it cannot be 
taken for granted that teachers would know this as well. If the lesson plans or the 
exercises in the manual are used as 'recipes' by teachers with no philosophical 
background or as worksheets for students to complete, then they can lead to a sort of 
inquiry that is far away from being philosophical 100 . Manuals work as a tool of instruction 
to deliver philosophy while "philosophy by its nature is not a delivered lesson" (Reed, 
1999, p.111). A 'pack of instructions' with exercises and questions are not enough to 
teach a facilitator how to philosophise. The facilitator, especially the one who has no 
philosophical background can get ideas from the manuals but s/he has to discover on 
her/his own what philosophy means to her/him. This can be achieved through personal
99 An example of a non cumulative discussion plan is given by Lipman when he asks whether a desk/ school/ family/ home/ street/ 
USA, world, story have a story. A cumulative discussion refers to investigating a specific subject starting with easier questions and 
moving to more difficult and abstract ones.
100 It's up to the facilitator and the feedback s/he takes from children how the stimuli will open up an inquiry. The pre-made question 
by Lipman and the options given could lead to philosophical discussions such as the connection of truth with its linguistic 
expression, the metaphorical thinking of truth in terms of colours, or emotional moods etc. A facilitator with strong philosophical 
background may direct children to a philosophical discussion that is not of children's interest. On the other hand, a facilitator with no 
philosophical background may not pick philosophical notions in children's answers that could be explored further.
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reflection, reading of philosophy and mostly practising philosophy in one's life, which is 
possible if philosophy is truly something that the facilitator loves and values.
Lipman argues that the manuals should be used in combination with training. However, 
the use of manuals presupposes that philosophy is something that can be learnt if 
certain instructions are to be followed. If philosophy is learnt that means there is 
someone who already knows (or has learned) what philosophy is and can teach the 
others how to do philosophy according to what someone or the 'books' say. Lipman 
knew well that the majority of teachers do not have a philosophical background so his 
initial thought was that providing teachers with manuals would support them in doing 
philosophy with children. However, Lipman portrays what is philosophy for him (or for 
the Anglo-American academic tradition he was educated in), but then adapted for 
children.
Lipman created material that is value dependent on its type of use. When the manuals 
are viewed as stimuli that will inspire both teachers and children to think further beyond 
the realms of their own thinking, then they have a generative philosophical aspect. If, 
however, they are viewed as manuals that should be followed so as to reassure that this 
is the proper way of doing philosophy, then each generative aspect of producing new 
thoughts is simply lost. The evaluative aspect of doing philosophy is also lost if manuals 
are seen as 'recipes' to follow.
McCall (2009) does not provide manuals as she considers them too restrictive and she 
assumes that the teacher who does philosophy with children has a previous background 
in academic philosophy and training in doing philosophy with children. Instead, she 
proposes her method, Community of Philosophical Inquiry method (CoPI) based on 
children's use of the formula "I agree/ disagree with...because..." when doing
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philosophising 101 . She also insists in teachers' philosophical training before using this 
method and enriching their philosophical background by on-going personal study.
Specially designed stimuli for doing 'philosophy with children' deliberately lack images 
that could make them more appealing to children. Lipman et al (1980) have claimed that 
readily presented images trap children's imagination and creativity from moving in 
different directions to the ones adults have already thought of. However, there are 
images that could act as stimuli and create in children a sense of puzzlement and 
inquiry (Murris and Haynes, 2000a) because meaning is not only found in words but 
also in images 102 (Murris, 1994).
3.2.3. Other intentionally designed textual material
Yim Pyoung Kap (2003) has created comics for doing philosophy, considering that 
comics appeal to children because of their form (images and texts that flow quickly). 
However, Kap's images are used less philosophically as they are used mostly as a way 
to illustrate the characters of the story. The basic characters are four members of a 
family, Socrates (who seems to escape from a frame on the wall and come to life 
whenever a philosophical issue can be raised), a Sphinx, a robot and a pet dog. 
Therefore the philosophical stimuli come mainly from the text, which often tries to 
deliberately elicit further philosophical discussion. Even though it can be argued that 
young people are familiar with the medium of comics and can easily take to it, they can 
lose their interest in reading it if the comic does not serve the role that comics do (e.g. 
entertainment). Below there is an example from Kap's comics:
101 Recently, McCall (2009) has reformed her formula to the model "I agree/ disagree with..(name of the person) .who said, 
(reconstruction of what has been said), .because, .(providing reasons)." This model requires listening carefully and remembering well 
what the others have said, reconstructing what has been said as accurately as possible and providing reasons.
102 Murris (1994) argues against Lipman that there is a confusion in equating 'imagination 1 with 'imagery'. She argues that the 






Figure 3.4: Sample of Yim Pyoung Kap's philosophical comics
The robot gets a virus and is taken to hospital. The first eight frames describe a really 
amusing story which could lead to philosophical discussion without the 'extra 
philosophical injection' of the last three frames. "Hey, by the way, can it happen our 
mind be virus-infected?" says the Sphinx and Socrates takes up the challenge to give
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an answer: "Why not? Haven't you guys heard about the mental viruses? That's not all! 
We may need vaccinating against". The discussion about viruses could occur without 
any need to force it. The fourth picture with the robot's head open in front of the doctor 
could be a stimulus on its own for critical and creative thinking: can robots have 
expressions when their heads are open? Are robots' viruses the same as humans'? 
What would a special hospital for robots look like? How would it be different from a 
normal hospital 103?
Michael Ende (1993, p.283) does not believe that "significant children's books have ever 
been written out of educational considerations" which questions the quality of Lipman's 
work. Ende (1993) argues that artistry is the only criterion to judge children's books 
which reflects the author's integrity of heart, mind and senses and therefore speaks 
about the integrity of people. He also claims that many books written for educational, 
political or sociological reasons usually reflect the tendency that adults have to discard 
whatever they consider as useless of children's literature. Lipman's novels cannot be 
considered as a 'by product', according to Ende; Lipman's intention was to help children 
reason well which is honest and welcome. However, I agree with Ende only to the point 
that the specially designed materials for doing philosophy for children lack the children's 
input as they are produced by adults and aim to be consumed by children. Philosophy 
appears as a product that adults make or select and children supposedly consume. In 
this way philosophy is something given from outside and not coming from children's
103 What might work better is the use of existing comics that are not specially designed for doing philosophy but philosophy is 
already infused in them. These cartoon serve both philosophy and enjoyment. Philosophy appears as a way of life and not as 
something 'technical' and 'artificial' attached to it. Such comics could be The Simpsons, the American TV animation created by Matt 
Greening for the Fox Broadcasting company have been used as an alternative stimulus fordoing philosophy. This comic describes 
satirically the everyday life of a working class American family that consists of five members (Homer, Marge, Bart, Lisa and Maggie) 
and reflects not only American culture and society but many traits of human nature that could be considered as universal (Conard 
and Skoble, 2001).
Another comic that could be excellent for doing philosophy with children is The Moomins (in Swedish: Mumintrolls), a series of 
comic books written and illustrated by Tove Jansson that describe the everyday life of a bohemian, eccentric and very tolerant to 
diversity family and other characters related to the family. The main three family members consist of Moomin Papa, Moomin Mama 
and Moomintrol, they look like hippopotamus and live in the Moomin valley. The different ideas and approaches the whole family 
has towards the external world could give raise to many philosophical dialogues (Jansson, 1961).
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experience, but what adults imagine or recollect from their own childhood as children's 
experiences.
A stimulus is appropriate when the child can identify with it, in a genuine and not 
imitative matter (Stevenson, 1993). Furthermore it seems too naive to assume that 
children who read novels will necessarily imitate the type of reasoning that fictional 
children demonstrate (Van De Leeuw, 2006, p.29). A stimulus is appropriate when it 
initiates in children questions not yet articulated or expressed. This is how philosophy 
can be linked with children's lives and experiences; not by artificially imitating a way of 
philosophising, but by involving children to ask philosophical questions that can be 
connected with their lives. A narrative text either in the form of a philosophical story or 
an ordinary story should provide a cognitive/effective experience which stimulates 
fruitful philosophical discussion by giving children a sense of the contingent complexities 
of a 'tangled' human life (Nussbaum, 1990, p.140).
3.3. Non-purposefully designed material for doing philosophy with 
children
This broad category includes whatever is not purposefully designed for doing 
philosophy with children but could be used for such an objective. These stimuli can be 
further divided into two subcategories: the text-based stimuli and non text-based stimuli. 
This division serves a methodological reason: to investigate whether these stimuli 
enable or can 'teach' children to think about their life philosophically and philosophy as 
a generative and evaluative force.
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3.3.1. Text based stimuli
Karin Murris (1992) introduced doing philosophy with existing stories104 and more 
specifically picture-books105 . Her book Teaching philosophy with picture-books inspired 
other P4C theoreticians and practitioners, such as Robert Fisher, to combine picture- 
books and philosophy. The illustration in children's books plays a mainly decorative role 
(Reeder, 1997) however, in picture-books text and image work together so as to make 
meaning for the story. Murris prefers picture-books as they are usually short stories and 
children can focus not only on how the story ends, but also on other details within the 
story such as the illustration which can give totally different messages comparing to the 
ones derived from the text (Murris, 1992). Picture-books do not 'spoon-feed' ready- 
made philosophical questions. On the contrary engagement with them offers "thought 
provoking ideas with no prescriptive content" (Murris, 2008b, p. 107). This means that 
the ideas which will emerge cannot have been predicted in advance. Also, there is 
always a possibility through engaging with the fictional characters, their dilemmas and 
the dealing with particular situations, that abstract truths are to be disclosed (Murris, 
2008b). Furthermore, the young non-readers can benefit from doing philosophy by 
listening to someone reading the story and getting the additional information from the 
pictures of the book (Scheinkman, 2004). Reading short stories to children prevents 
them from getting bored and enables them to remember more about the content of the 
story (Costello, 1992).
104 For more about enabling teachers to do philosophy with children by using stories see Sprod, 1993; Stanley, 2004; Glueck and 
Brighouse,2008; Fisher 1995. Sutcliffe and Williams, 2002; Murris and Haynes, 2000a. There are also more approaches that link 
picture-books with developing thinking skills but do not focus on philosophy (Polette,2007; Sipe,2008).
105 Burns (1997a&b) finds it difficult to define what a picture-book is and whether it is a separate genre or a format. Picture-books 
distinguish from children's books which are simply illustrated books. These books are not too rich for doing philosophy because 
there is no interaction between the two different systems: pictures and text. The word 'sophisticated' has been used for picture- 
books to imply that there are refined connections between pictures and texts which could be interesting not only for children but also 
for adults (Burns, 1997b; Weller,1984). In picture-books philosophy starts when the reader has to pay careful attention to both 
images and text, and use his/her critical and creative thinking so as to derive meaning from the book. Sipe (1998) argues that text 
and images of a picture-book create a new entity that it is more than adding its parts. In picture-books, words and images do not tell 
the same story; the pictures can be complementary, enhancing, contradictive, or counterpoising to the text (Wolfenbarger and Sipe, 
2007). Picture-books are multimodal texts where meaning is portrayed through different sign-systems: text and image 
(Serafini,2010). Sipe (2000) argues that these asymmetries make children readers to want to explore picturebooks more. This is out 
of readers' hermeneutic, personal and aesthetic impulses towards the picture-books (Sipe, 2000).
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In many picture-books, such as the ones written by John Burningham (1978; 1985), 
Anthony Browne (1985; 1997; 1987; 1994), Oram and Kitamura (1986; 1987), Maurice 
Sendak (1963; 1981) and David McKee (1980; 1982) both the text and the illustration 
are interdependent106 . Illustration stimulates children's critical thinking 107 rather than 
preventing them from imagining 108 (Murris, 1992; 1994). Pictures often enrich the story 
narrating other aspects of it which can be in accordance with the text or contrary to it. It 
is one of the points where literature and philosophy meet. Murris, referring to Egan, 
(1988; 1993) considers picture-books as an ideal place to present abstract binary 
concepts, such as love and hate, beauty and ugliness and odd creatures, like witches 
and monsters109 . For example, through the abstract binary concepts of love and hate 
children could engage into a philosophical discussion that can lead to different
106 For more examples about how meaning is derived from the connection of texts and images in picture-books, see chapter 5.
107 The Dyfed County Council project (1994) carried out a one year research that was focused on children aged 5 years and used 
Teaching Philosophy with Picture-books' (Murris, 1992) as the stimulus for discussion with the whole class. There were two 
experimental groups and one control group. One experimental group of six schools used two interventions (P4C-1 hour session per 
week and a reading activity), and the other experimental group of six schools used only the reading activity with a small group of 
children 'at risk' of reading difficulty. There was no intervention on the control group. A total of 229 children yielded data. The 
teachers received training and ongoing support by the project team. Data collected from: a) teacher questionnaires b) a measure of 
student attitude to reading, c) a reading analysis procedure, d) reading comprehension questions, and e) two tests from the British 
Abilities Scales the Word Recognition Test (reading) and the Matrices test (nonverbal reasoning). According to the outcomes of 
the standardized tests no significant differences among groups were referred. However, from the other measures it appeared that 
the first experimental group had the greatest gains in terms of thinking, listening, language skills, and self-confidence.
108 Egan (1992) does not approve of the pictures in books because their artists portray their personal view on how facts described 
in the story should be depicted. Lipman avoids also illustration in his novels as he thinks they capture children's imagination. Murris 
(1993;1994) critiques Lipman's argument, as she claims that he confuses 'imagination' with 'imagery'.
109 Egan (1997;2005) argues that the imaginative aspect of children's thinking "the other half has been forgotten in education, 
which centres too much on the logical-scientific 'side' of the child's mind. He recognises three different stages children's cognitive 
development goes through: a) the mythic, b) the romantic and c) the theoretic stage (Egan, 1997;2005). The first stage refers to the 
children aged 4-7 who understand the world in an imaginative - mythic way. The use of stories, metaphors, binary opposites, jokes, 
rhyme patterns, mystery and play are tools that match with the characteristics of children's understanding at this age and help them 
develop their understanding further (Egan,1997). The second stage encompasses children aged 7-12 approximately. The mythic 
layer of how children understand themselves and the world is replaced by a romantic one (Egan,1997). Children's cognitive 
characteristics that are displayed change so different that tools could now serve as their 'cognitive needs'. The use of heroes that 
gives the opportunity to children to identify with the sense of wonder, the need for reaching the limits of reality and experience, the 
narrative understanding (where things make sense in the context of a story) are some of the tools that can help children's cognitive 
development at this stage (Egan, 1997;2005).
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directions, such as what causes love and hate, whether love can transform into hate 
and vice versa, what is similar and what is different between the two concepts.
McKee's book '/ hate my teddy bear' (1982) is an example of such a puzzling book. The 
plurality of worlds that are demonstrated in McKee's book make the readers struggle to 
make meaning through the opposition of the text's simplicity and the imagery's 
complexity (Moss, 1992).
My teddy can count," said John
Figure 3.5: Picture from McKee's / hate my teddy bear
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; "So can mine," said Brenda.
Figure 3.6: Picture from McKee's / hate my teddy bear
The two children (shown by the sides of the ice cream kiosk) have been sent out to play 
with their teddy bears. After abandoning their teddies somewhere in the park they now 
begin their imaginative talk about what a teddy could do (e.g. counting). The text 
describes mainly the children's imaginative dialogues about their teddies. The images 
leave room for multiple interpretations, forming questions that may lead to philosophical 
discussions. Beginning with questions that come from the observation of the images 
such as:
  'Why is there a kettle in the middle of the road?'
  'What does the huge black statue of a hand represent?'
  'Why is it black?'
  'Why is there a man painting a rainbow?'
Children can move to more abstract and philosophical questions such as: 
'Is life a game?'
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  'Does the hand symbolize the order given by others to follow?'
  'Does the hand represent the heritage of the cultural past?'
  'Are adults free?'
  'Are nature and art connected?'
  'What is the nature of art and what is the art of nature?'
  'Can humans change (or create) nature?'
  'Should things in life make sense?'
  'When do adults stop being children?'
  'Is life inexplicable, discontinuous, incomprehensible and strange?'
The type of philosophy that is celebrated here matches well with the generative aspect 
of philosophy as it makes children wonder, generate questions and try to explain the 
symbols embedded in the images. The images invite multi-layered narratives that hold 
more than one meaning (May, 1995; Moss, 1992). The narrative lines that occur here, 
no matter whether they are fulfilled or not, open up a space to different philosophical 
interpretations, for instance about the confusion of male/female relationships (Moss, 
1992). It is also linked with the evaluative aspect, as it provokes reflective thinking and 
thinking about abstract concepts.
Are these picture-books aligned with philosophy's generative and evaluative aspects 
and philosophy as a way of life? As they have not been produced for doing philosophy 
with children, they lack the intention of adding purposeful ideas for the sake of doing 
philosophy in an academic and often artificial way110 . Picture-books do not force 
'philosophy', but often have 'philosophy' embedded in them 111 . Children's books have
110 Picture-books often reflect the authors' moral issues and perception of how the world is or could be (Stuart,1998, p.14). What 
makes it different from intentionally designed stimuli for doing philosophy is that picture-books show rather than deliberately tell what 
might be philosophical.
111 The writer and illustrator Shaun Tan (2006) claims that 'a successful picture-book is one in which everything is presented to the 
reader as a speculative proposition, wrapped in invisible quotation marks, as if to say 'what do you make of this?' This is a form of 
philosophy that comes not intentionally but one is genuinely interested to find meaning in one's illustration. See also chapter 4 
where there is a short philosophical analysis of some of the books illustrated by Tan.
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been written primarily for giving joy to children 112 and authors. Furthermore, the text and 
the images of a book reflect the author's: a) thoughts, b) imagination of how children 
could think and act, c) observations of how children react, and d) recollection of the 
child the writer once was (or still is). This is genuine as it comes from a genuine interest 
the writer has and it is not directed towards a purpose: to do philosophy. The non-linear 
reading of both text and images offers a re-presentation, not of the world, but of the 
world as already organized in discourse (Paul, L. 1992).
The writing of a story reflects the writer's philosophy from its generative point of view: 
creating something new. The same happens with the reader as beholder and re- 
constructer of the stimulus in a new way through questioning, inventing new analogies 
and metaphors, attempting to understand the writer's initial motivation and pushing 
thinking into new directions113 . The generative aspect of philosophical thinking is evident 
with the linking of ideas amongst people who discuss the stimulus and its 
characteristics. For instance, bridging the gaps between text and image is a creative 
process that can be "experienced differently as we grow older and as we bring our 
established habits of thought to the reading of the narrative" (Murris, 2008b, p.108).
Reading picture-books are usually part of children's experiences either in school or out 
of school (e.g. bedtime stories) and it helps naturally and spontaneously children to deal 
with emerging (and not forced) philosophical concepts. Philosophy can be infused in 
children's everyday life. It can start as a simple dialogue and gradually lead to
112 There are, however, many books that have more aims than just offering pleasure. For instance, there are books that offer 
enable children to: a) cope with their feelings or difficult situations (such as death or a divorce) (Jalongo,2004), b) become more 
creative in their thinking (Meador,1999)), c) enhance their critical skills (Graham,2000). There are two possibilities here: Either to 
have books that deal with certain subject but implicitly and in a literal way as it happens with Tan's The red tree where he shows 
rather than tells humans' loneliness and alienation from each other, or in Michael Rosen's The sad book where he deals with 
depression, or have books that are more prescriptive and provide particular ways of how to deal with such problems. Regarding the 
second case, the books might be useful but they are far away from being considered as works of literature. They seem to resemble 
with philosophy books specially written for children; both of them try to 'guide' people's behaviour or thinking. Strasser and Seplocha 
(2007) give a good distinction between picture-books and children's books: in the first case both picture and text are equally 
important in the second case there is simply text and illustration that are not connected together.
113 Mallan (1999) adopts the idea of'critical aesthetics' which combine the pleasure of reading with practising critique in this 
reading which seems to describe partly the role between philosophy and literature. Mallan's idea of 'critical aesthetics' is restricted to 
aesthetics whilst philosophy is broader; it includes aesthetics and does not end with it.
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questioning, reflecting, pointing arguments and counter arguments, learning to observe 
and listening to others. Philosophy becomes a lived way of life. Children's books with 
metaphors and the poetic style of writing can give way to children's imagination to 
generate ideas and questions, which is aligned with viewing philosophy as a generative 
force. The evaluation of thoughts generated and their possible application in everyday 
life comes as a consequence. Picture-books do not provide models of thinking at least 
in the same way that happens with the specially designed stimuli for doing philosophy 
with children and it is up to the facilitator and the group as to how they will infuse the 
evaluative aspect of philosophy in the use of picture-books.
3.3.2. Non textual material
Matthews (1993) also prefers existing stories as stimuli for doing philosophy along with 
questions115 that come directly from children's genuine interest and wonder 
(philosophical whimsy). In his book 'Dialogues with children', he gives many examples 
of philosophical discussions about happiness, desire, time travel and many other 
concepts that started after having read a story to a child or a group of children 
(Matthews, 1984). Matthews seems to add philosophy (by apt questioning) in children's 
everyday life or pick up moments of children's experiences 116 that could have 
philosophical interest and elaborate on them further so as to make children think more 
philosophically (Matthews, 1980). This is a more applied form of philosophy as a way of 
life, since philosophy is not only a matter that happens in a school as an activity, but 
something that can happen in children's real lives not necessarily systematically117 . It is,
115 Nelson's Socratic method (1993) is an 'updated' method of Socratic method used in philosophy with children. The stimuli for this
method are the questions that come from children's genuine puzzlement and are linked with children's experience. The method
aims at exploring and analysing children's thinking generated by a question at the greatest depth.
116Matthews in his book Philosophy and the Young Child (1980) refers directly to children's reasoning that comes from their play,
the reading of stories, children's moments of puzzlement and naTvete by citing extracts of their speech. What Matthews does is to
pick these moments and through questioning encourages children to elaborate further.
117 Adults' careful observation of what children do during their playing, drawing or watching TV could offer many moments of
philosophical reflection. Apt questions on children's drawings and listening to the stories that accompany their own drawings give
food to instant philosophical conversation (Coates,2004). Williams (2008) encourages children to write their own stories and then
use these stories as a starting point for philosophising. The philosophical discussion that comes as the natural consequences of
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however, up to adults to recognise these stimuli and encourage children's observations 
and engagements with them, rather than leaving them to one side. Patrick Costello 
(2007) takes these ideas a step further. Although he first started philosophy with 
children by using narratives as stimuli that he had written himself (alongside samples of 
reasoning to children and diagrammatical representations as e.g. PowerPoint slides), 
later on he began to write narratives that include the life of the contemporary classroom 
(Costello, 2000;2007). What Costello did was make stimuli out of children's own lived 
experiences. Children's experiences were incorporated into stories and consisted of a 
new stimulus in narrative form for further reflection and philosophical investigation.
Non-text based materials have been used much as stimuli by both Sara Liptai (2005) 
and Wendy Turgeon (2000) to encourage the use of musical pieces, objects and works 
of arts. Materials such as a work of art or ordinary objects can be used as stimuli as 
they include the "sociological, cultural and historical concerns that are attached to a 
specific object" (Liptai, 2005, p.4).
Drama has also been used for acting out the dilemmas philosophy poses (Kaye, 2006). 
According to Hannu Juuso the use of drama within philosophy aims at "presenting 
philosophy in such a way that it provides an opportunity for philosophising which in turn 
generates educationally important aspirations" (2007, p.63).
Similarly, photography (Williams et al, 2003; Liptai, 2002) and pictorial arts have been 
also suggested as fine stimuli for doing philosophy (Wilks, 1995; Turgeon, 2000, Slade 
and del Gigante118 1997). The question I raise again is whether these stimuli could be
children's activities with stimuli can be considered as philosophy lived within children's experience. Williams idea seem to go further 
with the journals Questions and Journal "100" ( Folman and Heesen,2000). They are both of philosophical content written and edited 
by children from different countries. As long the children write because they really need to express their philosophical ideas, then 
journals can be part of children's experience. Writing also helps children to express their ideas in a form that can be revised 
whenever children want to. Therefore, children's texts can be stimuli that children can access and discuss (and open them further) 
at their own time.
118 Slade and del Gigante presented children with art stimuli, such as a painting. The children had first information about the work 
of art. Then they were presented with a stimulus and invited to look at it carefully (or explore it with senses when feasible), ask
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viewed under philosophy as a way of life, highlighting its generative and evaluative 
aspect. Eulalia Bosch (1998b) introduced the 'mystery creatures' and how abstract 
works of art in museums can be perfect stimuli for PwC as they can create aesthetic 
responses to children (which are philosophical). Bosch used painting or sculptures that 
are abstract. The sculptures are 'mysterious' for both the facilitator and the children 
which makes everyone start from the same creative hypotheses of what the sculptures 
could be and their critical reasoning to support their ideas. The 'mystery creatures' are:
...objects with their own life that contain a mystery - knowledge and 
doubts- which can only be discovered by attentive contemplation. 
Aesthetic perception, the perception of an object's artistic qualities, is an 
act of seduction. We see many things, as we see many works of art, but 
we only look at some of them. We look at those that have held our 
undivided attention for a given moment, and have generated an inner 
supplication, born within us and addressed to us, a plea for further 
looking, listening, touching. This reflexive and reflective concern - 
reflexive, because it is a means of concerning ourselves with ourselves; 
reflective, because the sensation continues through the act of pondering 
- is what turns the perceptive act into an act of intellectual seduction 
(Bosch, 2001, p.168).
What Bosch demonstrates here, but not explicitly, is the importance of the attention 
people pay to a stimulus and their connection with the stimulus through the senses, 
their reflections and later on the dialogue with others. In her book, 'The pleasure of 
beholding' she states that one must feel attracted by "the silent dialogue the object 
inspires" (1998b. p.69). Bosch seems to reflect upon the idea expressed in the first 
chapter of philosophy as a generative force, where the mystery creature is there and 
sets a force upon the people, who will set a force to 'open' the stimulus further and 
along with it understand themselves (philosophy as a way of life). Works of art do not 
mimic external reality, but mostly the moment of inspiration119 and the experience that 
the artist had when he created the piece of art (Bosch, 1998b). It is as if a 'hidden force'
questions and then think about them. The question raised here is whether the information about the work of art should come first or 
last. Leaving children first free to have a fresh look with no specific relevant knowledge might lead them to more creative responses. 
119 The moment of inspiration reflects also the whole environment that surrounds the artist at the time of his/her creation of a work 
of art.
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is transmitted by the artist into the object of work, waiting to interact with the force that 
the beholder will set upon the object.
Even though this type of stimuli exists in a non-verbal medium (Liptai, 2005), children 
have to verbalise their thoughts no matter whether the stimulus is textual or not. Liptai 
(2005) argues that a work of art should be used for discussion for its own sake and not 
as a medium for discussing something else. Even though this kind of discussion would 
be more concerned with aesthetic values, I would argue that since aesthetics is part of 
philosophy, then an aesthetic inquiry has also a philosophical character. The 
philosophical investigation of a stimulus could be an end in itself but could also be the 
means for moving to another field of knowledge not necessarily directly linked to the 
stimulus.
The non-textual stimuli lack the verbal expression of ideas. This, however, does not 
indicate that only through language ideas are expressed, as language can be 
considered in a broader sense and can include images, sounds and whatever else can 
activate people's thinking 120 . However, the textual stimuli provide already the language 
as a medium to build on whilst the non textual stimuli require from children to find the 
right language to express their thoughts.
3.4. Stimuli and the facilitator's attitude
The specially designed stimuli for P4C reflect a certain way of doing philosophy which 
often assimilates the academic way of doing philosophy. The construction of material for
120 There is a whole area of research about children researching their environment. Children that learn how to use the necessary 
technological equipment (such as video cameras and audio recorders), so as to explore their environment, achieve more self 
confidence and develop further their creative and critical thinking because they have to choose what part of reality they want to 
depict in their photos (Clark, 2001; Walters,2006). This is an active way of helping children to create their own stimulation and reflect 
on it. Reflection on what one has created and discussion upon it is usually a form of philosophising. Adams and Lehman (2007) 
refer to an empirical research of 160 fourth graders who were encouraged to create their own books and these books were 
professionally bounded and placed in their school library. According to the writers the entire project boosted pupils confidence in 
using their own skills and sources so as to become writers.
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P4C is a creative and evaluative process for the creators of the stimuli (the authors) but 
not necessarily for the receivers (the children). Children's points of view of what 
philosophy might mean and their spontaneous contributions seem to be missing. 
Furthermore, the idea of children creating stimuli or adults creating them according to 
the children's interests (Laverty, 2002), are also forgotten. This seems to me the reason 
why philosophy as presented in the specially designed stimuli cannot be viewed as the 
children's way of life. The novels and the manuals present philosophy as 'one more 
lesson' added to the curriculum that takes place in a specific school timetable. The 
manuals can easily become guides for the teachers to follow as if philosophy is not free 
and logical thinking but a lesson to be 'delivered'. It is not necessary to dismiss the use 
of novels and manuals. Nevertheless it is necessary, especially for the facilitator, to link 
critically the novels and manuals with children's interests.
Alternatively, the non-purposely designed written materials for PwC seem to connect 
with children's experience and way of life. Generating new ideas seem to come easier 
when children have to combine and process different operational systems, such as the 
images and texts from picture-books121 (Harris and McKenzie, 2004). The risk with this 
category of stimuli is the philosophical value of the discussion that may be generated. 
There are many chances that the dialogue will not be philosophical, especially if the 
teacher does not have an academically philosophical background to distinguish what 
could be philosophical and of children's interests.
The use of intentionally or non-intentionally designed stimuli for P4C is related to what is 
the facilitator's 122 attitude towards philosophy. A facilitator who feels confident in finding
121 Simpson (2005) claims that there is a need for Visual grammar' which will enable people how to make the most of 'reading' 
pictures. It can be argued here that Visual' grammar, which would put children's thinking over a picture into a specific 'thinking box', 
could be replaced by philosophy which gives room for multi- interpretations of the pictures (Harris and McKenzie, 2004).
122 Facilitator is the term used to describe the role of a teacher within a philosophical community of inquiry. The facilitator is the one 
who enables children's philosophical thinking. The facilitative role is complex, as the facilitator is often at the same time the provoker 
who stimulates students, the modulator who reassures the cohesion of the discussion, and the supporter (Santi,1993). 
However, there is a disagreement over the use of the term facilitator. For instance, Splitter (2003) does not agree with the name of 
'facilitator1 as the one who 'delivers' philosophy. Borresen and Malmhester claim that the facilitator should be called 'hardener'
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what could be philosophical in everyday life is likely to be: a) attracted by using non- 
intentionally designed for P4C stimuli and b) repelled in using directive and prescriptive 
material. On the other hand, a facilitator who is not in tune with philosophy and does not 
feel confident with finding philosophy in everyday life is likely to be attracted by the 
intentionally designed P4C materials. Less confident facilitators might prefer stimuli that 
'guide' those on how to do philosophy rather than exploring by themselves what 
philosophy for themselves and children could be.
The philosophical background of the facilitator (and the philosophical community of 
inquiry) may also influence people's preferences for particular stimuli. For instance, 
tracking back to chapter two of this thesis, dualists or realists may be keen on using 
stimuli that are specially designed for philosophy as these stimuli show better what 
philosophy is in a formal and distinct way. On the other hand, second-order realists or 
relativists may prefer the non-specially designed stimuli and the ones defined by 
children, as they are more open to different interpretations. Critical pluralists and first- 
order non-realists may be keen on both categories, providing that they examine them 
critically and they are willing to 'open the stimuli up' further to what they have been 
designed for.
It seems that a possible tension might occur between the control and input of the 
facilitator as the selector of the stimuli and the notion that a philosophical inquiry 
consisting of children is free to go with what is chosen. To what extent is the 
philosophical dialogue constrained by the facilitator's choices? It must be admitted that 
most of the philosophical inquiries in a classroom start by an adult who either introduces 
a stimulus to the children or highlights the stimuli that children bring into the classroom 
and deal with them philosophically. To resolve such tension it is essential that the 
facilitator's role will gradually fade and the selection of the stimuli will become the 
children's responsibility.
instead as s/he should intellectually push children to think more philosophically, Lectures from Philosophy in School- Summer 
School, Oslo University College, Oslo, Summer 2010.
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3.5. The lack of a theory behind the stimuli
So far there is no clear identification of what the purpose is of using a stimulus. Is the 
stimulus necessary for a philosophical discussion to start? Can it start without a 
stimulus? Do people use the stimulus so as to generate a discussion about the 
particular stimulus (and therefore 'open' it)? Is it just a starting point to move to a subject 
that is not necessarily connected to the stimulus? Brenifier (2005) claims that there is 
often no need for a stimulus (text) as there is no interaction or 'confrontation' with what 
the text really says. I would agree that such situations described above can happen 
especially when a community of philosophical inquiry is still quite inexperienced and not 
yet so sensitive as to observe and make the most of stimulus. However, a stimulus is 
there either for somebody to work on and discover what it might mean, or to move away 
from it altogether and invent something new. One might wonder whether there is a 
specific way of approaching stimuli. If so, would a specific approach lead to an 
instrumentalisation of philosophy for children and a potential loss of originality in 
children's philosophy (Vansieleghem, 2005)?
It was claimed by Lipman (2003) that stimuli present certain types of philosophising 
which could act as models for thinking for young readers. Counter arguments refer 
mainly to the artificiality of such an attempt and suggest replacing these stimuli with 
children's literature. Both approaches agree, even if they do not mention this explicitly, 
that these stimuli can work well with children and develop their philosophical thinking if 
they are aligned with children's needs and interests. However, in both approaches the 
necessity for stimuli to share similar characteristics with children is not analysed in 
depth. The ideas of spontaneity, flexibility, originality, playfulness, emerging activity from 
children are not fully explored 123 as characteristics that stimuli should have. The
123 Ghanotakis (2006) constructed a board game The game of Wisdom' purposely for doing philosophy. It is a board game that 
consists of a four-coloured wheel each colour of which represents different kind of questions (logical reasoning, ethics, creative 
imagination and discovery) and speak tokens for the players to use when discussing. The game is a way for Ghanotakis to apply his 
WRATEC method (adaption of professors Thomas Jackson "Good thinker's toolkit: WRATEC". The WRATEC is the acronym that 
stands for (W)hat is the meaning of...(R)easons providing, (A)ssumptions detecting, (T)rue verifying, (E)xamples providing and 
(C)ounter examples (Ghanotakis, 2005). The game is so much 'philosophical' oriented that itmisses its primary functioning role as a
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connection between the stimulus, the facilitator and the children has not yet been 
explored to a great extent. The forces of attraction or repulsion that can develop 
between people and the stimulus need to be further investigated. Furthermore, there is 
a need to explain where these forces originate from. What makes a teacher or a child 
attracted towards one stimulus, repelled by another or perhaps disinterested altogether?
Nowhere in the literature has the role of love towards a stimulus been mentioned as yet. 
There must be a kind of love towards a stimulus, which will force both children and 
teacher to want to further expand on it. There is need also for a kind of passion, which is 
a form of love towards the stimulus, which is also not referred to in the literature124 . 
Could love, or the lack of it, be a key to the forces between people and the stimuli when 
doing philosophy? Facilitators that: a) do not love doing philosophy and b) are not 
passionate in finding stimuli and exploring them philosophically should not even attempt 
it. It is preferable not doing philosophy125 than doing it because it is obligatory. It stops 
being philosophy as by its nature philosophy is not something to force on others. Doing
game and that is to entertain. Also, the way in which philosophy is delivered is far removed from been linked to children's everyday 
experience. Philosophy is seen here more as developing children's thinking skills. On the other hand, the Would you rather card- 
game that was inspired by John Burningham's picture-book is a game that entertains but at the same time it offers children or adults 
many opportunities to think on hypothetical bizarre situations creatively, and critically.
124 Karin Murris (2009) in an interview was asked what the difference between doing P4C in summer schools and doing it in formal 
courses was. Murris (2009) explained that "it depends on the type of the summer school, but they are often voluntary, so the 
motivation of one's students is different" Analysing her statement further it seems that the words 'voluntary' and 'motivation' play a 
key role. Voluntary entails the idea of freedom to select or reject something offered to a person. Motivation, if internal, is connected 
to the passion and desire. Murris refers mainly to students but I think that this should be broadened so as to include teachers who 
get involved with philosophy for children. This statement shows also that any attempts to introduce philosophy with children in 
schools as necessary could possibly jeopardise both children's and teachers' 'voluntarily motivation', http://www.p4c.ir/index/e- 
ver/lntreview/karinmurris-inter.htm accessed on 16 March 2010.
125 One might wonder that if philosophy develops good educational aims, such as thinking skills and moral imagination, teachers 
should do it whether they like it or not. However, if philosophy is practised mechanically or in an authoritative way by someone who 
does not love it, it may influence negatively children's attitude towards philosophy. If philosophy is in a state of Thanatos for the 
teacher, then how is it possible to create Eros to children? A second objection would be that this is the same not only for philosophy 
but also for maths. Why should a teacher who hates maths have to do it? My answer would be that ideally the teacher who hates 
maths shouldn't teach it and be substituted by another one who could do it. There are many students who are afraid of maths only 
because they had bad teachers who couldn't teach it properly. These students deprive themselves from a whole world of thinking in 
symbols and this could go on if there is nobody else to inspire Eros towards maths and change their attitude. Why should this 
happen with philosophy too? Philosophy, like mathematics, reflects an even more expanded way of thinking and living upon thinking 
which should not be restricted to a particular set of questions and answers.
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philosophy as if it is a 'duty' gives children a false impression of what philosophy is. The 
need for loving somehow a stimulus and be attracted to it is not explored and this needs 
to be investigated further.
Philosophy as a way of life is possible only if children's lives are viewed philosophically. 
Philosophy is not only the hourly session in the classroom generated by a particular 
stimulus, but the viewing of stimuli philosophically whatever the place or time. For 
example, wondering out loud when going for a walk in the park with a child, or 
commenting on a drawing that a child has made and is willing to talk further about, or 
discussing a TV programme with a child when watching it together. All the thoughts and 
emotions that such activities may generate can be stimuli for further philosophical 
reflection in search of the meaning of these activities, either as activities for themselves, 
or as practical applications in people's lives. Giving stimuli is not philosophy genuinely 
derived from children unless it encourages children to offer or create gradually their own 
stimuli and think about them philosophically126 . Children's stimuli and the ways they are 
used, reflect children's philosophical perspectives and attitudes to life, which, possibly, 
is not fully translatable to adults. What is missing is the in-depth conceptualisation of 
children's stimuli as a way to understand a philosophical way of life. The fact that 
children's experiences are not referred to by children as philosophy, does not make 
their experiences less philosophical. Is philosophy only what adults understand as 
philosophy? Would it not be important to see what stimuli children bring into a 
philosophical discussion and what children understand as their philosophy even if they 
do not use the word 'philosophy'?
Another gap identified is that the use of stimuli should not be considered only as 
children's, but also as the adults' way of philosophical life (Goering, 2008). The use of 
stimuli should mutually involve adults and children in generating more ideas out of a 
stimulus and evaluating them afterwards. The differences in the approaches do not de-
126 Brewster (1997) claims that children who can make their own picture-books can master two systems: the linguistic and the 
visual, which can increase their self confidence. Enabling children to create their own stimuli can have also a philosophical 
application that is to their benefit.
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value the stimuli; on the contrary, they show the great potential stimuli have for being 
differently interpreted and open-ended.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, stimuli for doing philosophy with children were critically evaluated. For 
methodological reasons, the stimuli were divided into those that were deliberately 
created for doing philosophy with children, such as novels, short stories and the 
accompanying manuals, and those that were not intentionally created for this reason, 
but have been used for doing philosophy with children. These include picture-books, 
objects, works of art and children's everyday experience.
It was argued that the different kinds of stimuli appeal to different types of facilitators 
according to their philosophical beliefs and frameworks (realists, relativists and critical 
pluralists) and to their attitude towards what is new (e.g. confident in dealing with 
something unknown, or having a preference in support through substantive guidelines). 
It was claimed that there must be forces of attraction or repulsion working between the 
stimulus and the people engaging with it, which so far has not been fully explored as yet 
in this thesis.
Other gaps were also identified, for instance the lack of a theory about what is a 
stimulus for philosophy with children and the absence of exploring love towards a 
stimulus and towards philosophising with children. Such subjects and questions like 'Are 
the stimuli necessary for doing philosophy?', 'How are stimuli connected with children's 
philosophical way of life?', 'Is there any link between adults' and children's appreciation 






This chapter aims at identifying what a stimulus is. It is argued that a good stimulus for 
doing philosophy is linked with the concepts of 'catalepsy' (grasping) and 'Eros' (love). 
Particularly, the stimulus shares the same characteristics with 'Eros': It creates in 
people a sense of lacking (aporia) which drives them to discover what the stimulus 
'hides'. It is claimed that 'Eros' is what frees the stimulus to reveal its generative and 
evaluative aspects and become a way of life, which involves the children, teacher and 
stimuli in a pedagogic triangle. It is also argued why there is need to use a stimulus 
when doing philosophy and what the stages are.
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that a stimulus could be almost anything 127 . It 
can be material specially designed for doing philosophy with children such as Lipman's 
novels to a single piece of a puzzle used in a PwC session with the year six pupils at 
Gallions Primary School 128 . The stimulus is usually perceived as whatever is used at the 
beginning of a PwC session (Lipman, 2003; Haynes, 2008). The same idea is reflected 
in Gregory (2007a) who recognises the "offering of the text" 129 as the first stage of an 
inquiry and in Staricoff (2007) who calls them 'starters' 130 . Wilks (1995) understands it 
as a normal practice for children to engage in and generate questions from the sharing
127 Pestalozzi (1978) claims that almost anything within children's reach can be an object of a lesson by which knowledge might 
become useful for them. Similarly Comenius, the 17th century educationalist argues in favour of pampaedia which is a kind of 
universal learning for everybody, about all things and in all ways (pantes, panta, pantos) (Mulvaney.1993a).
128 GALLIONS PRIMARY SCHOOL. 2007. Thinking Allowed. Philosophy for Children at Gallions Primary School.( Year 6 inquiry). 
DVD. London: Gallions Primary School
129 Gregory mainly refers to written texts, like Lipman's novels from which an episode is shared amongst children. Lipman has 
written novels for different age groups (Elfie K-2 stage pupils, Harry Stotlemeier's discovery for 5-6 Grade pupils, Tony for 6 Grade 
pupils, Lisa.Suki and Mark for 7-10 Grade pupils). Each novel is separated into chapters and each chapters into episodes. The 
length of an episode varies but usually is under 4 pages. Children, often, read one sentence each until they finish the reading of an 
episode, then they have time to reflect on the text and come up with questions that puzzle them (Lipman, Sharp and 
Oscanyan,1980). See more about it in chapter 3 of this thesis.
130 Staricoff identifies more the role of a starter as specially (and occasionally playfully) designed for triggering emotions and 
permitting creative and inspiring thinking and philosophising to children
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of the stimulus. None of them, however, explains what a stimulus is, what is its nature, 
its purpose when doing philosophy. Is the stimulus necessary for doing philosophy? Is it 
just a 'starting point'? These questions will be answered in this chapter which is the 
beginning of forming a theory according to which stimuli are aligned with the evaluative 
and generative aspects of philosophy and in the long term can assist in establishing 
philosophy as a way of life.
4.2. A non-behaviouristic understanding of the stimulus
One clarification that needs to be made is that the interpretation of the word 'stimulus' 
throughout this thesis differs from behaviouristic accounts of stimulus-response131 . Even 
though the stimulus is used in order to create a kind of response in the children, for 
instance generating questions, this is not done reflexively and automatically. The person 
is already in a sense active towards the stimuli (Dewey, 1896; Dewey, 1930). This 
means that children's conscious reflection on the 'stimulus' and the discussion it 
generates with others is a necessary condition for the stimulus to create responses: 
thus what behaviourism rejects as a process. While behaviourism is conceived as a 
dualistic model (stimulus-response), stimulus in this thesis is not 'clearly cut off from the 
person who perceives it. Knowledge is neither located in the stimulus (objectivism) nor 
in individuals' minds (subjectivism) but in the transaction of those two and in the balance 
acquired, which is temporary (Biesta and Burbules, 2003). A stimulus is relational - it 
can be located in the space 'between'. A stimulus may be physically present prior to 
discussion but it is acknowledged as a "real" stimulus only when individuals draw their 
attention to it and open it up. This will be explained further later.
131 Behaviourism operates on a stimulus-response' principle ' and claims that behaviour is shaped due to external stimuli and there 
is no need to take into consideration consciousness or internal cognitive processes. This theory is also known as a stimulus- 
response theory (S-R). It was first introduced by Ivan Pavlov who conducted experiments with dogs so as to study how their 
behaviour changes if connected with certain stimuli. Pavlov showed with his experiments that dogs can learn and demonstrate 
certain behaviours that are activated when certain stimuli influence them. Behaviourism was further developed by J. Watson, B.F. 
Skinner (operant conditioning), E.L. Thorndike (connectionism) Bandura (social perspective) and Tolman (moving towards 
conditioning).
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Contrary to behaviourism that is interested only in people's observed behaviours and 
not the processes (mental life) that lead to them, in this thesis what matters is children's 
thinking and emotional processes when they engage with a stimulus. The stimulus used 
in doing philosophy with children does not lead to a certain response which is the same 
for everyone: On the contrary, children are encouraged to see different aspects of the 
stimulus and come up with creative ideas or questions that really matter to them. Also, 
the stimulus, as perceived by behaviouristic theories, remains the same, whilst in this 
thesis the stimulus is each time differently appreciated. The interpretation of the 
stimulus does not remain the same; it 'opens up' because of people's cognitive, 
emotional, imaginative interpretations, and because of the connections people make 
with their own personal experiences.
4.3. The Nature of the stimulus
If the stimulus does not bear resemblances with the behaviouristic pattern of stimulus - 
response then what is it? Susan Gardner (2004, p.2) claims that the word stimulus is 
another type of jargon used to express Value'. She perceives a stimulus as a value that 
determines all animate behaviour and that a change in animate behaviour can only 
occur as a result of a change in perceived value. This is a less behaviouristic approach 
and reflects Vygotksy's ideas of the internalization of a stimulus, or in other words, how 
the environment affects the way people think (Vygotsky, 1986). I agree with this and will 
explain that a stimulus and children's engagement with it is one way that can help them 
achieve a better understanding of their self, others and the world.
If the word 'stimulus' sounds so behaviouristic, why do I use this term? As Dewey 
claims, the transaction between a person and the environment is an active, adaptive 
process through which the person accomplishes temporarily a balance with their ever 
changing environment (Biesta and Burbules, 2003). It is not the stimulus that reveals 
itself, but it is through the interaction a person has with the stimulus that makes it 'open' 
up differently each time. Biesta and Burbules (2003, p.33) elaborates that John Dewey
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instead of using the dipole 'stimulus and response' distinguishes between: a) a situation 
that the connection between the person and the stimulus has already been established 
and b) a situation where such a connection is not yet there. However, this explanation 
does not solve the problem of the dualism between 'stimulus and response'; it only 
changes the name of a 'situation that the establishment is there' and a 'situation that the 
establishment it is not'. It seems that the word stimulus should not be replaced, as it 
highlights the starting point of a dynamic 'movement1 both from the stimulus to the 
person and from the person to the stimulus.
In order to understand what a stimulus is we need to locate it in a children's life and 
investigate its form. Dewey writes:
Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly but out of, and 
because of, tension. There is in nature, even below the level of life, 
something more than mere flux and change. Form is arrived at whenever 
a stable even though moving, equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock 
and sustain one another (2005, p.13)
In Dewey's passage, the tension comes through people's engagement with a stimulus. 
In the flux and change of everyday life, it is possible that something will stand out and 
will catch people's interests. This 'standing out' is a way to locate a stimulus as 
something that makes human life 'an experience' (Dewey, 2005). The stimulus can be 
an object, an experience, an idea or something else. For this to happen, a pair offerees 
is needed to be adjusted to the potential stimulus. Dewey (2005, p.15) calls these forces 
'rhythms' as they appear to ebb and flow or "systole and diastole". It seems to me that 
the term rhythm is very much aligned with harmony, which is not the case with stimuli. 
Stimuli break the harmony so as to make people create a new one. Therefore, 'forces' is 
a more suitable term to use, as they are more dynamic than rhythms and have the 
potential to either grow or decrease.
The stimulus is what breaks living in a state of "blissful totality" where everything is in 
harmony (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 185). Martha Nussbaum (2001) refers to Hesiod's 
'Golden Age' where people live in a state of blissful totality because everything is
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provided for them; therefore they do not need to think more. The stimulus is what 
tempers this blissful harmony and puts people in a state of imbalance that makes them 
think, reflect further and take decisions, so as to reach another state of equilibrium and 
restore totality and omnipotence (as found in the Golden Age) (Nussbaum, 2001).
The form of the stimulus is recognised by people who are interested in it. It is 
understood as a synthesis of attributes that people give to a stimulus in a way that 
shapes it harmoniously (Dewey, 2005). Even though the stimulus breaks the harmony, it 
should have a kind of harmony on its own. This is understood as a physical or cognitive 
shape that is recognised as a stimulus. This does not mean that the stimulus should be 
necessarily pleasant to the senses (even though it often helps as people prefer working 
with something that brings pleasure to them). The harmony of the stimulus refers to 
people's abilities to perceive it as a distinct stimulus coming from their own experiences 
and having the potential to alter it. In this way, the stimulus obtains its own reality 
(Dewey, 2005), which becomes meaningful by people's engagement with it.
As mentioned before, reflecting on Dewey's ideas, people are active but their action is 
located into stimuli making them kind of 'active'. Action is generated by forces 132 . There 
should be a kind of 'force' that makes people want to either investigate a stimulus 
further or not at all. In chapter three, two types of forces that may occur between a 
person and the stimuli were mentioned: attraction or repellence. The existence offerees
132 By action I assume motion. Objects can either be stationary or in motion, and this means any object in the entire universe. 
When an object is in motion, it is either moving at a constant speed (velocity) or its speed is changing (acceleration or deceleration 
(the term deceleration is used often for slowing down, but actually in proper Physics acceleration means changing of speed 
(velocity) either faster or slower)). Newton's 1st and 2nd of his 3 laws of motion, are helpful here. In the 1st Law he states that an 
object moves at a constant velocity unless a force acts on it (it also means if an object is stationary, it does not move until a force is 
applied). In his 2nd law he states what affects or defines the force. So, a force is always needed to be applied to change an objects' 
motion, whether it is stationary or moving ("Newton's laws of motion" A Dictionary of Physics. Ed. John Daintith. Oxford University 
Press, 2009. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. University of Wales, Newport accessed on 14 October 2010 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t83.e2055>).ln terms of Quantum Mechanics and 
relativity, really I think these other branch of Physics do not, in this case, change the answers significantly. For Quantum Mechanics 
there would be an uncertainty when determining the positions of the object and in relativity, the mass of the object and so the force 
required to change an objects motion would increase dramatically once its velocity exceeds about 75% the speed of light.
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of attraction or repulsion and their intensity is what makes people either to connect with 
a stimulus or not.
To sum up, a stimulus makes sense through its relationship with the participants who 
engage with it. On the one hand, the participants' contributions make something stand 
out as a stimulus and further "open up", simultaneously and on the other hand, the 
qualities of the stimulus- its physical or mental form again as it is understood or can be 
understood by the participants- attract the participants' attention. A pair of forces 
between the participants and the stimulus is necessary to establish any engagement 
with a stimulus. For example, a stimulus can be an object. Its physical characteristics 
may attract the attention of the participants who project on it their thinking and previous 
experiences, maintaining it as a stimulus that can further open. Similarly, a stimulus can 
be somebody's thoughts or questions which may lack a physical form; however it has a 
mental one. The further engagement of the participants with a particular thought or 
question enables its further exploration and opening. In both cases, a pair of forces 
between the stimulus and the participants has been established that leads to the further 
exploration of the stimulus and through it the exploration of one's self. When this pair of 
forces becomes loose, then the stimulus stops being a stimulus and the participants are 
no longer interested in it, at least temporarily.
4.4. Ways of engaging with a stimulus
The Venn diagrams can explain the possible connections that could be established 
among the stimulus, the facilitator and the pupils when forces of attraction bring them 
together and create an engagement. These three 'elements' comprise to make a 
"pedagogical triangle" as introduced by Jean Houssaye (2000). Figure 4.1 depicts the 
potential relationships that emerge and these are analysed below. The circles of the 
Venn diagram should be understood not as static, but as moving dynamic circles that 
either move towards or away from each other, depending on the forces (attraction or 
repulsion) that are created among them. The bigger the intersection, the more the 






Figure 4.1: The different ways of engaging with a stimulus
Part 1: shows aspects of the stimulus that is explored neither by the facilitator nor by 
the children. This is the part of the stimulus that is still hidden and secret. Neither the 
pupils nor the facilitator have accessed this bit of the stimulus yet. This idea 
presupposes that there are qualities of the stimulus incorporated in it which have not 
been explored yet. However, they act in a hidden way as potentialities that wait to be 
discovered. This unexplored part of the stimulus can create a cataleptic power over the 
people that engage with it as it will be explained later on in this chapter. The unexplored 
aspect of the stimulus does not reflect necessarily qualities that the stimulus has itself: it 
may as well reflect the participants' expectations that there is more to discover about 
the stimulus and themselves if they insist on exploring further the particular stimulus. 
Part 2: describes the engagement that some children have with the stimulus but not the 
facilitator. What would be desirable here is that both the other children and the facilitator
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listen to how some children have interpreted some aspects of the stimulus. Listening to 
others' interpretation of a stimulus can help the rest put themselves in another's position 
through imagination or seeing the same stimulus from a different perspective. 
Part 3: describes the engagement that the facilitator has with the stimulus but not the 
children. The facilitator should help children discover what s/he has discovered through 
questioning and dialogue rather than revealing aspects of the stimulus according to the 
facilitator's interpretation, which may be different from the ones children have. 
Part 4: describes the children that have not entered the inquiry and have not engaged 
with the stimulus yet. The facilitator should find a way to bring children into discussion 
without, however, forcing them either to participate or to engage with the stimulus. 
Part 5: describes the inquiry among some of the children and the facilitator which, 
however, is not related to the stimulus used. This is probable within a P4C/PwC inquiry. 
Children may start a philosophical discussion that is not linked with the stimulus. The 
lack of 'confrontation' with what the text says is not a sign of ignorance towards the 
stimulus; it is just a transfer of the focus to something else that again is generated by 
the stimulus. As for the listing of opinions, it is a necessary stage to inform us on what is 
available before judging or linking them together.
This does not make the discussion less philosophical; it may be philosophical but on a 
different subject. In that case the stimulus has played another very important role; it has 
become the bridge to move from one subject to another or the ladder that one can 
either ascend so as to achieve a higher order thinking or descend so as to gain a 
deeper understanding on the subject under discussion.
Part 6: shows the part of the facilitator that is not in the inquiry. This can make sense in 
a mature133 community where the facilitator can become mostly an external observer of 
children's discussion. The pupils engage with the stimulus without the need of a 
facilitator. The 'fading' role of the facilitator is an indication that children can deal with a 
stimulus without direct engagement from him /her. It could also mean indifference from
133 A mature community of inquiry refers to children that can self regulate when philosophising without the need for constant 
intervention and triggering by the teacher. In a mature community of inquiry children respect and listen to the others and are able to 
think well both independently and collaboratively (Splitter and Sharp, 1995).
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the part of the facilitator to engage with either the children or the stimulus, or it could be 
an expression of a relativistic epistemology in the facilitator (see Chapter 2.2.2). This 
attitude could work with mature and independent children that can regulate a dialogue 
amongst themselves. It would, however, lead to non-activity in the case of a group of 
children that are not very familiar with doing philosophy.
Part 7: describes the activity (dialogue) among children and the facilitator based on 
aspects of the stimulus used. When the intersection becomes broader it means that: a) 
more children engage with the stimulus, b) more aspects of the stimulus are discussed, 
c) the discussion based on the stimulus has expanded. The facilitator should try to keep 
her/himself active as far as asking questions that would help children's discussions to 
take off philosophically.
4.5. The cataleptic power of a stimulus
The first impression of a stimulus, which refers both to the stimulus and the way it is 
presented by the facilitator or the children determines whether the forces between will 
be of attraction or repulsion or neutral (no forces). For instance, in a workshop I had 
delivered in Ghent with other P4C practitioners, I used Maurice Sendak's picture-book 
'Outside over there' 134 , the illustration of which was repulsive135 for many participants 
(e.g. the pictures showing two faceless goblins kidnapping a baby). However, the forces 
developed between this stimulus and the participants were of attraction as the 
participants wanted to investigate it further, reflect more and listen to each others' ideas. 
If this first impression creates a sense of 'grasping' the attention or the interest of the 
audience, then this stimulus is potentially good for doing philosophy with children. Good 
here means that the philosophical dialogue that might emerge will be connected with
134 Outside over there is the third book in Sendak's trilogy that begins with the most popular of his picture-books Where the wild 
things are and continues with In the night kitchen. The main character of Outside over there is Ida, a young girl who manages to 
save her sister when she realises that she is kidnapped by the goblins. Lanes (1980) gives more information about Sendak's works 
and their illustration.
135 A stimulus may be very repulsive for some people, but for others it may seem to be very interesting and worth investigating 
further. In other words, a person may feel a strong aversion towards a stimulus, but at the same time a force that attracts the person 
to investigate the stimulus further.
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children's interests about the stimulus. Therefore children's reflective thinking and 
listening to others' ideas about the stimulus may lead to a better understanding of it, and 
of themselves, in connection with the stimulus.
To explain more the idea of 'grasping' I would like to connect it with the idea of grasping 
truth or 'cataleptic fantasy' as found in the Stoics (Hegel, 2006). As Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (2006, p.268) mentions the criterion of true knowledge, for the Stoics, is 
the representation in thought: the 'cataleptic fantasy'. Cicero, as referred to in Cocking 
(1991, pp.22-23) writes that 'Zeno introduced the notion of 'grasping truth': a truth or 
cognitive perception 136 , fantasy cataleptic ((paviaoia KaiaAnTTTiKn), which is like a 
'grasp' of what is really there to be perceived137 .
Engaging with a stimulus entails a process of perceiving what is 'really there' and 
representing it in thought. What is 'really there' means what is in the stimulus that 
generates thoughts to a beholder often connected with the beholder's experience. A 
stimulus that captures one's interest shows that there is a true connection between the 
stimulus and the person; the person finds in the stimulus something that helps 
understand more of his/herself. This is established intuitively (cataleptically). However, 
the retaining of this connection relies on the applying of meaning to this connection. 
Andrej Kalas (2001) with his article 'Cataleptic phantasy in Stoic philosophy', shows that 
the way from a cataleptic phantasy to cognitive content is not a straightforward one and 
that it is the logical meaning that makes it possible. This logical meaning comes after 
the person has been 'grasped' cataleptically. I would add here also the important role of
136 This may seem to be not in line with a Vygotskyan theory of how knowledge is constructed. I mentioned before that the stimulus 
opens when the person brings experience to it. However, in order for a person to open a stimulus there must be a phase of 
catalepsy where the person: a) is 'numbed' by the stimulus, b) recognises even intuitively the stimulus connection with the person's 
own experience and its potentiality to expand both the person's experience and the stimulus 'opening' by their connection. This 
phase is not Vygotskyan but can lead to a Vygotksyan style of constructing knowledge.
137 Zeno, wrote Cicero, held out his open hand with fingers outstretched, and said that "a presentation [phantasia] is like that. Then 
he contracted his fingers and said 'assent is like that'. Then he closed his hand entirely, to stand for apprehension or cognition, to 
which he gave a new name- katalepsis. Finally he brought up his left hand, clasped his first with it, and said that knowledge was like 
this grasp." (Cocking,1991, p. 22-23).
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emotions as forms of judgements139 that should not be left out. I suspect that 'cataleptic 
phantasy' has been perceived mostly emotionally and that's why logic is needed 
afterwards to make meaning possible.
Catalepsy is an 'immediate' perception of a situation just before emotions and thoughts 
are about to be generated 140 . It is a kind of stingray, using Socrates' metaphor (Plato, 
Mono, 80a-b). It is the sense of 'numbing' that the stimulus creates in both children and 
the teachers who feel that there is something more to be investigated (Murris, 2008a). 
Catalepsy is located between ignorance and knowledge (Meinwald, 2005). The Stoics 
say there are three things that are linked together: scientific knowledge, opinion and 
cognition141 stationed between them (Meinwald, 2005). The same also happens with a 
stimulus which creates a sense of grasping; it comes at the linking point between one's 
ignorance or limited understanding of the stimulus and one's desire to learn more and 
achieve knowledge, even if this knowledge is temporary and likely to be modified.
Adopting a more Pragmatic approach, catalepsy is the moment just before individuals 
engage with a stimulus. Individuals in catalepsy stay passive and overwhelmed by the 
stimulus. The meeting point of the community of inquiry with the stimulus will show 
whether the forces that will develop will be of repulsion or of attraction. It also depends 
of course on how a stimulus is presented. A vivid, I inguistically clear, expressive,
139 Solomon (2004, p.80) claims that emotions are judgements; emotions "are thoughts, or dispositions to have thoughts, or 
defined by thoughts". On the other hand, DeSousa (2004, p.62) argues that this is too cognitive a way to view emotions and 
suggests that emotions are "better construed on the model of perception than on the model of knowledge or judgement". It seems to 
me that the language provides two different words to describe emotions and thoughts and as a result their similarities in origin or 
action are lost. Both thoughts and emotions are ways of engagement with something, therefore, types offerees. Emotions and 
thoughts are always about something (e.g. a stimulus) not in a dualistic way, but as a way of grappling with the world in a Deweyan 
sense (Solomon, 2004). This idea ties in well with Nussbaum's claim that the "emotions are not simply ways of seeing an object, but 
beliefs - often very complex- about the object. It is not always easy, or even desirable, to distinguish between the an instance of 
seeing x as y [...] from the belief that x is y." (Nussbaum,2004, p.188).
140 Lipman (1993) acknowledges that the material used for doing philosophy with children should contain intellectual shock and 
surprise. These elements that Lipman describes are the basic ingredients of catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, is something more than 
the initial shock and surprise; it is the moment that the person decides consciously to engage further with the stimulus or not. See 
LIPMAN, M. 1993. Philosophy for children, Thinking children and Education, (ed. M. Lipman). Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt Publishing 
company
141 Cognition here is the translation for katalepsis.
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coherent storytelling that establishes a narrative and encourages students' engagement 
increases the chances 143 of a stimulus to be appealing for further philosophical 
investigation (Daniel, 2007).
The ideas presented above benefit from a concrete example taken from a picture of 
Sendak's Outside over there.
Figure 4.2: Image from Sendak's Outside over there
The picture where Ida plays her horn without noticing her sister's kidnapping by the 
faceless goblins and her replacement with an ice changeling can numb everyone in the 
classroom. Children's first reactions are usually a gasp (open their eyes wide and hold 
their breath). This is a moment of catalepsy. The possible reactions are either lack of 
interest or engagement.
143 Sayers (2010) in her qualitative research that explores how children build literary understanding confirms that performative 
responses such as gestures, intonation, mime, dramatization enable children achieve a better understanding of the story presented 
to it and keep interested and focus in it.
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A sign of engagement is the raising of questions of puzzlement such as: "Why did Ida 
turn her back to the baby while playing the horn?" "Did she not hear the goblins entering 
the house?" "Why does the picture of the father appears in half the frame?" etc. 
(Nikolidaki's log, 2009a). Then the interpretations begin such as the 'changeling' made 
of ice could represent Ida's jealousy towards the baby, or the distance between her and 
the baby, or her secret wishes to somehow get rid of the duty of looking after her little 
sister or her fear that something is going wrong. It could also represent the author's 
feelings at the thought of a baby being kidnapped (Nikolidaki's log, 2009a).
4,6. 'Eros' and the stimulus
The word 'Eros' is of Greek origin 144 and it refers to the passionate love and desire for 
another (Santas, 1988). The way Eros is connected to Catalepsy is similar to the way 
'love' is connected to 'love at first sight'. Catalepsy is a Pre-Eros stage; it is the 'first 
sight' response that a stimulus creates in people, which, if appealing, can lead to the 
pursuit of love (Eros). Eros is a strong force of attraction between the person and the 
stimulus that forces the person to investigate the stimulus further. This erotic force is the 
motivation 145 one has to do something and consists of the thoughts and emotions that
144 Eros is translated in English as passionate love but it is more complicated than that. In the Platonic dialogue Symposium there 
are three different verbs which if mixed can describe Eros: a) erao=to love, b) epithumeo= to desire and c) boulomai= to wish. 
According to Greek Mythology and as referred in Plato's Symposium Eros was the son of Poros (who is the personification of 
'plenty') and Penia (the goddess of 'poverty' or 'deficiency') who seduced Poros when he was drunk and became pregnant. This is 
why one that is grasped by Eros always desires for more (plenty) but has the feeling of less (poverty). Diotima argues that Eros is 
neither good nor bad, Eros lies between (metaksi UETQ^U) any two opposites (e.g. poverty and richness, wisdom and ignorance). He 
is not a god neither a mortal, he is something in between mortal and immortal (Nyrgen,1982, p.175), a daemon (daimonion) and can 
either move towards god and its completion - reaching beauty (even if never reached by Eros) or towards its deconstruction 
(Symposium,202e). This idea influenced many later philosophers such as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Freud. There is also 
another alternative according to which Eros is the son of Aphrodite (goddess of beauty) and Ares (god of war) which also explains 
the nature of Eros for desiring greedily (like war) what is beautiful.
145 Motivation is a force that makes people do things; it is the 'Eros'. Thoughts and emotions appear to motivate people 
(DeSousa,2004). One may argue that people may be motivated but not in love with the subject they are motivated towards, for 
instance, one may be motivated to finish a task even if the person does not like the task. In this case, the motivation (Eros) is still 
there but it is transferred to something else, e.g. to be motivated so as to experience the feeling of relief upon the completion of the 
task).
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the person develops towards a stimulus. Catalepsy is the very moment before the erotic 
force between the person and the stimulus is developed. It is the numbing feeling 
coming from the stingray while Eros is the itch that comes afterwards. This internal 'itch' 
that a stimulus can provoke in people is like an interior 'gadfly' that is noisily flying inside 
and biting people holding them in a state of alertness. Eros becomes the force that 
makes a person's desire to know more about a stimulus 146 .
In the Symposium, Plato underlines the two different aspects of Eros: the sexual 
passion and the desire for wholeness and completeness that characterizes the 
philosophical life147 . This last cognitive sense of Eros is of philosophical interest and 
implies dissatisfaction with partial truth (Dwyer, 2006). Philosophy, even etymologically, 
is a kind of intellectual Eros since it is the love of wisdom, which also includes the 
pursuing of knowledge. Philosophy is an "erotic activity consisting more in the quest, the 
desire for knowledge, than in the completion or achievement of wisdom" (Smith.S, 2009, 
p.40). A stimulus used in philosophy with children has the potential to inspire the 
stimulated person to wonder and to think philosophically. As Santas (1988, p.31) 
explains "the [erotic] object is that from which the attraction emanates or which the lover 
finds attractive; the aim is that towards which the instinct of Eros strives". What Santas 
does here is describing a pair of forces of attraction that develop between the person 
and the desired object. It is a pair because the person sets a force upon the stimulus 
(the person generates thoughts and/or emotions towards the stimulus) and the stimulus 
sets a force upon the person (the stimulus has something that the person seeks to find). 
This idea is connected with Ronald DeSousa's argument (2004, p.63) that "emotions
146 In Greek love can be translated as affection (storgi), charity (agape), passionate love (Eros) and friendship (philia). The love 
towards a stimulus can have only the identity of Eros. Both affection, charity and friendship are types of love that make sense when 
referred to living creatures and are either unconditionally given or mutually-reciprocally sought. Furthermore, affection, charity and 
friendship are 'calm' forms of true, genuine and profound love which would not make sense if established among people and a 
stimulus for doing philosophy. Eros, on the other hand, can be associated with an object and inspire the person with the desire to 
learn from the stimulus and through it, learn more about the person's self. Nyrgen (1982) offers a detailed distinction between the 
concepts of Eros and Agape.
147 Socrates, in Plato's Symposium (199c3-201c9) claims that love cannot both possess and want something at the same time. 
What Socrates means is that in his youth he was taught "the philosophy of love" by Diotima of Mantinea who was a kind of 
priestess. Diotima gives more emphasis to the spiritual aspect of love that directs the human soul towards the love of the Divinity as 
the source of beauty (Symposium,206a-207a).
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face both in and out: they reflect facts about the subject but refer also to something 
outside, to which they typically are responses". These forces are generated amongst 
people and the stimuli are either thoughts or emotions148 .
Similarly, the stimulus used for doing philosophy with children, even if it is not 
characterized as erotic, for fear of misunderstanding, is the one that attracts and makes 
the person be interested in it. It is important for a person to be grasped by a stimulus 
because through this connection a more important aim is to be achieved: that of 
wholeness149 , completeness and contemplation of what is beautiful and true, even if 
temporarily (Cooper, 2001). This sense of completeness could be translated as a need 
for seeking meaning or eudemonia, which as referred to in chapter one is a person's 
highest goal.
The need for a stimulus to be attractive whether it is a physical object or an experience 
(e.g. a book with interesting illustrations or a work of art) is usually the first step that 
stimulates one's senses and is likely to grasp his/her attention150 . Attractive does not 
mean necessarily beautiful, but something that can evoke individual's senses and/or 
critical and emotional thinking (Lorch, 1992). It can be claimed that this criterion is a 
form of censoring. Censoring 151 , however, is always there from the point of view that 
whenever there is a choice among two or more alternatives, the chosen one acts as a 
kind of censoring for the others, at least temporarily. This is far truer for children, who 
according to research need concrete stimuli to draw their attention 152 . Concrete does
148 Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that from the stimuli's point of view the forces that set upon the people could be 
characterised as emotions or thoughts.
149 "The philosopher's dominating passion is the desire for truth, for knowledge of the eternal order, or the eternal cause or causes 
of the whole" (Strauss,2001)
150 Nehamas writes: "we love people on account of their features, the psychological, mental and moral qualities that may attract us 
to them are always apparent in their face and bearing, literally in how they look to us" (2007, p.7-8). Similarly, what makes a person 
attracted by a stimulus and generate ideas can linked with the stimulus' physical characteristics without which the person possibly 
would not have come up with new ideas.
151 Haynes and Murris (2008) analyse in depth the idea of censoring attitudes towards stimuli (particularly picture-books).
152 There is a lot of debate whether concrete objects can help children learn abstract concepts. Many great pedagogues such as 
Comenius (Magna Didactica), Froebel, Pestalozzi, Montessori.Gagne and many others mostly influenced by Locke's empiricism 
agree that the use of concrete material helps children move to abstract learning. Through the combination of concrete objects and
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not mean necessarily objects; it can refer also to experiences as long as they have a 
clear form (shape) that children can recognise as a stimulus. Dewey gives a helpful 
example of a poet who claimed that the effect of poetry on him was more for the body 
rather than his intellect. He referred to the bristling of the skin, the shivers in the spine 
and the feeling at the pit of the stomach (Dewey, 2005, p.224).
However, the 'Eros' based only on the physical appearance of an object is not enough. 
The 'good 1 stimulus is the one in which a person will identify an aspect of his/herself. 
This is linked with Rousseau's extension of the meaning of Eros so as to include "the 
desire to extend our being" 153 . The engagement with the stimulus not only reveals 
aspects of the stimulus to people, but also enhances self-understanding.
This intellectual, emotional and aesthetic appreciation of Eros is what allows people to 
see everything as part of their nature or else to see part of their nature in the specific 
stimulus. As long as this connection is established, then Eros becomes a force of 
attraction that moves stimulated people from the level of duality to a level of unity, 
wholeness and completeness and this brings ewctemon/a154 . Eros is ascending love 155 
from the point of view that it is active and wants to have more, so it always ascends 
towards where its fulfillment may be.
the senses, individuals "penetrate deeper into the world of pleasure" (Lorch,1992, p.69). Musacchio (1992) goes further and 
categorises the senses into higher and more spiritual ones (sight and hearing) which can perceive objects at a distance and the 
lower and more material ones which demand more proximity for perceiving objects. However, he acknowledges that the lower 
senses such as touch are very important in understanding a stimulus more and gives the example that if for the animals touch 
breaks down then it cannot be or exist any more (Musacchio, 1992, p.95). Recent finding such as Kaminski et all agree that relevant 
concreteness may have some advantages over children's (earning. http://cogdev.cog.ohio-state.edu/fpo644-Kaminski.pdf. Brown et 
al, however, based on a growing body of research around the effect of concrete materials in helping children understand abstract 
issues argue that the use of concrete materials can be either an aid or a hindrance in children's learning if they are the wrong types 
of materials, or structured in a way that the abstract learning could not follow from the concrete materials. See more at 
http://www.nd.edu/~nmcneil/BrownMcNeilGlenberg_PersonalCopy.pdf
153 Cooper (2004) provides more information about how Plato's 'Eros', Nietzsche's 'will to power' and Rousseau's 'extension of 
being' are connected together.
154 Gilson (1995) uses the Greek word "henosis" to describe the connection of two people in love and their completion to make the 
most out of this union.
155 "Eros is an ascending love, the human's route to God; agape is a descending love, God's route to humans" (Soble, 1989; 
Nurgen, 1982),
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Eros, though, is searching for love, not true love. It is an appetitive desire which can 
become egocentric156 or even "vulgar" (Nyrgen, 1982). While love is unconditionally 
giving, Eros is greedy, taking what it can and becoming what Nietzsche calls a "will to 
power" 157 . In the case of a stimulus, this could be understood as a will from the people 
to understand what the stimulus is about and take control over the meanings that were 
previously hidden and not accessible. The more one understands that a stimulus has 
not been fully accessed, the more desire or Eros one has to dominate it158 .
Eros, even if 'possessive' is necessary in exploring a stimulus. A good stimulus is the 
Eros' 'dart' or 'arrow' that creates 'love wounds' for both children and the teacher: a 
passion that is almost a necessity for them to explore it further, getting the most out of it, 
even if it causes them simultaneously pleasure and pain. It is pleasure because people 
can investigate the way of contemplating what is really beautiful and true for them, and 
it is pain because there is always a need for more, which is not necessarily provided. 
Alexander Nehamas explains this greediness in terms of possession. He writes:
Socrates begins his account of Eros (200a ff.) is suspect. It calls to mind 
a wish to dominate, exploit and manipulate, a lack of respect and regard 
that reinforces commonplaces about the 'acquisitiveness' and 
'egocentricity' of Greek ethical thought. The desire to possess, one might 
say more generally, belongs to the consumer, not the lover; it reveals not 
love but its absence [...] Possession, though, is not identical with 
ownership or, if it is, it is ownership of a different kind: I may possess 
something as a detachable piece of property, losing which will have no 
effect on who I am, or as a genuine part of myself, which I can't lose 
without undergoing a serious change of my own. To possess something 
as love requires a person or a work of art I want to treat not merely as a
156 156 Egocentricity is not used derogatorily or in any sense of expressing approval or disapproval. It simply describes the type of 
love to which Eros belongs (Nyrgen, 1982).
157 Nietzsche refers to the "desire for power" (Machtgelust) in his works The Wanderer and his Shadow (1880) and Daybreak 
(1881) but expanded it more in The Gay Science (1882) in a section titled "On the doctrine of the feeling of power" and in Beyond 
Good and Evil (1886).The will to power refers to one's main drive to seek the best possible position in life. 
158 Someone may ask whether there are limits to the stimulus. The limits to the stimulus are determined by the people. If people 
cease interpreting a stimulus then the stimulus temporarily reaches its limits. It is temporary because nothing guarantees a future 
fresh look at the same stimulus that would open it again. Therefore, theoretically the stimulus has no limits. Practically the stimulus 
has the limits that are posed by the people who interpret it.
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means but also as an end in itself I must want possession to be a mutual 
affair: I want it to be mine as much as I want to be its own as well (2007, 
P-7).
Nehamas understands greediness in terms of a mutual possession which makes sense 
among people. However, while being egocentric and greedy and of possible harm, with 
the stimulus things are different. The greedier one becomes with a stimulus and the 
more one gets from it, the better the stimulus is because it achieves its purpose of 
existing: to stimulate and be an 'erotic' object.
Engaging and being in Eros with a stimulus is like pregnancy159 . There is something 
hidden (as will be explored below) that needs to be brought to life. This 'unborn child' 
creates pain because of the long time waiting for it and the difficulty in its 'delivery'. The 
same applies with the stimulus. The philosophical reasoning one has to apply so as to 
give birth to an idea is sometimes difficult and painful and at other times effortless. On 
the other hand, the result of a pregnancy is the product of Eros. The 'born child or idea' 
that came from the connection between a person and the stimulus enables them to 
understand not only the new child but also, through it, themselves and the way they 
reason. Socrates' midwifery method is the method of reasoning applied to a stimulus, so 
as to make sure that the ideas that come from the connection of people with the 
stimulus will be genuine, creative and stand to reason.
4.7. The sense of 'being hidden' and the sense of aporia
For Emmanuel Levinas, Plato in the Phaedrus understands Eros in two ways: a) as a 
person's desire towards the other and b) as a person's desire that the other will remain 
untouched by the person 160 (Webb, 2006). What Levinas suggests here seems
159 In Plato's Symposium the function of love (Eros) is to "give birth in the beautiful in relation both to body and to soul (TOKO^ EV
raA6)".
160 Simone de Beauvoir illustrates this contradictory nature of Eros in her writings. She states: "he wants his mistress to be 
absolutely his yet a stranger; he wants her to conform exactly to his dream and to be different from anything he can imagine, a 
response to his expectation and a complete surprise" (Beavoir, 1997, p.674-675).
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contradictory. On one hand, I desire the other and I want the other to be mine, but on 
the other hand, I want the other to remain untouched because if the other is totally 
revealed to me, then my desire (Eros) towards the other will cease. This is Eros's 
contradictory nature. Being untouched is used metaphorically and indicates retaining a 
sense of 'being hidden', as it happens when the first time a person desires the other. 
Nussbaum explains the contradictory nature of Eros as follows:
Erotic love [...] involves characteristic ways of viewing the beloved 
person, who is seen as radiant and wonderful, and also as necessary for 
the lover's happiness. Finally, the beloved person is also seen as 
independent- as uncontrolled and unpossessed, not simply a part of the 
lover, or submissive to his will (2001, p.470).
If in this passage the word 'person' is replaced by the word 'stimulus', then one can get 
a taste of the philosophical nature of a stimulus. This 'erotic' relationship, which at the 
same time requires the desire to discover and the 'desire to leave something 
untouched', applies to stimuli used for doing philosophy with children. A stimulus 
continues to be a stimulus as long as: a) it retains an aspect of itself that remains 
hidden (secret, not yet discovered therefore desirable which leads to Eros towards the 
stimulus) and b) it encourages a person to be curious and have a desire to know what 
this hidden aspect is.
The hidden aspect of the stimulus is essential so as to keep the perceivers' Eros 
towards the stimulus alive. If a stimulus becomes totally explored by a perceiver then 
the stimulus ceases being a stimulus. A poignant analogy is the following: "A stimulus 
fully discovered is like a philosopher whose 'subjective certainty' of a solution becomes 
stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution" (Strauss, 
2001, p.196). In both cases neither the stimulus is a stimulus not the philosopher, a 
philosopher.
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The sense that there is something secret is what can make 'Eros' towards the stimulus 
more intense and therefore encourages further exploration. The sense of 'hidden' is 
similar to the sense of lacking something that may be important to us. The hidden 
element is a kind of 'apor/a' 162 , of not having something which we want to have163 , or not 
being able to move through a process due to difficulty in access. This is the ingredient 
that keeps 'Eros' alive. The more a stimulus is explored, the more understanding a 
person gains for both themselves and the stimulus. The more a person investigates, the 
more hidden areas - possibly not previously considered - may be discovered. The 
accomplishment of understanding brings to the person content emotions of 
completeness, but if this continues then the person may possibly lose interest for the 
stimulus.
What connects a person with a stimulus is a sense of 'lacking' (Pen/a) and a desire that 
through it, the person will gain more (Poros). Therefore, behind the lacking, there are 
needs to be covered. These needs could be various. It could be the need for enjoying 
and appreciating something that is given through the stimulus, or the need for learning 
something that is considered as important. What all the needs have in common is 
people's desire to feel complete and whole through satisfying them, and therefore 
achieving eudemonia. The reason why a person is connected with a stimulus lies on the 
possible common alignment between the secret aspect of the stimulus and the 
unconscious or hidden aspects of a person's personality164 .
162 Aporia (orropfa) is a Greek word and etymologically comes from a = not + poros= go through/ having wealth). It has double 
meaning: a) it means perplexity and the inability to pass through and, b) it means lacking resources. Poros in ancient Greek 
mythology was the god of abundance and wealth. A-t- poros= Aporos (dnopo^), the one who does not have resources, the poor.
163 Ryle (1993) claims that "thinking cannot be given" and there is need for that when there is a gap in one's education. However, 
only when the gap is perceived as a lack that needs to be filled does the gap reflect a true lack. The engagement with the stimulus is 
what highlights the gap (e.g. in knowledge) and opens the way to seeking for ways to fill this gap (Ryle,1993).
164 Plato in Phaedo, argues about the immortality of the soul but in Republic he gives a more elaborated and unified model of the 
soul (psyche). The tripartite model of the soul divided into three parts: the rational element (AoyiaTiKbv), the appetitive element 
(£Tn6uunriic6v) and the spiritoual (9uuo£to"e<;). Plato uses the metaphor of the charioteer and the horses to describe the person who 
takes control over the 'horses' (the three parts of Soul). See Plato (2000) and Plato (1998). When a person is attracted by a stimulus 
and feels 'Eros' towards it, its because a part of the person's soul, the appetitive, is aligned to certain characteristics of the desired 
object.
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The good stimulus retains secret aspects or makes people believe that there are secret 
aspects yet unexplored. Therefore, people are triggered to look for these aspects of the 
stimulus, resulting in the following paradox: the more one investigates a stimulus, the 
more one learns about it but at the same time the more hidden aspects of the stimulus 
that at first sight were not even conceived as possible are revealed. This is much 
aligned with Dewey's idea that stimuli and the environment they are found in are not 
detached. However, this cannot be easily shown in a Venn diagram unless one would 
use a perforated circle showing the interaction of the stimulus with its environment and 
its potential to grow bigger.
A stimulus that is very difficult to explore may be left aside. When a stimulus is ignored it 
is because someone could not find a connection with it, either because the stimulus is 
too easy, or too difficult to comprehend, or perhaps because it leaves someone 
indifferent. It is a temporary death (Thanatos^ 65) of the stimulus, a 'dive1 to non-being 167 
because of repellent forces. Eros is generated between a person and the stimulus 
when, as DeSousa describes, "the cognitive or visual representation and the emotional 
"signature" [are confirmed]. If the signature fails, the visual presentation is deemed 
fraudulent" (DeSousa, 2004, p.68). It can also be argued that when someone cannot 
fully understand a stimulus, they may emotionally suffer because it is this force that 
makes the person either pursue further meaning or abandon any further effort. In the 
latter case the person may hate a stimulus only because s/he cannot fully possess it 
(Nussbaum, 2001).
Sigmund Freud (1923) refers to Eros in terms of libido which is a 'drive': the desire to 
create life168 . The often oppressive sexual drive and people's resistance to act upon
165 The word Thanatos' is of Greek origin and means death. It has not been used in Freud's work; it was introduced later by Paul 
Federn, Freud's secreter. I keep the Greek word Thanatos' as it makes more meaning when contrasting it with the Greek word 
'Eros'. In the present thesis Eros/Thanatos work together as opposites
167 There is a correspondence between what philosopher Martin Heidegger understands as an opposition of being and non-being 
and what the psychiatrist Sigmund Freud understands as the tension between Eros and Thanatos or love versus the death instinct 
(Olds ,2007, p32-34).
168 Freud (1905) claims that the sexual drive is present even in children. Freud has argued that the way children's sexual and 
aggressive desires are treated by their parents determines the further development of their personality. He describes the stages
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their impulses, led Freud to introduce the concept of 'sublimation', which is the direction 
of the inner 'drive' from the sexual activity to other activities (including philosophising), 
so as to gain pleasure and fulfillment (Freud, 1925a; 1926b). This kind of 'cognitive 
libido' is a desire to produce and construct. The oppression of the sexual drive and the 
failure of its sublimation to a constructive activity can lead to the 'death drive' (or 
'Thanatos 1) which is the opposite of Eros and leads the person to return to a state of 
calmness. Going back to figure 4.1, parts 4 and 6 are types o\'Thanatos' of the stimulus 
for the pupils or the facilitator, which, however, can be temporary.
The use of stimuli when philosophising is found between the two contradictory forces of 
attraction and repulsion: Eros and Thanatos* 69 and its up to how people connect with 
the stimulus as to the direction that will be followed. When people engage with the 
stimuli, there is a sense of puzzlement and wonder, a desire to generate questions and 
further elaborate on them and the direction that is followed is towards Eros and 
philosophising which is a constructive activity170 . When stimuli do not create catalepsy 
and Eros then they move towards their death (Thanatos) at least temporarily as in future 
this may change. The discussion about a stimulus and the sharing of ideas is a way of 
not letting the stimulus die.
4.8. The generative and evaluative aspect of the stimulus
A person's Eros towards the stimulus has an evaluative aspect: to discover and 
understand the stimulus and through it others and themselves. It also has a generative
through which children's sexual development occur: a) the oral where children's pleasure comes from sucking or putting things in 
their mouth, b) the anal where the focus is transferred over the child's success or failure to control going to the toilet, c) the phallic 
where the focus is transferred on the stimulation of the genital organs , d) latency which refers to a period that children seem to have 
no sexual interests and e) the genital stage which is the beginning of the sexual activity. Repression or maltreatment of any of these 
stages may lead to developing complexes and confusion of children's personality when becoming adults (Freud, 1905; 1925).
169 It is interesting to see how Eros and Thanatos apply in literature and particularly in Shakespeare's works of art such as Romeo 
and Juliet (Panagopoulos, 2007) and Hamlet (Olds, 2007).
170 See more about the combination of Freud's ideas with Karl Marx's in Marcuse (1956).
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aspect, which refers to the stimulus as the beginning of creating something new (an 
idea or philosophical discussion) or reinvention of the stimulus. Both the evaluative and 
generative aspects often merge together and it is not always easy to identify whether 
the stimulus is discovered or reinvented.
The 'opening' of the stimulus171 as a result of human's engagement with it is a form of 
generation, which could have the character either of a discovery or an invention. It is a 
discovery from the point of view that aspects of the stimulus that were so far hidden or 
neglected come to light. It is an invention from the point of view that the stimulus 
becomes stimulus for something new to be created, which is not necessarily linked with 
the initial stimulus. Both discovery and invention of the stimuli are acts of creation: the 
generation of something new, the allowing of 'not being' to becoming 'being'. Even 
words such as "building" and "constructing" are often attributed to the creative aspect of 
the stimuli; both allocate a process and its finished product (Dewey, 2005, p.53). 
Creation (Tro/Tyo/g) requires from people who engage with stimuli to think creatively so 
as they can both 'open 172 '. Thinking creatively means thinking originally, independently, 
holistically, expressively and imaginatively (Lipman, 2003; 1995, p.66). What comes 
before this is the establishment of a desire (Eros) for the person to embrace a stimulus.
The stimulus provides the person with the 'raw material' for thinking. It is there to be 
explored either as a whole, or by focusing on separate parts of the stimulus and 
possibly linking them together afterwards. It is there to be discovered through the 
senses and through the actions the stimulus generates. Stimuli generate thoughts, 
questions and wonderment. The stimulus opens as people reflect and examine it from 
different points of view, either independently or through inquiry, in collaboration with
171 When talking about emotions, Nussbaum makes a relevant point in the context of the 'opening of the stimuli. She argues that 
what distinguishes antithetic emotions such as love and hate from each other is not so much "the identity of the object, which might 
not change, but the way the object is perceived" (2004, p.188). Similarly, with the opening of the stimulus, it is not the stimulus as a 
form of an object or lived experience that changes; what makes the stimulus 'open' is the way it is perceived, or in different words, 
the experience one brings to it.
172 'Open' has a double meaning: The stimulus 'opens' which means that it reveals its characteristics to people. People also 'open' 
their thinking to new ideas and become more sensitive towards the stimuli they engage with
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each other. The stimulus reveals a whole imaginary world which is linked with the 
imaginative capacity each person has.
Eros is also aligned with the evaluative aspect of philosophy. By engaging with the 
stimulus, people learn much about the stimulus, but also about themselves and the way 
they think and apply meaning to their life. People can reflect on a stimulus and at the 
same time recognise the tools they use to reason or/and their emotions that are 
involved when they reason. After people listen to other people's interpretation of a 
stimulus, which is an imaginative process, they have to evaluate the thinking generated 
by the stimulus. This evaluation requires the ability of a person to think critically about 
the ideas generated in terms of their soundness and applicability, and also 
empathetically (caringly) which refers to whether the ideas produced are offensive to 
some people.
4.9. Stimulus as a way of life: Stimulus, children and teacher. The 
erotic pedagogic triangle
People interact with the world and encounter stimuli. Thinking is generated when a 
person engages with a stimulus. This thinking is not necessarily philosophical but it 
gradually 'opens'. In a situation that the person is grabbed by the stimulus, it is difficult 
to distinguish between the stimulus and the person. It seems as if the person moves, 
through the engagement with the stimulus, from a state of duality to a state of unity with 
it. Stimuli become a way of life when people are able to: a) recognise the stimuli in the 
world b) align them with their thoughts and c) learn more not only about the stimuli but 
also about themselves. Therefore, the sensitivity towards stimuli aims at finding 
meaning in them but also in ourselves through them. The engagement with a stimulus 
can happen individually, but requires individuals who are sensitive to the stimuli around 
them and who are willing to find ways so as to align their thoughts and experiences with 
them. The role of a facilitator who is already sensitive to the stimuli would help children 
establish the sensitivity required to engage with stimuli that matter for them and
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contemplate. The engagement with the stimulus by both the teacher and the pupil can 
generate new, collective thinking.
4.10. Why should we use a stimulus when doing philosophy with 
children?
I will pose a Euthyphro-like question 173 : Do we use a stimulus when doing philosophy 
because it is necessary or is it necessary because we use it? So far there is an 
extended reference to the nature of a stimulus, but there is no answer as yet to the 
questions whether a stimulus is necessary for philosophising, and whether philosophy, 
children and Eros are compatible with each other.
Plato refers to pedagogic Eros which is a cognitive loving attraction between a teacher 
and the pupil (Burch, 2000). The pupil admires the teacher's beauty of mind and the 
teacher sees the potential of a beautiful young body to acquire a beautiful mind too 
through the teacher's contributions. They both share the desire (Eros) for beauty and 
through their attraction they both achieve completion and contemplation of perfect 
beauty (eudemonia of mind and body). What activates both teacher's and pupil's 
attraction 174 is a stimulus that will bring both the final aim of eudemonia.
Dewey (1913) argues that when children's interests become educational aids, children 
learn what they are interested in quickly and efficiently. Children's interests are another 
way to refer to children's 'Eros' towards certain activities or objects. The stimuli that 
emerge from children can have educational value as they are both pleasant and 
effective: pleasant because children are happy doing the activity that involves the 
certain stimulus and effective because children gain benefit from the specific activity
173 Euthyphro is one of the early Platonic dialogues that takes place among Socrates and Euthyphro and try to identify what is 
piety. The Euthyphro dilemma is the question that Socrates poses to Euthyphro: "Is the pious (TO 'ooiov) loved by the gods because 
it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by gods?" (Euthyphro, 10a).
174 To avoid any misunderstanding and misconception whenever I refer to attraction between teacher and pupils I exclude the 
sexual one. I refer to cognitive and emotional attraction.
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(e.g. through philosophising children acquire skill in thinking critically, creatively and 
caringly). Teachers only need to recognise the stimuli that come from children (or the 
philosophical comments that children make) and enable the further elaboration on them 
(Matthews, 1993).
The underlying assumption in using stimuli here is that activating children's thinking is 
desirable especially if this is increased and quickened (Murray, 1961). The sooner 
children are able to think well, the better. This is a two fold assumption: a) the child that 
can think quickly and well feels capable of thinking and therefore s/he possibly can 
adapt smoother and sooner into the society where s/he grows up 175 , b) the society 
needs children to think well as soon as possible. Gregory (2002a) argues that 
philosophy and children are good for each other because on the one hand children can 
get experience of collective inquiry, pursue meanings for them and self-correct, and on 
the other hand, philosophy gains more practitioners who are often more prone to 
philosophical wonder than adults, and gains meaning through investigating children's 
points of view and expands 176 . The common ground for this meeting of minds is the 
presence of a stimulus.
Using a stimulus is a way of avoiding boredom (Guilford, 1959). Boredom is a 'disease' 
where people perform less and less, because there is no call upon them to think 
constructively, take decisions or generally find meaning in what they do (Guildford, 
1959). This is also applicable to education. The lack of finding meaning in educational 
material and processes can lead to boredom or to a cognitive and emotional 
"Thanatos". The use of stimuli, in general, but also for doing philosophy, is what can 
create in children a desire (Eros) to learn more towards what matters for them and find 
beauty in it.
175 See chapter 2.
176 Gregory's linking of philosophy with children reassures the immortality of philosophy as it familiarises children with philosophy's 
past and through children's philosophising, philosophy reassures its existence in future.
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One of the aims of doing philosophy with children is making sense for ourselves and for 
the world we live in (Lipman et al, 1980). Stimuli can help children be motivated and 
search for meaning in two ways; a) by appreciating and analysing further the stimuli that 
come from children and are expressed in the form of questions or puzzling statements 
and b) by providing stimuli that are aligned and make links with their interests and 
experiences (Golding, 2004). The stimuli, as they do not lack content, can provide 
children with concepts or even hints of concepts that could be discussed philosophically 
and could serve the aim of making meaning. They can also help children in their search 
of an end (telos), which is a greater meaning of acknowledging what children are and 
what they could become177 (Kennedy, 2004).
Stimuli and the community of inquiry are inseparable and they create together an open 
system that is characterised by a dynamic, fluid process that is non-sequential, 
relatively unpredictable and irreversible (Kennedy, 2004). As 'lovers' will discuss 
matters relevant to their shared interests, the same happens with a community of 
philosophical inquiry when sharing a stimulus. The stimulus works as the 'loving object' 
which draws the attention of the 'lovers' who are not to fight over the object but to 
discover it further through the different perspectives from which they view the 
stimulus178 . The stimulus is what brings both teacher and children in a unity as they 
learn from each other. They contemplate the beauty of other people's ideas generated 
from the stimulus, make sense of themselves and others and finally achieve a sense of 
being complete, even if only temporarily.
Finally, the stimulus can be used by the teacher as a trigger (Kennedy, 2004 Splitter, 
2003; 2006a) to achieve the goal of motivating children and seeking meaning and also 
to offer an education that is enjoyable (since children learn better when they enjoy the 
process) and reflective (we assume that the stimuli are the bases to reflect on them and 
also for teachers to observe which of the stimuli work and why).
177 See chapter 2.
178 See Golding's epistemic positions as displayed in chapter 2.
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4.11. Conclusion
In this chapter I characterised stimuli as non-behaviouristic, and showed how they can 
be connected with the concepts of 'catalepsy1 and 'Eras'. Catalepsy is the state of 
'grasping' people's interest towards a stimulus. If this 'grasping' is firm then the 
catalepsy gives in turn to 'Eros' (love). Eros can be identified as a desire that leads a 
person to learn more about the stimulus and through it learn more about themselves. It 
is a constant demanding for more, as it is the product of Pen/a (poverty) and Poros 
(plenty/ richness) and has as a final aim a person's eudemonia. A good stimulus is one 
that keeps aspects of itself 'hidden' and creates a sense of puzzlement (aporia). That 
way Eros is kept alive and forces the person to constantly seek for meaning. It is 
possible, however, that a stimulus does not trigger a person's interest, which can be 
considered as a temporary 'Thanatos' of the stimulus.
Eros is aligned with both the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy. By 
engaging with the stimulus, people learn not only a lot about the stimulus, but also 
about themselves and the way they think and apply meaning to their lives. People can 
reflect on a stimulus and recognise the tools they use to reason and make sense of both 
the stimulus and themselves. Stimulus becomes a way of life from the point of view that 
people become sensitive in recognising them in the world, aligning them with their 
thoughts and exploring them (and at the same time themselves). The 'pedagogic 
triangle' that involves the engagement of children and teacher with stimuli is an 
application of recognising stimuli and learning through them in our everyday life and as 
such find meaning. The chapter ends with the finding that a stimulus is not only a 
starting point, but something that develops and changes throughout a philosophical 
inquiry .
There is a need to investigate what the specific criteria are that make a stimulus suitable 
for doing philosophy with children. The analysis of the concrete characteristics of some 
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Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to explore the criteria that make a stimulus suitable for doing 
philosophy with children, if selected by the facilitator. In order to identify these criteria 
one should focus on the concrete characteristics of the stimulus such as text and 
images. The analysis focuses on picture-books as they combine images and text. The 
findings of this investigation can be applied to other types of stimuli that refer either to 
texts, or images or both. These criteria will be further analysed and connected with the 
generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy, along with the concept of philosophy as 
a way of life in the following chapters.
5.1. Introduction: What are the criteria that make a stimulus good for 
doing philosophy with children?
In the previous chapter it was claimed that a phase of 'catalepsy' and 'Eros' towards a 
stimulus is necessary for the stimulus to be further opened and discovered 
philosophically. It was also mentioned that what makes a stimulus philosophical is not 
only in the stimulus, but in the space 'opened' between the stimulus and the people 
involved. Forces of attraction develop among the stimulus and the people involved and 
have a bidirectional character: people approach the stimulus, but also the stimulus with 
its certain characteristics attracts people. Therefore, there must be some characteristics 
which are not universal for all stimuli, but 'stimulate 1 individuals.
Lipman (2003) and Sharp and Reed (1992; 1996a) claim that the stimuli used for P4C 
should give the 'know what' (the concepts to think about) and 'know how' (the ways of 
philosophising). The stories should be philosophical in nature, depicting the 
complexities of moral actions and people's communications in everyday life (Sharp, 
1995), along with creating a sense of philosophical whimsy (Matthews, 1980; 1984). 
Particularly the stimuli should give: a) the concepts (topics) that will be the content of 
the philosophical inquiry and b) various ways of thinking (process: reasoning and
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inquiring skills) through the characters in the story (Fisher, 2000; 2003). Splitter and 
Sharp (1995), as mentioned in chapter two, also agree that the concepts should be 
common, central and contestable. These criteria can be met in purposely written stories 
and in children's literature as well. However, if children do not engage with the stimulus, 
they will not pay attention to it, therefore it will not work. Before the children move to the 
concepts there must be something else in a stimulus that 'grasps' them cataleptically179 .
Cam, reflecting on Lipman's ideas, highlights philosophical themes, dialogical format 
and the openness to inquiry as the basic criteria for selecting a story. In opposition to 
Lipman, he is not dismissive in selecting stimuli with pictures as he believes they inspire 
philosophical dialogue (Cam, 1995). It seems that Cam is aware of how images make a 
stimulus more engaging. This becomes clearer when picture-books are introduced as a 
stimulus for doing philosophy for children: an approached pioneered by Karin Murris 
(1992). Haynes and Murris (2000a) give examples of picture-books that have rich 
images and texts 180 . Images and texts create a 'duet' or, according to Sipe (1998), a 
'synergy' and should be 'read' together in order to allow them to complement each other 
and create meaning. The pictures are not just artistic decorations, but they also raise 
opportunities for dialogue (Bosch, 1998b).
It is claimed that the stimulus should be of children's interest and of the right length in 
duration, as children's attention spans vary according to their age (Haynes, 2008; 
Daniel et al 1999). As for its form and content, a stimulus that has the following 
characteristics has more chance of appealing to children's intellect, imagination and 
emotions (Stanley, 2004; Murris, 2001; Murris and Haynes, 2000a, pp. 8-9):.
o visual - with rich images,
o thought provoking,
o not presenting just a single theme or moral,
o complex,
o highly ambiguous,
179 See chapter 4.
180 See chapter 3 for particular picture-books that have been used for doing philosophy with children.
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o puzzling,
o not patronizing or moralizing
Particularly, picture-books have a great potential to be used philosophically because of 
the asymmetry they display: their text is usually ruled by the logic of time, whereas the 
images by the logic of spatiality (Kress, 2003; Serafini, 2010). This asymmetry provides 
picture-books with textual and inter-textual characteristics, such as the parody, the non- 
linear or non-sequential plots, the multiple narrators, the changing perspectives, the 
unresolved endings, words and images interacting together which are prone to further 
philosophical analysis (Pantaleo 2004; 2007; 2009b). What the writers referred to 
above do is to clarify in more detail how a stimulus is connected with children's senses 
or experiences, either factually or imaginary.
However, such criteria are still too abstract. What is puzzling in an image? What is 
ambiguous? My argument is that a stimulus can be used philosophically if it can first 
create a sense of 'Eros'. The goal of exploring a stimulus further is the achievement of 
eudemonia, even if only temporarily. Eudemonia is the state of contemplation, pleasure 
and happiness about a person's life and has two aspects: one refers to what is 
important for individuals' goals and ends and the other refers to the values that the 
stimulus posses and without it, individuals' lives are incomplete181 (Nussbaum, 2001, 
P-47).
These intrinsic values are like 'qualia' of a stimulus that distinguish it from others as far 
as its philosophical use is concerned. The reason why there are no unanimous criteria 
in selecting stimuli for philosophical use is that there are differences in what is evaluated 
as eudemonia for different people (Nussbaum, 2001). These differences refer to the 
intensity of a stimulus (e.g. its potential to go beyond the threshold of what is considered 
as a stimulus for each individual), its quality and the way it is linked with a person's 
cognitive or aesthetic aims.
181 This sense of incompleteness can be translated as not achieving in keeping the daemons happy, therefore not achieving 
eudemonia.
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The physical features of the stimulus or the conceptual that are attributed to it create the 
catalepsy that grasps children's interests. The connection between the children and the 
stimulus is established when the stimulus 'forces upon' the children's whole being 
(senses and mind). This is mainly achieved through the narrative form of a stimulus 
which is again applied to it by the participants. The reasons why narration is a criterion 
for selecting a stimulus are:
1) Narration has the same structure as the emotions. According to Nussbaum, 
"emotions have narrative structure. The understanding of any single emotion is 
incomplete unless its narrative history is grasped and studied for the light it shed on the 
present response" (2001, p.236). The same happens with a stimulus when doing 
philosophy with children. If a stimulus already has or creates a sense of narration, then 
children's thoughts and emotions can be aligned to it182 . This narration could happen 
with stimuli that are textual, imagery or are connected with events and ideas from 
individuals' experiences. What images generate are aesthetic responses accompanied 
by a sense of pleasure and happiness (Laverty, 2002) and therefore a sense of 
eudemonia. Images can achieve this 'cataleptically'. A stimulus that pleases children 
and can be connected to their experience, either factually or imaginary 183 has the right 
ingredients for philosophy with children.
2) Narration is a source of freedom which is the power to imagine; it provides a 
'potential space' in which to explore life's possibilities (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 238, p.515). 
Freedom in narration is expressed at least in three different ways:
182 Busselle and Bilandzic (2009) offer ways of measuring narrative engagement of people when watching a TV program, which, 
however, could apply to stimuli used for doing philosophy with children. They focus on four different dimensions: a) the narrative 
understanding which refers to the viewers' comprehension of the situations of the story in a way that is meaningful to them, b) the 
viewers' emotional engagement (e.g. showing sympathy for the characters of the program), c) the attention focus on the program, 
and d) the narrative presence which refers to the transition from the actual world to the story world.
183 I understand as factual experience children's everyday life but their imaginary experience may be even more important to them 
and often merges with their factual experience. An example of imaginary experience is when children use (or not) tools of everyday 
life, but altered by their imagination so as to serve other reasons. Children's imaginary play allows them to e.g. use a stick as a 
horse. When children are evolved in their imaginary play they experience themselves as heroes, princesses and warriors and not 
only as if they are heroes, princesses, warriors or anything else their imagination create (Piaget,1962).
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o The freedom of the author (or creator) to give birth to a stimulus. This stimulus 
could be, for instance, a particular narrative plot with characters whose lives have 
their own causality, often unexpected twists and turns, in other words, their own 
peripeteia (adventure which includes sudden reversal in circumstances), as 
Aristotle explains in Poetics (Murris, 2009).
o Narration opens the space to the imaginative interpretation of a stimulus by the 
beholders and its connection to their life with the final aim of their eudemonia 
(Egan, 1992). The stimulus is not necessarily created by someone but 
recognised as something that stands out in a person's experience. The stimulus, 
therefore, used for philosophical inquiry is the transitional object which can be 
manipulated by children (often without the help of the adults) and enable them to 
generate ideas and philosophical questions that matter for their lives.
o The freedom of the narrative product as an independent 'object' or 'lived 
experience' to be each time differently perceived and interpreted.
3) Narration is what can connect stimuli with children's experience. This links to Rorty's 
idea that we cannot know what the real world is but only descriptions of the world as 
narrated through our language (Rorty, 1989). The world does not intervene in our 
stories, but it is through this narration that we understand this world and connect it with 
our experience. This is what Rorty means when he claims that 'we live in story after 
story after story' (Calder, 2003, p.9). Narrative is a "coherent representation of a series 
of events" (Barwell, 2009, p. 49). Egan writes:
The ability to follow stories stimulates and develops the narrative mode of 
the mind and its sense-making, meaning- making capacities. Many and 
varied stories can help to make more sophisticated our grasp on, and use 
of, metaphor, which is itself the connecting logic of narrative and a central 
component in the causality which holds stories together. The causality of 
stories involves both logical and emotional components together. That is, 
in stories the sequencing of events that are intelligible, that make sense, 
is not simply logical, through it has to be so in part, but it involves as well 
an affective pattern (1992, p.63).
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The different ways of narration demonstrate the different thinking styles of the writers 
and offer the opportunity to children to link their ways of thinking with the writers' 
through the particular stimulus (Sprod, 1995). On a second level, what is achieved is 
the linking of children's experience with the narration that often is an imaginative way of 
portraying the different experiences and appreciations of them by the writers and with 
the others' through discussing the stimulus. This is a way of making sense of our life's 
experiences and understanding the world. 184 On a third level there is a possibility of 
children's self-correction, reconstructing identity of oneself and, therefore, 
transformation (Sharp, 1995) as the children internalise ideas that come from their 
engagement with a stimulus in narrative form.
To achieve this there must be some kind of 'deep structure' found not necessarily within 
the stimulus but in the way people engage philosophically with it. Bruner (1986), in 
answering the question what it is that makes a story a story, identifies the 'deep 
structure' which seems universal185 . In the case of the stimulus the narrative form is the 
'deep structure' which refers both to characteristics that the stimulus has and to the 
ability of people to interpret them in different ways (to make narratives). People's 
abilities to create narratives can be explained through Jungian ideas about collective 
consciousness and finding archetypes. McKee points lout that "[t]he archetypal story 
unearths a universal human experience, then wraps itself inside a unique, culture 
specific expression" (McKee, R. 1999, p.4).
In order to understand the narrative form of stimuli, I suggest to dig not only deeper, but 
also at a more concrete level, trying to shed light on the 'deep structure' of the 
narratives concerning both the characteristics of a stimulus and the way they are 
interpreted. There is a need to clarify that this chapter mostly focuses on concrete 
stimuli usually selected by the facilitators. A large category of essential stimuli is partly 
left out, that is, the stimuli that come from children's everyday experience and have
184 Ideas takes from Karen Murris' lectures on "What is a narrative" (8/1/2008).
185 The deep structure does not imply a kind of scientific understanding that is context free. On contrary, the understanding is 
always context sensitive, particular and concrete.
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narrative form186 . However, this category will be the main topic in chapter eight. 
Therefore, I narrow my investigation to a particular selection of picture-books. The 
reasons for selecting picture-books are mostly practical. Picture-books:
o combine text and images, thus whatever mentioned for text, images or their 
combination applies to other textual or non-textual stimuli (e.g. paintings, 
sculptures, videos, drama),
o are resources easy accessed by the facilitator or the children, 
o link to children's everyday experiences as they are often part of children's lives in
and out of school, 
o have narrative form and encourage new narratives created by children.
To investigate more the narrative form of 'picture-books', I will focus on the concrete 
ingredients that comprise them, such as the text, the image and the paper used for the 
book (Doonan, 1993; Eubanks, 1999; Poole, 1996). Both text (the words, their 
syntactical connection between them and the use of metaphors) and images (colours, 
shades, shapes, lines, and textures) are potential carriers of meaning (Doonan, 1993). It 
is up to the beholders whether or not they will apply meaning to the stimuli. To make 
this easier, it is a requirement that there is some experience about the basic ingredients 
of art and composition, how pictorial symbols represent or refer to the real world and 
how abstract ideas are connected to concrete experiences (Doonan, 1993).
Below, the concrete characteristics of a stimulus that open the space to narration and to 
the connection of the stimulus with children's experiences will be investigated. Such 
concrete criteria are: the selection of words, of combinations between images and 
words, the colours which are used (hue, tone, saturation), the arrangement of shapes 
and figures, the use of perspectives and textures, the close study of the small or large 
scale patterning found in the pictures along with the art medium that the artist uses 
(Doonan, 1993). Illustration and text will be further analysed and their combination in
186 The voice intonation, the body action and the music have their own narrative (not necessarily translated into texts or images) 
which, however, will not be further explored in this chapter.
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selected picture-books. Particularly, there will be a focus on how both illustration and 
text created to me as a researcher and to children who engaged with the particular 
stimuli narratives.
5.2. The illustration
There are many aspects worthy of analysis when seeing an image, such as the 
arrangement of colours, shades of light and dark, shapes, lines and small and large 
scale patterning (Doonan, 1993; Poole, 1996). For instance, with lines and textures, a 
painter can produce delicate or wavy lines that indicate different ideas of sharp lines. 
The use of faint pastel colours creates different responses than the matt ones. 
According to Doonan, pictures have two ways of referring to things: a) denotation and b) 
exemplification (1993). In the former, a picture represents an object, refers and denotes 
it. For instance, if individuals know how symbolically with lines a real object like a table 
is depicted, they can recognise it when they see it in a picture. The exemplification 
means that
pictures show, by example, abstract notions, conditions, ideas that cannot 
be pointed to directly but may be recognised through qualities or 
properties which the pictures literally or metaphorically display. Meanings 
do not come attached, as they do to symbols that denote (Doonan, 1993, 
P-13).
This is a matter of using prior knowledge to give meaning to what is seen or else it 
refers to archetypical ways of exploring the 'deep structure' of the narration and 
reflecting anew on social norms under the safe environment that picture-books offer 
(O'Neil, 2010).
5.2.1. The (deliberate) use of colours
The quality of colours used in illustration, their different intensity, texture and nuances, 
their changes from page to page do not only create certain aesthetic responses but also
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become stimuli themselves for asking further questions. Below, I will give some 
examples of how the colours and the way they are used in picture-books can provoke 
questions and lead to further reflective thinking.
When I used David McKee's 'Not now Bernard' (1980) with a mixed age group187 in an 
after school philosophy club in Newport, I asked the children to discuss their first 
impressions. They were fascinated by the colours. Here are some moments as notes 
from my research-log referring to the pictures displayed from the book188 .
Children noticed that dad's face in pages 13-14 of the book changed from 
white to purple when the monster bit him. "The father's face turns to 
purple, maybe he becomes a monster" was Hilary's reaction. When I 
asked her why she thinks so she responded that "maybe the poison 
passed from the monster to the dad". I asked other children to state their 
opinions and these are some of the answers:
"When you are angry you are like a monster" (Jake).
"Maybe the monster is angry and makes the father angry too. That's why
they have the same colour" (Louka).
Later on Louka flipped through the pages and made another comment 
that he associated with the change of the colours. "Look the man on the 
TV is transforming into a monster" Louka said. When I asked him to 
elaborate more on that he said that his body is purple and round like the 
monster's. Then he added "Maybe the programmes Bernard sees on TV 
turn him into a monster" (Nikolidaki, 201 Oa).
187 The group consisted of 6 adults, two girls aged 6 year, a girl aged 11, and two boys aged 9 and 12.
188 For more examples of analysis of the colours in picture-books see appendix 7
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The monster bit Bernard's father.
Figure 5.1: Picture from McKee's, Not now 
Bernard
"Not now, Bernard," said Bernard's father.
Figure 5.2: Picture from McKee's Not now 
Bernard
She put the dinner in front of the television.
Figure 5.3: Details from Not now Bernard
Figure 5.4: Details from Not now Bernard
The fact that Louka noticed the purple colour on the man on TV and associated it with 
Bernard's monstrous behaviour shows both critical and creative thinking along with a 
great sense of observation of colour details. It also shows that the stimulus enabled
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children to create narratives out of the images (for example, when Hilary explained how 
the purple colour passed from the monster to the dad). The association of colours 
(purple) with emotions (anger) that Jake made is a good example of thinking in 
metaphors. Hilary's imaginative thinking that a purple monster must have a purple 
poison that when released colours the victim, is another example of children's 
metaphorical thinking. The assumption of a certain colour representing a given emotion 
is more a convention than an observation. As Dewey points out "it stands in the way of 
acute sensitivity of response" (2005, p. 159). What is important to notice here is that the 
'purple' colour is an intrinsic quality of the stimulus so it is what the stimulus 'does' to the 
children. On the other hand, the interpretation of what this colour might mean is a 
process of 'undergoing' or what the children do to the stimulus (Dewey, 2005)
Let us move to another example. In the book, 'Once upon an ordinary school day' 
(2004), Colin McNaughton and Satoshi Kitamura use black and white for the first seven 
pages to symbolize the dullness of the routines at home, in the neighbourhood and the 
school until a 'different' teacher arrives at school and things change. There is no need 
for much text; detailed images in black and white tell their own story about the child's 
dull everyday life (even in the child's dreams). Gradually the black and white images are 
replaced by colourful ones which depict the change in the child's mood due to the new 
teacher's influence. The following pictures depict aptly what is described above.
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Figure 5.5: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura 'Once upon an ordinary school day'. The black 
and white monochrome dreams: The child is depicted curled up as if he is not free even during his 
sleep.
Figure 5.6: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura Once upon an ordinary school day
The first time the colour enters the book (after seven pages in black and white) is when 
the teacher with his 'strange equipment' enters the classroom. The main character is 
depicted in colours illustrating his connection with the new teacher (and the educational 
approach he represents).
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Figure 5.7: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura Once upon an ordinary school day. The child 
writes his essays and enters into the colourful world of his imagination.
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Figure 5.8: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura Once upon an ordinary school day: The 
classmates communicate their imaginative ideas. They are all colourful now!
162
Figure 5.9: Picture from McNaughton and Kitamura Once upon an ordinary school day: The book 
ends with the dreams of the child that are colourful. The child is not curled up, but flies and so do 
the rest of the birds.
The colours add to the philosophical meaning of this story and create lots of questions 
such as: Why are the new, the different and the unknown colourful? Is the ordinary 
always boring? Is the world of imagination a world of vivid colours and a place where all 
the unordinary things could happen? Does the communication of ideas (when children 
share together their imaginary stories) and knowing people through their imagination 
make them more colourful to us? The last pages of the book depict the child dreaming 
and flying among a group of white birds all looking alike. Is this an indication that what is 
new, colourful and extraordinary in the beginning will become soon ordinary and 
possibly black and white in the future? What makes a person wonder is his/her attempt 
to create a new narrative out of an image.
The use of colours to make meaning is even more important in wordless 189 books. To
189 Wordless books offer a developmental sequence of pictures that tell a story (Jalongo,2002). However, the key question here is 
what differentiates the wordless books from a mere collection of pictures? What is in the pictures that make the people think that 
there is a logical development? It seems that the repetition of the same scenes and heroes with slight differences that can be 
reasoned gives a sense of continuity. However, the picture-books require people's involvement so as to acquire meaning. The 
different meanings for the same wordless book are due to the different perceptions of what is in the pictures and the different 
experiences that people bring to them. The wordless books are perfect stimuli for doing philosophy with children as they activate 
both their critical and creative thinking. Critical thinking because children need to find the logical sequence and how the pictures link 
together to tell a story, and creative thinking because they have to construct a verbal story that is not provided in advance. Empirical 
research confirms these claims. Research on children's attitudes and attributing meaning when they read wordless picture-books
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give an example, Nikolai Popov's 'Why?' (1996) shows the depressive effect of a war 
and its catastrophic elements. While in the beginning of the book the colours are in 
tones of green, as the story proceeds green is mixed with brown until the end of the 
story where the tones of black are very intense. The colours tell their own story 
(narrative) of a war. The black colours are indicative of death, sadness and loneliness 
that come after a war. Even before the mouse's appearance, which starts the war, the 
illustration appears to give a precursor of what may continue. The flowers look as if they 
have violently exploded and the black colour in tiny bits at the beginning indicates that 
something sad will follow.
Figure 5.10: Picture from Popov's Why?
shows that children follow a similar process as they do with print-based texts (e.g. reading from right to left and top to bottom) 
(Lindauer,1988). Children construct meaning using prior learning, focus attention to the inter- textual clues and the sequence of the 
pictures, consider multiple perspectives, develop their oral and written language skills, implement humour and playful behaviours as 
part of their reading process (Crawford and Hade,2000 ; Whalen, 1994). Wordless books are challenging both for children and 
adults; this is important for doing philosophy as both adults and children can enjoy wordless picture-books and be puzzled by them 
{McGee andTompkins,1983).
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Figure 5.11: Picture from Popov's Why?
Figure 5.12: Picture from Popov's Why?
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The brightness and clearness of colours can also be interpreted philosophically. In 
Shaun Tan's 'The red tree' (2001). The images are executed in gouache, oil and water 
colour and in collage. They can create a moving, humorous, puzzling and uplifting mood 
in the reader.
sometimes the day begins 
with nothing to look forward to
Figure 5.13: Picture from Tan's The red tree
and things g° from bad to W0rse
Figure 5.14: Picture from Tan's The red tree
There is an intense use of dark colours to indicate depression and alienation, red colour 
to create a tension and yellow colours to indicate all the wonderful things which the 
protagonist can only see behind a glass and being in a dark room with locked windows 
where there is no chance of approaching the world outside. Interpreting this picture 
philosophically, it could be argued that it depicts the Platonic distinction between the 
real and the ideal world.
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Figure 5.15: Picture from Tan's The red tree
ijqst as you»
Figure 5.16: Picture from Tan's The red tree
Most of the colours are dirty and dull and only when the protagonist goes back home
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and sees the bright side of life is the room depicted in a warm and clear red colour that 
spreads into the room. The tree that grows is red, bright and clear. Why do we 
associate the bright clean colours with positive thoughts? Lakoff and Johnson (2003) 
would argue this is one way of thinking metaphorically and attributing meaning, which is 
not attached initially to the colours, but influences people's understanding. It is also 
again an example of the Deweyan process of 'doing' and 'undergoing'. The curve of the 
lines and the intensity of the colours belong to the stimulus (the intrinsic material of it) 
but not their meaning; the stimulus cannot be separated by the way it is interpreted and 
experienced by the perceivers (Dewey, 2005, p.87, p.91, p.93). The creative and critical 
vision of the readers modifies the meaning of the picture-book.
5.2.2. The image details
Apart from the colours, other image details can tell their own story which can either 
enhance the story told by the text (in case the stimulus includes text as well) or be 
different from the story. To illustrate this point I will give two examples: one from 
Anthony Browne and one from Maurice Sendak.
Anthony Browne's picture-books are good examples of illustrations rich in strange 
details such as parts of animal's bodies - usually gorillas or things associated with 
animals that replace other details or are found in unexpected places) that provoke 
questions. For instance in Zoo (Browne, 1992), Browne tells the story of a family that 
visits a zoo. People 'turn' increasingly into animals and dad and the children behave like 
animals themselves. Some of the people have animal characteristics such as animals' 
feet, horns, beaks, animal print clothing and expressions which some readers do not 
notice immediately because people are so familiar with what they expect to see 190 (see 
figures 5.17-5.18).
190 Our senses (and particularly vision) tend to recognise whole forms and figures rather than a collection of simple lines and 
curves. Uncompleted shapes or different details in an image that are not expected may be ignored. These are examples of Gestalt 
theory. See more at:
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Figure 5.17: Picture from Browne's Zoo.
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PhlN945ORCYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Gestalt+theory&source=bl&ots=8d8B5qOgzG&sig=o 
DfDnomDunbQuJU8cqPO2kThc1w&hl=en&ei=87O1TM7hGZe8jAf-
gs22Aw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=OCCMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false accessed on 10 December 
2009.
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Figure 5.18: Details from the picture above Figure 5.19: Details from the picture above
When I used Zoo with a mixed aged group aged between 4 and 65 in Newport, children 
were better than adults in finding humans with the animal details in the image. Only 
when I encouraged them to pay attention, not only to the text but also to the images, did 
adults notice the animal details, which made them wonder whether animals are more 
dignified than humans, or whether humans are really animals since they have animal 
characteristics. Some of the younger children seemed puzzled whether animal features 
or animal prints in human clothes make them animals 191 . What, however, is important to 
mention is that many children paid attention to details of the illustrations and made 
some thought provoking comments. Below, I cite some of their statements.
191 This is part of the dialogue whether people are animals or not.
Judy: Are we animals?
Facilitator: What do you think?
Judy: I think we are animals. Look the gorilla hides himself and the boy is in the cave and hides himself as well. (She refers to
the page where the child has the strange dream of a child in an animal's cage.)
Facilitator: Does that similarity makes you think that they are both animals?
Judy: Yes.
Facilitator: What do the others think about that?
Paul: The gorilla hides himself. He is so lonely.
Christopher: Maybe he is scared if the people knock the glass.
Jean: He does not have anytime for himself but people have when they are in their houses.
Judy: I think we are animals. Look, children are fighting like animals...mmm the animals don't fight.
Karla: Yes we are animals. We came from the monkeys and we do things like the monkeys. We eat, climb, walk, mock
(Nikolidaki, 201 Ob)
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Figure 5.20: Picture from Browne's Zoo.
1) There is a snail at the top of an image that depicts the traffic jam before the family 







Why is there a snail? Why does it fly?
Maybe it is a spy?
Or because there is too much traffic and even a
snail goes faster?
Yes, but why it is on the top of the page?
If it was at the bottom we wouldn't see it.
We would. It could be next to this pink car that has
a pig's tail!
2) There is an image of two giraffes in an enclosure. Their colour and pattern blend in 
with the wall (Zoo, p.9).
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Figure 5.21: Picture from Browne's Zoo.
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Figure 5.22: Detail from the picture above
Judy: The giraffe licks the 
black paint 
because she does 
not have any food 
or water!
Facilitator: Why do you think 
so?
Judy: Because there is 
no black colour, 
she has already 
licked it!
3) There is the image of a tiger in a cage (Zoo, p. 11).
Louka: Can you see the little butterfly at the bottom of the page?
She has the same colours with the tiger. But the butterfly is
free to fly. The tiger is in a cage. 
Barbara: Did you see that there is only a little square on the top of
the image from which the tiger can see a bit of the sky? 
Louka: And it is cloudy. 
Paul: The sky looks as grey as the wall. 
Louka: Look at the grass. Outside it has a vivid colour, but in the
cage it is pale.
173
Figure 5.23: Picture from Browne's Zoo
Figure 5.24: Detail from the picture above
Figure 5.25: Detail from the picture above
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What is fascinating is that the children were able to pick up details and create narratives 
focusing on their imagination and previous experiences 192 . Louka pointed out such a 
small detail (the butterfly at the bottom of the page) which was hardly noticeable as it 
had the same colours as the tiger. He also pointed out that the grass had more vivid 
colours outside than inside the cage. Even if he did not elaborate further on freedom, 
and maybe this is an omission from the part of the facilitator193 , the child understood 
even intuitively the difference that freedom makes to the animal's behaviour, and the 
environment in and out of the cage. These responses seem to align Styles and Arizpe's 
findings of their case study (2001) on reading Browne's Zoo to children aged 4-11. They 
found that children, even if not confident yet at reading print, demonstrate impressive 
capacities for analysing images 194 .
The details gave the opportunity for children to apply imaginative thinking as it 
happened with Judy and the giraffe's licking of the black colour on the wall, or Louka 
who perceived a snail as a spy on top of the page 195 . Children were free to open the 
books during the discussion, get more ideas and show others how they shape their 
thinking based on an image. Children seeking meaning, offer opinions, flip the pages, 
laugh, play and create their narrations. They bring to the pictures meaning carried from 
their past experiences or their imagination and in this way, they add expressiveness and 
emotional excitement to the stimulus. Dewey quoting Barnes says that:
a vast number of emotional attitudes, feelings [are] ready to be re-excited 
when the proper stimulus arrives, and more than anything else it is these 
forms, this residue of experience, which fuller and richer than in the mind 
of the ordinary man, constitute the artist's capital. What is called the magic 
of the artist resides in his ability to transfer these values from one field of
192 Empirical research also confirms that children's understanding and interpretations of the picture-books provide evidence of their 
experience and learning (Yu, 2009).
193 As a facilitator I could have asked questions in order to help them connect the concrete image with abstract ideas. For instance 
I could have asked "Why do you think the butterfly has more vivid colour than the tiger? Or "What makes the butterfly have more 
vivid colours than the tiger? Then I could see what answers children would have given. For instance, they could have said that 
butterflies are genetically made to have vivid colours so in this case we could have move to a discussion about what is determined 
and how free we are when things are already determined for us.
194 For more about children's ability to interpret Anthony Browne's books in multiple ways see Pantaleo (2004)
195 See previous page of this chapter.
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experience to another, to attach them to the objects of our common life, 
and by his imaginative insight make these objects of our common life and 
by his imaginative insight make these objects poignant and momentous 
(Dewey, 2005, p. 123).
What Barnes claims happens twice in the case of the picture-book: First with the writer 
and the illustrator who put their ideas and images into words, and second with the 
perceivers who create their own meanings and link the stimulus with their experiences 
and lives. Some of the traits of the stimulus may express the writing skills or the 
illustrator's abilities (kinds of technique), but for the perceiver these skills as depicted in 
the stimulus acquire content if linked with the perceiver's experiences or imagination.
The unusual use of motives or symbols in illustration is routinely used by Maurice 
Sendak in his books and can raise many philosophical questions. Sendak's 'Outside 
over there' 196 is also full of metaphors, symbols and images, with multiple 
interpretations.
Focusing on the images, there are many symbols used which also creates a sense of 
wonder and consequently, new sets of questions that show puzzlement, ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Below, I display some of the symbols found in the book and the ideas they 
generated within me. They show potential philosophical paths that open up in the 
reader. Following the sequence of pictures in Sendak's book, the sunflowers face and 
grow into the side of the room when in reality the opposite should happen. They also 
tend to grow too quickly while Ida is playing the horn. Could the flower's growth be
196 The main character of 'Outside over there' is Ida, a young girl who manages to save her sister when she realises that she is 
kidnapped by the goblins. The story starts with Ida, her baby sister and her mother being in the arbour, while her father, a sailor, has 
gone to sea. Her mother seems to be very absent minded and Ida takes on the responsibility for looking after her baby sister. While 
she is playing the horn to rock the baby still (but without looking at her), the goblins come and kidnap her sister. Ida goes mad and 
decides to look for her lost sister 'outside over there'. Wearing her mother's coat, and holding her horn, she embarks on a journey. 
Finally she finds the goblins who have been transformed into babies, similar in appearance to that of her sister. Ida charms goblins 
by playing her horn till they churn into a dancing stream. Only one baby behaves as a normal one and that is Ida's sister. Having 
found her sister, Ida returns home where she finds her mother holding a letter from her father who counts on Ida to look after the 
little baby.
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interpreted as a threat, as Ida's growing anger and despair or her maturity to take on 
more responsibilities and grow faster than her age? (Nikolidaki, 2009b).
Figure 5.26: Picture from Sendak's Outside over there
Figure 5.27: Picture from Sendak's Outside over there
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In the same sequence of pictures, the scenes out of the window 197 change as the story 
unfolds from a meadow to a calm sea, then to a rough one with the ship sinking. Do 
these scenes represent Ida's changing moods? Do they hint at her father's possible 
death? Do they represent her father's potential frustration of Ida's inability to take care 
of her sister? Is the ship a metaphor of how to handle difficulties? Is there any 
correlation between the difficulties that her father faces as a sailor at sea and Ida's 
attempt to save her sister from the goblins? Does the change from storm to calm show 
the different emotional states Ida goes through? Could it be a deeper philosophical 
thought referring to the ups and downs of human lives? The 'changeling' made of ice 
could represent Ida's jealousy towards the baby or her fear that something is going 
wrong. It could also represent the author's feelings at the thought of a baby being 
kidnapped (Nikolidaki, 2009b). All these questions and many more are potential starting 
points for a narrative and further philosophical dialogue.
Sendak depicts Ida's feelings artistically by using certain lines to form anger in her 
glance and determination in her motions. Even the drawing of the room environment 
(e.g. the flowers) is in accordance to the feelings that Ida has when she realises her 
sister's kidnapping (Graham, 1990). It may be this reason Ida's view from her room 
changes from a meadow to a sea and then to a terrible storm that sinks the ship 198 . The 
changes in the sizes of the image frames help the narrative as it matches with the 
changes of Ida's and the readers' emotions 199 (Poole, 1996). All these recordings are 
depicted with colours; textures and lines creating sentiments in the reader that are 
unusual200 . The sensitive reader dives into the story and follows Ida's moods. The
197 Certain images in Sendak's work recur from book to book. The image of the windows represents the borderline between what is 
inside (safe place) and what is outside (unsafe and discomforting place) (Lanes,1980, p.248).
198 What does this ship represent? Ida's fears? Her father's expectations of her? Does the window represent a window to her inner 
world?
199 The change in the sizes of the frames of the images is seen in other books by Maurice Sendak's such as In the Night Kitchen 
(1970) and Where the Wild Things are? (1963).
200 Doonan underlines that Sendak "promotes a dreamlike quality by using multiple viewpoints so that we may float about with Ida 
when she goes journeying" (1993, p.17).
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facilitator can encourage children to read the text, but also pay much attention to the 
images. S/he also should be open to follow the philosophical inquiry where it goes201
5.3. The text
The poetic language with the careful collection of words202 can create an aesthetic 
response: a Deweyan experience not only for children, but adults too. Creating images 
in one's mind and generating ideas from words artistically joined together is what 
philosophy as a generative force requires. The use of metaphors, rhymes, playing with 
the sound of the words, the humorous use of language, the grammatical and syntactical 
structure of the sentences and the ambiguity (e.g. misinterpretations because of the use 
of homonyms) helps focus the children's and adults' attention on the stimulus.
Sendak uses poetic language in a way that may startle the readers. Why does Sendak 
use unusual words and a strange word order? For example, he writes: "'What a 
hubbub', said Ida sly, [to the goblins] and she charmed them with a captivating tune" 
(Sendak, 1981, p.26). The use of unusual words such as 'hubbub', the odd word order 
and the sophisticated selection of some words (e.g. captivating, charmed) may create a 
sense of bewilderment not only in children but also with adults. The poetic style of 
language can captivate the attention and even move to a more meta-cognitive analysis 
of why such style has been selected.
201 The multiple use of the horn either to rock the baby still or to charm the goblins had been a stimulus for discussion when I had a 
P4C session with a year 6 class in a primary school in Cwmbran, South Wales. Some of the children were puzzled how and why the 
goblins were charmed when Ida started to play the tune with her horn. Some other children could not understand how Ida knew in 
advance that the horn would be of any use. I personally thought of the horn's connotation as a symbol of apocalypse or the similarity 
with Mozart's magic flute, as a parallel story which is also identifiable in Sendak's book. Children had an inquiry about music and its 
role in affecting people's behaviour (e.g. melancholic music, loud heavy metal music and being aggressive, music that calms you 
when you're stressed). I finished the inquiry with children listening to the different music pieces and drawing according to the mood 
that music created for them (Nikolidaki, 2009a).
202 Sendak started writing 'Outside over there' in February 1975, but finished early in June 1979. It is a three hundred and fifty nine 
word story, but it took Sendak almost a year and a half to write and more than one hundred drafts to complete. As Sendak himself 
said"! have a hostility towards books which are not well written... A true picture-book is a visual poem"(Lanes, 1980, p.229).
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How is ambiguity portrayed by words? In Browne's Zoo, Dad says that the best bit of 
the visit was going home, whilst the mother's response is "I don't think the zoo really is 
for animals...! think it's for people" (Browne, 1992, p.22). This statement on its own can 
provoke further philosophical discussion by simply asking children's opinions about it 
and, according to children's interest move the discussion for instance towards human 
and animal rights. Mother's particular response is ambiguous and can relate to
the notion of the purpose of the zoo as entertainment rather than 
conservation or (a reading more consistent with the imagery of Zoo) to the 
idea that people are metaphorically caged by speciesism" (Bradford, 
1998, p.88).
Staying with the picture-book Zoo, a careful analysis of the vocabulary, the incomplete 
sentences and the repetitions can give rise to many issues that could be discussed 
philosophically. Father's humour seems out of place, however the child's response 
"Everybody laughed except mum and Harry and me" is humorous and shows the child's 
grasp of sarcasm. Irony and humour is depicted in other places, such as when the 
mother sees two monkeys fighting and at the same time her children fight. She does not 
tell them off, she just says "They remind me of someone [...] I can't think who."
When I used Zoo with a mixed group of adults and children203 both groups spotted the 
family members' different attitudes towards the animals. They were based both on 
textual and illustrational evidence. Louka (aged 10) noticed the chocolate that is thrown 
on the ground as a sign or disrespect. Judy pointed out the brand name of the chocolate 
(Cadbury) and Barbara commented on the father's use of the word 'pussy' for the 
tiger204 . Children seemed to get the message of the father's disrespect from the images, 
whereas adults stick to the language used205 .
203 The group consisted of 6 adults, two girls aged 6 year, a girl aged 11, and two boys aged 9 and 12.
204 Louka: "There is chocolate on the floor. The family does not respect the zoo. They should not throw it" (regulative thinking) 
Judy: It's Cadbury's! (Nikolidaki, 201 Ob)
205 Bradford writes:"ln Zoo, the narrator's discourse is relatively unembellished, having the vocabulary ("boring," "really smelly," 
"stuffing its face") and syntactic range ("we just wandered round," "just stood in a corner") of a voice limited as to expressiveness 




Figure 5.28: Picture from Browne's Zoo.
Figure 5.29: Detail from the picture above.
It is necessary for adults to engage with picture-books as they are usually the ones who 
pick and read the stories to children. Often they pick the ones that adults also enjoy 
reading. The stimuli that are most successful are the ones that are subjected to different 
interpretations and can be read in different levels so both adults and children can enjoy
analysis and I just draw attention to Mum's silence or responses to what she sees (e.g. Her expression "Poor thing" indicate both a 
caring attitude towards the animals' non natural life that transfers them to...things displayed for people to see them.
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(Trivizas, 2010). Adults can learn from children's fresh and imaginative approaches 
towards a stimulus and how to observe the images better and get information out of 
them(Nikolidaki,2010b).
5.4. The role of the explicit and implicit questions in the text
Not all stimuli that provide ready made questions are equally ideal for doing philosophy. 
'The Philosophers' club' (Philips and Doner, 2001) is a book specially written for doing 
philosophy with children. It does not tell a particular story, but only contains questions 
that academic philosophers could recognise as philosophical. Questions such as "is 
change a kind of violence?" are thought provoking because they encourage children to 
think metaphorically on changes as violence. However, most of the questions seem to 
be a simplistic and artificial 'translation' of academic philosophical questions at a level 
that children would be able to understand. As for the illustration, it imitates the ancient 
Greek dress code, which appears more as a role play than an attempt to think 
philosophically.
Figure 5.30: Picture from Philip's The philosophers'club.
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Figure 5.31: Picture from Philip's The philosophers'club.
There is no narrative, too many questions and possibly some of which are of no interest 
whatsoever to children. The questions, if directly imposed, should be the ones that 
children would possibly be curious to know about. On the other hand, in her book, 
'Mummy never told me', Babette Cole (2003) asks a lot of taboo questions, which could 
give rise to many philosophical questions, as children may feel free to ask what really 
matters to them. A question like "why do some women prefer to fall in love with other 
women and some men with other men?" could lead to a philosophical discussion over 
individuality, self identity or people's sexual choices and preferences. However, such 
issues are usually categorised as inappropriate to discuss.
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Figure 5.32: Picture from Cole's Mummy 
never told me.
Figure 5.33: Picture from Cole's Mummy 
never told me.
There are also stimuli that give questions which are more closed as far as their format is 
concerned, but could lead to a very open philosophical discussion. In contrast, John 
Burningham's 'Would you rather...' asks questions in the form of a series of choices. 
For example:
Would you rather...an elephant drank your bath water, an eagle stole your 
dinner, a pig tried on your clothes or a hippo slept in your bed?
Would you rather be lost in the fog, in a desert, at sea, in a forest or in a crowd? 
(Burningham, 1978)
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Figure 5.34: Picture from Burningham's 
Would you rather...
Figure 5.35: Picture from Burningham's 
Would you rather...
It is up to the community of inquiry as to how these questions will be used as P4C is 
also a democratic practice. The book could be read all at once or each question could 
be dealt with separately. A philosophical discussion could occur by analysing one 
particular question206 . Each question is a stimulus within the stimulus207 and encourages 
both children to think creatively as they have to think in hypothetical - imaginary 
situations. It also involves critical thinking as they have to evaluate their answers and 
then reject the alternatives. Children, being inspired by these questions can create their 
own hypothetical dilemmas or link them with actual dilemmas that children never had 
the opportunity to express before. In that case, a stimulus is further linked with 
children's experience which finally becomes the focus of further philosophising.
206 When I tried this book with a group of year 5 children, I presented to them only one question: where they would prefer to get 
lost. Children had to give reasons for their choice. Then they created small groups of people who had similar ideas and were 
encouraged to find arguments that support their idea and arguments that weakened the other's. Then children presented their ideas 
and they were free to move from their group to another one if the ideas of others convinced them to change their mind (Nikolidaki, 
2009a).
207 When I say that each question is a stimulus within a stimulus I mean that each question can each time be interpreted differently. 
Therefore it is as if we have one stimulus but as it is unpacked it releases many other stimuli in form of questions.
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Apart from the books that mainly consist of questions, there are also some that do not 
contain ready made questions specially designed for educational use. However, they 
easily generate questions from children or adults.
5.5. Combination of image and text
The particular combination of image and text of a stimulus can create an aesthetic 
response similar to what Dewey (2005) calls 'an experience'. Linking it with the idea of 
Eros, individuals' Eros towards a stimulus leads them to have 'an experience'. Image 
and text are incorporated into a unity, where they do not lose their identity; but on the 
contrary are enriched. When texts and images do not replicate each other but work 
complementary, the most creative works emerge (Graham, 1990). This is because the 
gaps of the text are filled by the illustration and vice versa and by the interpretation of 
the reader (Bainbridge and Pantaleo, 2001). There is not a necessary beginning with 
aesthetics or with logic that interprets the aesthetics (Bosch, 1998). The unity of an 
aesthetic experience is divided up into intellectual, emotional or practical qualities. 
These qualities are not only joined together but also merged, creating a new underlying 
quality, which is the aesthetic experience. This 'whole' aesthetic experience is 
temporary and dynamic since it keeps changing and opening up.
According to Sendak, a picture-book is a special mixture of text and pictures with each 
complementing the other. Pictures add to the text. Reading picture-books involves 
reading the text, contemplating the pictures and 'reading' between the lines (Murris, 
2008b). In a picture-book both pictures and text are equally needed to convey the 
message of the story (Lanes, 1980). One can look at the pictures and read the texts 
irrespective of whether this feeling is the same the artist had when they created their 
piece of art (Warburton, 2003).
The crucial moment that Ida in Outside over there discovers her sister's kidnapping and 
its replacement by a melting changeling would not be so powerful if text and image
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where not combined together to reinforce each other208 . "The ice thing only dripped and 
stared and Ida mad knew goblins had been there" (Sendak, 1981, p.15). The words 
rhyme, the syntactic disorder (Ida mad) matches perfectly with Ida's disordered mind. 
The environment also 'goes mad'. The changeling is just a 'thing' while in the previous 
page Ida is holding it in the belief that it is her sister. Ida's change of perception nulls the 
baby's fear of 'being unnoticed' which the changeling could represent (Kushner, 2003, 
p.24).
Picture-books deal with two sign systems: the visual and the textual. The visual compels 
the reader to ponder; the textual pushes the reader to continue with the text. The 
combination of colours, textures and lines in the pictures as well as the words in the text 
create a significant form which is different from any other just form, under which the 
whole story unfolds (Doonan, 1993). The combination of the two different systems can 
generate even more questions than what each one could do separately. This is aligned 
with philosophy's generative aspect. The contribution of both image and text in making 
meaning and how well this is achieved, comes after children's reflection and critical 
dialogue with each other (philosophy's evaluative aspect).
5.6. Conclusion
A stimulus that is puzzling, ambiguous, thought provoking, subjected to multiple 
interpretations and able to make people raise questions is often appropriate for doing 
philosophy with children. However, the criteria listed above are not necessarily qualities 
that the stimulus has but in the 'gap filling' it provokes. There are two basic 
characteristics that make a stimulus appropriate for doing philosophy: a) it creates 'Eros' 
in the people that engage with it and b) has a narrative form or can make people create 
narratives when engaging with it. To explain further the narrative form of the stimuli, it 
was argued that there must be some concrete characteristics in the stimuli that grasp 
people's attention and make them fall in 'Eros' with the stimuli and attribute to them the
208 See figures 5.26 and 5.27
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criteria above.
In this chapter some picture-books were analysed for their appropriateness for doing 
philosophy with children. The narrative form of the selected picture-books was further 
analysed with more concrete characteristics, such as the text, the imagery and their 
combinations. As for the text, the selection of the words, their combination, the possible 
rhymes, the use of metaphorical language, the allegories, the odd word order that is 
possibly not grammatically correct, the use of words (e.g. homonyms) can set the 
presuppositions for further philosophical discussion209 . As for the images, the colours, 
the shapes, the textures and the details are the characteristics that will be interpreted by 
people as puzzling or thought provoking. The nuances of the colours, the differences in 
their brightness or textures create aesthetic responses that can capture children's 
interest and make them explore the stimuli further. The more details are depicted, 
especially if they do not necessarily match with the rest of the book's concept, the better 
for generating puzzlement and ambiguity. The combination of text and image requires 
the involvement of people who approach the stimulus: a) to recognise what messages 
both writer and illustrator try to convey and b) most importantly to re-construct the 
stimulus and combine afresh images and text so as to create new meanings.
When further analysis does not seem to make any sense, it is required the synthesis of 
the parts. This synthesis opens the space to interpretation of criteria such as humour, 
playfulness, ambiguity and the need for both adults and children to be trigged by a 
stimulus. This synthesis refers to the stimulus, the person and the in-between 
engagement. It will be explored in the following chapter under the understanding of 
philosophy as a generative force, an evaluative force and a way of life.
209 The facilitator is also encouraged to pursue the 'illogical way' and insist in finding out what is the thinking behind children's 
mistakes. The 'silly' answers may be very logical and miss a kind of prior adult knowledge. Investigating how children come to a 
certain conclusion can be philosophically interesting as we learn more about the way we think (Fields, 1995b).
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CHAPTER 6 
Stimuli and the generative aspect of philosophy
189 
Abstract
This chapter explores how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a generative force. It is 
argued that people's engagement with a stimulus is what 'opens' the stimulus and 
generates new ideas for them (the generative aspect of philosophy). The 'opening' of 
the stimulus is possible if there is a strong attraction (Eros) from the person towards the 
stimulus, which will enable the person's reflection about the stimulus. It is also claimed 
that a stimulus opens easier and more effectively through discussion with others in a 
philosophical community of inquiry. This is a way of linking the stimuli with the pedagogy 
of c.o.i. Finally, it is suggested that the generative relation between the stimulus and 
philosophy lies in listening to one's self and to others through a process of zymotic 
(fermentative) listening.
6.1. Introduction
As implied in chapter four, I follow a more Deweyan direction according to which 
individuals already find themselves in the environment they live so they are not cut off 
from the stimuli, but involved in a constant dynamic process of doing something (to a 
potential stimulus) and undergoing (the influence they have from a stimulus) (Dewey, 
1963). However, there are some experiences that are perceived as events with a 
beginning, middle and an end that are of more importance for individuals (Dewey, 
2005). These experiences can become stimuli for further philosophical investigation. 
The same can happen with an object, often unnoticed in the environment, which 
becomes a stimulus. This process of something becoming a stimulus is the beginning of 
the 'opening' of the stimulus. In this chapter I will explain how people are engaging with 
a stimulus and how its 'opening' is linked with philosophy as a generative force.
The idea of philosophy as a generative force shares similarities with Whitehead's 
creativity which is also understood as a force. Whitehead in his book Adventures of 
ideas writes:
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The initial situation includes a factor of activity, which is the reason for 
the origin of that occasion of experience. This factor of activity is what I 
have called "Creativity" The initial situation with its creativity can be 
termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be 
termed the "actual world" relative to that occasion. It has a certain unity 
of its own, expressive of its capacity of providing the objects requisite for 
a new occasion, and also expressive of its conjoint activity whereby it is 
essentially the primary phase of a new occasion. It can thus be termed a 
"real potentiality". The "potentiality" refers to the passive capacity [...] 
This real potentiality [...] is active with its inherent creativity, but in its 
details it provides the passive objects which derive their activity from the 
creativity of the whole. The creativity is the actualization of potentiality, 
and the process of actualization is an occasion of experiencing. Thus 
viewed in abstraction objects are passive, but viewed in conjunction they 
carry the creativity which drives the world. The process of creation is the 
form of unity of the Universe (Whitehead, 1964, p. 181)
The idea of passive potential for creation within an object is applicable to the stimulus. It 
is passive, because it requires human engagement, but it can transform into something 
new. It can expand. As for the process of actualization in Whitehead's passage, it can 
be parallel to the thinking process that allows the stimulus to expand and give birth to 
something new. However, Whitehead understands creativity as innate while it can be 
argued that Eros is the cause of creativity. Without being interested in something no 
generation or creativity comes from it. Creativity is itself erotic or as Nussbaum 
suggests "it is only through love, and bodily love at that, that human beings can find an 
exit from solipsism and loneliness to the reality of another life" (2001, p.692). How is this 
opening for oneself and the stimulus achieved?
6.2. What does opening of the stimulus mean?
The 'opening' of the stimulus is the generative process by which people create new 














Figure 6.1: The stages of the stimulus' opening
Stage a) describes the state of the potential stimulus which has not yet become a 
stimulus. The individuals have not yet reached the threshold potential of opening the 
stimulus. The stimulus has not yet been perceived as a stimulus; it's not something that 
stands out from the ongoing activity of the one who experiences it. This idea is clarified 
further in Jackson when he refers to Dewey and writes:
prior to becoming perceived as objects and events, they were but 
brute existences, things whose bearing of the course of behaviour was 
either unperceived or non existent" The threshold potential refers to 
the moment that the individual begins to be 'stimulated' (Jackson, 
1998, pp. 22-23).
What bridges stages a) and b) is the moment of catalepsy in a person, which may 
develop into Eros. Dewey would describe it as a state of immediacy, the "felt 
relationship between doing and undergoing as the organism and the environment 
interact" (Dewey, 2005, p.217). It is at this crucial moment that something becomes a 
stimulus or not. Stage b) describes the gradual 'opening' of the stimulus due to forces 
upon it. This opening has its origin in people's falling in Eros with the stimulus and 
desiring to explore it further. This desire or Eros is what will unfold people's creative, 
imaginative and critical thinking which not only will enable them to understand a
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stimulus but also reconstruct through imagination their own experiences210 . Stage c) 
(see figure 6.1) shows the stimulus's potential to open as a whirl even more. This 
shows that the same stimulus is 'multiple' and can create different responses each time 
one is occupied with it. Bruner (1983) claims that children become in tune with making a 
lot out of a little, by combining a small set of elements to create a larger range of 
possibilities. Young children try out all their motor routines on a single object (e.g. 
grasping, throwing, and banging it) and metaphorically this attitude is what enables a 
stimulus to open up. Bruner (1983) also claims that when children stop being interested 
in a particular way of using an object they may be interested again if there is a twist in 
its use, a different way of approaching it.
Chris De Haan, referring to Dewey, explains further the gradual opening up of the 
stimulus:
We are creatures of imagination [...] Philosophy arises from imagination 
and desire. Employing imagination we reconstruct experience. Knowledge 
is active and operative, our ideals... "a collection of imagined possibilities", 
our ideas instruments of action. In deliberation we experiment 
imaginatively in what Dewey called "dramatic rehearsal", following 
possible courses of action in imagination. Imagination is the way in which 
meanings find their way into present interaction (De Haan, 1995, p.5).
The process of 'opening' of the stimulus is possible through the interpretation of the 
stimulus by people. What 'opens' the stimulus depends on the different ways people 
view it. Therefore, at this stage the stimulus enables people to raise questions, make 
observations about it, test and experiment its properties, explore further details of the 
stimulus that previously were ignored, move thoughts to different territories not 
necessarily linked with it, think of possible situations or probable scenarios that involve 
the stimulus, think in metaphors, and share ideas about the stimulus with others 
(Dewey, 1938).
210 Serafini claims that "we attend to what we notice, and what we notice depends on what we understand. Readers cannot 
interpret that which is not perceived, and what is perceived can change based on what is understood" (2010, p.93). What, however, 
she does not explain is what makes us in first place notice what we will attend to afterwards.
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All these are ways of interpreting the stimulus that enable its 'opening' and also the 
understanding of oneself. Let's suppose that the initial stimulus is a spoon used for 
stirring tea. It starts 'expanding' if someone starts contemplating its use, its craftwork, 
whether it has been a gift and if it has been used by a very important person (Jackson, 
1998). If questions such as 'what makes a spoon a spoon?', or 'what makes a spoon a 
piece of art?' or 'Does the fact that the spoon has been used by an important person 
add something to the spoon's existence?' are added, then the stimulus can 'open up' 
philosophically. As Dewey highlights:
The singular object stands out conspicuously because of its especially 
focal and crucial position at a given time in determination of some problem 
of use or enjoyment which the total complex environment presents (1938, 
p.72).
The opening of a stimulus is always contextual. It depends on the community of inquiry 
and how people will engage with the stimulus so as to open it212 . The experimentation 
with a stimulus, the playful disposition towards it, the building on each others' ideas 
when interpreting a stimulus, are ways that transform the stimulus to something more 
than an initial object. It becomes, 'an experience'. Especially with young children, the 
opening of the stimulus should be done by involving more the senses and imagination, 
which are often philosophically neglected (Garrison, 1997). In this way, children engage 
with the stimulus not only pedagogically, but also ethically and aesthetically213 (De 
Haan, 1995).
This is because children who engage with a stimulus try to find something within it that 
appeals to them. Paul (1993, p.35) claims that figuring something out involves 
"constructing a logic which matches the logic of the thing to be understood". This 
indicates that individuals not only try to find structures of their thinking in the stimuli they 
engage with, but they create them in case these structures are not yet available. This
212 As the children's community of inquiry matures, the selection of the stimulus should come from it instead of the facilitator. In this 
case, the control of the facilitator is reduced and both the stimulus and the discussion that follows reflect the children's genuine 
interests. See page 128 of this thesis.
213 "Not for a moment is an art (music or poetry) conceived of by itself, but exclusively as what produces satisfaction for the 
senses" (Lorch,1992, p.70).
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brings to mind Piaget's position that to understand is to invent (1976). For children, the 
more senses, emotion and thinking that are involved, the more possibilities are to be 
motivated by the stimulus physically, ethically and aesthetically. The ability of someone 
to ask a new question about a stimulus and point at a new frame of reference for the 
stimulus is what 'opens it up'. The questions raised here are: Is the process of opening 
a stimulus always connected with philosophy?
It is not enough for the stimulus to open philosophically if it only 'grasps' people's 
attention and throws them into a moment of catalepsy and then to Eros. It needs to 
create for the person a moment of epiphany. Epiphany2 ™ is a sudden intuitive 
perception of insight into the essential meaning of something, usually initiated by some 
simple or common place experience. Whereas catalepsy is a moment of grasping, 
epiphany is a moment of illumination not expected that pushes people to think deeper 
about themselves and the big questions of life.
Dewey would possibly classify an epiphany moment as an 'experience' and would 
highlight its unifying of emotions, its uniqueness, and completeness as major 
characteristics (Jackson, 1998). As a stimulus opens it can create this kind of 
experience for a person. This 'experience' that the engagement with a stimulus can 
offer is unique for each person and it does not mean necessarily that it happens for 
everyone. It is a rare event. It happens suddenly and uncommonly, it is memorable and 
it involves a kind of epiphany different to each individual (Jackson, 1998).
Moments of epiphany can occur also through discussions with others which enable 
further elaboration about the stimulus and its illumination through other people's 
experiences. The community of philosophical inquiry is necessary as the sharing of the 
ideas about the stimulus open the stimulus up. This process is a kind of recreation of
214 Epiphany (ETricpdveia) is a Greek word that comes from epiphainesthai, which means to appear/ to show. Epiphany means an 
appearance or manifestation (especially of a deity) and it is also used for celebrating Christ's manifestation on 6th of January. The 
word Epiphany is used to show a sudden, intuitive perception of the reality or essential meaning of something, usually initiated by 
some simple, homely, or commonplace occurrence or experience (Collins,2003). In literature Epiphany is used symbolically to 
indicate a moment of revelation and insight. See at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Epiphany.
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reality according to people's cultures and experiences (Freire, 1972). As C.S. Peirce 
said, "one man's experience is nothing, if it stands alone. [...] It is not «my» experience, 
but «our» experience that has to be thought of; and this «us» has indefinite possibilities" 
(1995, p.259). This is a broader version of the stimulus which incorporates the stimulus 
and the experience created by it in a certain cultural environment215 .
Egley and Foulston (2010) give an example where the experience of a stimulus 
becomes a new stimulus for a philosophical inquiry216 . The stimulus is people's lived 
experiences. This is an appropriate example of where all types of philosophy 
(generative and evaluative) become a way of life217 . How does this happen? People 
have an experience and then they reflect upon it from a certain distance (time and 
place) since it took place. Through philosophising, the lived experience is further 
illuminated (Lebuis et al, 1993). Costello (2007), as mentioned in chapter three, writes 
narratives from children's experiences in their classrooms, which also accomplishes 
connecting children's experiences with narrative forms of expressing them and 
reflecting a new upon them. This is the new generative element; the stimulus comes 
from people's everyday lives (experiences) and is linked with the temporal way of life 
(examining life).
Does the stimulus remain constantly open when opened once? Theoretically the 
stimulus can open unlimitedly. Practically, what hinders the constant 'opening' of a 
stimulus is the lack of time, loss of interest or ideas for the particular stimulus and the 
borders of the language, e.g. not being able to find (or construct) the words that 
describe our thoughts, emotions and experiences about the stimulus in a way that will 
be understood by others. What actually stops us from engaging with a stimulus further 
is our choice to discuss a particular aspect of it rather than another. When we change 
our mind, what happens is a selection change, which 'opens' again the door for further
215 Apart from this, the experience of a stimulus is linked with philosophy as a way of life, asnot only can a stimulus be used fora 
philosophical inquiry and reflection but also the experience of the certain stimulus.
216 Egley and Foulston (2010) run philosophical inquiries with adults based on experiences that they have lived (e.g. visiting a 
place and then having a philosophical inquiry inspired by this experience).
217 See more at chapter 8.
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interpretation of a stimulus (Davies, 1988). A second 'reading'218 of a stimulus can lead 
to a change of perspective under which the stimulus is viewed (May, 1995). This 
generates again Eros for the person to explore it further. That is why the limits of a 
stimulus are always 'temporary'.
Nevertheless, a stimulus in its process of opening is the 'object' plus the memory of the 
experience that the person had connected with this 'object'. Even if the person forgets 
the main characteristics of the stimulus (e.g. details in the illustration of a picture-book), 
there is still a kind of "emotional" memory that reminds the person of his/her 
engagement which can be named as its 'history'. This is not just recalling a memory that 
can stimulate anew the person to think. The person does not only recollect the thinking 
done over the stimulus some time ago, but s/he generates new thinking219 .
6.3. How does the stimulus open?
The stimulus 'opens up' when the person engages and reflects on it. This presupposes 
that: a) the person has the freedom to recognise a potential stimulus and to think about 
it, b) there is time available for the person to spend on the stimulus, c) there is a state of 
a catalepsy for the person that can move to a state of Eros, d) Individuals have attitudes 
(emotional states) that enable them to recognise and reflect upon the stimulus and e) 
there is potential of something to become a stimulus. Below, I will explain how listening 
is essential in 'opening' a stimulus further.
218 Usually a second reading of a 'stimulus' is done when the stimulus was very captivating and individuals liked it or when it is not 
captivating at all but individuals give it a second chance in case they find something captivating into it (May, 1995, p. 181).
219 One may ask, if the stimulus opens temporarily and the chances are that we will forget many things about it, then what's the 
point of bringing so much attention to the stimuli? Each time a stimulus is used, people's creative thinking is activated. Each time 
there is a new opportunity for many ideas to be generated. The writing down of these ideas enables the stimulus to remain open for 
longer and recall in memory of the experience felt. The use of the stimuli enables children's practice in engaging with stimuli and 
generating questions and ideas. Opening of the stimulus enables people to learn how to 'see' the stimuli. This does not indicate that 
there is just one way of seeing but that there is seeing and not ignoring.
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6.3.1. Listening: The idea of 'zymotic listening' as a special way of opening 
a stimulus
In what ways are listening and the opening of the stimulus connected philosophically? 
To answer this, it is necessary to clarify first what is understood by listening. Fiumara 
(1995) argues that listening has been philosophically ignored. Listening is part of 
language; in the sense that it is the 'other side of language' (Fiumara, 1995). She claims 
that listening is thinking because it requires active participation from the one who 
listens, through focusing, thinking and creating meaning from what others say by 
connecting with the ideas and beliefs a person already has (Fiumara 1995). Listening is 
not just hearing sounds but involves a process of understanding these sounds and 
creating meaning. Understanding listening as thinking, as Fiumara suggests, means 
that there is not a clear division between them. People listening to others and to 
themselves and at the same time they reflect on what they are hearing. This process 
does not take place fragmentally.
Stimuli and listening are mutually linked together. Without a stimulus there is no 
listening and without listening there is no further exploration of a stimulus. A stimulus is 
necessary for capturing our attention and listening to it and similarly listening to oneself 
and the others is necessary for linking the different ideas together and 'opening' the 
stimulus further. This means that a person often listens when there is a stimulus to 
activate the generation of ideas and listen to them. This is often achieved through deixis 
(to show intentionally). I will give an example from my research log:
I had a meeting with my supervisor about what makes a stimulus a 
stimulus when she took the case of her sunglasses, opened it and placed 
it in front of me. 'Here is a stimulus', she said. Her movement to make 
something that was already on the table, but never noticed before, 
transformed it into a potential stimulus. An object was thrown into my 
attention. At that moment there was silence. I was surprised because I 
didn't expect her to do this and somehow a moment of catalepsy was 
created. I had some reflection time and suddenly I started generating 
ideas about the sunglasses' case. About its use and its reason of being, 
about the idea of emptiness (since the glasses were not there).Then I
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thought metaphorically and suddenly the sunglasses' case became an 
open shell which was lacking something valuable (pearl). I thought of 
relations (e.g. sunglasses and cases). I was grasped by the stimulus only 
because my supervisor brought it into my attention and within the context 
of a meeting about philosophy. Possibly, I wouldn't do the same if I was 
sitting in a bar and a friend of mine just placed her case in front of me. I 
brought my thoughts and emotions to the observation of the object. It was 
an experience to me when this happened; now I am only describing this 
experience without feeling my first excitement of making the case of 
glasses a stimulus when before it was just an unnoticed object 
(Nikolidaki'slog,2010a).
From the example above it seems that the intention to see something as a stimulus and 
the particular context in which something appears as a stimulus are two other reasons 
that explain how a person engages with a stimulus. It is what Bruner (1983) says, 
referring to John Lyons, is 'deixis'. It is not just 'tagging', but locating something in 
context and bringing something to one's attention. Deixis is a way of making others 
'listen' intentionally.
On the other hand, in order to open a stimulus, it is necessary to listen both to oneself 
(what the individual thinks and feels about the stimulus) and to others (what the others 
think and feel about the stimulus). This two-way 'listening to the stimulus' (through 
listening to oneself and to others) is a 'zymosis 220 . 'Zymotic or fermentative listening' is 
the long-term result of the synthesis and fermentation (zymosis) of listening to others 
(through the inquiry) and listening to oneself (through reflection) when interpreting and 
therefore opening a stimulus.
What is zymotic listening and why is it connected with philosophy as a generative force? 
When children and the facilitator enter a philosophical inquiry which begins with a 
stimulus they are unaccustomed with, they do not know the direction the discussion will 
take. One could argue whether it would be different if they knew the stimulus in advance 
but in this case, if something is already known to its full extent then it is not a stimulus. 
According to Zeldin (1998, p.9) a conversation is a "meeting of minds with different
220 I borrow the Greek word which can be translated as fermentation.
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memories and habits." When different people enter into a conversation they not only 
share a stimulus, but they also transform the way each one views it. Zeldin (1998) 
claims that a conversation has the potential of changing a person's point of view. This 
kind of transformation is a zymosis because: a) the person transforms his or her own 
self through the different ways of appreciating and understanding a stimulus as it 
happens with the zymosis of the initial ingredients to something different and new b) the 
transformation does not happen immediately but takes time. As it happens with 
fermentation, there is a state of agitation and a state of settling down of the ingredients 
to allow them to mature221 . The same happens with the opening of the stimulus; there is 
an agitation of ideas generated, but it takes time both to listen to these ideas that others 
offer and to settle down through reflecting critically on them.
The zymosis of ideas takes time and requires an emotional safe environment for 
children's ideas to brew. When doing philosophy with children in the classroom, there 
should be enough time available both in the short and long term. 'Short term' means 
that the facilitator of a philosophical inquiry gives time in each session for children to 
listen carefully and thoughtfully to others and their ideas. 'Long term' means that 
zymotic listening is practised continuously and as the members of the inquiry become 
more experienced in philosophising, they can practice more their listening. Ideas that 
ferment from the early sessions until the later ones will lead to something new. Zymotic 
listening is mostly a long term process. It does not happen immediately during the first 
philosophical inquiry, but gradually: it 'matures' with time and practice from both the 
members and the facilitator of a community of inquiry. The children through listening 
zymotica\\y benefit in two ways; in terms of process (becoming more creative thinkers) 
and of product (producing creative ideas).
The idea of zymosis is illustrated in Dewey when he writes:
221 The states of creative process are identified as follows: preparation, incubation, illumination and verification (Goswami,1999). 
Fermentation shares many characteristics with incubation as they both require a phase of idleness (doing nothing) till the idea 
comes. However, the fermentation is not located only before the illumination (when the idea comes) but it is a process that takes 
place even before the evaluation of the ideas produced.
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The turmoil marks the place where inner impulse and contact with 
environment, in fact or in idea, meet and create a ferment [...] Hence it is 
not mere excitement that is expressed but excitement about something; 
hence, also it is that even mere excitement, short of complete panic, will 
utilize channels of action that have been worn by prior activities that dealt 
with objects (2005, p.69).
It is important to highlight two things here. First, the idea of excitement about something 
refers both to the engagement with the stimulus and to listening both to oneself and to 
others about this listening. Secondly, the idea of prior activities can work as 'yeasts' that 
enable the fermentative process of thinking to take place. Listening zymotica\\y and 
engaging with stimuli does not happen immediately, but it is the process of becoming 
more sensitive to the stimuli, listening to one and others and being open and evaluating 
the whole experience222 . This is a dynamic fermentative process or as Dewey says it is 
"a growth" (Dewey, 2005, p.57).
Zymotic listening incorporates the exchange of ideas between what others say and 
one's personal reflection, but it is more than a simple accumulation of the different ways 
of listening223 . Dewey (2005, p.63) would understand both listening to others and to 
oneself about the stimulus not only in terms of quantitative accumulation of ideas, but of 
qualitative too, "a transforming of energy into thoughtful action, through assimilation of 
meanings from the background of past experiences". Zymotic listening causes agitation 
and excitement in children and teachers which is not necessarily translated into 
physical excitement, but a mental brewing of ideas that mix with each other as 
something new. This kind of zymotic listening can cause a disturbance and resistance, 
especially with adults. This is because adults interpret it as not listening. For many 
adults (and teachers) listening requires a silent audience which does not happen in the 
case of zymotic listening. There is an agitation of ideas in the head. The diagram below 
shows schematically what counts as zymotic listening:
222 See more about these ideas at chapter 8.
223 The verb 'ferment' comes from the Latin word 'fevere' which means "to boil".
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istemng
Zymotic Listening and 
Thinking
Time
Figure 6.2: Zymotic listening
Zymosis is a constant transformation, changing, mixing and stirring of ideas that come 
from the different ways of listening. The arrows in figure 3 show how these tensions for 
the different ways of listening merge with each other and synthesize into zymotic 
listening. The quality of this 'zymosis' depends also on the environment. A community 
of philosophical inquiry that takes place in a safe and trusting environment where 
occasional silence is not considered as a gap but as thinking time enables the ideas of 
children to brew (Haynes, 2008). Nevertheless, inquiries that take place in a physical, 
cognitive and emotionally unsafe environment either do not allow zymosis to happen or 
the ideas generated are of low quality. When ideas are fermented, they can be 
completely different from what the person initially received from the others, or had 
already in mind.
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The stimuli play a double role: They are the 'ferments', or the 'yeast' 224 , that evoke 
people's zymotic listening and often they are also the focus point that the fermentative 
listening leads to. The ideas that are generated from listening to oneself and to others 
often go back to the stimulus to help people attain a different, wider, understanding of 
what they had before. This is a way for the stimulus to open. Zymotic listening 
(fermentative) is at the same time creative, critical and emotional225 . But what does it 
mean to listen creatively, emotionally and critically and how are these linked to a 
stimulus? To understand zymotic listening in more depth, it is necessary to understand 
its ingredients.
Listening creatively refers to the ability of listening with a "beginner's ear" (Brady, 2009) 
and is "ear- initiated" rather than "mouth-initiated" (Pinney, 1970). What is implied here 
is that a stimulus opens when we 'clear' as much as possible from what blocks us from 
listening. Laverty (2004, p. 196) interprets this 'cleaning' as naivety which "allows for the 
realization of what is non self. Naivety enables the deeper exploration of a stimulus 
because the stimulus is viewed afresh as if never perceived before. It encourages the 
creative listening to what others have to say about a stimulus. It also enables asking 
thought provoking follow up questions (Haynes, 2008; Kneller, 1965).
Listening creatively can enlighten the members of a philosophical community of inquiry 
to come up with follow up questions that they possibly could never imagine otherwise. 
These questions can help children and adults acquire a better understanding as to the 
aspects of the stimulus through probing, instructing, checking eliciting information, airing 
and opening new aspects of it that were almost ignored or explored (Robin, 2004; 
Whalley, 1993). People who allow space for naivety and hold back their previous 
knowledge or biases can come closer and even attain what is not articulated or
224 According to the Oxford English Dictionary "Fermentation is a process of the nature of that resulting from the operation of 
leaven on dough or on saccharine liquids. In Alchemy fermentation was the name of an internal change supposed to be produced in 
metals by a 'ferment', operating after the manner of a leaven." (Murray,1961).
225 The creativity in opening the stimulus is not found in its 'ingredients'but in the way they are used (Dewey,1966).
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understood226 . What is accomplished with naivety is the further understanding of a 
stimulus and through it the further understanding of oneself. Naivety should not be 
considered as a lack of experience, but as looking afresh as if there was no previous 
experience which creates the curiosity to learn. Children have this kind of naivety227 
which naturally allows them to think and listen creatively to a stimulus (Matthews, 1994). 
Therefore, listening in the company of children helps adults to listen more creatively.
Listening critically tests creative listening which has been generated after a stimulus has 
been introduced. Its role is more of an 'Elenchus' based on reasonable criteria; it is a 
kind of practical wisdom that Aristotle called phronesis, which helps to check whether an 
idea generated is rational and/or virtuous to apply in everyday life (Garrison, 1997). 
Being reasonable is not only being logical228 ; it involves striving for objectivity, accepting 
fallibilism, maintaining a pragmatic attitude and judiciousness which are virtues very 
much linked with listening critically (Burbules, 1995). Elaborating on Burbules's ideas it 
seems that striving for objectivity involves being tolerant to different views, listening 
carefully to others and acknowledging the intrinsic worth (or biases) of each point. 
Accepting fallibilism means being able to admit mistakes and correct them. This attitude 
is a sign of caring for oneself and others since the person admits mistakes so as to 
improve both his/her thinking and illuminate others. It also has a creative aspect as "the 
shock of the new" that an error reveals, enables the testing and possibly the changing of 
our assumptions (Popper, 1959). Maintaining a pragmatic attitude, people may get 
frustrated in their attempt to get answers for their philosophical questions which is
226 Slade (1998) moves a step forward and suggests as an aspect of creative listening the ability to listen to what has not been said 
yet or could perhaps never be said. Slade seems to give a broader meaning to creative listening which includes non verbal 
communication and silence. The silence often created when a person engages with a stimulus is the crucial time where Eros 
towards the stimulus is to be established or not.
227 Can an adult become naTve? Can life experience and knowledge be pushed to one side? Laverty presents naivety as if it is 
something that the facilitator can decide to allow space to it or not. It seems that being naTve is something that the person can 
control either to be or not. But is that possible? Even when adults think creatively with a playful attitude does that make their thinking 
naTve? Instead of naivety I would suggest appreciation of children's naivety and sharing it with adults' experience.
228 "A person who is reasonable wants to be careful and prudent in the adoption of important positions in life, is willing to admit 
when he or she has made a mistake and so on. These qualities are not exhibited simply by following certain formal rules of 
reasoning. They are enormously more complex than that, since they are manifested in a broad range of situations that are not 
governed by formal rules" (Burbules,1995, p.86).
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acceptable and expected. As for judiciousness, this refers to the limitations of reason 
and the appreciation of other forms of expression when taking decisions (e.g. tonal 
utterances and gestures may convey certain meanings) (Burbules, 1995).
Critical listening is careful listening that aims at:
o gathering information on children's previous knowledge which becomes apparent 
in the questions they ask, but also their attempts to give answers to problems 
and make meaning of their world (Rinaldi, 2006, p.14) and the assumptions they 
bring to their reasoning,
o building cognitive links between the facilitator's and children's knowledge,
o recognising the intentions behind objections and any possible interference from 
the facilitator's part (Myhil, Jones and Hopper, 2006, p.96; Bee and Bee, 1998, 
p.23; Daniel and Delsol, 2005;Daniel et al 2005; Daniel 2001),
o listening with care (care-fully). All good thinking already has moral responsibility 
attached to it.
Listening emotionally is listening empathetically (Sharp, 1997). Empathetic means trying 
to understand a stimulus from another's point of view or 'hearing through their ears' 
(Wegerif, 2006, p.63). Listening appears as a form of understanding that occurs through 
empathizing with what learners say and the emotional situations they find themselves 
in. This emotional situation may alter or even block the perception of the stimulus to 
something new. Empathetic listening helps in recognising others' sense of biases 
through thinking about them the way others do (Thayer Bacon, 1998). Rather than 
critiquing any prejudice or bias in thinking, it helps through empathising to really 
understand the way others perceive a stimulus and the reasons why they have such 
biases. Listening empathetically enables leaving aside the "habits of mind" and 
understanding others' views and premises when interpreting a stimulus (Murris, 2008; 
Murris and Haynes, 2000a).
Zymotic listening is a complex mixture of creative, critical and emotional listening. It is 
more than the accumulation of these types of listening. It is similar to creative listening
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because both lead to the generation of new ideas and both require a phase of 
incubation of the generated ideas, but also different from it as it is broader and includes 
the critical judgement that creative listening on its own lacks. Zymotic listening is:
o emotional as the creation of ideas can lead to a wide variety of emotions such as 
enthusiasm, wonder and passion, but also requires 'reading between the lines' 
which means being aware of how these emotions influence thinking, 
o critical because the ideas generated are judged for their reasonableness and
application to everyday life,
o Similar to reflective listening as it is based on rethinking both what others and 
oneself says, however, it describes better the complexity of the inner process of 
listening that takes place.
Zymotic listening is what is required so that all the ideas generated by one's 
interpretation of the stimulus can be translated to others229 . Translation means the 
ability "to absorb what other members have said and to translate and put other 
members' thoughts into a meaningful context both for the listener and the speaker" 
(Swanson and Hornsby, 2001). The stimulus can enable the translation of the ideas as 
it is the source of reference for the members of a philosophical inquiry. Can a stimulus, 
however, be ever totally translated as Lipman suggests, because (referring to Bakhtin) 
"there is no potential text of texts" (1996b, p.110)? In this example, the text is the 
stimulus, which can be much broader than words. Still, though, the stimulus's total 
translation is impossible. This is because there is no complete access to the stimulus by 
a person who can never know what a stimulus really is in itself (Nagel, 1974). The 
reason for this is that the person who chooses a stimulus always has a particular 
perspective. There is 'no view from nowhere' as Nagel suggests. The accurate 
translation of a stimulus is inhibited because there are gaps in the translation of the
229 Kennedy comes close to zymotic listening as he understands active listening as a sequence of reflective moves which can be 
verbal or non verbal, done by the facilitator or others, such as listening in order to seek for clarification, summarize ideas, find 
connections among statements, identify proportions, similarities, differences, Kennedy (2004) considers these moves as equivalent 
to active listening on a logical-linguistic level equating 'active listening' with 'translation'. 'Active listening' or 'translation' is critical but 
at the same time creative as it aims to create a common language of understanding between the facilitator and members of a 
c.o.i.(Cannon and Weinstein,1993).
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stimulus from one person to another. Thus, listeners can never be sure of a speaker's 
intentions, so a 'gap' in translating of what was said to what is understood may occur. 
Also people are different and have different ways of listening and decoding what they 
are listening to. This does not reassure that what one listens to is what the other meant.
Since accurate translation is not possible, at least partial translation (with all the 
possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations that hinder communication) can 
happen through creative listening and trying to imagine what the other may want to 
say230 .
6.3.2. The consequences of zymotic listening and the further opening of the 
stimulus
Zymotic listening enables other ways of 'opening' further of the stimulus as described 
below:
a) Establishing creative attitudes and using creative techniques
One of the ingredients of zymotic listening is creative listening. As listening is identical 
to thinking, then the techniques for creative thinking that look for fluency, flexibility, 
originality and elaboration (Torrance and Safter, 1989; Guilford, 1971) can 'open' the 
stimulus further. This means that the more ideas are displayed, the more opportunities 
that some of these ideas are good enough (fluency of ideas) (Getzels and 
Jackson,1962). The more flexibility in moving from one stimulus to different fields in 
thinking and linking them together, the more the stimulus 'opens'. Kirn (1990) refers to 
vertical and lateral thinking which can apply to the 'opening' of the stimulus. Vertical 
thinking enables the analysing of the stimulus and its components. The lateral thinking 
is moving away from the stimulus to new fields that could be connected to the stimulus.
230 This idea is aligned with Gregory's first-order non-realism and Golding's critical pluralism. See chapter 2.
207
The more deviated and original the ideas are, the better the stimulus is explored 
(originality). The more elaboration and dialogue over the ideas generated from a 
stimulus, the more the stimulus opens (Vernon, 1970).
The opening of the stimulus matches with an opening attitude231 that people who listen 
creatively have towards it (Cam, 1995; Kneller, 1965; Freire, 1972; McKinnon,1983; 
Goswami, 1999). Being open indicates selflessness on the part of the person to hold 
back his/her ideas and give a fully open ear to others and their new ideas (Pawling and 
Rich, 1985; Murris and Haynes, 2000b).
The stimulus and its possibility of multi-interpretation link playfulness with philosophy. 
This is mostly governed by the "pleasure principle" (Kennedy, 2006, p.60). Playing and 
experimenting with new ideas is part of children's lives and the way children get to know 
the world they live in (Bruner, 1960). Doing philosophy playfully awakens children's 
imaginations to generate ideas and make it a pleasant activity that helps them be more 
open-minded. It results in people finding pleasure that derives from their emotional state 
when engaging with and exploring the stimulus. Apart from pleasure, play is also seen 
as an activity. Children's play is children's work (Froebel, 2009). Philosophising is also 
the practice of philosophy and if done regularly, it strengthens people's reasoning skills. 
Philosophy can be playful, even mischievous and therefore lots of fun (Cam, 1995, 
p.26). It can be cognitive play and "cognitive fun" (Lipman, 1996b, p.36).
b) The metaphoric use of language
The use of metaphoric language is a consequence of listening creatively and having a 
playful attitude which can lead to a new understanding. This goes through the use of 
language. The more different vocabulary we use (and so metaphors) to describe a 
stimulus, the more different descriptions and understandings people get from it232 .
231 See chapter 8.
232 See Rorty's describing of metaphors as "a way of grabbing hold of causal forces and making them do what we want, altering 
ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations" (1991, p.81)
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Thus, the metaphorical use of language triggers re-descriptions which allow further 
progress (Calder, 2003). Below, I will give an example of how the metaphoric use of 
language can enable us to acquire a different understanding of what a stimulus could 
be. The following passage from Dewey's Art as an experience is illuminative:
The juice expressed by the wine press is what it is because of a prior 
act, and it is something new and distinctive. It does not merely represent 
other things. Yet it has something in common with other objects and it is 
made to appeal to other persons than the one who produced it (Dewey, 
2005, p. 86).
Adapting Dewey's description and speaking metaphorically, the stimulus could be the 
'wine' and the 'juice' expresses the new ideas and the moments of epiphany that people 
have when engaging with it. Dewey underlines the prior act which is essential for the 
stimulus so that something new can be generated. The more one recognises and 
analyses a stimulus, the more probable it is that one will be able to get something new 
out of it. This new 'juice' out of the stimulus is what links the person who produced it 
with the ones who will appreciate it. The appreciation of the stimulus and its 'products' 
is an act of creation. Dewey claims that "for to perceive, a beholder must create his own 
experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the 
original producer underwent" (2005, p.56).
What Dewey implies is that a stimulus is the medium, connective point between the 
people who generate ideas and the ones who appreciate them and, in turn, generate 
new ideas. Using a new simile, the stimulus, in this case is the link or the scaffolding of 
new ideas. Myhil, Jones and Hopper describe "scaffolding" as a way to facilitate and 
enable one process (2006, p. 10). They describe it as a temporary state that supports 
one piece of work until it is finished, non aesthetically but in a handy, strong and safe 
way which provides the platform to walk on, enabling access to an area of knowledge 
that otherwise would be out of reach and providing structure to work as it is carefully 
constructed and flexible to allow changes and improvements. This is exactly what the 
stimulus does. It is the platform that will help children generate ideas whether these 
ideas go back to the stimulus and to its further opening or not. For instance, the text
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and the images of a picture-book are types of scaffolding on which children can rely and 
think of questions and ideas that matter for them.
Staying with metaphors, the stimulus could be the 'gadfly' for doing philosophy with 
children and this is a metaphor deliberately used to show in practice an example of the 
generative aspect of philosophy in constructing new understanding. Murris (2009) 
clearly prefers the stingray metaphor (Plato, Meno) instead of the gadfly because it is 
not only the children that are perplexed and numbed but also the teacher. In this case 
both appear equal in a philosophical inquiry. I agree with this point, but the gadfly 
metaphor can more accurately link the use of a stimulus with philosophy's generative 
and evaluative aspects than a stingray. It is a matter of finding attributes in common 
between the 'gadfly' and the stimuli used for doing philosophy with children.
For instance, the gadfly is a pollinator of flowers. In this case children's thinking is the 
flower which in order to flourish needs to be pollinated. The noisy buzzing of a gadfly 
could symbolize the creative phase when a stimulus is presented and the reactions 
children have towards it. Buzzing noisily indicates an active, lively, energetic classroom 
where noisy discussion takes place. Similarly, the itching of the gadfly's bite could 
symbolize the children's irresistible desire to generate more ideas but also test them as 
they need a relief from the itching. All these different interpretations of the gadfly 
metaphor are samples of the generative aspect of philosophy in its attempt to achieve 
an understanding of the world233 .
Similes such as 'wine', 'juice', 'scaffolding' and 'gadfly' as ways of describing the 
'opening' of the stimulus are creative uses of our language. The use of metaphors, 
analogies, similes and descriptions is another way that helps people engage with a 
stimulus and 'open it up'. The creative use of language which could happen even 
through mistakes or misinterpretations may create moments of epiphany suddenly 
making the same stimulus to be differently viewed. It is as if the stimulus appears in a
233 For these reasons and many more that will be explored throughout the thesis, stimuli and the teacher's role would be 
investigated under the prism of the gadfly metaphor.
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different form which "marks the way of envisaging, of feeling and of presenting 
experienced matter so that it most readily and effectively becomes material for 
construction on adequate experience" (Dewey, 2005, p. 113). Some stimuli, such as 
picture-books or specially written stories for doing philosophy with children, have a 
narrative form234 , which incorporates metaphors and other ways of creative use of the 
language (Nussbaum, 2001). In primitive inquiries the metaphors given by the text (or 
the images) may encourage children's creative thinking and generating of new ideas as 
part of the generative aspect of philosophy.
c) Questioning
Questions are basic keys of 'expanding' a stimulus providing that zymotic listening has 
fully taken place. They seek further clarification and exploration of a stimulus so they 
open it and can become stimuli in themselves. Often a question can be so fascinating 
and it seems that the stimulus is left aside. This is true only if the stimulus is viewed as 
a starting point. If the questions are conceived as an expansion of the stimulus, then it is 
obvious that the stimulus is not lost, it can only have transformed into a question and 
can always transform into a new one later on. In practice, many facilitators when doing 
'philosophy with children', probe children to ask questions which can be connected or 
not to the initial stimulus. What is misunderstood here is that the questions emerging 
are aspects for potential analysis of the stimulus, or a new stimulus that can lead to 
different paths of knowledge.
Aristotle in Poetics describes the twists and turns in a plot of a character in a tragedy as 
peripeteia. The same is applicable to the stimuli. The different engagements with a 
stimulus and the different questions that occur can be described as different peripeteia 
that the stimulus 'throws us in'. There are many different categorizations of the 
questions. Whether questions are categorised as closed, textual, open or
234 See chapter 5.
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philosophical235 (Stanley, 2000; Cam, 2003; Fisher, 2007a; 2007b), or as ordinary, 
rhetorical or inquisitive236 (Splitter, 1994), they all enable a new exploration and a better 
understanding of a stimulus and beyond it237 . This understanding of the stimulus can 
have a psychological, sociological, historical, etymological, scientific, philosophical, 
theological, physiological and literal character, but not necessarily a philosophical one.
The stimulus opens philosophically when the questions that follow are not 'canned'238 
and push a philosophical inquiry. Golding (2007) moved this idea further by connecting 
the types of questions that can emerge with the types of philosophy (e.g. ontology, 
epistemology, logic, ethics and phenomenology239). He proposes questions that enable 
children to explore the ideas further that are generated by a stimulus through 
questioning that is evaluative, conceptual, metaphysical, phenomenological and 
epistemological. He gives examples of questions that are, for instance, evaluative or 
conceptual and he suggests how to use these questions in order to explore a subject, 
such as beauty or culture, in a more holistic way. Comparing the different ways of 
categorising the questions I think Golding's approach is more effective because: a) it 
focuses on the creative 'opening' of a stimulus and b) questions do not need to be 
mutually excluded from the categories.
d) Building on each others' ideas
235 The closed questions have one right answer, the textual ones are literal or informative and can be researched or ask an expert 
to be sorted out, the open questions have more than one answer and the philosophical are conceptual and favourite thinking in the 
abstract (Cam, 2003; Stanley, 2000; Fisher,2007b; Jackson,2004).
236 Ordinary can be understood as closed or textual the answers of which can be found empirically, rhetorical are the ones that the 
person who asks knows the answer but wants to check other's people knowledge and inquiry are the questions that require further 
research (conceptual or not) to be answered without guarantee of finding answers (Splitter,1994).
237 Another categorization of the questions is according to the moment they were raised. There are some pre-story questions 
where the teacher tries to connect children's experience with the story that will be used as a stimulus, post-story questions which 
they aim in the better understanding of the stimulus, transfer questions that enable the children's thinking moving from the stimulus 
to another subject linked with children's experience (Vallone, 2004).
238 Gardner refers to 'canned' questions to indicate the ones that occur mechanically without adding anything new to people's 
understanding. It is not enough to ask for an example or for a clarification only for the sake of asking a question (Gardner, 1995).
239 Ontology refers to the study of Being, epistemology refers to how we have any knowledge, logic refers to how to reason well, 
ethics refers to what is right or wrong and phenomenology refers to the study of our experience (Golding,2007).
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Finally, building on each others' ideas is another way to generate ideas. Children realise 
that through communicating with others (e.g. by participating in group games and 
working together), their thinking is further creatively stimulated (Dewey,1916). Felicity 
Haynes (2006), referring to Julian Baggini and Peter Fosl (2002), argues that only when 
we discuss our ideas and respond to the challenges that others make are our ideas 
really developed. The creative ideas come as more than the sum total of individual 
efforts. The linking of ideas is a kind of synthesis; thoughts are conceptualised and 
connected together to produce meaning (Kant, 1929 B103). The linking of ideas is a 
creative synthesis which occurs due to a sudden interlocking of ideas previously 
unrelated (Koestler, 1964). This connection of ideas is not for the sake of accumulation, 
but for the sake of finding meaning (Bosch, 1998b). A practical tip here could be the 
'mapping' of the stimulus240 used for doing philosophy which can offer visual 
representation of the opening of the ideas (Sutcliffe and Williams, 2000; Bruce, Knight 
and Barnes, 2008).
6.4. Conclusion
The opening of the stimulus is a generative process and begins with the interaction 
between the stimulus and people. What 'opens up' the stimulus is the different ways 
people view it rather than a literal opening. However, it is not enough for the stimulus 
just to grab the interest of people, it needs to offer them moments of epiphany or what 
Dewey calls 'an experience'.
As a stimulus opens it creates a new experience for each person. This new experience 
becomes part of a person's life which can be used anew as a stimulus (e.g. reflecting on 
the experience people had over a particular stimulus). This is a broader version of the 
stimulus which incorporates the stimulus and the experience created by it in a certain 
cultural environment. The 'temporary' limits that the stimulus reaches refer to the
240 See more about the mapping of the stimulus in chapter 7.
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moments that the further investigation of the stimulus stops at due to the lack of time, 
ideas or interest to explore it further.
Listening zymotica\\y (which can begin after a deixis of a stimulus) is a necessary 
condition for 'opening up' a stimulus. Listening is understood as thinking. Stimuli and 
listening are reciprocally linked together. In order to listen, a stimulus is needed to 
activate people's generation of ideas, and in order to open a stimulus, it is necessary to 
listen both to oneself and to others. The stimuli play a double role: They are the 
'ferments', or the 'yeast' that evoke people's zymotic listening and often they are the 
focal point that the fermentative listening leads to.
Zymotic listening is more than the sum of listening critically, emotionally and creatively 
both to oneself and others. It certainly shares characteristics with listening creatively 
(e.g. need for naivety and pushing back previous experiences so as to listen to what is 
new), critical listening (evaluation of the ideas generated by the opening of a stimulus) 
and emotionally (empathizing and looking from another's perspective). Zymotic or 
'fermentative listening' is the long term result of the synthesis and zymosis of listening to 
others (through the inquiry) and listening to oneself (through reflection) when 
interpreting and therefore opening a stimulus. Zymotic listening is what enables the 
translation of one's ideas to others. However, the stimulus can never be translated in 
itself, that's why theoretically it always appears as a source open to generating ideas.
The consequences of zymotic li stening that can further open up a stimulus is the 
establishment of creative attitudes and the use of creative techniques that look for 
fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration of the ideas offered when reflecting or 
dialoguing philosophically, the metaphoric use of language as a way of generating 
different understandings of a stimulus, the raising of questions that 'dig' vertically or 
laterally and the building on each others' ideas. The stimulus opens more if more than 
one person is involved and they are dialoguing with each other. This is where the 
community of philosophical inquiry can play a significant role.
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It is not enough just generating ideas out of a stimulus. Their evaluation in terms of truth 
and applicability should also been taken into account. The next chapter will explore the 
evaluative aspect of philosophy and how it is linked with a stimulus.
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CHAPTER 7 
Stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy
216 
Abstract
In this chapter there is an attempt to investigate what is the connection between stimuli 
and the evaluative aspect of philosophy. To do so, it is first explained in what ways 
philosophy has evaluative aspects. It will be argued that they are linked with people's 
ability to self-correct (within a philosophical inquiry). It will be argued that stimuli are 
linked with the evaluative aspect of philosophy when children engage with them within a 
philosophical c.o.i. in different ways. The chapter closes with an example that shows a 
dialogue using a stimulus and with children making efforts to self-correct.
7.1. Introduction: In what ways is philosophy evaluative?
The main reason for evaluation is the achieving of eudemonia which is a state of 
temporary equilibrium that makes people feel calm, relaxed and happy about the 
decisions they have made and the impact they have had on their and others' lives. 
Philosophy entails the search of what is considered as wisdom, which usually refers to 
what is true, right and correct to do. Hence, it has not only a theoretical but mostly a 
practical character as pointed out by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (Book VI, 
1143a31). As humans lack access to incorrigible sources of truth that could serve as 
"external" judgers, evaluators and correctors of 'human being's thinking', they have only 
themselves to evaluate the situations they confront and through them to self-correct. 
According to Peirce, who argued against Descartes and other rationalists, there is not a 
God of science or philosophy who could be the external corrector of humans' 
knowledge (Scheffler, 1974). The ability to self-correct shows also the ability to self- 
direct towards change which is a kind of autonomy necessary within a philosophical 
community of inquiry (Heron, 1989).
The facilitator can enable children's evaluating situations, reflecting on them and 
possibly self-correcting by:
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o providing or recognising the stimuli that children bring to inquiries, which can be 
used as starting points of philosophical inquiries and the point of constant 
reference and reason for reflective thinking,
o asking the questions (as Socrates did when implementing his midwifery method) 
that will push children's thinking further and
o making sure that people listen to each other.
The zymotic listening241 to others and to oneself when a stimulus is explored is one 
connection between the generative and the evaluative aspect of philosophy. On the one 
hand, one needs to listen creatively, emotionally and critically to the others so as to be 
inspired and build on other's ideas and come up with new questions and ideas. On the 
other hand, through listening children manage to evaluate their own and others' 
opinions and take decisions and further plans for action. For the early stages of 
philosophical inquiries, the stimulus on its own may not be sufficient, so children might 
need further motivation by the teacher to be sensitive in recognising and requiring a 
stimulus. The role of the teacher is to help children be evaluative without saying 
explicitly how they should evaluate the situations they face, their thinking and their 
experience.
Lipman (1980; 2003) highlighted the self-corrective character of thinking in philosophy 
for children. Self-corrective thinking means that a person reflects on his/her own 
thinking, discovers weaknesses and rectifies them. Lipman claims that the conditions for 
self-correction are optimal when building communities of inquiry where members correct 
each other's methods and procedures (Dewey, 1938; Splitter and Sharp, 1995). 
According to Lipman (2003, p.219), "each participant is able to internalize the 
methodology of the community as a whole, each is able to become self-correcting in his 
or her own thinking". What Lipman describes above brings to mind a constant process 
of evaluative "focusing in" and "focusing out" of the zymotic process that describes what 
happens within a philosophical community of inquiry at a communal and individual level 
as far as thinking is concerned. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the
241 See chapter 6.
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inquiring process and the collective seeking of good reasoning is what someone as an 
observer sees in a community happening as s/he "focuses out". "Focusing in" enables 
the investigation into what happens to each person's thinking separately and how the 
inquiring process helps each one reflect and possibly self-correct.
The 'focusing out' is a way of looking on the thinking that happens within a community. 
Cam (1995, p.51) calls this 'focusing out' as "thinking together" which is viewed as a 
collective process of correcting mistakes that may happen when exploring ideas within a 
community of inquiry. Cam (1995) claims that the more a person is used in the 
philosophical inquiry process, the more s/he learns how to correct mistakes by listening 
to others, exploring other alternatives, testing the premises each thought is based upon, 
and being open to find and correct mistakes242 .
Figure 7.1: The Bride and the old woman
242 Cam also identifies behaviours that show children's self-correction such as children's re-stating an opinion by choosing carefully 
the right words, having second thoughts, meeting the criteria of their remarks after they changed their mind (Cam,1995).
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Figure 7.2: Duck and hare
The optical illusions above (the young-old lady and the rabbit-duck illusion) are only 
some examples of the same stimulus perceived differently each time243 . The stimulus 
cannot be seen simultaneously in a different way, but through changing perception and 
looking from another point of view its different aspects are revealed (Brann, 1993). This 
is an example where the community of inquiry and 'thinking together' can help. 
However, in the end it is a matter of each person to select what s/he will see (Goswami, 
1999). The self-correction in this case has the character of being able to see more and 
different perspectives than what we could see before. The stimuli in a philosophical 
inquiry are much more complicated than the illusion because they open even more 
space to interpretation and afterwards to evaluation.
The dependence of self-corrective thinking both in a person's ability to recognise 
mistakes in thought and in the community of inquiry that provide alternatives ways of 
thinking is highlighted by Eugenio Echeverria when he defines self-correction as the 
situation
when other members of the community of inquiry offer sufficient and 
appropriate evidence to challenge a point of view that I made, I have the 
capacity to recognise that I was mistaken and even in some cases to be
243 In the first picture the item in the circle can be perceived as the ear of the young lady or the eye of an old lady, whereas in the 
second image the item in circle can be perceived either as a bill of a duck or the rabbit's ears. See figures 7.1, 7.2.
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grateful that thanks to their observation I was able to grow cognitively by 
transforming my way of thinking (Echeverria, 2007, p. 130).
Echeverria assumes that the starting point of self-corrective thinking is challenging 
people's thinking and ends in a state of thankfulness to the others for our self- 
correcting. This challenging includes a degree of what Piaget (1929) calls disequilibrium 
in one's thought. When a person realises that s/he may be mistaken or that there are 
other alternatives available, there is disequilibrium in his/her mental state (Dewey, 
2005). There are new data for the person to analyse which finally may change the way 
s/he thinks. The 'focusing in' can be identified as thinking for oneself. Thinking for 
oneself is an independent kind of thinking which hints at a sense of a person's freedom 
to question their own attitude, experiences and situations in the world (Splitter and 
Sharp, 1995, p. 16). It also involves applying reliable criteria before making any 
judgement and examining one's thinking (or else self-correcting). The 'community of 
inquiry1 provides the person with other members' ideas to think on, evaluate and self- 
correct if necessary244 . It seems that the person is inspired by others, but still corrects 
his/her self. This is how personhood (thinking for oneself) and citizenship (thinking 
together) can link meaningfully together (Splitter, 1997).
The person does get a lot from others' thinking but s/he has to make the final decision 
of what her/his thinking will be245 . Splitter claims that:
Meaning is not something which can be dispensed or handed from one person to 
another, even where the former- the teacher, say- has a greater degree of 
understanding of the subject than the later. Meaning, like knowledge in general, has 
to be constructed and while the process of construction can, and should, be a 
collaborative one, there is a sense in which each person is obliged to make sense of 
things in his or her own terms (2000b, p.21).
244 Splitter (2000a) distinguishes that "a community is not necessarily a community of inquiry, but inquiry necessarily presupposes 
an element of community". This strongly shows that an inquiry is a collective process. This inquiry becomes philosophical when the 
participants apart from the subject they discuss, they also think on the process of thinking, or else "thinking about thinking". Through 
this meta-level process of thinking one can identify himself and possibly self-correct (Splitter,2000b).
245 Popper, as cited by Splitter and Sharp (1995) argues that a scientific inquiry must be communal but "there is nobody but himself 
to check his results, nobody but himself to correct those prejudices which are the unavoidable consequences of his peculiar mental 
history...what we call "scientific objectivity" is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality, but a product of the social or 
public character of scientific method.
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Therefore, "thinking together" has meaning only as a collaborative process that takes 
places in a certain place and time, and among certain people each time they share 
opinions. However, the practical decision-making is done individually. In other words the 
person incorporates new ideas from others, which to an extent form who the person is 
and becomes. Nevertheless, it is up to the person whether s/he makes the new ideas 
his/her own (Glaser, 1993).
Part- whole and whole-part relationships246 within a c.o.i. reflect the "focusing in and 
out" described above. They are central in philosophy with children and reflect influences 
of George Herbert Mead, Bruner and Vygotsky. Consciousness and internalization are 
key concepts in Vygotsky's philosophy and in philosophy with children (Vygotsky, 1986). 
Vygotsky (1986) claims that thinking is the internalization of speech and that the 
connection between language and thought is important in learning to think. Bruner 
(1983) adds to this idea by favouring the using of culture as necessary to master 
language. What Lipman does is to combine these ideas by showing that the community 
of inquiry is the place where different cultures meet and each individual can internalize 
them, make meaning and shape their own opinions. The communicative interactions 
that both Bruner and Vygotsky suggest match with the pedagogy of the community of 
philosophical inquiry (Lipman and Pizzuro, 2001; Lipman, 1996b).
Mead (1934) also states that a person can self-correct and develop thinking through the 
capacity to talk to himself/ herself. Mead understands thinking as an internal dialogue in 
one's head. This "internal" person's talk is a kind of self-reflective thinking that 
presumes an internalisation of the forms of thinking that others display in a community 
of inquiry. What is indicated here is that listening to and building on each others' ideas 
within a community helps each person individually get more ideas and effective thinking 
skills to think for him/her self as an inter-dialogue with themselves, therefore the 
chances of self-corrective thinking increase. Vygotsky states this idea as follows:
246 Part- whole relationship is the relationship each member has towards the other members that form the community of inquiry. 
Whole-part relationship is the way the whole community reacts with each person individually. These kinds of relationship act 
complementary.
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Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first on the 
social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (inter 
psychological), and then inside the child (intra psychological) (1978, p.27).
What Vygotsky indicates above, links to a great extent with the idea of self-correction 
within a philosophical community of inquiry. The person listens to others' opinions 
expressed in the community of inquiry, internalises the process through reflecting on 
what happens in the community and then possibly incorporates ideas discussed and 
ways of thinking within the community. The person through the internalisation of the 
thinking process that takes place might find that some ideas or ways of thinking that 
came from others work better for him/her. In that case the person self-corrects his/her 
previous ideas or ways of thinking with the new ones that possibly work better for 
him/her.
Self-correction seeks for a "better - truer" knowledge. What each individual does when 
s/he thinks reflectively is testing his/her beliefs and reconstructing them because of 
either the emergence of new evidence that comes from a stimulus or, most importantly, 
the implementation of reasonable epistemological criteria to his/her thinking of both the 
old beliefs and the new evidence coming from others (Gregory, 2006). At a communal 
level, self-correction seeks ways of improving the inquiry's processes and the thinking 
skills that the individuals demonstrate.
7.2. How are stimuli connected with philosophy as an evaluative 
force?
The link between stimuli and the evaluative aspect of philosophy is differently viewed 
depending on the philosophical school one is influenced by. As mentioned in chapter 
two, realists, relativists and critical pluralists have a different appreciation of what 
philosophy is, therefore they have different perspectives on what the role of the stimulus 
is. Even though it is not stated clearly what the evaluative role of a stimulus is (as 
usually the stimulus is considered as the starting point of a philosophical inquiry that
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needs no further investigation), I will try to imagine its role within the different 
philosophical traditions.
Realists tend to perceive an objective reality separated from people's understanding of 
this reality. The stimulus for a realist is external, distinct and independent from people's 
interpretation. A realist would probably use for a philosophical inquiry a stimulus that is 
already evaluated as worth being explored philosophically. An evaluative statement for 
a stimulus such as "this book does not have meaning" would make sense as the 
particular book would not meet the criteria that a realist sets in advance when s/he 
defines what is its meaning. A stimulus within an inquiry with realists would probably be 
accompanied with a manual of how evaluation should be done - objectively speaking. 
The main criterion of evaluation would be in terms of the truth and validity of the 
stimulus and of the ideas that have emerged as a result of it the stimulus.
On the other hand, a relativist would appear much more open in evaluating a stimulus 
for an inquiry positively. The chances are that any stimulus could be used 
philosophically as you cannot predict what meaning children will attach to the stimulus. 
Relativists would be much more open in exploring and interpreting a stimulus, however, 
they would struggle with evaluation as it would be difficult to define the criteria for such 
evaluation. They might even skip the evaluation altogether247 .
Critical pluralism seems to be the 'golden mean' as it allows for experimentation with 
any stimulus but at the same time encourages critical evaluation. Adults and children 
can both participate in such a dialogue providing both can give good reasons for 
reviewing a stimulus positively or negatively. The dialogue among children and adults 
does not exclude anybody or anything, except indoctrination (Costello, 2000) and at the 
same time sheds light on some aspects of a stimulus that would have remained 
unknown otherwise to both adults and children. Bearing this position in mind, I will try to 
explain below how the stimulus could be connected with the evaluative aspect of 
philosophy in two different ways.
247 See figure 2.1
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Firstly, there is an evaluation about the stimulus itself and an evaluation that comes 
from the engagement of the person with the stimulus248 . In the first case, the evaluation 
refers mostly to the selection of a stimulus either by the children or the adults which can 
either go through a process of Eros, or Thanatos2™. In the second case, the stimulus is 
the point of connection between focusing 'in' and 'out' of an individual's thinking. The 
evaluation refers to the individual's engagement with the stimulus which:
o enables the mapping of the experience generated through the person's
engagement with a stimulus, 
o provokes emotions in the person that either enable or prohibit the further
evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion that emerged through the
engagement with it, and 
o activates the person's reflective thinking of the ideas generated and possibly
leads to self-correction and to applying philosophy in everyday life.
In all cases the gadfly metaphor used for the 'stimulus' in chapter six is applicable here 
again, to help us achieve a better understanding of the evaluative aspect of the 
stimulus:
o The traces left by the gadfly's flight create an imaginary map of the aspects of the
stimulus that were discussed. 
o The gadfly persistently flies and provokes emotions and requires patience from
the participants to make judgements bearing in mind the emotions generated, 
o The constant presence of the gadfly keeps children's thinking alert. The stimulus 
as a 'gadfly' can create a shared perplexity between the children and the teacher 
and therefore the beginning of a philosophical inquiry (Matthews, 2003a).
2481 will not refer to the evaluation of the stimulus itself as it concerns mainly the criteria of selection of a stimulus which is the 
subject of discussion in chapter 5. 
249 See chapters 4 and 6.
225
It is very important to highlight that the engagement of children with a stimulus may lead 
them to self-correct without the intervention of the facilitator250 . In other words the 
stimulus can indirectly help children become better in evaluating situations and self- 
correcting. This gives children the sense of being an agent instead of being acted upon 
(Pestalozzi, 1898). The child becomes more autonomous and capable of controlling 
their own thinking without being directed by the teacher (Freire, 1972). It may also 
resolve the apt dilemma that the facilitator often faces: shall s/he let the dialogue go on 
expecting that its quality and depth within a c.o.i. will improve or intervene and nudge 
students to think critically (Splitter, 2007a). A good stimulus does most of the work, 
keeping children busy thinking and leaving to the teacher a secondary, facilitative role. 
In this case the facilitator needs only to push children's thinking further by asking for 
further clarification when necessary, make sure that children's ideas are listened to by 
all and give hints about aspects of the stimulus that could be further developed 
(Haynes, 2008). Thus, the dialogue has more chances of focusing mostly on children 
than on the teacher, or as Splitter highlights changing from "T-S-T-S-T-S-T251 ..." to " T- 
S-S-S-S-T-S-S-S-S-T-S..."252 (2007a, p.217).
The more complex the stimulus is and the more heterogeneous the community of 
inquiry is, the more difficult and challenging the evaluation is. An inquiry that consists of 
a very homogenous group of members who share the same perspectives, have the 
same aims and think similarly may help them think in more depth and reaffirm their 
beliefs and agree to what they know but it may not challenge them to identify different 
aspects that would be worthy of discussion. On the contrary, a very heterogeneous 
group of individuals whose thinking displays huge differences, a very complex stimulus
250 The cycle according to which the teacher asks a question, the student answers and the teacher evaluates the answer does not 
work because it puts off children to think creatively about ideas that the teacher would not approve, it does not allow children to 
learn from each other, and there is no connection between the questions' and children's past and future interests and experiences 
(Sprod,1995).
251 T stands for teacher and S for student. T-S-T-S model is the traditional educational process in the classroom where the teacher 
asks a student and the student replies to the teacher. Instead, a T-S-S-S-T-S-S-S model gives emphasis to students' questioning 
and talking to each other. In this case the teacher is just one member and not the centre of the educational process. Students have 
more opportunities to express themselves.
252 See an empirical application of Splitter's idea in Korean preschool settings (Seon-hee Jo and Park, Jin-whan, 2001)
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or a combination of the above may be disruptive and make it difficult for the facilitator to 
facilitate.
7.2.1. The stimulus as a way of mapping the children's experience with it
All the questions, diagrams, comments that the children make about the stimulus within 
a community of inquiry, if recorded253 , can create a potential, but not exclusive, 'map' of 
the stimulus254 . This 'map' is potential because it can be different each time it is made 
for the stimulus, as it represents the different aspect of the stimulus that each time is 
discussed255 . It's not exclusive as it does not 'capture' all children's reflective thinking; 
for instance the thinking that has not been verbally expressed. However, even if not 
totally accurately, this mapping enlightens further the initial stimulus and shows to the 
community how it has philosophically proceeded256 . It shows its 'history' and also the 
dynamics of the community of inquiry during the analysis of the stimulus (e.g. who 
spoke often, what were the responses in certain questions etc) (Splitter, 2003; 2006a; 
Lyshyn, 2002). The mapping of the stimulus is not only on its own an evaluation of the 
process followed and captures the progress the philosophical inquiry, but is also a point 
of reference for the evaluation (not necessarily in the classroom or during a certain 
timetable). Mapping or recording children's philosophical experiences by writing their 
ideas in personal logs or audio-recording them, enables children's self-correction no
253 For instance, children's questions and comments can be written on the board or in a logbook which can be communal or for 
each individual. Children's thinking can be visualised in many ways such as: a) by using charts, diagrams and mind maps of their 
ideas (Buzan,2003), b) by writing down positive, negative or interesting points concerning the under discussion subjects or 
identifying the obvious and not obvious premises underlying as if the subject under discussion is an iceberg (Margulies and Valenza, 
2005; Durham, 2006). Their ideas can also be audio taped or videotaped (Kyle,1993). The interactive whiteboard can show 
graphically the relationships and the connection between the ideas and the gaps in knowledge that occurred through engaging with 
a stimulus (Bruce, Knight and Barnes, 2008).
254 Costello's three-fold programme of Philosophy which is based on the use of short stories, diagrams and modes of reasoning 
depicts somehow the mapping of children's experience when doing philosophy with children (Costello,1996).
255 See for instance appendix 4: Questions that emerge spontaneously in the classroom. The writing down of children's ideas 
captures, as a map, the progress of a philosophical discussion at this particular moment. However, this works as a stimulus that can 
open in future. Children can always see their ideas written, revisit and open the dialogue again by evaluating what they have already 
written and adding new ideas that again are open to further evaluation.
256 See the idea of 'focusing out' analysed before and the idea of improving the techniques of thinking at a communal level.
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matter what drawbacks may be demonstrated257 . This process works also as a 
memorandum or as an 'extension' and 'expansion' of the initial stimulus: Children can 
'visit' their ideas, test them in terms of their validity and applicability in life and either 
abide with them or reject them (Kyle, 1993). Sharp's analogy of a community of 
philosophical inquiry with "Going Visiting" or differently "travelling to a new location" 
would be useful here (Sharp, 2008a; 2008b). A person who participates in a community 
of inquiry and differentiates him or herself from others is like a visitor at a new place 
who views stimuli as a tourist without letting them change his or her way of thinking or 
behaviour. On the other hand, when one self-corrects his or her self for the sake of self- 
corrective thinking it is like the refugee who migrates and is totally assimilated into the 
new environment and its stimuli to the extent that the person forgets oneself and one's 
origins. I would say that those two different attitudes set the limits and the range of self- 
corrective thinking.
The mapping of the stimulus, although it is not exclusive, serves as a mapping of the 
children's experiences through their engagement with the stimulus. Dewey writes:
The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades 
the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. This 
unity is neither emotional, nor practical, nor intellectual, for these terms 
name distinctions that reflection can make within it. In discourse about an 
experience, we must make use of these adjectives of interpretation. In 
going over an experience in mind AFTER its occurrence, we may find that 
one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it 
characterizes the experience as a whole (2005, p.38).
This passage highlights the evaluative role of the stimuli: on the one hand, children live 
the experience by engaging with the stimulus and on the other hand, they evaluate it
257 There are drawbacks though which I summarize below: a) when the facilitator summarizes in a few words what children said 
s/he mostly bases this on his/ her interpretation and understanding of what children might have thought. Children may not comment 
on the teacher's possible wrong interpretation for many reasons, such as wanting to please him/her that they have understood 
correctly or because they want to avoid arguing, b) it can be impractical as the facilitator has to listen carefully as to what the 
children say and write down their thoughts. S/he may lose the track of children's thoughts or her/his own thoughts, c) in case 
somebody else does the mapping, there may be a three way translation gap between what the pupils think, what the facilitator 
understands and what the writer maps.
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afterwards258 . This opens the way for further meta-cognition and evaluation of children's 
whole experiences. Again, the role of the facilitator fades as it is not him/her that 
evaluates, but children themselves by referring to the stimulus and the way they opened 
it within a c.o.i. The comments made, the questions raised, the ideas written down in 
personal log books become a lived experience that afterwards can help children 
evaluate their thinking, their progress, their attitudes towards the philosophical dialogue 
and the ideas they came up with.
7.2.2. The stimulus as a way of provoking emotions and making children 
aware of them when evaluating situations
Children need to be aware that they think not only logically but also emotionally. As 
argued259 earlier, emotions are judgements (Nussbaum, 2001). Therefore, rather than 
trying to push them away or pretend that they are not involved when taking decisions, it 
is better to accept this, be aware of one's emotions and try to understand how they 
influence and inform thinking and the decisions children make. Stimuli, as they provoke 
emotions, can help children recognise how their thinking is emotionally influenced. 
Through the stimulus children can realise their individuality in terms of the emotions 
generated by the stimulus. As Nussbaum argues the "emotions contain an ineliminable 
reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of goals and projects" (Nussbaum, 
2001, p.52). Children realise that their judgements reveal their ways of thinking and 
feeling, therefore aspects of themselves and how they evaluate themselves and others. 
Their likes or dislikes for a stimulus can influence their attitude towards it.
The engagement with the stimulus leads to emotional response from the members of 
the community of inquiry which is an aspect of what is often described as caring thinking 
(Sharp, 2007a). This emotional mood, part of zymotic listening, affects people's self- 
correcting and evaluating of their ideas. Sharp in her article "The other side of reason"
258 See chapter 6 and the example given by Egley and Foulston (2010).
259 See chapter 4 and 5
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builds on Lipman's ideas and expands on self-correction as emotions which are a form 
of thinking260 . For Sharp, self-correction makes sense when children are able to identify 
certain emotions that influence their thinking and manage them in a way that helps them 
adjust in their social environment and communicate more effectively with the other 
members (Sharp, 2008a). What Sharp denotes is a kind of meta-thinking which consists 
of a deliberate awareness and a conscious concentration about the way children think 
and feel so as to self-correct.
Thoughts and emotions (if not considered as thoughts) are about something - they have 
an object (Nussbaum, 2001). According to Nussbaum this object is intentional:
that is, it figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person 
whose emotion it is. Emotions are not about their objects merely in the 
sense of being pointed at them and let go, the way an arrow is released 
towards its target [...] Emotions are active ways of seeing and 
interpreting/ not being given a snapshot of the object, but requires looking 
at the object, so to speak through one's own window (2001. p.27 -28).
What Nussbaum highlights above has a direct application to stimuli. The stimuli are 
about something and can provoke emotions that are subject to multiple interpretations. 
Also the way stimuli are evaluated is not so much because of them being objects, but 
because of the different ways they can be viewed. The stimuli can offer children a two 
fold opportunity: a) to make them emotionally moved and engaged in a dialogue that 
can allow children a Deweyan experience, b) to allow space for meta-cognition about 
the stimulus used and the experience created which allows children to deliberately 
concentrate on them. Hence, children become more sensitive about their thoughts and 
emotions and can evaluate certain situations.
Through their involvement with a stimulus children can also become aware that their 
thoughts and emotions are localised: they refer to the particular stimulus or experience
260 Goleman (1996) understands emotional intelligence as a person's ability to recognise one's feelings and others', motivates self 
and manages well the emotions either for him or in the relationships the person is member of. This ability is necessary to be 
developed among the members that participate in a community of inquiry as it can enable members to self-correct their thinking.
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that the children have rather than the general meaning of the particular emotions in the 
universe as a whole261 (Nussbaum, 2001, p.31). Such a thesis was the basic argument 
against philosophy with children which was perceived as "concrete philosophy"262 
(Kitchener, 1990). However, talking in general about what is an emotion is 
philosophically empty if first of all emotions are not recognised in concrete examples. 
Focusing on concrete situations enables a deeper understanding of the nuances that 
emotions take in particular and concrete situations. For instance, there are different 
nuances of disgust for a stimulus. Children may be disgusted by the same stimulus but 
for different reasons they may express their disgust in different ways. Being able to 
distinguish these different connotations of an emotion and evaluate it for a particular 
situation is much more important than simply generalizing about what is an emotion. But 
even if an abstract discussion about what a stimulus is important, it makes sense only if 
firstly children have empirically or conceptually experienced emotions in particular 
situations or with certain stimuli. The role of the facilitator is to make sure that the 
inquiry does not turn into a therapeutic session that is consumed by a psychological 
analysis of children's emotions connected with their previous experiences (Ecclestone 
and Hayes, 2009).
Emotions are not only created through the engagement of children with the stimulus; 
they are often imbedded in the stimulus (Sharp, 2007a; Murris, 2009). Murris (2009) 
highlights the emotional dimension of a narrative and how this affects dialogue among 
members in a community of inquiry. Through the narrative (as found in picture-books or 
P4C novels), children become aware of their emotions towards the characters of the 
narrative, explore them further, discover new meanings, and possibly correct 
themselves (Nussbaum, 2001). It may be argued that such stimuli, being already loaded 
with emotions, may create a skewed view towards the stimuli or even block children's 
objective evaluation. I would argue that as long as these stimuli do not provide emotions 
that impose or direct towards certain ways of how the readers should feel, they are even
261 See appendix 4: The classroom labels: How do I feel today? Children talk about their own emotions which keep changing 
during the day and soon elaborate by asking rather complex questions such us "is Georgia's anger the same as mine?" which can 
be discussed further philosophically.
262 See chapter 2.
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richer than other alternatives available for doing philosophy with children. They add to 
the multiple interpretation of a stimulus and widen the range of possible evaluations.
What is hinted at here is that the stimuli can offer models of thinking that are subject to 
children's evaluation263 . These models that the stimulus offers work better within a c.o.i. 
and when they are discussed further. An inquiry about a stimulus enables children's see 
the emotions others have for a stimulus which may vary from their own. Listening to 
different ways of others justifying their emotions towards a stimulus, children can grasp 
a deeper understanding of the aspects of the stimulus that might have never been 
considered before. Splitter (2000a; 2000b) indicates that "inquiry presupposes 
community". He highlights the asymmetry between community and inquiry: community 
can be independent without inquiry but inquiry needs community. Therefore, a person 
may change her/his thinking when s/he is exposed to different ways of thinking. The 
stimulus, in this context, offers the field for experimentation with ideas and the reason 
for the community to start discussing. The children have a starting point to refer to so as 
to possibly 'change their minds' and self-correct.
The stimuli should support the maintenance of a balance among "resilience, courage 
and flexibility" in children's thinking while they address philosophical issues and think of 
how to work out plausible responses in a community of inquiry (Matthews, 2008; 
Haynes, 2008). Children changing their minds, shows openness in their thinking which 
sometimes adults lack for fear of giving the impression of being weak. On the other 
hand children may change their thinking only because they are considered to be prone 
to influence. The stimuli and the engagement with them within a c.o.i. give the 
opportunity for children to be:
o resilient to changing their mind only when there is a good reason for that,
o courageous either to accept that they are mistaken and change their mind or hold
their previous ideas, and 
o flexible to listen to new ideas and accept new ways of thinking.
263 See chapter 3 the discussion about Lipman's novels
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7.2.3. The stimulus as a way of enabling children's reflective thinking which 
possibly leads to self-correction
In chapter six, it was argued that the stimulus enables children to generate ideas 
through zymotic listening. There is a phase of excitement about ideas but as the 
fermentative process goes on, the ideas settle down. This settling down enables the 
evaluative process of the ideas that were generated as it allows time for them to be 
tested critically. The stimulus is the topos (place) where children and philosophy as an 
evaluative force meet. Without the initial stimulus and the constant presence and 
reference to it, ideas would neither be generated nor tested afterwards. Even though the 
stimulus itself is passive, the engagement with it is what makes it powerful. This is why 
the role of the teacher and the community of inquiry are important: it is through them 
that a stimulus can be explored to its maximum potential.
The constant reference to the stimulus makes children more sensitive to the context of 
the discussion around the stimulus. For example, the special limitations and the 
exceptional or irregular circumstances that are indicated by the stimulus or described in 
it (Lipman, 2003; Lipman, 1996a). Therefore, when children try to find reasons and 
arguments to support their ideas they have to think and evaluate whether these ideas 
could be applicable to the specific context of the dialogue about the stimulus. They have 
to be flexible in their thinking, experiential and personal (Murris, 2008b). Even though 
this could be characterized as 'concrete thinking', it can be argued that it's a form of 
practical reasoning. Decisions in everyday life are usually made for particular concrete 
situations and children need to have the skill of evaluating these particular situations264 
in a spirit of phronesis, as indicated by Aristotle. According to Fields (referring to 
Evans), children have the opportunity to think about relevant criteria that meet the 
situations given by the stimulus, be consistent in their thinking, but also be flexible to 
change their minds when there are good reasons and express their ideas 
comprehensibly (Fields, 1995a; 1995b).
264 For an example see appendix 4: The scale of responsibility and children's discussion that being perfectly responsible is not 
necessarily a very good thing.
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The stimulus, apart from being a concrete example, opens up to the world of possible 
situations that could be safely investigated. Safely, means that children can experiment 
with ideas without real consequences, in the sense of having any negative effect on 
their lives. However, children's engagement with the stimulus can help them evaluate 
possible situations, imagine how things would be if they were different and possibly 
apply some of these ideas to their own life. The engagement with the stimulus allows 
children to develop certain behaviours and skills that show this, such as identifying 
errors in thinking265 or that of others, pointing out ambiguity, vague, obscure or non 
clarified expressions, demanding further elaboration on reasons or criteria that have 
been used to support arguments, seeking inconsistencies or fallacies in reasoning, 
examining the premises and their hidden assumptions on which an argument is based 
(Lipman, 2003; Fisher, 2008). These behaviours and skills can be transferable into 
other situations (Winstenley, 2008) and this is one way that the evaluative aspect of 
philosophy can be linked with philosophy as a way of life266 .
The question "What would happen if..." opens the space not only for children's creative 
thinking but also for its evaluation. Stimuli such as those specially written stories for 
P4C or children's literature can help the readers:
o think actively by organizing what the thoughts and the emotions of the fictional 
characters are, building on the ideas of the fictional characters adding at the 
same time their ideas and the ideas of the other members of the c.o.i., 
o think affectionately by acknowledging the emotions of the fictional characters and
trying to justify them, and
o think normatively about how the characters should act and if there are certain 
obligations given by the stimulus.
The Socratic Method can be a way of exploring a stimulus further with the implicit help 
of the facilitator or the other members of a mature community of inquiry that can self
265 See appendix 4: Children's discussion and need for practical critical thinking about how to adjust the fake bear on their faces in 
their pretending playing of being Ancient Greek gods.
266 See chapter 8
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direct without the facilitator's intervention. Briefly, the process of Socratic Elenchus
comprises of the following stages:
o concept clarification by giving a definition of it, 
o checking the premises upon which the definition is based, 
o offering of counter examples that contradict the definition, 
o critique the reasoning and searching for alternatives and finally 
o the final evaluation of the reasons that support the initial definition267 (Creel, 
2001, p.45).
In the Pragmatist context Socratic method could be used as a method of hypothesising 
and understanding knowledge as a justified true belief even if temporarily (Matthews, 
2003). It remains to be asked, however, how this process is linked with a stimulus in 
philosophy with children?
Socrates would start with a question that was truly puzzling his interlocutor (an aporia), 
for instance, 'what is love?' was the main subject in Plato's Symposium. Such a 
question might emerge from children's engagement with the picture-book of Max 
Velthuijs' 'Frog in Love'.
267 See the example of Euthyphro in chapter 1, p. 18.
235
Hare thought hard, just like a real doctor.
"I see," he said. "It's your heart. Mine goes thump-thump too."
"But mine sometimes thumps faster than usual," said Frog.
"It goes one-two, one-two, one-two."
Hare took a big book down from his bookshelf and turned the pages.
"Aha!" he said. "Listen to this. Heartbeat, speeded up, hot and cold
turns... it means you're in love!"
"In love?" said Frog, surprised. "Wow! I'm in love!"
Figure 7.3: Picture from Velthuijs' Frog in Love
Children might try to define what love is. The stimulus used could be a source either for 
children finding reasons to support their ideas, or to test arguments that might be 
offered by the stimulus itself. When, for instance, Frog goes to the doctor and it is 
diagnosed that he is in love because his heart goes "thump-thump" the facilitator may 
ask the children to assess this premise as to whether it is a good argument in favour of 
being in love. Children may find counter arguments, for instance the heart also thumps 
when one is anxious (due to taking an important examination or going to the dentists). 
Heart rate can also be highly increased in the case of a claustrophobic person trapped 
in an elevator. Therefore, the 'thumping' criterion is not a necessary condition to explain 
what it means to be in love. However other children may have different arguments (e.g. 
there are special ways of thumping!) and elaborate further on them. This is where the 
Socratic method can be used to check the validity of children's arguments.
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7.3. An example of self-correcting thinking: Is it good to throw 
fireworks at Easter?
Below, I present an example of a dialogue among children aged 4-6 years old that 
shows how the use of a stimulus may lead to children's self-correction. The discussion 
began when a child brought in to the class the photos of fireworks (stimulus) that his 
family had taken during Easter. He shared his photos with us because children were 
encouraged in my classroom to bring things that they would like to discuss or show to 
others. There was no intention of expanding the discussion philosophically until a girl 
said that the fireworks made her scared and some other children agreed with her. Some 
others, however, insisted that fireworks were 'good fun'. I asked them to give reasons 
why it is good or bad to throw fireworks268 .
Children were invited to think of the consequences of certain actions. After the 
presentation of the children's ideas, which I wrote on the wall so as not to forget, 
children wanted to go on and think what is morally correct or wrong to do. Below, I 
present a passage of the dialogue that took place during the presenting of the children's 
arguments.
268 Arguments in favor of throwing fireworks during Easter because:
We like them (Ntinos)
We throw them up to the sky, they are noisy and they make us laugh (Elpida)
We threaten all the 'babies' (Mike)
They have nice colours (Gina)
It's just one day a year and it is fun (Minos)
Arguments against throwing fireworks during Easter because:
A bullet may explode close to people and smash them into a million of little pieces (Kostis)
The church may catch fire (Kostis)
Somebody may get burnt (Eui)
A bullet may lose the way and get into our ears and destroy the drum and then we will not listen to the others (Vasos)
Our hands may got burnt when we light the fireworks (Gina)
Yeah... a firework may stick into our hands when we try to light them and then it can go off and we will die (Mike)
It may causes damages to the houses and the people who live there (Elpida)
Maybe the light of the fireworks can cause damages to our eyes and we will not be able to see (Vasos)
People who are fast asleep will get up frightened (Rhodi)
Birds will be scared (Mike)
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Elpida: I hadn't thought that birds would be scared by the
fireworks.(l)269
Gina: Mm, yeah...if I woke up by the fireworks in the night I wouldn't like it. (2) 
Minos: Yeah...but this night all the people are out, nobody sleeps. (3) 
Me: How do you know that all people are out? (4) 
Minos: Because it is Easter. You can't sleep, you go to the church. (5) 
Ntinos: My grandmother doesn't go to the church because she is too old. Maybe
she would be terrified if a firework exploded next to her. (6) 
Minos: But it wouldn't. It's still cold and the windows are shut. (7) 
Vasos: It can smash the glass so the Ntino's grandmother could be hurt by a
piece of glass that would go straight to her neck. She would bleed. Or it
would destroy the drums of her ears.(8) 
Ntinos: She is quite deaf anyway. (9) 
Minos: But it is just once a year. What's wrong in throwing some fireworks once a
year? (10)
Kostis: Yeah...once a year is not too much. We shouldn't feel guilty.(11) 
Elpida: Now I don't know what to do. Before I thought that fireworks were fun, but
then I thought that poor birds may suffer and now Minos says that once a
year is not too much. I am not sure (12)
(small pause) 
Gina: Mmm...it's not only once a year. There are fireworks when there is a
wedding. And there are many weddings every summer (13)
Mike: I will tell my father off next time that he will throw fireworks anyway (14) 
Elpida: Are there fireworks with no sound but with colours? (15) 
Ntinos: Pf.... Fireworks without sound are not fun.(16) 
Vasos: The colour can still make the birds blind. It's very bright.(17) 
Minos: Come on! It's just a quick flash. (18)
This dialogue shows how the engagement with a stimulus can activate children's a) 
creative thinking which takes place at the beginning when the children think of
269 I number the sentences so as to use the numbers to refer to certain sentences later instead of repeating the sentences.
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arguments for and against using fireworks and b) critical thinking, when children test the 
validity and applicability of the arguments offered before by applying their own a version 
of Socratic Elenchus and testing it within the community of inquiry that children have 
created. Children's discussion shows an immaculate coherence and focus on the 
stimulus, as well as on the question that came from it. This is because children 
disagreed with each other about a stimulus that matters to them and they tried to 
provide arguments to support their opinions and undermine the opinions of others.
Minos was the one in favour of the fireworks and offered a counter argument to Gina's 
argument about people being asleep. He generalized by using the word "all". His 
argument was that this is a specific night: all are out/nobody sleeps. This made Ntinos 
test the word 'all' and provide counterexamples that not all people go to church (e.g. his 
grandmother did not). Minos ignored Ntino's counter example and seemed to forget the 
issue of noise. He argued that the firework cannot affect his grandmother because the 
weather is chilly and does not permit people to open the windows. Vasos supported 
Ntino's counter argument by exploring it further and offering some alternatives. The 
discussion went on with a sequence of arguments and counter arguments that illustrate 
how philosophising can be evaluative within a c.o.i.
Elpida's attitude is an example of reflection and an attempt to self-correct. She seemed 
to have carefully listened to what the others said and realised parameters that she had 
not thought of before, which made her questioning whether it is bad or good to throw 
fireworks (1). She seemed to decentre from herself and think over other people's or 
animals' points of view, which is a necessary skill for evaluating. Later on Elpida was 
confused with the arguments in favour and against as to the use of fireworks, however 
she was able to summarize the basic arguments to such an extent that she constantly 
changed her opinion (12). This is a sign of zymotic listening: listening to others, 
reflecting on what has been said and trying to form her own point of view. However, it 
seemed that both sides of the argument were well supported, so she was still puzzled.
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How did the stimulus keep being a point of reference throughout the inquiry? One way 
was by thinking of other occasions than Easter when fireworks are also used. When 
Minos gave a second counter argument, i.e., referring to the rarity of using fireworks 
(Easter is once a year) so as to justify their use, Kostis was persuaded, but Gina 
knocked Mine's argument down by providing another counter argument: that fireworks 
can be used to celebrate.
Another more imaginative way, was by visualising the effects of throwing fireworks. 
Vaso's descriptions had strong elements of thinking hypothetically as to what the 
consequences of an action could be which not take placed at that moment. This could 
be either due to previous direct or indirect experience (e.g. through films he has seen 
and books he has read) that Vasos had, or due to his ability of thinking creatively and 
evaluating as to the possible consequences of each hypothesis. Vaso's contributions 
are genuine examples of both creative and critical thinking. The same thing was also 
the case with Gina who tested Elpida's argument about irritating people who are asleep 
by imagining herself in this position and how she would have felt. Gina agreed with 
Elpida's point because she could visualise her thinking and her possible reactions 
based mostly on her previous experience (2).
A third way was by building on the stimulus and opening it for further thinking. Elpida's 
attempt to keep the fun of fireworks but eliminate their bad effects activated her creative 
thinking (15). This enabled others to evaluate the new idea (16, 17). Colourful but mute 
fireworks were a new aspect of the initial stimulus to be explored. This is where the 
c.o.i. is important: it provides its members with new ideas to evaluate further. Elpida 
'opened up' the initial stimulus by offering an imaginative version of it and by stimulating 
others to imagine the consequences of the expanded stimulus.
The evaluation of the arguments did not take place for the sake of the arguments, but 
for the sake of what action children should take in the future. Mike's statement -he 
would say to his father not to use fireworks again- shows: a) evaluation of a situation by 
its consequences and b) a type of action that could take place and is now connected
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with children's well being. Children were puzzled whether it was good to use fireworks 
or not and tried to come up with an answer they could apply. It seemed as if Elpida was 
looking for general rules, in her attempt to find out how one should act (12).
Therefore, the evaluation of the arguments was not only done for the sake of the 
argument, but also for the sake of how one should live. This dialogue is an example of 
how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force links with children's experiences 
and their understanding of how they should live (philosophy as a way of life). The 
children kept discussing this for a long time because this issue was linked to their 
experiences, so it mattered to them to explore it further. It's worthy to mention that this 
dialogue emerged from children's genuine interests (the stimulus was offered by the 
children). What the facilitator only did was to identify the initial disagreement over the 
use of the fireworks and bringing it closer to children's attention to explore it further.
7.4. Conclusion
In this chapter it was argued that the evaluative character of philosophy is mostly 
connected with individuals' self-correcting. The stimulus and philosophy as an 
evaluative force are linked together in two different ways. There is an evaluation 
towards the stimulus itself and an evaluation that comes from the engagement of the 
person with the stimulus. In the first case, the evaluation refers mostly to the selection of 
a stimulus whereas in the second case, it refers to the person's engagement with the 
stimulus which: a) provokes emotions in the person that either enable or prohibit the 
further evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion that emerged through the 
engagement with it, b) activates the person's reflective thinking of the ideas generated 
and possibly leads to self-correction and to applying philosophy in everyday life and c) 
enables the mapping of the experience generated through the person's engagement 
with a stimulus.
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1) The emotional response that the stimulus offers and the emotional mood it creates 
within the community of inquiry is essential for people's self-correcting. The stimuli can 
offer children a two-fold opportunity: a) to make them emotionally moved and engaged 
in a dialogue that can allow children a Deweyan experience, b) to allow space for meta- 
cognition about the stimulus used which allows children to deliberately concentrate on 
how they feel, what they think about the stimuli they engaged with and how they can 
evaluate certain situations better. The stimuli and the engagement with them within a 
c.o.i. give the opportunity for children to be: a) resilient and change their mind only when 
there is a good reason to do so, b) courageous either to accept that they are mistaken 
and change their mind or hold their previous ideas and c) flexible to listen to new ideas 
and accept new ways of thinking.
2) The settling down of ideas generated through zymotic listening is a kind of evaluative 
process where the ideas are tested critically in terms of their validity and applicability. 
The stimulus is the topos where children and philosophy as an evaluative force meet 
together. This is because without the initial stimulus and the constant presence and 
reference to it, neither ideas would be generated nor would they be tested afterwards. 
However, it is the people's engagement with a stimulus; no matter what it is or who 
brings it (children or adults) that activates their reflective thinking which may lead to their 
self-correcting.
3) The mapping of the stimulus, including children's comments and questions, enables 
children's self-correction independent of the possible drawbacks. Moreover, it serves as 
the mapping of the whole experience children had through their engagement with it. 
This opens the way for further meta-cognition and evaluation of children's whole 
experiences. The role of the facilitator fades as it is not him/her that will evaluate, but 
children through referring to the stimulus and the way they opened it within a c.o.i.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the link between the stimuli and the evaluative 
aspect of philosophy is differently viewed depending on the philosophical school one is 
influenced by. Realists would find it easier to identify what counts as a stimulus and how
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a stimulus should be perceived whereas relativists would appear much more open in 
evaluating a stimulus for an inquiry, positively and uncritically. Critical pluralism seems 
to be the 'golden mean' as it allows not only the experimentation with any stimulus, but 
at the same time the critical approach of it.
The generative and evaluative role of the stimuli is not enough to link them with 
philosophy as a way of life. How this is possible is explained in the chapter that follows.
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CHAPTER 8 
Children, stimuli and philosophy as a way of life
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Abstract
This chapter focuses on two parameters: a) What is philosophy as a way of life and how 
it is connected with the stimuli used for doing philosophy and b) how children's lives and 
philosophy as a way of life can be connected. Philosophy as a way of life is understood 
as linked practically with human's action. This link is reflected in individuals' diathesis 
(attitudes) towards examining their lives. It is claimed that stimuli's narrative nature 
enables the linking of everyday experience with philosophy. The last part of the chapter 
concentrates on how children's philosophies as a way of life are possible, including 
examples which show that philosophy with children goes beyond the classroom. 
Children's actions are further analysed, the necessity of dialoguing with children at any 
occasion and the process of building children's diathesis that favours philosophy as a 
way of life.
8.1. Introduction
There is a failure of philosophical programmes when they are reduced to mere thinking 
skills, or to the history of intellectual thought (Gazzard, 1996). This is because the 
programmes are inadequate to generate desire for making meaning connected with 
children's lives and fail to develop a reflective habit of mind in children that will be 
transferred in other aspects of their life. Philosophy is about the whole person and not 
just developing thinking skills (Robinson, 1995; Lamb, 2000). Philosophy is not only 
"philosophy of something" but "a living attitude and living this attitude" (DelNevo, 2001). 
Another reason that philosophical programmes may fail in the long term is that the 
philosophical discussion that occurs within a c.o.i. does not have any practicality. This 
means that the ideas generated are not tested in actual situations (Bleasby, 2004). 
Philosophy in education should be considered as an embodiment of lifelong learning 
(Burgh and Brien, 2002).
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Philosophy with children and education should go together. There is no education 
without an underpinning philosophy and no philosophy with children without 
pedagogical character. There are two basic philosophical questions that emerge and 
determine the aims of the education: a) what person I want to be and b) in what world I 
want to live (Echeverria, 2007). Both questions are theoretical and practical. 
Theoretically they seek the criteria of what is a person, if the person is ever likely to 
become something different, and what is the ideal world to live in. Practically, education 
through its curriculum and its stimuli aims at bringing into reality what is ideally 
considered as the best person and the best world to live in. Therefore, one basic aim of 
education is to incorporate practicality (Dewey, 1966), or in other words to link the 
philosophical theory with philosophical action and make the theory a potential way of a 
philosophical way of life.
8.2. How are stimuli connected with philosophy as a way of life?
Developing one's thinking skills is necessary but should also be embedded into 
everyday life. Philosophy as a way of life incorporates thinking skills to the extent that it 
helps a person 'know thyself and his/her connection with the world and others. The 
philosophical inquiry is worthy when it aims at understanding and making meaning of 
experience (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). This is the practical orientation of 
philosophy towards examining life and assuring people's eudemonia. What makes 
philosophy as a way of life distinctive and more than the sum of its generative and 
evaluative aspects is its connection with individuals' diatheses and actions. Stimuli 
emerge from everyday life and can be explored philosophically. However, in order to 
connect stimuli with philosophy as a way of life there is need to see whether they are 
connected with diathesis and human action.
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8.3 Diathesis
Diatheses refer to people's attitudes and dispositions towards life270 . They refer to the 
person as a whole being that has thoughts and emotions, acts in many ways and tries 
to place him/ herself in the world. They reflect people's 'philosophy' and 'narration' 
towards life. Diatheses can either be positive and reinforcing further exploration and 
thinking upon the stimuli life gives to us, negative which could lead to the abandonment 
of life and its stimuli (temporary or permanent Thanatos of them) or mixed and unclear. 
Being in Eros271 with the idea of improving oneself and the world one lives in (especially 
if such attitude becomes a necessity and a habit) is what establishes positive diatheses 
that can link philosophy with practical life. As Johann Wolfgang Eckermann claims we 
learn only from those (or what) we love (Moorhead, 1971). One way to achieve this is 
through the matching of the stimulus's narrative form272 with individuals' narrative 
understanding of the world (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000).
Becoming open and tolerant but also in a state of alertness (prosoche) seems to be two 
fundamental diatheses that enable individuals to communicate and achieve reasoned 
agreements with each other in everyday life (Benhabib, 1992). Being open and alert can 
be understood also as Values' that we bring into a community of inquiry to reassure it 
as a place of further intellectual research which is free from indoctrination. These 
diatheses are also both linked with zymotic listening273 : the first one enables creative 
thinking, whereas the second one allows critical and emotional thinking. Both diatheses 
make the person open in finding stimuli within life that are worth exploring and tolerant 
with the idea that zymotic listening takes time.
270 Splitter (2010) analyses philosophically what a disposition is by clarifying first whether they are physical or mental and 
identifying later their relationship with abilities, habits, beliefs, desires and values.
271 There is a need for "love to occur" (Philei ginesthai) as Marcus Aurelious claims (Hadot,1995, p.198). See also chapter 4 for a 
more thorough analysis of Eros.
272 See chapter 5.
273 See chapter 6.
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8.3.1. Becoming tolerant and open
Laverty (2007, p. 125) suggests a type of listening within a community of inquiry that "is 
receptive, open, and self-eclipsing". The parameter of self-eclipsing, presupposes that 
the listener is selfless, holds back his/her own ideas, and prioritises listening to others 
instead of speaking first (Pawling and Rich, 1985; Murris and Haynes, 2000b). This 
diathesis is a moral virtue necessary to maintain a democratic society274 and a true 
listening community in which "we" becomes more important than the "I" (Freire, 1972). 
Both adults and children need to have it because it allows zymotic listening to take 
place. Thus, respect and care towards others, admitting pluralism (Daniel, 2001; 
McLeod, 2005), understanding others' views and consequently constructing new 
meanings are secured (Waksman, 1998).
Tolerance refers also towards the stimulus which means avoiding censoring it 
immediately in case it does not meet our preferences. It also means dealing with the 
uncertainty of exploring the ideas of others which may be different from ours (Murris, 
2008b). This last parameter is often not welcomed by teachers as they either fear how 
to approach ideas never thought by them before, or do not want to appear cognitively 
'weak' in case they are not able to deal with a question or idea.
Openness allows listening to others but also, according to Levin (1989, p.83), listening 
for something, such as ideas that can come out of a stimulus. I disagree with Levin's 
listening 'for' something and I will stick to using the preposition 'to'. How can one be 
open when one listens for something? It is as if the person has already put a censoring 
filter and listens selectively to particular ideas that come from a stimulus or from the 
others talking about the stimulus.
Openness both to what others have to say and to one's own reflections is a necessary 
attitude for exploring a stimulus further. Levin (1989, p.48) referring to Heidegger
274 Being open means being able to think both independently and collaboratively, aspects of which are the willingness to review 
matters under other people's perspectives and the reasoned responses to disagreements or differences with others (Cam, 2009).
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understands openness as a process of "letting-go and letting-be" which ensures that the 
listener focuses on the stimulus or what the speaker has to say. The idea here is "to 
flow with the stream" (Humphreys, 1977, p.71) not as a follower of a flock but as a way 
of being inspired by the stimulus and letting oneself be free to imagine where the 
stimulus takes us. This is not only an attitude that can be adopted during a dialogue but 
an attitude that is applicable in life. Rinaldi (2006) gives a 'broader' openness to include, 
apart from ears, all human senses. Openness is receptiveness, willingness to make the 
strange familiar and learn from it, allowing creative listening and afterwards critical 
thinking to happen.
8.3.2. Being in state of alertness/ prosoche
Being open minded means being alert and willing to receive information, test any ideas 
one hears, check for precision, seek more effective alternatives and abandon them if 
there are good reasons for that (Ennis, 2001; 1993). Openness implies acceptance that 
truth alters and is only temporary (Sharp, 1993). No matter how important tolerance and 
openness are, people should keep a balance between being unconditionally tolerant 
and totally intolerant. Tolerance is welcome up to the point that people do not reveal 
their vulnerability to peers (Haynes, 2007). Accepting any view in the name of tolerance 
can lead people to lower their expectation for themselves and others. Since people 
know that others are tolerant they may not bother to reason well so as to support their 
views further.
According to the Stoics prosoche means concentration in the moment which is always 
bearable and controllable (Hadot, 1995, p.85). Preston finds similarities between the 
Stoic's philosophy and the philosophy of the Samurai (referring to Tsunetomo) and 
gives the following understanding of the prosoche of the moment:
There is surely nothing other than the single purpose of the present 
moment. A man's whole life is a succession of moment after moment. If
249
one fully understands the present moment, there will be nothing else to 
do, and nothing else to pursue (Preston, 2003, p.49).
This attention helps people respond immediately to stimuli and events in the world as it 
enables people to connect with each other (through listening to others and thinking 
upon what they say). Being in a state of alertness ensures focusing on listening to 
others with the attempt to make meaning from what they have said (Rinaldi, 2006) and 
use effectively the Elenchus275 (Socratic Method), so as to evaluate the ideas generated 
by the engagement with stimuli.
8.4. Human action
Practising a certain way of life may lead individuals to be in Eros with it. However, 
examining it may make people realise that they do not agree with it. This is not 
necessarily negative; on the contrary, it shows that one's philosophy is flexible and it 
can change. Self-correction and a changing attitude always reflect changing one's 
philosophy (or perspective of understanding the world and his/her self).
Pierre Hadot explains in more details how philosophy presents a form of living.
First of all it is the memorization and assimilation of the fundamental 
dogmas and rules of life of the school. Thanks to this exercise, the 
vision of the world of the person who strives for spiritual progress will 
be completely transformed....can lead to an exercise of the 
imagination in which human things appear of little importance in the 
immensity of space and time. It is necessary to try to have these 
dogmas and rules for living 'ready to hand' if one is to be able to 
conduct oneself like a philosopher under all of life's circumstances. 
Moreover, one has to be able to imagine these circumstances in 
advance in order to be ready for the shock of events (Hadot, 1995, 
p.59).
Hadot gives here an example of how philosophy can merge with life. The comparative 
example of the importance of things in the immensity of space and time requires
275 See chapters 1 and 5
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imaginative thinking and an open-tolerant diathesis as mentioned before. Imaginative 
thinking done in advance gives its turn to evaluative thinking which puts individuals in a 
state of alertness (prosoche). This prevents people from being shocked by the 
consequences of their deeds as they have already imagined them. This imaginative and 
evaluative thinking is what Hadot describes as assimilation. As for the consciousness 
that people acquire through this process, it could be associated with the transformation 
of oneself which is a zymotic process.
Hadot (1995) understands that every philosophy is based on some dogmas which are 
methodological principles for each philosophy. Without some standard dogmas, there 
can be no further action and progress towards life. If everything is constantly 
questioned, practical decisions cannot be made. However, when the dogmas remain 
constantly unquestioned and untested then philosophy ceases. Philosophy, by 
definition, questions even its dogmas with the only aim to test their truth and its 
applicability in a constantly changing world. Philosophies change because life changes.
The intention (or in some cases intuition) of the action is the generative force that 
makes the action happen. What happens during or after the action is its evaluation 
through individuals' narrative structuring. These are the generative and evaluative 
aspects of philosophy. When they become a habit, which means that people constantly 
generate new thoughts and consciously evaluate them and incorporate them into their 
life, philosophy becomes embedded in one's life276 .
Finding stimuli and appreciating them (which means leaving them to generate thoughts 
then evaluating them) is something that children and philosophers do. The only 
difference is that children do this naturally as an attempt to adapt and explain the world 
they live in and therefore its stimuli. Genuine philosophers are somewhere in between 
as they still possess the child's new and fresh way of looking and interpreting stimuli,
276 Of course one can argue that a psychologist or a religious person do the same thing. However, a religious person is usually 
reluctant to challenge his/her faith or be open to new ideas. Psychologists also personalizes their ideas without bothering to seek 
general rules for truth. On the contrary, philosophy, looks for creating ideas, examining them and incorporating into life even 
temporary, bearing in mind that these should serve not only oneself but also others' well being.
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but they usually have enough training in using their media adequately. However, the 
training in using certain media may, occasionally, prevent them from directly locating 
themselves within the world and its stimuli.
The diatheses of openness and alertness enable individuals to identify stimuli in place 
and distinguish them from the flux of their experience as outstanding (or as 'an 
experience' according to Dewey). The more 'unclassified', 'absurd' or 'atopos' (not in 
place)' a stimulus is, the more room it leaves to multiple interpretations and therefore to 
narrations. The more out of place (atopos) a stimulus is, the more individuals are forced 
to think 'out of the box' and allow different narrations to take place. The more places 
(topos) individuals find for their thinking, the better understanding they achieve for 
themselves and the more choice they have to adopt one or more in their life. Stimuli 
provide the place for multiple narrations and the dialogue within an inquiry is what picks 
them out.
So far, the stimuli have been located by referring to the topos. Time is another way to 
locate stimuli and people's actions in the world. There is an epiphany moment (time) 
where one reveals a new aspect of the stimulus. The ancient Greeks had two words for 
time, 'chronos' and 'kairos'. The first refers to chronological, sequential time, whereas 
the latter signifies a not necessarily determined time in which something special 
happens277 (Freier, 2006). 'Chronos' is the 'objective human way of counting time', 
whereas 'kairos' is another way to refer to time subjectively (Sharp, 1997). The stimulus 
that has not influenced a person belongs in 'chronos'. In contrast, when a person is 
grasped by a stimulus due to the Eras towards it and starts generating thoughts, then 
time stops being objective for this person. The person is totally absorbed by the 
stimulus and does not realise the time spent on the stimulus. In other words, the person 
moves from 'chronos' to 'kairos'. Philosophy as a way of life takes place mostly in 
'kairos' rather than in 'chronos'.
277 Mark Freier (2006) Time Measured by Kairos and Kronos, at http://www.whatifenterprises.com/whatif/whatiskairos.pdf accessed 
on 21/05/2010.
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Human action is located in space and time. The philosophical interpretation of the 
stimuli derived from human actions leads to a tuning that can be expressed 
simultaneously in three ways. In particular, when the person engages with a stimulus 
then: a) s/he experiences living in 'atopos' and passes through different places (topos) 
and different opportunities of narration in each of them, b) s/he lives in 'kairos' rather 
than in 'chronos', and c) s/he connects him/herself and the world together and acquires 
a good understanding of both. This is achieved through narrative. This narrative reflects, 
according to Rorty, how people understand the world under their descriptions (Calder, 
2003). People express their descriptions about a stimulus, such as ideas, stories, 
memories in a narrative way through which they achieve the communication of these 
ideas with others. Those narratives which combine the lived experience with people's 
imagination and critical thinking become their own stimuli that educate and enhance 
understanding for both oneself and others (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). Through the 
narratives and the philosophical inquiry, thinking and doing are unified. 278
An attractive stimulus can capture children's attention, whereas a rather dull stimulus 
can affect negatively every potential for a philosophical dialogue. Ende claims that if 
something is well written it always "comes from an integrity of heart, mind and senses 
and hence speaks according to the integrity of people" (1993, p.283). Similarly stimuli 
that come from children's actions show children's tuning with their 'topof and 'kairos'. 
Adults, mainly parents and teachers, should be able to recognise the stimuli that 
children find attractive because these stimuli possibly reflect their interests and needs 
and come from children's praxis and experiences.
8.5 Children, stimuli and philosophy as a way of life
No matter what philosophical underpinning underlies the different ways of doing 
philosophy for/with children, philosophy has been associated with the dialogue that 
occurs among children in the classroom after sharing a stimulus (Lipman et al, 1980;
278 See ideas of Schon, Oakeshott and Johnson as referred in Clandinin and Connelly (2000).
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Gregory, 2007a; McCall, 2009; Murris and Haynes, 2000a). It is too restrictive to limit 
philosophy with children only to a classroom or to an after school philosophy club. 
Philosophy may start in the classroom but its use needs to be expanded279 . It should 
also help children to become aware that philosophy can be part of their thinking, making 
choices, and living. In chapter three it was mentioned that children are welcome to 
select the stimuli for doing philosophy but also create their own. Any initiative of 
children's expressing their ideas verbally, written or non-verbally should be 
welcomed280 . For instance, children could write their philosophical ideas in a journal281 
or the school's newspaper282 . This way apart from the spoken inquiry in classroom 
space, a written expression is opened, which is part of philosophy and a further stimulus 
for discussion later (Foleman and Heesen, 1999).
Are children expected to show the same kind of awareness when they generate ideas 
or evaluate them as adults do? Are children expected to reflect on their choices and live 
consciously and philosophically? These questions are invalid as they presuppose an 
unnecessary comparison of adults' and children's narrations. Children are often 
expected to grow up so that they can make decisions the way adults do; however it is 
forgotten that children are brought up in an environment with adults so they have 
already experienced adulthood even if they have not lived it (Flay, 1978). Philosophy as 
a way of life is not a particular model that either children or adults follow. It is the 
awareness of one's life and the changing towards what seems to be better for both the 
person and the others. Children's philosophical ways of life have meaning only if linked 
with their everyday experiences and their thinking about it283 . Therefore, philosophy in 
children's lives helps them: a) to discern what matters to them (Splitter and Sharp,
279 See appendix 4. It offers a variety of examples that show how philosophy can be incorporated into children's (age 4-6) everyday 
school life. Many of these examples can take place into children's houses and parents only need to be informed by the teacher 
about what children do at school.
280 See appendix 5. It offers examples of works produced by children which could be used philosophically within a community of 
philosophical inquiry.
281 As long as this happens because children really want this and not because the teachers in a school want to impress others, it is 
linked with children's philosophical way of life.
282 "Journal 100" is a European philosophical magazine that publishes children's thoughts on particular matters (Foleman and 
Heesen,1999).
283 For more examples see appendixes 4 and 5.
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1995), b) resolve daily dilemmas that answer the question 'how should we live' or 'what 
should I do' (Haynes, 2008) not only in the classroom but in every aspect of their life. 
Philosophy enables children to discuss all the issues that are not well managed in public 
life and may suspend or mislead children's development (Glueck and Brighouse, 2008). 
The role of adults is very important as it is them who should welcome the stimuli that 
come from children and encourage their further philosophical investigation (Matthews, 
1993).
8.5.1. Philosophy that comes from children versus stimuli given to them
Children's everyday life can be connected with philosophy through the stimuli that either 
are given by adults to children or, even better, emerged from children284 . Referring to 
philosophy, there are stimuli designed by adults fordoing philosophy with children such 
as the specially written material for P4C, stories, paintings etc. Adults often choose the 
stimuli so as to encourage children's philosophical thinking. There is nothing wrong with 
this as long as it is not imposed upon children what adults understand as philosophical 
thinking and as long as it does not become the only way of doing philosophy with 
children. Instead, adults should be helped to recognise how these stimuli given to 
children (such as picture-books) are explored by them and link with children's own 
experiences and narratives and their understanding of the world. They also should offer 
stimuli that encourage afterwards children to bring their own stimuli285 . Activities for 
creative thinking, such as drawing, guided imagery, creative writing, philosophy camps 
act as a change of pace and a fresh perspective (Yule, 1992). These activities can 
become stimuli since they provide children with new experiences and can be linked with 
their own previous ones. These stimuli can enable children's expression of ideas and 
reflective thinking.
284 See appendixes 4 and 5
285 See chapter 5 and appendixes 4 and 5.
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However, priority should be given to the stimuli children bring into a discussion. There is 
an assumption here that what children bring as stimuli is what matters to them and that 
they have genuine questions to ask (Dewey, 1913). Sears and Hilgard highlight that 
"what keeps the pupil performing is also likely to keep him learning" (1964, p.182). It can 
reflect their special interests and needs. These stimuli come through children's 
observation of how the world appears to them, through their games, the stories they 
choose to read, the TV programmes they watch and so on. They generate questions for 
the children which reflect their philosophy and understanding of the world. Therefore, it 
is important that these stimuli are explored philosophically not only in the way that 
adults would do (e.g. by linking children's ideas with existing philosophical matters), but 
also in the ways that children might indicate. That means that children could offer new 
methods of exploring stimuli philosophically, only if adults were open to listening to 
them. In this case, children's philosophy could refresh adults' philosophy and the way 
adults think about themselves and the world (Gibbons, 2007). It is not claimed here that 
there should be a distinction between 'children's philosophy' and 'adults' philosophy'. It 
rather means that children should not be excluded from philosophical thinking and from 
inventing new methods for doing so.
Kaye and Sexton (2004) view philosophy as a search for meaning that is based on the 
relationships among the pupils themselves and the wider community. Following on from 
this, children may incorporate a philosophical approach in viewing life which they can 
transmit to a wider environment, e.g. to their parents. Therefore, instead of having only 
adults altering children's lives because of their choices and their greater experience, the 
opposite can occur: children can show to adults philosophical ways of life that possibly 
are forgotten due to the rituals followed in everyday life286 . Research on children's ways 
of reflecting on concrete or abstract ideas e.g. through drawings287 or through stories
286 See more about children's interpreting picture-books through their life experiences in Pantaleo (2007)
287 Children's drawings and discussion of them should be taken into philosophical consideration as they enable adults to get a 
better understanding of children's representing and making meaning of the world (Soundy and Drucker, 2010). For instance, 
children through their drawings show how certain concepts and activities make meaning to them, such as their school experience 
(Einarsdottir et al, 2009) the planet earth children live on (Ehrlen, 2009). See also figures 8.1-8.5 of this chapter and also children's 
representations in drawings of their ideal houses in appendix 5.
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that children write themselves288 should be taken philosophically into account. This can 
be translated into questioning, being more attentive observers, dialoguing with others, 
taking decisions that affects themselves and others and they may alert adults to re- 
examine their own life and see what is worthy in it289 .
Gareth Matthews's dialogues with children (1984) seem to be close to what I describe 
as the connection of children's action with philosophy as a way of life. Matthews is 
willing to begin a conversation with children whenever there is a stimulus for that. 
Therefore when the children come up with a question that could be philosophically 
interesting, Matthews shows a way of how to continue the dialogue and enable children 
to think deeper. He gives examples of philosophical dialogues that he had with his 
children during bedtime stories, walks or over lunch/dinner time. What he points out is 
that the stimulus could appear whenever and wherever, and it's up to the adults to listen 
to it and enable children to elaborate on it further. However, what Matthews merely does 
is to link children's stimuli with already known philosophical problems and push them 
further, so as to investigate children's thoughts towards existing philosophical problems. 
What I suggest is paying also attention to the 'opposite' direction: how children's stimuli 
can create new philosophical considerations that adults have not yet thought about. 
This is possible by observing children's monologues, dialogues, playing alone and with 
others and all the aspects that form their experience290 . It is also possible by observing 
adults attitudes towards children and how their voice can 'silence' children's voices (and 
potential philosophical thought).
One could argue that Matthews is a philosopher, so it is easy for him to identify potential 
philosophical ideas in the stimulus. A counter-argument would be that because
288 Pantaleo (2009;2009b) focuses her research on children's reactions to picture-books' devices (see chapter 5) and how these 
are incorporated into the stories children create. She provides an ecological perspective on how children's understanding of the 
picture -books (which is socially constructed) affects their reading and writing. Such findings very much link with doing philosophy 
with children and viewing it as a way of life.
289 This process is a reminder of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed where the oppressed show to the oppressors more authentic 
ways of life and society changes from down to up instead of up to down (Freire,1972;1997).
290 See appendixes 4 and 5
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Matthews is a philosopher, it can lead children's discussion towards a direction that is 
acknowledged by adults as philosophical. What happens, however, with ordinary 
teachers and parents who usually do not have a philosophical background and are also 
very busy with the practicalities of life? Adults need to recognise, understand and 
support children's actions through discovering first philosophy for themselves. Their life, 
as it is conducted, is based on some philosophy (could be hedonism, materialism, 
idealism, romanticism or a mixture). The sooner parents and teachers are aware of this 
the quicker they can understand children's action291 .
The first step is for adults to distinguish that philosophy is not the history of ideas that 
great thinkers have provided, and realise how they conduct their lives and how it is 
different from other ways of life experiences292 . Of course, reading what great thinkers 
have written is usually useful as it helps to open the mind, look at things from different 
perspectives and examine afresh our own life. When Socrates said that the unexamined 
life is not worth living (Plato, Apology, 38a) he meant that people need to be conscious 
of what they do and why. The next step is to realise that there is no such thing as one 
way of 'correct' living. Therefore, there is a variety of different styles of living and 
thinking. Children's styles of thinking and children's experiences might be different from 
adults', but they are worth exploring. The third step requires both openness to listen to 
what is new and different and spending time doing so.
It may sound that such an approach is difficult to put into practice. However, if children's 
welfare and wellbeing is both the adults' aim, then it turns out that the whole of 
education (received formally in school and informally outside school) needs to be linked 
with philosophy (Postman, 1996; Cole 2010). This is not something new: different
291 Empirical research (mostly based on questionnaires) shows that teacher recognise the positive effects that P4C has on 
children's cognitive and social development, their impact on children's motivation for further dialoguing and collaboration with others 
(Jones, 2008; Baumfield and Mroz, 2002). Furthermore, teachers who focus on developing children's thinking skills tend to change 
their overall pedagogical practice and behaviour towards children (Baumfield et al.,2005).
292 For an example from my personal experience where philosophy as a generative and evaluative force becomes a way of life, 
see appendix 8.
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educational aims always reflect different underpinning philosophies and also different 
understandings of what a child is293 but not necessarily teaching philosophy to children.
8.5.2. Observing children and dialoguing with them on every occasion (not 
only in class)
Stimuli for philosophical investigation can emerge at any time as long as adults pay 
attention to what children offer. Below, there are some examples from my experience as 
a teacher and as a listener that gave rise to philosophical discussions with children. 
However, many more examples are included in appendixes 4 and 5 of this thesis.
Example 1: What is the last number?
My five year old cousin was playing with three other boys of his age when suddenly one 
of his friends started to show off about how high he could count. I was washing the 
dishes and at the same time as I was listening to Nick counting to 100 without leaving 
any number out. Kimon, who was a bit jealous of Nick, said that he could count even 
further. This competition led Vasilis to ask a very philosophical question which seemed 
to be stimulating for the rest of the children. Below, I represent the dialogue that took 
place (I wrote it down as I remembered it after it had finished).
Vasilis: What is the last number? 
(Small pause)
Manos: It must be one million. 
Kimon: No, there are two millions also. 
Nick: Then we must have million millions. 
Kimon: Yeah...million million million millions.
Vasilis: What is the name of the number million million million millions? (He turns 
to me) Sofia what is the last number?
293 More about what is a child, see chapter 2.
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Me: What do you think?
Manos: If I start writing a number in a line writing lots of zeros, this must be the
biggest number. 
Kostas: If we write a number not in a line but to cover all the floor, then that must
be the biggest number. And if we write tiny numbers we will write even
more (digits). Then this will be the biggest number. 
Nick: If we could write a number that could fill all the room? 
Kostas: Or fill also the next floor? 
Nick: Maybe go up to heaven. 
Vasilis: There is always a number bigger than the one we can think. Is there a last
number?
(Pause for a while/ thinking)
Nick: My brother says that the numbers are infinite. He writes it like that 
(He shows how it is written). 
Manos: What is infinite? 
Nick: That numbers do not finish.
Vasilis: This is not infinite. This is an eight that is lying. This is not a number. 
Me: Do numbers have a beginning? 
Kostas: That's silly! Of course, they start from zero. 
(Nikolidaki's diary, 07/08/2006)
This dialogue began during their play which is part of their everyday life action. This is 
an example that shows how children incorporate philosophy in their playing even 
without adults intervening. It also shows that a philosophical dialogue may take place 
not necessarily within a classroom philosophical inquiry. The stimulus here was a 
question generated by children's counting. Vasilis statement that there is always a 
bigger number than the one we can think is very philosophical as he: a) implies that 
numbers are infinite and b) can distinguish between what can be thought and what 
cannot. Vasili's puzzlement whether there is a last number has become the subject of
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discussion among philosophers and mathematicians (Clapham, 1996)294 . The children 
tried to answer the question based on their experiences and their thinking. Somehow, 
they used an Elenchus process when offering and rejecting the different possibilities for 
the last number. What they did during their dialogue was providing counter arguments 
that disproved the previous given answer. This shows that children can think critically 
about very abstract concepts as long as they matter to them. What is not needed is 
adults' intervening with comments of the type "that's nonsense?" or "how cute!" 
(Brenifier, 2003).
I am not sure whether I should have intervened to ask whether numbers have a 
beginning. Maybe I should have left this question for later and witnessed how children 
would continue. I thought that I would make them question whether numbers have a 
beginning but they all agreed that zero is the beginning. None thought about negative 
numbers because they are unaccustomed with them and possibly not within their
?Q*i
experience .
The next example is linked with children's everyday life but it did not come so naturally. 
It shows how the teacher can enable children's philosophical thinking, that otherwise 
would possibly not take place.
294 He refers to David Hubert's, example of the hotel with the infinite rooms. In the example of the hotel with the infinite rooms all 
the potential new guests can be served by moving the rest one room. Hilbert shows in a hotel with finite number of rooms the 
number of even numbers of rooms is less than the number of all the rooms. However, in the case of a hotel with infinite number of 
rooms, the infinite number of even rooms is not less than the numbers of the rooms as they are infinite as well. What children do in 
the dialogue in their effort to find the last number is accommodating ways of creating a larger number each time (e.g. a number that 
fills the surface of the room, a number written with smaller digits so as to fill the surface of the room, a number that fills all the 
dimensions of the room. What children realise is that writing many digits so as to fill the room by making them smaller is an infinite 
process.
295 They also live in Crete that hardly ever has very low temperatures (below zero), so there is only a slight chance of having heard 
about negative numbers and linked them with the research of what is the last number.
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Example 2: How does my mind work? (Children describe in their drawings how 
their mind works)
The drawing of how children's minds work began in my classroom when two boys 
started fighting and one of them said to the other 'Stupid! Your mind does not work at 
all'. The offended one was just about to punch the other back when I intervened and 
asked them that I really would like to know how a mind can or cannot work. The children 
looked at me quite puzzled as they expected to be told off. "I know how the mind works" 
said Kimon. "I can draw it for you". Vasilis responded that he knew too. Many other 
children were also interested so I welcomed their drawing too296 . I also suggested that 
they could use the books we had in the library if needed. What followed was an activity 
that brought children into a state of kairos rather than chronos. Children had their time 
to express their ideas through drawing their thoughts and explain them verbally to me.
Below, are some of the children's drawings along with the short conversation I had with 
each one individually so as to understand what they had drawn297 .
Maria thought that the mind is like a ball. She was aware of books that show the brain's 
physiology and she explained how the mind works. There is a place where the ideas we 
have in the mind are situated. She distinguished a certain location for the 'good blood', 
which is the 'clean blood' that enables thinking correctly without mistakes. The blood is 
cleaned in the triangular place of the tube before it enters the mind! When people do not 
think correctly it is because this part of the tube does not function properly! Maria also 
identified little holes. When they are full of blood the mind works faster (Figure 8.1).
296 See also appendix 5 for other drawings that children have produced regarding their ideal house, along with constructions using 
other materials such as blocks. See also appendix 6 which suggests how the facilitator can run discussions and activities that are 
philosophically enhanced.
297 The comments on the drawings are in Greek as this is material that came from my teaching experience there (April, 2007). I 
need to comment here that I find it inappropriate from my perspective to write on children's drawing and I am convinced that from 
now on any comments I will ever write will be on post it notes. I feel I have violated children's drawings.
262
Figure 8.1: My mind is like a ball
Odysseus had also drawn his mind, inspired by the brain's physiology. He separated 
the mind into the mind that is thinking and the mind that tell us what to do. He also 
needed a tube which enabled the blood to come into the mind. He depicted the veins in 
purple. The red part was the blood and if it totally filled the mind then the person died! 
He seemed to distinguish between mind and soul as he stated that 'the soul is as if 
there is a second head in your mind' (Figure 8.2).
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Figure 8.2: "The soul is like a big head into the mind"
Less inspired by the physiological conception of how brain is constructed, Martha drew 
a girl, a mechanism that allows the mind to get into the girl's head and a big 
representation of what is the mind. The green colour is for the mind's skin and the red 
bits represent the blood in the mind. The circles are for certain activities that we do 
(Figure 8.3).
264
Figure 8.3: "The mind is born by the ears" (Martha, & year) versus "Listening is Thinking" (Gemma 
Corradi Fiumara, Italian philosopher)
Hellen drew a house for the mind and she insisted that within the mind there is another 
one that makes it work (Figure 8.4). As for Rodi, the mind was out of the head 
positioned up in the heavens so as to be able to see what happens everywhere! (Figure 
8.5)
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Figure 8.4: "The mind is out of my head"
Figure 8.5: "The house of the mind".
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Children's drawings leave room for plenty philosophical comments. There were 
'physicalistic approaches' in their drawings (where the brain is identical to the mind) 
possibly because many children took into consideration the books available in the 
library298 . Explanations that the soul is on top of the brain as a kind of 'qualia' were also 
given. 'Platonic' approaches of the mind were evident in Rodi's drawings in which the 
mind is out of the head so as to inspect the things as they are. Animistic and 
imaginative approaches where the mind has its own home were also given. Children's 
comments such as where the ideas we have are situated within the mind, or whether 
there is a need for a 'second' mind to activate our mind to work (and then what activates 
the second mind?) or what the soul is, leave plenty room for further philosophical 
discussions that kept children thinking for days. Children's drawings not only raise 
philosophical discussions that push their thinking further, but also give adults the 
opportunity to understand how children think and refresh their own thinking.
Example 3: Adults and children discussing together
As part of my research and personal development as a facilitator of doing philosophy 
with children, I ran voluntarily philosophical inquiries once a week with a mixed group at 
a local library in South Wales. The group was a mixture of adults and children of various 
ages and was characterized for its diversity299 . I saw it as an opportunity of linking 
philosophy and everyday life together. Philosophy should be open to all ages and this 
mixed group was a challenge to see how children's and adults' thinking could merge 
together. Throughout the inquiries, both children and adults showed respect for each 
others' ideas, felt free to link their ideas together, agreed and disagreed with each other 
by providing reasons and found ways to link ideas together (Splitter and Sharp, 1995).
298 I could have asked for distinguishing between using the word brain and mind and if these two words indicate different things or 
can be used interchangeably.
299 It consisted of children and adults that were considered as people with low self esteem or low performance in school (for the 
children), who received once a week for two hours extra support from adults who were willing to help them voluntarily. I ran 
philosophical inquiries to this group from January to June 2010.
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Some moments of an inquiry with adults and children are presented below. The 
stimulus used was the pop up book "Mummy?"300 The discussion led to the dilemma 
whether the child finds his mother at the end of the story and whether this mother is the 
'real' one. Participants were split into three groups: the one who agreed that the child 
found his mother (yes group), the one that believed that this was not the baby's mother 
(no group) and the undecided group (maybe group). All groups gave reasons for their 
decisions.
'Yes' group Arguments
Laura (a): The child is maybe dreaming and in his dream his mother appears as a
monster. 
Joan: If it was not his mother she wouldn't say baby. Look, she also smiles
because she recognises the baby.
Paul (a): The mum is ready to hug the baby. The baby has its hands open too. 
Hilary: (pointing to the last picture) I think these two are family (she points at the
monster with the dummy and the little creature in his pocket) and these
two (child and mummy) they are family too because they are people and
not monsters.
'No' group Arguments
Barbara (a): If it was recognition then the child wouldn't keep asking. There is a
question mark after mummy. 
Judy (a): And the child holds back.
300 Mummy? (Yorinks, Sendak and Reinhart, 2006) is a pop up book with complicated images getting out of the book and giving a 
sense of a 3D dimension. It is a book about a child who looks for its mummy in a neglected house situated close to a cemetery. The 
house is full of well known monsters that have been seen on TV or the cinema. The child seems totally unfrightened by the 
monsters. The end of the story is ambiguous as it is not clear what happens. According to how much the reader opens the book, 
there is a different effect in movement which possibly creates different reactions to the readers. Taking into consideration that before 
Mummy? the writers of the book had used the same characters for a theatrical play titled "It's alive" that was on October 1994 at the 
Tribeca Performing Arts Center in New York, maybe the choice of a 3D book was closer to the effect that the theatre creates to the 
audience.
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Lena(a): If the mummy recognised the child she would say 'my baby' or the child's
name and not just baby.
Mina: It's his mother. The child is alive and the mummy is dead. 
Me: How do you know she is dead? 
Mina: She is white, pale! She is connected to this machine. She is a zombie.
Maybe group Argument:
Christina and Judy: There is not a clear conclusion in the book. There is not an answer 
so we stay in the middle.
Later on Joan added the following:
Joan: The mum speaks like a vampire.
Me: How do you know?
Joan: Because the letters are like thunder. So she says it like that...I can't do it
but it must sound scary.
Me: So, do you think that this is not his mother? Have you changed your mind? 
Joan: No. She has big teeth and that's why she can't say 'baby' properly!
In many cases adults' and children's thinking was critical (e.g. finding examples to 
support ideas, to agree and to disagree with others) and creative (e.g. when both adults 
and children associated meaning to the illustration of the book or thought in metaphors). 
For instance, Hilary's grouping of the creatures into a family according to their 
species301 is reasonable and at the same time creative (she points out a little detail of 
the monster having another monster in his pocket). Joan interpreted the font of the 
written word ("like a thunder") as something that should sound scary (critical and 
imaginative thinking) which is an example of thinking in metaphors. Mummy's scary 
voice due to her 'big teeth' (anatomic issue) is a creative way for Joan to support her 
argument.
301 According to Hilary monsters together make a family. Mother and child are a family because they are the only humans.
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There are similarities and differences between adults and children in the way they 
approach and cope with the same stimulus. Children, usually, have a more imaginative 
approach towards the stimulus than the adults. Adults need to 'listen to the children' and 
their different approaches because they usually reflect a type of logic which can be 
noteworthy302 . Children, also, were very able in observing details that could have easily 
been ignored. The observation of details give food to further philosophical investigation 
and activate both children's and adults' thinking. These findings reveal "the other half of 
the child" as Egan (1993) highlights. The discussion with the mixed group can show to 
adults what the losses in their thinking are as they grow up (Egan, 1988). For instance, 
adults can always enhance their thinking by observing children's ability for thinking 
imaginatively, observing details, looking at the world as if it is for the first time and 
thinking divergently. What the children bring into philosophy is their zest of life, their 
fresh imagination and the element of playfulness (Mulvaney, 1993b, p.349). Children 
also bring to philosophy a lively interest in questioning which adults often lack 
(Matthews, 2008). These elements reflect in the most direct way children's philosophy 
from which adults can benefit. On the other hand, adults' experiences in thinking can be 
helpful to children as they listen critically to what adults have to say. What is more, 
philosophical diatheses of being open and critically alert are encouraged to develop 
further through the engagement of both adults and children into a dialogue.
Finally, there was evidence that the stimuli and the philosophical inquiries had an 
impact both for the children and adults which is essential for viewing philosophy as a 
way of life. A week later a girl was still fascinated by reading "Mummy?" I sat next to her 
and started flicking through the pages of the book. As she turned the pages she saw a 
picture and said: "Oh, that's a bag full of hands! A handbag! Cool!" A cataleptic moment 
occurred for me as it was the first time I noticed the linguistic connotation of a handbag 
literary and metaphorically. Mina also claimed that it was unfair to have on the front 
page only the protagonist's photo. She offered to draw a new version including all the
302 According to a report provided by Age Concern North Tyneside (2010), P4C sessions have been running with a mixed group of 
adults and children with huge benefits for both adults and children. It has been reported that the two different aged groups match 
well together and could benefit from each others' ideas. For instance, adults had the chance of communicating with younger children 
and understanding their way of thinking more.
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monsters (see figure 8.6 below). Such statements show children's philosophy towards 
life (e.g. equality of all the monsters). This 'one to one' discussion is another way to 
practice philosophy daily between parents and children and make both understand 
themselves.
8.6. Conclusion
This chapter aimed at exploring how philosophy is linked with stimuli and becomes a 
way of life. It was argued that philosophy as a way of life is more than the sum of its 
generative and evaluative parts: It is connected with certain diatheses a nd human 
everyday action. The diatheses refer to individuals' attitudes towards life and are 
positive if inspired by Eros. It was argued that being open, tolerant and in a state of 
alertness are diatheses that enable people to connect philosophy with life and 
appreciate the stimuli found in life.
Human action, when examined, can change if there are good reasons for this and this is 
an indication of self-correction. It is located in space and time. As individuals engage 
with a stimulus, they: a) experience living in different places (topoi), b) live in kairos 
instead of chromos and c) connect themselves with others and the world acquiring a 
better understanding and transforming their life. This is achieved through narratives 
which combine the lived experience with people's zymotic listening and thinking.
Children's ways of life are not necessarily the same with adults and it was argued that 
adults need to follow a three step process to realise so: Apart from having the diatheses 
mentioned above, they first need to identify what is their philosophy and be tolerant with 
philosophies that are different from theirs (including the ones of their children) be open 
to understand them. It was also argued that adults can offer stimuli to children but the 
best ones are the ones that children bring into discussion.
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The examples at the end of the chapter illustrate how philosophy can be linked with 
children's lives. They also show that the best stimuli and the best philosophical 
dialogues are the ones that emerge from children's experiences in or out of the school 
and are linked with other activities, such as playing or drawing. The role of adults is to 
identify these philosophical moments and enable children to make the most out of them.
Figure 8.6: All the Protagonists from the "Mummy?" Unfinished drawing
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CHAPTER 9 
My stories as stimuli for doing philosophy with children
273 
Abstract
This chapter is mostly a practical illustration of the ideas described already in this thesis. 
It attempts to show how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way 
of life can be linked with: a) the process of my writing of stories which can be used for 
doing philosophy with children and b) the content of the stories and children's 
engagement with them. It also shows how my stories are situated as stimuli in the field 
of philosophy with children and what are the major similarities and differences they have 
comparing to other stimuli already used. It will also be argued that my stories: a) serve 
philosophy as good as picture-books in case that the facilitator picks the stimuli for 
doing philosophy with children and b) can motivate children to create their own stimuli 
for philosophical discussion as argued in chapter eight.
9.1. Introduction
The motivation for writing stories is an intrinsic force that pushes me to write something 
that needs to be spoken out. Foster (1993, p. 159) describes it as a "boiling up in the 
interior". I would connect this with a zymotic process where the excitement of ideas 
inside the mind is like a boiling that seeks for ways out. Writing stories is also a way to 
put somebody into the writer's imagination (Foster, 1993). Narrating them is a way to 
communicate with others. This communication is possible if there is a match between 
the story's narrative form and people's narrative understanding. It is also possible due to 
the individuals' need to "seek in art a sense of completeness: a "sense of an ending", 
not available to us in life" (Banville,1993, p. 110).
The stories under the process of writing are in a state of a Deweyan 'doing 1 and 
'undergoing'. The 'doing' refers to the actions303 that I take so as to create a story with 
unusual plot and atmosphere which captures the audience (Highsmith, 1993). This
303 Moggach has said that "novelists are actors-luckier than actors actually, because we can become our own characters and make 
up our own lines" (Moggach, 1993, p.135). What Moggach describes is a deliberate action taken from the part of writer which allows 
him/her do things and create a new world of phantasy.
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'doing' could be reflected in questions, such as: 'how can I say the same thing using 
simpler vocabulary', 'how can I make the stories less wordy?', 'can a story draw a 
picture that summarizes the story?' and 'what do children do with these stories and what 
do the stories do to them?'. The 'undergoing' refers to the changes that I experience: 
'how do children's ideas influence me?', 'what do I learn from them and what do they 
learn from me?', 'how does the narrative form of the story match with children's different 
narrative ways of understanding?', 'do I have epiphany moments and how do they 
change me?' Through this constant doing and undergoing, both I and children learn 
about ourselves and the world around us. The 'mapping' of the different experiences 
from discovering different aspects of a stimulus are just tiny stops of temporary states of 
equilibrium that refer both to our understanding and to the form (and content) of the 
stories. Below, I will first try to illustrate how the process of writing stories and their 
content match with philosophy as a way of life, with both generative and evaluative 
aspects.
9.2. Connecting my experience in writing stories with philosophy as a 
generative and an evaluative force and as a way of life
Writing stories is a zymotic process which involves thinking creatively, emotionally and 
critically. It requires a diathesis of being open to the new stimuli that come from 
experience, observations, and the dialogues with others and the imagination which turn 
into a story. It also requires being in a state of alertness to decide which possible 
threads of thoughts will transform to a story. The fictional story that comes out of this 
process is not a created harmony (Gardam, 1993). It is mostly an arranging of thoughts 
and feelings that aim at giving a temporary shape to the chaos that comes from the 
blending of my experience with imagination. Below, there is a brief description of how 
the writing of my stories is connected with philosophy as a generative and evaluative 
force and as a way of life.
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The writing of the stories matches with my understanding of philosophy as a way of life. 
Through writing stories I achieve a state of eudemonia. Writing does not happen daily, 
but when it happens it is fun, a pleasure of blending together experience and 
imagination, a joy to see in front of your eyes a little world to come to existence and a 
game of experimenting with different possible ways of a story's existing. As Mackay 
(1993, p.79) says "there are days when all the world is paper and all the seas are ink". 
These particular days writing a story means living in subjective time (kairos) instead of 
objective time (chronos). I may start writing at lunchtime and stop only when the only 
light that comes to me is from the computer screen. In chronos it is dark and there is 
need to switch the lights on, but in kairos, it takes longer to realise that this light is not 
enough for working and not good for the eyes304 .
Experiencing a moment of epiphany is often necessary for me to write a story. It 
provides a reason to write and communicate with others. A funny incident, an annoying 
situation, a journey where unexpected things happen, queuing to pay bills, dreaming, 
attending a boring conference, making a spelling mistake or grammatical error305 , 
waiting for the doctor and observing things that usually remain unnoticed can always be 
the stimuli that offer moments of epiphany. Some of the epiphany moments convert into 
stones. It depends on how strong my desire (Eros) for writing a story is. It takes time 
until the epiphany moments transfer into the story. This often requires a process of 
writing that is two steps backwards and one step forwards (Moore, 1993). The agitation
304 It is claimed that the writers and the illustrators live at the same time in two worlds; the real one and the imagined world they 
create (May, 1995). They both create Utopian worlds.
305 For instance, my 'mosbuito' (instead of mosquito) story, a story written in Greek emerged from a spelling mistake. Mosquito is 
translated as kounoupi in Greek. My story is about a kounoupi that is born with a chromosome anomaly and instead of having a p in 
the word kounoupi it has an f (kounoufi). This anomaly influences not only the appearance of the kounoufi but also its behaviour and 
character. What I tried in this story is to think of words in Greek that begin with p and can be attributes of a mosquito and replace 
them with other words that begin with f and are completely opposite to the attitudes a mosquito has. When a friend of mine said to 
me "Mm Sofia, I think you can't do that very quickly (in Greek there is a certain collocation for very quickly and it is called 'sto pi kai 
fi') he just gave me another expression where the two letters I was looking for 'p' and T blend meaningfully together. This stimulation 
that comes sometimes accidentally is what makes me transform my stories. It is as if you have two or sometimes more people 
thinking on the same subject in a lateral way that can only benefit the story.
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of ideas needs to settle down and usually this takes time and much redrafting of the 
initial story. It is a zymotic process.
The attending of modules for creative writing helped me familiarize with the techniques 
of writing fiction. Some of the classroom activities encouraged the brainstorming and 
writing of our first thoughts for a potential story in limited time. Even though inspiration 
cannot be forced, the discipline of thinking and writing for a limited time turned out to be 
effective not only for writing stories, but also for brainstorming other tasks. It is a 
blessing to allow deliberately even a short time for thinking imaginatively as ideas might 
emerge and later on transfer them into complete stories. The pressure of completing a 
not so interesting task was another stimulus for writing stories. Often the creative ideas 
for a story were an escape gateway for tasks that I didn't particularly like.
The process of writing and the content of the stories reflect my understanding of reality 
blended with imagination. Experimenting with the story means thinking of and creating 
possible variations of the same story. Writing a story is a form of creation that brings 
something into being that didn't exist before. Apart from the initial ideas for a story, a 
series of imaginative, practical and 'style' questions constantly emerge during the 
writing process. The practical questions refer to the setting of the story: who will be the 
characters, what will be the place, the time, the plot of the story, what will be the main 
character's journey307?
The imaginative questions ('What if type) such as: 'What would happen if the main 
protagonist lacked one of his/her characteristics or had the exactly opposite one?' 'What 
would happen if the place of the story was different?' 'What if the time of the story 
changed?' 'What if the sequence of the facts of the story changed?', 'what if I had to 
restrict the story to 600 words?' provide different possibilities for resolving the practical 
questions. The imaginative questions also encourage the use of creative techniques
307 Aristotle Poetics give a lot of practical instructions about how to create an interesting plot and a meaningful hero's journey which 
starts with an exciting incident, moves through conflicts and complication to a climax and then reaches its reversal and resolution 
without leaving out a last moment of suspense.
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that activate further thinking creatively. For instance, picking random words and joining 
them together in a meaningful way or throwing a random word in the story, when stuck, 
and trying to incorporate it into the story may generate more ideas that shift 
meaningfully the plot of the story (DeBono, 2007; Rodari, 1996; Lamb, 2001).
The 'style' questions refer to the language of the story and to how I can play creatively 
with the words, their rhythm, their sounds and their metaphorical and literal meanings. 
Writing in a second language has its positives and negatives. As for the positives, cliche 
expressions are less likely to be found in the stories as they are unknown to me. I also 
make creative use of English language as it is new for me, so there are less taboo 
areas in writing in a way that could be non-conventional. As for the negatives, I am not 
fluently aware of colloquial English that would help me play more with the words. 
Difficulties with prepositions, the grammatical structure of language and unsuccessful 
translations of meanings from Greek into English are also problems to confront. 
Attending the course in creative writing enabled me to stick to the use of simple 
language, which, however, describes the ideas of the story accurately. Choosing the 
words for a story carefully is also a critical and evaluative process that requires my full 
awareness and attention.
The story does not stay static. It constantly changes until it takes its (temporary) final 
form. Nothing guarantees that the first plot for a story will be executed as initially 
conceived. New ideas, new observations, new discussions with others alter the story 
and make me learn more about the story and myself. The writing process with all the 
changes that occur becomes a live stimulus that gradually opens and alters308 .
308 When I wrote one version of my Animal Party, a story mainly addressed to adults, the initial thought was a party with people 
dressed as animals who gradually behaved like the animals they were dressed up as. I needed a motive for a party. The idea of rich 
people rising money for a chanty was a good answer. But now I needed a 'silly' reason for raising money that could appeal to an 
avant-garde society. Discussing with friends, one suggested raising money so as to save sturgeon and keep the caviar! I found this 
idea fascinating but I had to abandon it as I needed to reduce the dress code to sea animal costumes and some animal behaviours 
that are used to describe also human characteristics (such as eat like a pig etc) would be lost. The idea of raising money for 
supporting animals' art came in a flash when attending a lecture about animal rights. This contribution was possibly a latent stimulus 
for writing my story. The idea of raising money for animals' art made a perfect contrast with the lack of money raising for saving 
children who suffer from cancer. To my astonishment, I found out later that animals' art really exists which gave me further ideas of
278
Discussing with others my stories in their first complete draft is a form of evaluating and 
understanding them through listening to other people's points of view. This is a social 
event accompanied with a little meal and a glass of wine when possible. It is usually a 
nice time for communicating with each other and having fun. Often I check previous 
versions of a story with children and I observe whether they match with their interests 
and whether the narrative of each story can match with children's experiences and 
narrative ways of understanding themselves and the others. These observations enable 
me to see whether communication can be achieved and whether my stories can create 
moments of catalepsy that lead mostly to Eros and the creation of epiphany moments.
Discussing the stories in an informal inquiry enables me to evaluate the aspects of them 
that possibly need editing, evaluate in what ways these stories can become stimuli that 
could lead the participants to reflection and possibly self-correction. As for my personal 
self-correction, it takes place in two ways. Firstly, the writing process functions as a 
catharsis and a way of communicating ideas that possibly I couldn't express better 
otherwise (McGahen, 1993). Secondly, people who know me well can find aspects in 
the stories that reflect bits of my experiences which possibly happen unconsciously for 
me and only through the dialogue I can point to them, reflect on them and know 
myself309 . Having finished a draft of a story, it works as a stimulus to me to see what are 
my hidden questions and hypotheses that compose my story310 . Reading my stories is a 
stimulus to recognise a posterior as to what made me write them. The story becomes a 
vehicle to discover myself.
The alterations and evaluations that need to be done afterwards are often demanding. 
Apart from the linguistic corrections, sometimes there is need for further research on a
how to use the particular story afterwards philosophically and move to matters about what is art and if animals can produce art. The 
story is still in development as its style of writing needs further work. Also, research on ways bourgeois people talk and behave is 
necessary so as to make the narrative form of the story compatible with people's narrative forms of understanding.
309 Graham Swift (1993) claims that stories are not prescriptive since they can not direct our living. However, they are postscriptive 
"by recovering our lost or damaged parts we also simply recover. We strengthen, we go on" (Swift,1993, p.24).
310 Frank Smith (1982) writes that "we can be surprised, confused, or delighted by the ideas we find in what we have written 
[...]The ideas that we create and represent on paper may not be ideas that we ever had before we began to write, but provided we 
can find in the text what we wanted to say (even at a very global level of intention) or what we are content to think we have said" 
(p.129).
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topic so as to know more and be able to write a specific part more effectively. At this 
stage of the story I feel as if I have something to care about. The story becomes a living 
creature that needs care and responsibility to blossom. Questions, such as 'how do my 
characters feel?' or 'what shall they do next? 1 may accompany me even when not 
writing the story. I am also responsible in choosing which possible variation of a story 
will finally exist (even though I keep separate files for the alternative 'rejected' versions).
9.3. Connecting the content of the stories with philosophy as a 
generative and evaluative force and as a way of life
Below, I will give two examples that illustrate how the content of the stories and 
children's engagement with them match with philosophy as a way of life with both 
generative and evaluative aspects.
9.3.1. The example of 'Artistic Dust' as a stimulus for doing philosophy with 
children
'Artistic Dust'311 is a philosophical story that can be read literally and metaphorically. 
The story describes the life of some objects in a storage room of a museum which 
'changes' when a photographer visits the room and takes their photos in his effort to 
capture messiness. It can give birth to discussions about abstract concepts that can be 
dealt with philosophically, such as the different perceptions and understandings of the 
world, reality, the problem of existence, the nature of change (e.g. attitudes) and being 
changed, boasting, being a tool, having fun, the existence of messiness, dreaming, 
being important, the human's world versus the world of objects, making mistakes, being 
artistic, possibilities of knowing, appreciating beauty, the role of names and many 
others.
311 See appendix 1
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The generative aspect of philosophy in 'Artistic Dust' is reflected in playing with the 
literal and metaphorical meaning of the words. The names of the characters such as 
Holy Cross, Cushy Cushion, Duster Cover, Daisy Floral, Sink Leaky indicate bits of their 
identity where literal and metaphorical meaning blend playfully together. The extract 
below shows a creative play with the word 'messiness'.
The photographer said he would take photos of the messiness. But we don't 
know of any messiness living with us, do we?" Cushy Cushion leisurely bounced 
and let a cloud of dust rise (Nikolidaki, 2009c).
There is a double irony here; Cushy is looking for messiness in the room and to 
reassure that they do not know, she uses the 'do we?' question tag so much used in 
English! Ironically her bouncing produces messiness without her realising so.
But we don't know of 
any Messiness living 
with us, do we?
Another example of creative playing with the literal and metaphorical meaning of words 
is found in the use of the word 'tools'. The extract below explains it clearly:
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"That's really funny," Duster Cover laughed. "You all forget that you 
couldn't make the slightest move without a human's hand. You could 
never be important, you are just tools."
They were all silenced. Nobody liked the word "tool" (Nikolidaki, 
2009c).
The word 'tool' refers both to one characteristic of the tools' identity: their passivity 
without human's action and their dependency in humans, but it can also be used 
metaphorically for tools as 'dummies'. This abstract can also give food to further thought 
about the metaphorical use of the language. It can also raise questions such as: 'Are 
people sometimes tools?' 'Can people distinguish when they are treated as tools?'
The questions that are either found in the story or can emerge from it reflect another 
aspect of philosophy as a generative force. Can we ever know if the objects have 
thoughts? Is there such a thing as messiness? Can you ever take a photo of something 
that does not literary exist (e.g. messiness)? Can you ever be 'busy dreaming'? Can a 
mop dance? Is the cleaning of the rooms a form of dancing for Mary the cleaner as 
well?
The possible occurrence of epiphany moments is another illustration of philosophy as a 
generative force found in this story. The end of the story provides such an opportunity, 
leaving the reader further to think about it.
"We are important now!" they all shouted. All but the Duster.
"It's the photos that are important guys, not us. Nothing is going 
to change for us" Duster said.
But the 'tools' of the storage room were already busy dreaming 
how their new important lives would be outside the storage room 
(Nikolidaki, 2009c).
The story finishes in a way that enables multi interpretations and creating of new 
narratives and stories. Do 'tools' become important? How is their life outside the storage 
room? Do the tools like their new life or do they want to go back to the safety and 
anonymity of the storage room?
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Is the photo important or 
the person that the photo 
shows?
Is it the content that 
matters or the artistic 
element of a photo?
Can a photo 
change one's life?
There are many parts of the story that encourage evaluating the ideas presented which 
reflect aspects of philosophy as an evaluative force. The extract below gives the 
opportunity to critically examine questions such as: 'What makes something important?', 
'Can dust ever be artistic?', and 'Does being next to something important make us 
important as well?', 'Can we ever have a false interpretation of our world?
Gradually the Mop began to change her attitude. She was boasting that 
she was the most important thing in the storage room because she knew 
everything that lived outside it. Lately she asserted that she should move from 
the storage area and live constantly within the big rooms. She was a dancer after 
all: a pure artist whom all the paintings and the photographs on the walls were 
gazing at.
"You are just a messy thing full of dust," Bucket the plastic said one day to 
the Mop openly annoyed.
"But it is not simply dust. It is artistic! It comes from the important things of 
the art museum", the Mop flicked a speck of dust from her hair (Nikolidaki, 
2009c).
This story is linked with philosophy as a way of life intrinsically and extrinsically. The 
story is highly political and depicts human's relationships as found in the world. 
Metaphorically, the storage room could be interpreted as Plato's cave where the 'tools' 
listen to the 'important' Mop describing the world 'out there' without being able to test 
the truth of her descriptions. Mop could be a politician, a religious leader, the TV or any
283
'authority' that thinks she knows how the things really are! Mop is the 'travelled' one 
who, however, cannot get out of her conceptual system of interpreting the world. What 
Mop offers is not an account of how reality is but a description of it often prejudiced by 
her thoughts and emotions.
There could be also other interpretations for the storage room. It could represent 
human's self defense mechanisms towards new ideas that come from others. It could 
also represent everyday routine life which changes slightly or more when a Mop or a 
photographer offer new perspectives no matter whether they are correct or suitable for 
them.
Human relationships as found in everyday life are projected on the tools of the story. 
Brushy Brush needs to highlight his importance by clarifying his role in putting colours 
on the canvas to make all the pictures that enjoy people's admiration in the showing 
rooms of the museum whereas he remains unknown312 . Sink Leaky, ironically, brings 
Brush to 'reality' as he says in a comical way that painting a wall plain white is not the 
same with painting images that have artistic value. Aren't those situations found in 
everyday life? Philosophy as a way of life can help readers reflect further on what the 
story is and examine how it applies to their lives. Does Brushy's need to show off come 
from a lack of self awareness? How many examples are there from everyday life of 
people, famous or not, who crave for being acknowledged as important? Is it our role in 
society what makes us important? Why do we need to be important? Is it an 
evolutionary characteristic that reassures the continuity of our existence? 
It can be claimed that Sink also highlights the difference between the ideal work of a 
brush (painting a work of art) and the actual one (painting a wall) which can give birth to 
discussions about potentialities and actualities in human's lives. It is obvious that the 
interpretations of the story are as many as the different narratives the readers can apply 
to it. The narrative form of the story matches with individuals' different understandings of
312 "I am the one who puts the colours on the canvas to make all the images, but I am left here. I should be also outside there next 
to the paintings. Do you know how many paintings I have made?"
"If I remember well you had been used to paint the wall of this room. And you painted it plain white" Sink Leaky said as he was 
throwing some water to Mop's hair. You are a simple paintbrush! (Nikolidaki, 2009c).
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the world. The richness of a stimulus is that the same story enables different ways of 
individuals' engaging with it and leads to different ways of its 'opening'.
Apart from the content of the story, its process of writing reflects my experiences and 
views of philosophy. 'Artistic Dust' was written during my stay in Mendham313 (NJ) for an 
advanced seminar on philosophy for children. It started as an exercise to produce 
stories or material for doing P4C in a short period of time. It turned out that some of the 
stimuli for writing it were:
a) the picture of a tree in the music room with the rubric 'Artist: God',
b) the place I was based at (the retreat's house in a nunnery),
c) my reading of Dewey's 'Art as an Experience' and
d) one of the closets rooms that I opened accidentally and found out that it was full 
of forgotten things.
However, before starting the writing of the story I had never thought of incorporating 
deliberately these stimuli into my story. The idea of the museum as a place for the story 
came possibly from reading Dewey's ideas on art and whether art is found in a 
museum. As for the idea of importance, I guess it came from my constant observations 
of people showing off, including myself!
When I started writing the story, my external stimuli became part of the narrative of the 
story as follows:
I am not a tool," Daisy Floral said. "And I am beautiful! If I was made by 
humans I might have been now in the other rooms of the museum, the 
important ones."
"God made you," Cross Holy chanted. "God is the greatest artist" he 
added but nobody replied (Nikolidaki, 2009c)
313 IAPC is the Institute of Advanced Philosophy for Children based on Montclair State University in New Jersey. Every summer it 
used to run summer courses on Lipman's method training at Mendham (St. Marguerite nunnery) the last of which training I had the 
pleasure to attend.
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The physical painting on the piano become part of my story and potentially a further 
stimulus for philosophical discussions that could concern natural and human made 
beauty and viewing God as an artist and/ or a creator.
The philosophical discussion that came from using Artistic Dust
'Artistic Dust' is a good example to illustrate that the individuals' engagement with the 
story can lead either to a state of Eros creating moments of epiphany and opportunities 
for further philosophical analysis, or to a state of Thanatos. Once I used this story with a 
mixed group of children aged 10-11 in a local school in South Wales. The children were 
curious to know why I picked a mop as the main hero for my story. They were puzzled 
how one could ever write a story about tools. It seems that the children were more 
interested on my motives of writing a story rather than the content of the story. This 
could be interpreted as a temporary Thanatos of the stimulus, at least as far as its 
content is concerned. I was honest towards them, so I explained my motives but then it 
was my turn to ask why they were so puzzled with the idea of writing for tools. This 
question became a new stimulus for a philosophical inquiry314 .
314 Here is part of the dialogue from children that took place concerning my motives of writing about a living mop.
Paul: I have never read a story about...a mop and other tools!
Elias: Me neither. It's a strange story.
Me: What makes it strange?
Elias: That it is about things that are not alive.
Me: Yes, but there are also other stories about things that are not alive,
(some children nodding that this is correct)
Elias: But it's not the same. There are humans in this story.
Claire: There are humans in this story too; the cleaner and the photographer.
Elias: Yea... I mean somebody plays the flute. The flute does not speak.
Richard: Come on, there are stories about toys that become alive when everyone sleeps.
Maria: Maybe the same thing happens in the storage room. How do you know that when you sleep your toys do not speak...Or
maybe, the foods in the fridge!
(Some children laugh)
Mark: Imagine! (He laughs) Opening the fridge and finding the cheese arguing with the milk!
Me: Wouldn't that be a nice start for a story?
Ron: Yes, especially if milk could speak and say to my mum that it does not want to be drunk. I hate milk! (children laugh).
(small pause for children to stop laughing)
Paul: For a start, the language is strange.
Teacher: Is it because Sofia's English is her second language? Is there something you don't understand?
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Referring back to figure 4.1 in chapter 4 that explains the ways of engaging with a 
stimulus in chapter four, it seems that the discussion that took place is located in 
intersection three. This means that the initial stimulus functioned as a bridge to move to 
a philosophical discussion not directly connected with it. However, children had to go 
back to the story to find arguments that explain in what ways the story felt strange to 
them. Therefore, as the discussion was proceeding, children's dialogue seemed to 
move towards the intersection seven315 .
In another case, children discussed about the moral of the story and moved to subjects 
such as what is important, whether the Queen is more important than other people, 
whether appearance is more important than personality, whether wealth makes people 
important and what could be the criteria for selecting friends316 . Some of the children's 
comments were very profound and brought to mind ideas of very important philosophers
Paul: No, I don't mean that. There are some strange words. Messiness... maybe... And the photographer...why did he want to
take photos of the tools? That's strange.
Me: Can you all understand what messiness means? Melissa?
Melissa: When you are messy, filthy and dirty.
Me: Thanks. Any other suggestions? David?
David: I want to say about the photographer. He wanted to take a picture of the tools because no one before had thought of
doing this. His exhibition would be original.
Elias: Yea... but you can't be original with photos of tools. You must have nice photos.
Luke: I don't agree. My brother's girlfriend is a photographer and I saw her pictures of rubbish. She got a price for them!
315 The diagram is the same as seen in chapter 4
316 See in appendix 3 the whole dialogue
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such as Epicurus discussing about the meaning in life and Kant318 about treating 
others as ends and not means. Sophie's idea about "Sometimes less is more" 
functioned as a stimulus for me to search for it on the internet and find who had said 
so319 . Transcribing children's dialogues made me think that some children had linked 
somehow the discussion with Jacqueline Wilson's Tracy Beaker stories, which discuss 
children's bringing up in foster homes. This example shows how a stimulus can be 
linked with children's experience from their reading in everyday life.
Figure 9.1: Artistic Dust Illustration
317 Sophie: Some people, say they are rich, what makes them happy, say a TV makes you happy, so you need a TV to 
make you happy, but as long as you have got family and friends these are the things you really need. You can still be happy 
(Researcher's log,2009).
318 Sophie: Treat everyone as you like to be treated (Researcher's log,2009).
Vana: I think you shouldn't be friends with somebody just because they are important or use them if they are not and not really 
bother with them. You should like them for who they are and not what they have got (Researcher's log,2009).
319 Ludwig Mies van der Rohe was a German architect who called his buildings "skin and bones" architecture and made use of 
aphorisms such as " less is more" and "God is in the details". See more at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Mies_van_der_Rohe 
accessed on 30/10/2010.
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9.3.2. The example of 'Save the jungle' as a stimulus for doing philosophy 
with children
The story titled 'Save the Jungle' 320 describes a state of alarm for the animals of a 
jungle about the deforestation in an area nearby. The owl calls all the animals into a 
meeting to think what action they should take but instead, animals seem to fight over 
who will speak first as the most important. Little ant has some ideas but no matter how 
much it tries to be heard, it is ignored. Heading back home, something unexpected 
happens and the ant is found again among the other animals. This time, however, the 
animals are silent so as to listen.
One creative element of the story is that it does not reveal what the ant's idea was. 
Even though the animals listened to it, the readers were not too silent to listen so they 
have to guess. This can give birth to generating lots of ideas which link with philosophy 
as a generative force. The story, as with Artistic Dust, can be interpreted politically as it 
implies that in periods of turmoil people still do not combine their power towards 
preventing a disaster. Concepts such as being important, environmental degradation, 
leadership, irony, listening, death, silence, freedom of expression and differences 
between humans and animals can emerge from this story and be dealt with 
philosophically. The playing with the language is also there and could be used 
philosophically.
This story is linked directly with my experience (blended with imagination) as it reflects 
my emotional response for the political and economic situation of my country. Many of 
the stories written during 2009-2010 reflected my fears, hopes, frustrations, anger and 
disappointment regarding everyday matters but mostly, the future of my country. 
Reading my stories I became aware of strong emotions and the impact that had on one 
of my identities: being Greek. I realised how this identity becomes stronger in a foreign
320 See appendix 1.
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country where any negative statement referring to my country was often perceived as if 
it referred to me.
'Save the jungle', has given rise to different discussions from my initial motives which 
shows how the same story can become a different stimulus each time used. The 
engagement with the story is what enables its 'opening up' towards different directions. 
One inquiry with children aged eight at a local school in South Wales was based only on 
the last line of the story: They were not animals anymore'. Some of the children 
understood that animals were truly transformed to humans whereas some other said 
that animals remained animals but they could think and talk like animals. Salina, 
however, heard 'there 1 instead of 'they' so she interpreted the story differently. This 
creative misunderstanding made her offer the solution that animal by the end of the 
story had already become extinct because the risk threatening the jungle was already 
there. This was a profound moment for me as it gave me a moment of epiphany of 
looking differently at my own story. I saw the prospect of animals already dead as a 
possible ending to the story which was never thought during the writing process. A 
hidden aspect of the story, even for me as creator, was discovered by a child's fresh 
interpretation. What she basically indicated is that we often spend too much time talking 
instead of taking quick and accurate action.
For another group of children aged nine to ten and two adults (children's teacher and a 
student) who attended regularly an after school P4C club the crocodile's tears were a 
detail worthy for concentration. The question for discussion was whether crocodile's 
tears are always fake321 . During this dialogue, children and adults:
321 Below there is an extract from the discussion about the emotions that occurred after reading the story Save the jungle' 
Louise: Are crocodile's tears always fake? 
Mark: Do crocodiles cry?
Lena (a): Yes, they do. When they cry they sound like a baby. They do it deliberately to full other animals and eat them. 
Me: Thanks for this. So what do you think, is crocodile's crying always fake? 
Gemma: I don't know. I am confused. People cry not only when they are sad but also when happy. 
Paloma: I have never cried when I am happy. I cry only when I am sad.
Daisy (a): Maybe you have not felt yet that kind of happiness. Maybe in a few years time you will. I cried in my wedding 
day. Those kind of events are special.
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o exchanged information about crocodile's ability to fool animals by crying like a 
baby.
o found connections between the discussed subject and their experience
o transferred the discussion from crocodile's tears to human's situations.
o thought creatively about examples of crying without emotions (e.g. onions)
o were confused with cases of crying even because of happiness
o made distinctions by referring to differences between crying due to an emotion or
due to non-emotive situations 
o debated whether the composition of tears is the same no matter what the
reasons for crying are.
Going back to Figure 4.1, intersection 4 would describe this dialogue that moved away 
from the text of the story to the human's situations, possibly because this comes closer 
to children's experience. However, this didn't make the discussion less philosophical. 
Children had time to reflect (and possibly self-correct) about the puzzling situations of 
crying because of different emotions and make critical and creative distinctions 
concerning the compositions of tears. The same group of children and adults later on, 
went back to the story, and jumped to the differences between people and animals in 
thinking and whether monkeys are our ancestors. The discussion moved to science and 
DNA as a tool to identify similarities and differences between the animals
As informed by Lena, the children's teacher, some of the children kept mentioning 
during the week different situations of crying, whereas David looked through the 
encyclopaedia to find out whether tears composition does really change due to 
emotions. The differences between humans and animals emerged also a lot that week. 
This is an example of how a stimulus and an inquiry occurred can link with children's
Lena (a): Yea...sometimes you may cry from anger! I am so crossed when I try something on my computer and it does not work
that I may cry. But then my problem is not really fixed, is it?
Jess: I may cry because of the onions. They make my eyes watering.
Me: Are the emotions important when crying? Is crying because of emotions different from crying because of the onions.
David: I think crying is the same...I mean...tears are the same if you cry for onions or because you are sad.
Louisa: I think it is not the same. When you cry because you are sad, crying is louder. (Nikolidaki's research log, 2010)
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everyday life and make them pursue further research, not necessarily philosophical, in 
order to find answers in their questions. This pursuing of research is a sign of Eros, a 
desire for children to learn more. Writing down children's initial questions, the comments 
made and all the research that possibly took place afterwards shows a part of the 
'mapping' of different aspects of the initial stimulus.
An inquiry about language occurred in a group of gifted children aged nine to ten at a 
school in South Wales where I used 'Save the jungle'. Some children wondered whether 
all animals speak the same language, whether all understand 'humanese' and whether 
the ant was ignored not because of its tiny size but because the rest of the animals 
didn't understand its language. Some children came up with creative animal languages 
such as 'elephantese', 'parrotese' and 'lionan'.
What astonished me is that with all groups that I worked this story nobody was really 
interested to learn what the ant actually said. As it is deliberately not written in the story 
(so as to leave it open to different interpretations for both myself and the others), I was 
expecting that somebody would ask. That would give me the opportunity of inviting them 
to write down what they thought the ant might have said. However, this didn't happen. Is 
this a kind of Thanatos of the stimulus? Is there a main subject in the story that if 
ignored or not understood influences the whole quality of the story? Shall I feel that the 
communication with the children through the story was not fully achieved?
Adopting again the Venn diagrams (Figure 4.1) my concerns fall within the intersection 
3. Possibly, these aspects of the stimulus that I have discovered are not yet perceived 
by the children. My role as a facilitator could be either to ask questions that will enable 
children to see this dimension or allow children time to discover the aspects of the 
stimulus that appeal to their interests. Had I been the teacher of these children, I would 
have had the story available to children to read it whenever they liked and made the 
most out of it progressively. Discovering a stimulus is a process that takes time and 
requires zymotic listening both to oneself and others.
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9.4. Where do my stories stand in the field of philosophy with 
children?
My stories have not yet been used officially by others except me as a recognised 
distinct stimulus for doing philosophy with children. However, the stories have been 
used in my philosophical inquiries and have been much appreciated by both children 
and adults. The obvious question here is whether my stories could have a place as 
stimuli within the field of philosophy with children. To answer so, it seems necessary to 
find what are their main similarities and differences to other 'recognised' stimuli for 
doing philosophy with children
Contrary to Lipman and others who constructed a series of novels with certain 
characters reflecting certain types of thinking, I avoided doing so. This is because 
writing in this format would make me deliberately produce stimuli for doing philosophy 
with children, which does not match with my outlook of philosophy as a way of life 
where my experiences are blended with my imagination. My stories were never written 
under the thought 'I have to write a philosophical story' 322 , but when I felt that there was 
an inside need to write something. They are very much linked with my lived experience 
and my observation of others' people (or children's) lived experience which somehow is 
incorporated into the stories. This, however, does not happen when I want to do so. It is 
a zymotic process that takes place in my mind, often without me being totally conscious 
of it323 . Besides, writing in this way often leads to identifying certain ways of thinking 
with certain characters of the stories. I prevented students from identifying with some of 
the characters and possibly adopting their ways of reasoning. The point of my stories is 
not for children to find fixed and given models for thinking, but to discover their own 
ways of thinking by setting free their imaginative and critical thinking.
322 My Artistic Dust was written in Mendham under the pressure of producing material for philosophy with children which seems 
contradictory with what I support. However, my stay in Mendham was so full of experiences and observation that it was inevitable 
not to write a story. It just happened the inspiration and the fermentation process required for the story to come out to fall within the 
time constraints of the IAPC seminar.
323 However, it is obvious that sitting in front of a pcto write is important, otherwise I would have never written anything.
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My stories can be used on their own without the necessary need of a manual. I adopt 
McCall's (2009) position according to whom the facilitator should already have a 
philosophical background, thus s/he can identify what could lead to a philosophical 
discussion either provided by the stimulus or by the children's engagement with the 
stimulus. Nevertheless, my stories could be accompanied by manuals if teachers felt 
that they needed some extra inspiration of how my stories could be used. In appendix 2, 
I provide an example of a possible manual accompanying my artistic dust that includes 
exercises and lesson plans similar to those Lipman, Cam and Sharp and Splitter have 
already provided. However, what is different with the possible manuals that I could 
provide with my stories is that they refer to a variety of activities linked with children's 
experiences. Since I am in favour of a philosophy as a way of life, the manuals for a 
story should promote exactly this idea; that philosophy is part of life and very much 
involved in the practicalities of everyday life. The manual suggests activities that could 
follow from a story and it can be characterized as a 'first' opening of the stimulus (story). 
The manual also suggests how the stories could be used philosophically without forcing
so324 .
In terms of writing I try to use a much more literary style. In the first place, I want my 
stories to offer aesthetic pleasure. I want the readers to enjoy them and at the same 
time reflect on them. Contrary to Lipman's view of literature as seductive that prevents 
children from thinking critically, I aim at this particular seduction. The chances are that if 
a stimulus creates in children a sense of catalepsy, children will reflect on it and 
possibly think deeper and philosophically about very important concepts in life. The 
symbolisms, the metaphoric language and the playing with the words that are often 
used in my stories serve this reason; the possibility of getting children into a state of 
catalepsy and Eros. The possible misunderstanding that might occur through the 
playing with the words could be used as points for a philosophical discussion to take 
place.
324 In appendix 6 I put forward a suggestion of constructing activities and discussion plans that fit the stimuli that children bring and 
could be further philosophically investigated if children are still interested.
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I would say that my stories stand between the material that is purposely written for 
doing philosophy and the textual material that has been used for doing philosophy for 
children but was not initially designed for this purpose (for example the picture-books). I 
do not write so as to provoke or push philosophical dialogue as it often happens with 
both Lipman and Sharp. At the back of my mind, there is always a philosophical 
perspective of understanding the world which is often reflected in my stories more than 
it happens in plain literature for children. Still though the stories mostly imply rather than 
force philosophy. What is unique with my stories is that they combine literature 
imagination, lived experience and philosophy together without one forcing the other. 
The stories are also a product of a true enjoyment from the writer's point of view.
There is a preference in writing short stories as Cam does and I would wish, in future, to 
write even shorter ones. Individuals with short attention spans are more likely to pay 
attention to a short story than to a long episode. Also, a story that provides a beginning, 
middle and end (Egan, 1988) has more chances of meeting individuals' expectations for 
reading something concluded. Contrary to Cam, my stories focus very much on lived 
experiences blended with imagination. Again, I try to imply philosophy rather than giving 
it explicitly.
Comparing my stories with picture-books in terms of doing philosophy with children, I 
would select my stories for their content and the picture-books for their illustration. I am 
very much in favour of images that either support or contradict the text and in parallel 
give their own stimuli for further philosophical discussion (Serafini, 2010). One of my 
future plans is to combine the text of my stories with images that would only enhance 
the possibilities for further enjoyment, creation of moments of epiphany and possibly 
further philosophical reflection.
One of the reasons for writing stories is to encourage children to find their own voice, to 
express themselves philosophically either through the stories they create or through 
other ways (e.g. drawing). Appendices 4 and 5 show some samples of children's
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activities (for instance drama activities or free play) and works (for instance drawings, 
constructions with using bricks or dough, books written by them after being inspired by 
books that had been read in the classroom) that illustrate their philosophy and can be 
further used for philosophical reflection. What is important again is to see all the 
activities as part of life and philosophy also as something that makes this life meaningful 
and occasionally enjoyable. This is also another difference from others in the field. The 
priority is not to put forward the stimuli that we create for the children, but mostly put 
forward what children can create and what reflects their way of life.
To sum up, the answer is positive concerning whether there is a place for my stories in 
the field of philosophy with children. This is because they combine literature with 
philosophy without forcing each other, they match with the idea of philosophy infused in 
life and they promote not only children to develop their thinking abilities but also their 
production of stimuli that reflect their philosophical ways of life. Therefore my stories, 
among other stimuli such as picture-books, could be a good stimulus for a facilitator to 
choose as they combine literature, philosophy and my lived experiences. The narrative 
forms of my stories could match with children's narrative ways of understanding as 
described in chapter five. Furthermore, my stories can inspire children to come up with 
their own stimuli that reflect their imagination blended with their lived experience which 
could be philosophically fruitful for future discussing.
9.5. Conclusion
In this chapter there was an attempt to illustrate how my experience of writing stories 
and the content of the stories match with my initial hypothesis of philosophy as a way of 
life, with both generative and evaluative aspects. It was claimed that the stories are 
always in a state of constant change due to listening zymotically to the ideas that come 
to my mind and to the discussions with others. It was also argued that through writing 
stories, reviewing their content afterwards and practising them with children, bits of my
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lived experience blended with imagination are demonstrated and occasionally I am led 





Synopsis of my basic arguments
To justify a philosophical theory of the stimuli for philosophical inquiry, I needed to state 
clearly the perception of philosophy which formed my initial hypothesis. Philosophy in 
this thesis was viewed as a way of life both theoretically and practically with generative 
and evaluative aspects. The hypothesis was tested by providing arguments such as the 
following:
The generative aspect of philosophy was understood as the creative element of 
philosophy that makes individuals wonder and ask questions, and in the process push 
our thinking further. It was argued that philosophy as an imaginative process makes 
sense since the structure of our conceptual system is imaginative as everyday language 
is imbued with implicit and explicit metaphors - the language people use to think and 
categorise the world with. It was also claimed that when people dialogue with each 
other, imagination is necessary to understand each other's points of view (moral 
imagination). I argued that even logic, and the establishment of rules, is the product of 
imaginative and creative thinking. The generative aspect of philosophy is what makes 
people think creatively, that is, rearrange existing ideas and produce new ones.
What emerged was the idea that philosophy as an evaluative force shows how self- 
correction takes place. This process involves making distinctions between answers that 
are more and less defensible decisions. Pragmatic and Socratic approaches were 
theoretically compared and contrasted in an effort to explore what self-correction. The 
Socratic idea that philosophy is for everyone (if and only if people speak the same 
language and share their genuine beliefs) has been informed and given new shape 
through the ideas of Pragmatist philosophers who regard the construction of new 
knowledge as a matter of mutual, ideally infallible, agreement between a community of 
researchers. I explained how through the Socratic Elenchus (within a community of 
inquiry) individuals become aware of their implicit beliefs or prejudices they bring to their 
understanding of a concept and how they may self-correct as a result. The
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acknowledgement of emotions as modes of thinking and tools for evaluating situations 
could be regarded as the connection between adopting a more Pragmatist approach 
about self-correction and the use of the Socratic Method.
Philosophy as a way of life showed that philosophy is much more than the sum of its 
evaluative and generative parts. Its educational worth is limited if done only for the sake 
of fostering skills in thinking creatively and critically. I have argued that philosophy is 
part of life and aims at improving individuals' quality of life and achieving eudemonia. 
Philosophy as a way of life is understood as a process that enables people to have 
diatheses, such as being open and tolerant but also being in a state of alertness, and 
therefore also has political and moral implications. These diatheses enable individuals 
to see their everyday actions as meaningful or change them into meaningful ones which 
is a kind of self-correction. Philosophy as a way of life is an inevitable part of individuals' 
experiences and has the character of a constant conceptual search of what is true, even 
if our truth-claims are only temporarily valid. The explicit teaching of philosophy in 
formal and informal educational settings makes people aware of the conceptual 
dimensions of their own thinking and educates them not only about the role philosophy 
plays in their life, but also supports the development of skills, attitudes and knowledge 
that makes them better philosophers.
After setting the scene of what I consider as philosophy, it was necessary to check 
whether it was compatible with philosophy with children and children's thinking and 
ways of life. To explain it further, I referred to different examples of categorising the 
different philosophy with children approaches. The first example referred to Gregory's 
epistemic categorization: between 'Realists', 'First-order-non-realists', and 'Second- 
order-non-realists'. The second example used Golding's distinction between 'Dualists', 
'Relativists' and 'Critical Pluralists'. I showed how the different philosophical 
underpinnings influence the use of stimuli and the different styles of facilitation while 
doing philosophy with children. I compared these different categorizations with each 
other and with my categorization of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and 
a way of life. I argued that my categorization agrees with Golding's Critical pluralists1
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approach and Gregory's First-order non-realists, but consider as well the practical 
aspect of philosophy as a way of life which is what both Golding's and Gregory's 
categorizations lack. I also argued that these models do not take into consideration 
philosophy for children from the children's point of view.
Children and the model of philosophy I propose have the following in common: a) the 
presupposition of an open-minded attitude towards what is new, b) playing with new 
ideas, c) a tendency to wonder and probe questions, and d) thinking in metaphors for 
establishing meaning. The evaluative aspect of philosophy is what teaches children to 
think about their thinking and to test their ideas for applicability and reasonableness. 
Gradually the diatheses of being open and at the same time being in a state of alertness 
and prosoche become more of a way of life and this is a way of incorporating 
philosophy into everyday issues. There is a need to clarify here that people are always 
philosophers, one way or another, but developing certain diatheses makes them more 
conscious of what they value in their lives and why.
The stimulus is a salient connection between children and philosophy. To explore this 
further, I categorised stimuli that are specially designed for doing philosophy with 
children, such as Lipman's novels and manuals, and those that are not specifically 
designed for doing philosophy such as children's literature. It was also claimed that 
stimuli can be concrete or abstract. An example of the latter stimulus would be a 
thought that becomes a question. Despite the wide variety of stimuli that are and have 
been used for doing philosophy with children, there is still remarkably little theorising in 
the field about what it is that constitutes a stimulus for philosophy with children in 
philosophical terms, hence the topic and relevance of my thesis. Throughout this thesis, 
it has been supported that knowledge is neither located in the stimulus nor in 
individuals' minds, but in the space opened 'between' because of the transaction of the 
two. The stimulus is a flexible term that has been used to refer to whatever can create 
not only attraction or repulsion to the individuals, but a whole experience. The 
experience of individuals itself can become a new stimulus that creates further attraction 
or repulsion to others.
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The analysis of the concept 'stimulus' was distinguished from any behaviouristic use. I 
view stimuli not as part of the automatic process: stimulus-response. Instead, stimuli 
were viewed more in a Pragmatic manner. To distinguish a stimulus from a non- 
stimulus it is a necessary condition for individuals to engage with it and experience it. If 
someone is left 'cold' towards a stimulus then there is no stimulus for that person, at 
least temporarily. The engagement requires the development offerees, either attraction 
or repulsion, between the individual and the stimulus. These forces can become 
stronger or weaker during the individuals' engagement with the stimulus, which explains 
the developing of individuals' Eros or Thanatos towards it.
My conceptual analysis continued through a clarification of these forces and by 
introducing a new vocabulary to describe key concepts related to the stimuli such as 
'catalepsy', 'Eros' and 'Thanatos'. Particularly, a state of catalepsy determines whether 
the individuals' engagement with a stimulus will lead to Eros and therefore to a further 
discovery of the stimulus, or instead to Thanatos. Eros was identified as the result of a 
force of attraction between the individual and the stimulus, which creates a desire for 
individuals to learn more about a stimulus and through it learn more about themselves 
and others. A good stimulus retains a hidden aspect (aporia) which is necessary for 
creating puzzlement in individuals and therefore, a desire to discover more.
It was examined whether the concept 'stimulus' matches with the initial hypothesis of 
what philosophy is as outlined at the beginning of the thesis. Stimuli were aligned with 
the generative and evaluative aspect of philosophy and with philosophy as a way of life. 
I concluded that Eros is compatible with the generative aspect of philosophy as it is the 
desire to push thinking forward. The reflection on a stimulus and the ways individuals 
use reason, leads to self-correction and increased self-knowledge.
Apart from the novel concepts I introduced to describe the characteristics of stimuli used 
for doing philosophy with children, it was also necessary to check how these concepts 
were linked together. The criteria that makes a stimulus suitable for doing philosophy 
with children are: a) the creation of 'Eros' in individuals who engage with the stimulus, b)
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the stimulus' narrative form that matches with the ability of individuals' to create 
narratives when engaging with the stimulus and c) the creation of moments of epiphany 
for individuals that engage with the stimulus. In order to explain the narrative form of the 
stimulus further, it was argued that there must be some concrete characteristics in the 
stimulus that grasp people's attention and make them fall into 'Eros' with the stimulus 
and have moments of epiphany. The narrative form of the stimuli is illustrated for 
instance in the stories that I have written and given examples of in chapter 9, or in 
picture-books which combine text and image. The analysis of these narratives can 
move to more concrete characteristics such as words, colours, shapes and details of 
the images. I also applied my findings to other stimuli that are visual or textual. Finally, 
in chapter eight of this thesis I have shown how the narrative form is also present in 
stimuli taken directly from children's own experiences.
I claimed that the stimulus does not remain static; instead it 'transforms' as the 
individuals engage with it. Its 'opening' is a generative process and begins with the 
interaction between the stimulus and people. What 'opens up' the stimulus is the 
different ways by which individuals view the stimulus as a result of the moments of 
epiphany that take place during this engagement. It was argued that the particular 
engagement with a stimulus creates a new experience for each person, and as I have 
argued this depends on how we listen. The resulting new experience becomes part of a 
person's life which can be used afresh as a stimulus (e.g. reflecting on the experience 
people had as the result of a particular stimulus). This broader take on what a stimulus 
is incorporates the original stimulus (e.g. the story) and the experience created by it in a 
certain cultural environment. The 'temporary' limits that the stimulus reaches refer to 
moments that further investigation of the stimulus stops, for example, because the 
community is running out of time or ideas or interest to continue the philosophical 
investigation.
I introduced and developed the idea of listening zymotically. This innovative key concept 
relates directly to the concept 'stimulus' and its particular way in which it 'opens up'. 
Zymotic listening is a way of thinking. It matches with philosophy as a generative and
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evaluative force as it involves listening critically, creatively and emotionally both to 
oneself and others. The stimuli are the 'ferments', or the 'yeast' that evoke people's 
zymotic listening. Zymotic or 'fermentative listening' is a long term process that leads to 
the synthesis and zymosis of listening to others (through the inquiry) and listening to 
oneself (through reflection) when interpreting and therefore opening up a stimulus. 
Zymotic listening is what enables the translation and communication of ideas. However, 
the stimulus can never be totally accessed and communicated or translated to others; 
that's why theoretically it always appears as an open source for potential ideas to be 
generated. It was discussed that zymotic listening, if done well, can enable other ways 
of opening up a stimulus through: a) the establishment of creative attitudes, b) the use 
of creative techniques (fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration) when 
philosophising, c) the metaphoric use of language as a way of generating different 
understandings of a stimulus, d) questioning and e) building on each others' ideas.
It was investigated how stimuli's alignment with philosophy as an evaluative force is 
evident in individuals' engagement with the stimuli which: a) provoke emotions in the 
person in favour or against the further evaluation of the stimulus or the discussion 
followed by it (which again in itself becomes a new stimulus?), b) activate the person's 
reflective thinking of the ideas generated and possibly leads to self-correction (which is 
a characteristic of zymotic listening) and c) enables the mapping of the individuals' 
experience with the stimulus. The stimulus was argued to be the topos of constant 
reference when needed by the children to review their experiences and possibly self- 
correct.
Furthermore, it was claimed that philosophy as a way of life is the searching for 
individuals' eudemonia. The stimuli can offer this through the connection with human 
action, which is, like stimuli, located in space and time. It was argued that as individuals 
engage with a stimulus, they: a) experience living in different places (topoi) through the 
on-going discovery of the stimulus, b) live in kairos instead of chronos and c) connect 
with others which can lead to better understanding of self and others and therefore 
transformation. This is achieved through narratives which combine lived experience with
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people's zymotic listening and thinking. It was shown that appreciating and getting 
engaged philosophically with the stimuli, cultivates certain diatheses to individuals such 
as being open, tolerant but also alert.
Children's way of life, as shown through the empirical paradigms taken from my 
previous experience as a teacher (see appendices) and my reflective practice, are not 
necessarily the same as adults' way of life. Adults can benefit from children's way of life 
if they identify first their philosophy, acknowledge and tolerate that it may be different 
from children's and open themselves to listening zymotically and reflect upon it. For this 
reason, it is possible that adults can provide children with stimuli, however, it is more 
important to be able to recognise and learn from the stimuli that children themselves 
generate as they will reflect their own needs and interests, hence they will be motivated 
to pursue them further.
I ended my investigation with a small sample of my own created stimuli (stories) for 
doing philosophy with children. I evaluated this material critically by contrasting it with 
other stimuli used in the field. It was argued that these stories match with the hypothesis 
of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life. I contemplated 
that the writing process brings me into a state of "Eros" with the stories and in a state of 
subjective time (kairos). What the practical examples show is that the stories work well 
with children if the Eros I experienced whilst writing them is experienced by them as 
well. My stories reflect ways of: a) producing stimuli based on lived experience that may 
not just be a source of literary enjoyment, but also provide seeds for further 
philosophical investigation and b) encourage children to generate their own stimuli and 
provoke philosophical enquiries.
The originality of this thesis
The originality of the thesis is the offering of an in depth philosophical underpinning of 
what a stimulus is and does in an inquiry. The choice of stimuli is not simply taken for
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granted, or chosen out of practical considerations, but justified philosophically. 
Moreover, apart from offering a general theory concerning stimuli used in philosophy 
with children, there are also other new ideas offered in each chapter that contribute to 
the originality of this thesis as explained below:
The idea of zymotic listening is a major contribution to the originality of this thesis. It 
builds on Fiumara's idea that listening is thinking and describes further that this is a 
zymotic (fermentative) process. Zymotic listening is the condition of the possibility of 
other ways of 'opening up' a stimulus, such as experimenting, being playful with ideas, 
questioning and building on each others' ideas. The idea of the stimulus as a mapping 
of children's experiences in a philosophical community of inquiry is also new. It needs 
however, further empirical testing of how this mapping can take place in everyday 
practice.
The idea of philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and as a way of life 
enables a more holistic understanding of what philosophy could be when it blends 
theory and practice. Much emphasis within this work is given towards the generative 
aspect of philosophy, as it is often ignored in academia, but it is the one that can push 
people beyond the existing boundaries of their thinking.
In chapter two, the comparative study between three different ways of underpinning 
philosophy with children epistemologically is also new and shows that different existing 
categorizations overlap, that is, between: a) realists and dualists, b) critical pluralists 
and first-order non-realists, and c) relativists and second-order non-realists. The model 
of philosophy offered in this thesis matches most with the second category (b). 
However, my epistemological position also highlights the practical dimension of 
philosophy which links philosophy with everyday life.
I also explored the link further between the previous philosophical background of a 
facilitator of philosophical inquiry and how this influences their selection of a stimulus. 
For instance, it was assumed that facilitators with no strong philosophical background
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may select specially designed stimuli for doing philosophy as they provide them with 
support on how to 'deliver' philosophy, in comparison with facilitators who have had a 
philosophical education and feel confident enough to find and use stimuli not directly 
linked with philosophy with children.
I have not come across the concepts of catalepsy, Eros, Thanatos and epiphany in the 
field of philosophy with children. These concepts have shown to be philosophically rich 
by offering a deeper understanding of stimuli and their role when doing philosophy with 
children. They have helped me to formulate the persuasive claim that it is the Eros that 
makes stimuli appropriate for doing philosophy with children. There is a crucial point, a 
state of catalepsy, that determines whether the forces that will develop during the 
individuals' engagement with a stimulus will be either: a) of attraction and lead to a state 
of Eros (love and desire) and further exploration of the stimulus (and through this 
discovery of various aspects of one's self), or b) of repulsion that lead to a state of 
Thanatos and the abandonment of the stimulus. The moments of epiphany are the ones 
that make individuals think 'deeper' about the 'big' questions in life and reveal other 
aspects of the stimulus.
A particular use of Venn diagrams also offered a new understanding of the different 
ways in which a person can engage with a stimulus. It made it possible to visualise a 
dynamic pedagogical triangle featuring the facilitator, the community of inquiry and the 
stimulus. I suggested imagining these Venn circles as dynamic thereby illustrating the 
different, dynamical forces developing between the participants of an inquiry and the 
stimulus.
I also put forward the idea in chapter five that when the narrative form of the stimulus 
matches with individuals' narrative understanding of their own experiences, there are 
more chances for moments of epiphany to occur. Eros is necessary but not sufficient in 
opening a stimulus philosophically. It needs to create moments of epiphany. The 
analysis of concrete details, such as colours, image details and text of the stimuli
307
provide us with some concrete examples of how a moment of catalepsy may lead 
individuals to a state of Eros when engaging with the stimuli.
The idea of philosophy as a way of life and its linking with children and the stimuli used 
in doing philosophy with children is not new but certainly an area that needs much more 
attention. Of course, it can be argued that philosophy with children is sufficient as a 
classroom activity. However, in this case philosophy is reduced to another subject in the 
school curriculum or to one more educational tool used for improving children's thinking 
skills; it cannot become a way of life. The thesis put forward here is only a beginning. 
Philosophy as a way of life is linked with children's actions and creates certain 
diatheses of recognising and involving with stimuli whenever they create them.
The inclusion in this thesis of empirical examples of my own practice as a teacher, as a 
facilitator and as an observer of philosophical inquiries, has helped to ground the 
theoretical ideas I have offered and have helped connect the theories with the practical 
dimension of philosophy in life.
Last but not least, my stories for doing philosophy with children add to the originality of 
this thesis. The stories could be used effectively as stimuli when doing philosophy with 
children as they combine literature and philosophy and their narrative form matches 
children's narrative understanding. My stories are also good examples for illustrating 
how philosophy as a generative and evaluative force and philosophy as a way of life 
blend together. Apart from the originality of the stories, they also serve practical 
purposes as they can be used directly by practitioners and others interested in doing 
philosophy with children. What is required, however, is further empirical testing of the 
stimuli that are proposed in this thesis by means of educational empirical research.
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For whom and in what ways is my research useful?
This theoretical and practically grounded piece of writing would firstly be of interest for 
theoreticians and practitioners of philosophy with children. The theoreticians would have 
a new field for discussion about stimuli and their role in philosophy with children. The 
practitioners would firstly acquire a profound understanding of the importance of stimuli 
in philosophical inquiries and secondly are offered some criteria and philosophical 
reflections to consider, when selecting a stimulus. For example, what makes a stimulus 
attractive or repulsive for them and for children? They are also introduced to a sample 
of my stories that could potentially be used as new stimuli for doing philosophy with 
children since they are in 'between' existing stories and specially made resources for 
P4C.
Apart from practitioners or academics in the field of philosophy with children, 
philosophers, theoreticians in pedagogy and education, developers and designers of 
educational material, teachers, parents and others working or living with children, could 
be inspired by this thesis as it describes a profound model of understanding stimuli and 
how we engage with them. The possible applications of the ideas put forward and 
claims made go beyond the field of philosophy with children. What follows are some 
examples of how this research could be of any use.
o The role of Eros (love) is important not only in selecting stimuli in doing 
philosophy with children but in any educational process. The element of Eros 
(desire) to learn or to teach something is often abandoned either because it is 
mistakenly taken for granted or because it is not considered be measurable or 
quantifiable. However, for research into motivation or engagement in education, 
the role of Eros is paramount. It is Eros that is the necessary motivation for 
further progress: a) for learning, b) for teaching with passion and genuine 
interest, c) for selecting or creating educational material that will create children's
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and teacher's desires to explore further and d) for using methods that enable 
children's thinking to develop and flourish.
o Particularly, the discussion about stimuli in this thesis should not be restricted to 
the philosophy for children field but be taken seriously when considering the 
creation of any educational material or even curricula. Children need to feel 
desire for their learning subjects and see them as stimuli for further exploration. 
All the ideas described in chapter five about the stimuli's concrete characteristics 
are applicable to other educational materials as well.
o The moment of catalepsy has a practical educational impact. What is implied 
here is that not only the content of the stimulus is important but also the way the 
stimulus will be presented for creating catalepsy. The presentation of a stimulus 
refers to finding stimulating ways of presenting ideas (e.g. even the most 
promising stimulus if used as something to "kill time" and with a teacher having 
no real interest in it will lead children to a state of boredom which is a type of 
Thanatos). Therefore, in the case of a story (picture-book) as a stimulus it is 
equally important how, when and where the story-telling will take place, to allow a 
moment of catalepsy to occur.
o Zymotic listening shows that philosophical thinking takes time. It is useful for both 
parents and teachers to allow time for ideas to agitate, settle down and shape 
into temporary conclusions. Zymotic listening does not apply only to children, but 
also to adults and it is necessary for developing inquiring minds and judging what 
stimuli are worthy for our development and what are not.
o The findings of this thesis link very much with contempory ideas of educational 
sustainability and dealing with continuous instability and uncertainty. This thesis 
promotes the idea of viewing philosophy as a way of life where people acquire 




The limitations of this research can be viewed from a philosophical and pedagogical 
perspective. From a philosophical perspective this research does not establish concrete 
and objective criteria in selecting a stimulus for doing philosophy with children. It seems 
that one of the aims set in the beginning of this research, finding criteria for selecting 
stimuli, is only partly achieved. This is because no matter how deep we delve in the 
characteristics of a stimulus (e.g. text, image and their combination), there are always 
individuals involved and their interpretation of the stimuli. Therefore, the criteria for 
selecting a stimulus do not lie only with it; they depend also on individuals' 
interpretations - it is in the relationship. This research opens a space for further 
consideration of Catalepsy, Eros and Epiphany as important elements not only for the 
recognition and selection of stimuli, but for their active incorporation in other educational 
processes.
I discussed the diatheses that philosophy as a way of life creates to individuals by 
highlighting two parameters: being open towards what is new and at the same time in a 
state of continuous alertness. What, however, is missing is the identification of the 
balance of these diatheses. How is it possible to be open and at the same time in a 
state of alertness (prosoche)? How can you find a balance between openness and 
alertness? It seems that there is an opening here for further philosophical investigation.
From a pedagogical perspective, in order to link philosophy with everyday life and its 
stimuli, more empirical research is required along with more data about the stimuli that 
children can bring to a philosophical inquiry. It is also required that a further empirical 
investigation on how the diversity of the children in respect to their learning abilities and 
learning styles affect their perception of the stimuli they encounter and their ability to 
open them further up. This research makes a step in this direction by using examples of 
children bring stimuli in a philosophical inquiry, as well as by indicating how my writing 
of stories connects with philosophy as a way of life and encourages children to create 
their own stimuli.
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The idea of philosophy as a way of life could become problematic especially for 
someone who searches for unanimity and mutual consensus upon what is the correct or 
proper way of a philosophical life. As there are different understandings of philosophy, 
there are also different understandings of philosophy as a way of life. These different 
ways of life may contradict each other. This thesis does not offer any suggestions of 
how these differences should be resolved.
Finally, I could have limited my subject to one category of stimuli, as the thesis may be 
considered still too broad. However, I wanted to approach the topic in such a way that I 
could generalize from the findings of this research. Still, however, some stimuli were not 
really discussed in any detail, for instance, art, music and drama.
Further research/ New directions
It has been mentioned already that certain aspects of the research could have been 
done differently, both philosophically and empirically - in turn this offers suggestions for 
future research. For example, in the context of the research topic of stimuli for 
philosophy with children, it would be beneficial to focus on particular types of stimuli. 
Researching the underpinning philosophy behind Lipman's novels and manuals (and 
the possible controversies found) or other specially written material for philosophy with 
children would give us a better understanding of the potentialities of a stimulus. Similarly 
interesting would be exploring the potential of non-specially designed stimuli for doing 
philosophy with children.
From a philosophical point of view the conceptual analysis of children's playfulness and 
humour and their connection with creating and using existing stimuli for philosophising 
would also open new directions in the research field. The conceptual connection 
between Heidegger's idea of "Dasein" and the cataleptic moment that leads to Eros 
when engaging with a stimulus could also bring new ideas to light. Furthermore, the 
philosophical connection of philosophy with children with other temporary trends in
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education such as the ideas of sustainability, globalization and lifelong education would 
be a prosperous field of research. Also the idea of researching, either philosophically or 
empirically, the methods of presenting a stimulus (e.g. storytelling) and their impact on 
creating catalepsy and Eros to children could be educationally worthy. It may be the 
case that a less potential stimulus for philosophical dialogue can create Eros to children 
if it is well presented.
Conducting, mostly, empirical research and focusing on stimuli generated by children 
when doing philosophy is a rich area of educational research. The findings of such 
research could show a lot about what children's interests are and how they can be used 
educationally. They could also open spaces to conceptual inquiries about who decides 
what educational resources will be used in the classroom. Children's own experiences 
as a stimulus for philosophical inquiries are a rich area for further research. Also the 
theoretical ideas of stimuli explored in this thesis could be tested practically to find out 
whether the children's engagement with the stimuli (materials/ methods) used in 
Education would benefit if the ideas of Catalepsy, Eros, Thanatos, Epiphany and 
Zymotic listening were practically incorporated.
Providing stimuli for children, to enhance their thinking is necessary as it helps children 
strengthen their thinking skills. However, adults' prescribing the stimuli is not genuine 
philosophy by children unless it encourages them to offer gradually their own stimuli and 
think about them and in the process create their own stimuli for philosophical 
discussion. Another topic generated by my research is the possibility of an empirical 
research project about teachers' attitudes towards the stimuli used when doing 
philosophy with children, as I claim in this thesis that teachers' philosophical training 
and epistemological have an impact on the facilitator's confidence in selecting and using 
a particular stimulus.
Furthermore, as indicated above more research needs to take place about the possible 
differences in perception of stimuli between adults and children. Adults and children live 
together and there is a need to conduct more research in order to find out how,
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philosophically, both adults and children can benefit from having common philosophical 
inquiries, from sharing stimuli and what the implications might be for educational 
practice. Such an inquiry may possibly lead to a reconsideration of the term 'philosophy 
for/with children' as this seems too restrictive. Philosophy for/ with children may be seen 
as marginalising, the smaller version of the 'real' thing. A way forward might be to call it 
simply 'philosophy' which incorporates also children as people who are able to do 
genuine philosophy.
Further research should consider the diffusion of philosophy with children in other 
subjects of the curriculum and in children's everyday life. In the first case, it would be 
worthy researching how the school subjects can become stimuli for further philosophical 
investigation that could lead to finding meaning in the curriculum subjects and 
understanding themselves better. In the second case, philosophy as a way of life is 
possible only if children's lives and children's way of life are viewed philosophically. 
Philosophy should not be restricted to one-hourly classroom sessions because then it 
becomes another subject of the curriculum that can be totally forgotten the very first 
minute children leave the classroom. Further research could evaluate if and how 
children regard stimuli philosophically out of the classroom sessions, for instance when 
they go for a walk to the park, comment on others' drawing, or talk a bout a TV 
programme. The thoughts and emotions that such everyday events and activities 
provoke can be points of departure for further meaningful reflection. As parents are in a 
unique position to recognise stimuli for inquiries with children, research that includes 
parents could be another direction for future research.
Nevertheless, what in particular needs further empirical and philosophical research is an 
exploration of what children understand as philosophy. Many questions can arise here 
such as: 'can children's play be a form of children' philosophising?', Ms children's 
philosophy their way of approaching the questions adults ask them?', and 'is children's 
play a form of philosophy which is not fully translatable to adults?' The fact that 
children's experiences are not referred to by children as philosophy does not make this 
experience less philosophical. Therefore, more questions arise, such as 'Is philosophy
314
only what adults understand as philosophy?', and 'Would it not be important to see what 
children understand as their philosophy even if they do not use the word 'philosophy'?'
Apart from the new directions for research as indicated above I as a researcher could 
actively get involved with, there are also some more particular plans I have to take my 
research forward and develop some of the ideas explored in this thesis. In particular, my 
immediate plans are to further develop materials for doing philosophy with children and 
to conduct empirical research in the effectiveness of my stories for P4C in a) stimulating 
children philosophically and b) in modelling for children how they can create their own 
stimuli without any resemblance to my stories.
Conclusion
The whole process of writing a Ph.D. became an on-going stimulus itself - with many of 
its aspects still hidden. Conceptual researching, reflecting on my previous experience 
as a teacher, running or attending philosophical inquiries and writing stories have 
become part of my life for years now. Many ideas proposed in this thesis came from the 
combination of reading, writing, epiphany moments and creative tantrums that comprise 
part of my lived experience. The zymotic listening and the maturation of ideas is a lived 
experience. It was what I saw happening not only in mature communities of inquiries, 
but also in my own practice and studying. This thesis itself is a product of a constant 
zymosis of my previous experiences as a researcher, teacher, student of philosophy, 
amateur writer with my new acquired experience in practising philosophy with children 
and adults, reading more about philosophy with children, networking with people from 
the field, writing stories, attending lessons in creative writing, attending seminars and 
attending and presenting papers and workshops in conferences. It was necessary to 
allow time for ideas to emerge and, equally important, to give time for the stimulating 
ideas to settle down and to mature following their own pace and link with the diatheses 
of being open, tolerant but yet critical. These diatheses developed slowly but steadily
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and were necessary for being flexible in dealing with the uncertainty concerning the 
various 'twists and turns' of the structure of this thesis.
Reflecting back on my experience as a teacher (as seen in examples in the 
appendices), I realise that what I now present as a theory about stimuli for P4C in 
particular has always been a lived part of my practice as a teacher. It seems that the 
zymotic process of listening to others and me had already started then, however, it 
needed further time and more 'stimuli' so as to be developed and shaped into a theory. 
What will make me a different teacher from now on is that I have started 'examining' my 
previous practice in the light of philosophy with children. Much of my practice as a 
teacher was philosophical even if I was not fully aware of it at the time. This is because I 
truly loved (Eros) the discussions with children and their viewpoints. Now I know how to 
recognise the stimuli that children bring with them into the classroom - stimuli that can 
be explored philosophically. Also, I know now how I can offer children more quality 
stimuli that can provoke their natural tendency to philosophise.
I entered the field of philosophy with children and this particular thesis as a question 
mark. I leave this thesis not as a full stop, but as a larger question mark that I want to 
pursue further. This should be the role of a stimulus when doing philosophy with both 
adults and children: to create more question marks and in parallel trigger them to 
'chase' their further questions. Wittgenstein had said that the aim of philosophy is "to 
show the fly the way out of the /7y-bottle" (PI. 309). If the stimulus is a sort of Socratic 
gadfly, then we need to make sure that the fly is not only out of the fly-bottle but also 
triggers us to chase it. Chasing a stimulus out of true desire (Eros) leads to discovering 
more about the stimulus and ourselves. This opens the space to the unfamiliar, 
unknown, uncomfortable and not yet discovered territory. Being open and alert are 
diatheses that enable the new discovery not only of the stimulus but also of ourselves.
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Glossary of Greek terms
Anamnesis (AvdMvnai?): It is a term used by Plato in Meno and Phaedo and it means 
recollection. It refers to the knowledge as the result of the incarnated soul's recollection 
of its previous immortal state.
Akroasis (AKpoaaq): It means listening carefully
Aporia (Arropia): Etymologically this word comes from a + poros (not going through or 
having wealth). It has a double meaning: a) it means perplexity and inability to pass 
through and b) it means lacking resources. A+poros= Aporos and means the one who 
does not have recources, the poor.
Atopos (ATOTTOS): It means out of place or not in the right place. It can have a literal or 
metaphorical meaning. Atopos can mean also incongruous or absurd.
Catalepsy (KaraAnipia): It is an 'immediate' perception of a situation just before 
emotions and thoughts are about to be generated. It is understood as a sense of 
grasping and numbing that Socrates' stingray metaphor could describe well. Catalepsy 
is located between ignorance and knowledge and apart from its initial shock and 
surprise for the person, it determines the moment that the person decides consciously 
to engage further or not with a stimulus.
Chronos (Xpovo^): It means time and refers to the chronological, sequential and 
'objective human way of counting' time.
Deixis (A£i£i£): It is the action that enables someone to draw intentionally someone 
else's attention about something, usually by pointing at it.
Diathesis (Aiti8£ai£): It refers to people's attitudes and dispositions towards life. 
Diathesis reflects people's 'philosophy' and 'narration' towards life. It is subject to 
change, ranging from being positive and reinforcing further exploration upon stimuli in 
life, to being negative and abandoning life and its stimuli.
Elenchus ('EAEYXOS): It is Socrates' mode of argumentation that aims at exposing 
inconsistency within the interlocutor's beliefs rather than an instrument implemented to 
establish an objective truth.
Enkrateia (EyKpaTEia): It means self mastery. It is a compound word (en+ kratw) which 
means I hold something inside.
Epiphany (ETTKptiveia): It is a sudden intuitive perception of insight into the essential 
meaning of something, usually initiated by some simple or common place experience. It 
comes from the word epiphainesthai, which means to appear or to show. It also means 
an appearance or manifestation, especially of a deity.
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Eros f Epws). Eros was an ancient Greek semi god of love and desire who was the son 
of Poros and Penia. He has been also considered as the son of the Greek goddess of 
beauty Aphrodite and Ares (god of war) which explains the nature of Eros for desiring 
greedily to possess what is beautiful and not yet acquired. Eros is understood as an 
active passionate love which often involves sexual attraction and is directed to a 
particular living or non living object. The person who is in Eros desires achieving 
wholeness and completeness through the pursuit of his/her loving object. (Ancient 
Greek verb erao=to love).
Eudemonia (EuSaiuovia): It is usually translated as happiness and flourishing, but it 
also refers to being at ease with one's conscience. It is a compound word (eu + daemon 
(=good spirit, deity) It is achieved by leading an examined way of life based on reflecting 
on the decisions made and the way one's life is conducted.
Kairos (Kaipos): In this thesis it also means time but it has a more subjective character 
and indicates the time in which something special happens.
Penia (FlEvia): In Greek Mythology she was the goddess of poverty and deficiency who 
gave birth to Eros.
Peripeteia (nepiTTETEia): It has been introduced by Aristotle in his Poetics and it refers 
to a hero's adventure which includes sudden reversal in circumstances
Poros (fl6po^):ln Greek Mythology he was the god of wealth and father of Eros.
Prosoche (npoo~oxn): It means being in a state of alertness and concentrating in the 
moment of one thought or action.
Telos (TeAoc;): It has been used by Aristotle and it means both the end and the reason 
within it. This is where teleology comes from.
Thanatos (Odvcrros): It means death, or metaphorically complete lack of interest. In 
this thesis, it is used in contrast with Eros.
Topos (ToTTos): It means either a physical or a mental space.
Zymotic listening (ZupwriKn aKpocran): Zymotic means fermentative. It is a new term 
introduced in this thesis which refers to a mixture of critical, creative and emotional 
listening that leads to the maturation of thinking in time through a fermentative process 
(zymosis). It can be used to explain how stimuli are linked with philosophy as a way of 
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1 st story 
Artistic Dust
The main door of the Art Museum was now closed. The last visitors 
could hardly be heard as they were walking down the steps. The door of the 
storage room opened.
"It's my turn," the Mop said as she felt a hand grasping her. It was 
dancing time with Mary the cleaner. Together they were swinging around the 
rooms, quickly and slowly, forward and backwards, reaching corners or 
running along corridors leaving behind the smell of fresh lemons: swishing 
and swashing, to-ing and fro-ing. It was fun, at least for the Mop.
The Mop shared the storage room with many others who never left the 
room. The chair with the Duster left on it, the old paintbrush on the table, 
Mary's mug, the wooden cross on the shelf and the almost withered daisy in 
the vase were silently listening to the mop's narratives. So did the plastic 
bucket that accompanied the mop but was always left outside the rooms.
"Tell us, what is outside of this room?" they begged her and the Mop 
started narrating all the things she could see.
"Oh...there are big rooms full of light, with floors that are smooth and 
smell of wood. And there are tables but I have never seen what is on them. I 
can only move towards their legs. There are also stone people that stand still 
and things on the ground inside boxes of glass. They seem quite old. Mary 
stops my dancing when we approach them. She says that we should be 
careful, these things are important! I can't understand why."
"I wish I could be one of these tables" the storage table wobbled its 
legs every time it listened to Mop's narratives.
"Tell us more" they begged.
"Well...let me see...yes, the most important thing I have ever seen is in 
the middle of the biggest room in the museum. It is a glass box on the floor lit 
from underneath. It is a light that...guess what...it changes colours! A fence is 
around to protect it. There is also a huge white stone with some scribbles in 
front of it which shouldn't be there!"
Gradually the Mop began to change her attitude. She was boasting that 
she was the most important thing in the storage room because she knew 
everything that lived outside it. Lately she asserted that she should move from 
the storage area and live constantly within the big rooms. She was a dancer 
after all: a pure artist whom all the paintings and the photographs on the walls
were gazing at.
"You are just a messy thing full of dust," Bucket the plastic said one 
day to the Mop openly annoyed.
"But it is not simply dust. It is artistic! It comes from the important things 
of the art museum", the Mop flicked a speck of dust from her hair.
"So what?" brushy Brush the painter joined in the dialogue. He had 
suspected that maybe Mop was only showing off.
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"I am the one who puts the colours on the canvas to make all the 
images, but I am left here. I should be also outside there next to the paintings. 
Do you know how many paintings I have made?"
"If I remember well you had been used to paint the wall of this room. 
And you painted it plain white" Sink Leaky said as he was throwing some 
water to Mop's hair. You are a simple paintbrush!
"That's really funny," Duster Cover laughed. You all forget that you 
couldn't do the slightest move without a human's hand. You could never be 
important, you are just tools."
They were all silenced. Nobody liked the word "tool".
"I am not a tool," Daisy Floral said. "And I am beautiful! If I was made 
by humans I might be now in the other rooms of the museum, the important 
ones."
"God made you," Cross Holy chanted. "God is the greatest artist" he 
added but nobody replied. He used to turn every discussion into God, maybe 
because he came from a nunnery. But Mop was absolutely sure that this 
place never existed. Mop only knew what the world was like outside of the 
storage room.
One day something happened that would change the lives in the 
storage room forever. It was not yet time for the Mop's dancing but the door 
suddenly opened. A man with black curly hair and a black camera hanging 
from his neck got into the room. He started moving slowly, looking around 
carefully. He touched the duster and picked a flick of dust from the table. Mary 
followed him.
"That's perfect!" he said many times. "That's what I am looking for".
"Should I tidy up first, it's very messy in here."
"No, it is that messiness I want to snap," the man replied and started 
taking photos.
"I will have an exhibition at the central room of the museum" the 
photographer said as he took his camera out of the case. "About the objects 
that you never see in the main rooms of a museum" he added.
Mary nodded her head not sure that she had understood well. She 
asked whether he needed anything else. He said no and kept taking photos of 
everything in the storage room. Mary left the room and an hour later the 
photographer was gone too. The storage room was quiet again.
"Hurrah!" Mop yelled when all had left. "I knew it, I knew!"
"Did anyone understand what happened?" Muggy Mug asked still 
shocked from the flashes.
"This guy touched me with his wet hands!" Duster complained.
"This guy is a photographer and he took photos of us. We are 
important. They will move us from here. You see, because of me, luck smiled 
at you too" Mop raved.
"Really?" Brush cheered.
"It was God's wish" Cross applauded.
"The photographer said he would take photos of the messiness. But we 
don't know of any messiness living with us, do we?" Cushy Cushion leisurely 
bounced and let a cloud of dust rise.
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"Come on", Table said. "Can you take photos of something that doesn't 
exist? He must have made a mistake. He was taking photos of us, so it was 
us that he wanted! We are important now!"
"We are important now!" they all shouted. All but the Duster.
"It's the photos that are important guys, not us. Nothing is going to 
change for us" Duster said.
But the 'tools' of the storage room were already busy dreaming how their new 
important lives would be outside the storage room.
2nd Story
Save the jungle
A big issue was raised in the jungle and all the animals were invited to 
participate in the first discussion animals would ever have. It was the visiting 
owl's idea. She came from the burnt forest 30 miles away from the jungle.
"We have to take a serious decision and share our ideas," the owl 
wrote in the invitation that she sent to all animals.
The animals didn't really understand what owl's invitation was about 
but they decided to go to this meeting at the big tree in the centre of the 
jungle.
The owl had a big poster on the tree with the issue in large print.
"Jungle is at risk. Next human attack is already planned. Deforestation 
is on the way. How can we avoid it?"
The owl spoke slowly to make sure that everybody heard and 
understood and then left the discussion to the animals.
The lion roared first because he was the king so he had to speak first.
The elephant trumpeted even louder because he was the biggest and 
should be heard first.
The hippopotamus stamped his foot on the ground to show who was 
the strongest there.
The parrot fluttered his wings and squawked in a human voice "I am 
the only one who can speak humanise"
The snake bit and hissed at all the members. "My ancestors had 
beaten the humans once, so we will beat them again"
The laughing hyena was really annoyed and kicked the snake back.
The giraffe was ignored even though she was the tallest and found it a 
good idea to head butt the others.
The monkey climbed up the tree and then she let herself fall into the 
middle of the animals circle to show who can draw the attention.
The crocodile showed his teeth.
After a while the animals were roaring, punching, kicking and slapping 
and the owl in a loud voice screamed.
"Can you stop behaving like animals? There is not time left, we need to 
save the jungle," But nobody listened.
The ant was sitting opposite the tree reading carefully the issues up for 
discussion. He was not sure what "deforestation" meant but he was sure it 
was something terribly bad. Maybe even the death of the jungle! He sat on a
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stone and began thinking and thinking until he suddenly came up with a great 
idea. It was a perfect idea: the idea that would save the jungle.
The ant raised his voice, but nobody listened.
He raised his voice even more and more. He was now shouting, but 
nobody listened.
He tapped his foot strongly on the floor. Again and again, but nobody 
listened.
He jumped as high as he could, but nobody listened.
He poked lion's and then elephant's foot and hardly escaped being 
stepped on.
He got angry and shouted, punched and kicked the air but nobody 
listened.
He went back home, took out a large yellow leaf and a piece of coal 
and wrote in capitals:
"I have the right to speak and be listened to."
He held his leaf as high as he could and silently protested. But nobody 
listened.
"Do I exist?" the ant asked, but nobody replied.
The ant sure that nothing was likely to happen anymore turned his 
back and went home.
But then something did happen. First the roars, then the punches and 
the kicks and suddenly a hurricane of dust blew so firmly that the ant lost his 
balance.
He swirled, then he flew and finally he landed on a big, grey piece of land that 
was flapping around in the wind.
"Where am I?" the ant asked. But nobody listened.
"Am I dead?" he wondered.
"But I can still move," he said and moved first round and round, then 
forwards and finally backwards.
"If only they could listen to me" the ant said. "I have the answer" he 
said and kept exploring the new area. He was approaching a dark tunnel 
when he listened to a loud trumpeting. Then an earthquake forced the grey 
land to move.
The ant lost his balance again and found himself sliding on a big slope. 
It was fun! Then the ant felt going up and up and up till he stopped in front of a 
black circle. It looked like a huge eye.
"It is an ant!" the elephant said bellowing from his large trunk that made 
the ant fly again.
All the animals stopped fighting.
"We haven't heard from him yet, have we?" the owl said. 
"What could an ant know?" the monkey mocked. 
"He is so small, that he can't even be heard" the hyena giggled. 
"Let's be silent then" the owl suggested. "Put your ears down on the 
ground and you will listen to him" she added. So the animals did. 
The ant shouted his answer. 
"I can't hear" the rattlesnake complained. 
"It's because you are not silent. Stop playing with your tale" the owl
said.
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Then there was silence, a deep silence till the whispered ant's voice 
was heard. And he said the simplest thing which would definitely save the 
jungle. It was so obvious but nobody had thought of it so far.
When the ant stopped talking there was still silence.
The animals nodded their heads. The crocodile wiped a teardrop. The 
owl smiled. She had passed the message on. She could move to other places 
that were in danger.
The animals sat in a circle and discussed what further action they 
would take. They were not animals anymore.
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Appendix 2




Group target: Children aged 4-7
Objectives: The children through the discussion should be able to:
  Listen carefully to what others say.
  Respect rules of the community (e.g. no interruptions when one's 
speaking).
  Give examples of important things.
  Give reasons for their answers (e.g. why certain things are important).
  Give counter-examples of things that are considered as important 
when they are not and vice versa.
Warm up activities:
  Role play: Children choose an object either from the story or not and 
try to act as if they were the objects they have chosen. They are 
allowed time to explore their character's role and act it out. What 
objects would they be? Why would they choose to be a certain object? 
What would the objects look like? How would they move? What would 
be important to them?
  Children bring (or think of) things that they consider as important. They 
talk in pairs and each child gives reasons to the other about why 
his/her object is important. When the facilitator claps his/her hands the 
children change pairs and give their reasons to another child.
Discussion Plan: Objects of importance
Some of the potential questions that could be the stimuli for discussion are 
listed below:
  Are the things from the storage room important?
  Why did the Mop think that she is more important than the others? Did 
she have good reasons?
  Can you think of some important objects? Why are these objects 
important?
  To whom are these objects important?
  Who decides what is important? (mother, father, teacher, police, the 
Prime Minister, god?)
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Can a person be important?
Are all the objects important to all of the people?
Are there objects that are not important at all? Give examples.
If one object is not important for anybody, does that make the object
not important or irrelevant?
Is it important for an object to have a name?
Can an object stop being important?
Can an object that was not important become important? How?
Is there anything that is the most/least important thing?
Can an important thing be unnoticed? (e.g. the air we breath)
Exercise: Objects of importance
The teacher sticks on a large piece of paper some pictures of objects and 
creates with the children the table that follows. Then children have to place 
ticks whether they consider the certain objects as important or not and 
indicate to whom they would be important. They need to justify their choices.
Dog













Exercise: Naming important people
What makes a person important?
Are there some people who are important for everybody?



















Exercise: Quantifying the important!
o How much importance do we need?
o Are the important things big? How big?
o Are the important things expensive? How expensive?
o Are the important things famous? How famous?
Making graphs of importance
Geography:
o What makes a place important?
o Can you think of important places?
o Why are they important?
o What is so important about them? Discuss.
History:
o What makes a historical period important? 
o Can you think of any period that is historically important? Why? 
o Are there historical periods that are more important than others? 
o Can we make comparisons? Upon what criteria?
Art:
What makes a work of art important?
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o Is a piece of art important only because you can see it in a famous
	gallery?
o Are there important works of art not in art galleries?
o Can a child's drawing be a work of art?
o What distinguishes an important painter from a unimportant one?
o Who is to say what is an important work of art?
o Can a bad painting be famous? Why?
Discussing particular paintings, for instance one famous painting and 
another one which is not famous. What are their differences? What are their 
similarities?
Taboo Word playing: Say that something is important without using the word 
'important'
o Are there any words that are important? Name them. Why are they
important? 
Imagining:
o A world where everything would be important. How would that world
be? 
o A world where nothing would be important. How this world would be?
Draw an important: person, place, and thing.
Leading Idea: Messiness 
Discussion plan
o Can you find messiness in tidiness? Can you find tidiness in
	messiness?
o What does it mean to be messy?
o Is being messy a negative or positive thing? Why?
o Does messiness grow bigger?
o Can animals be messy?

















o We draw the artistic dust. What does it look like? We make a little 
expedition with our messy drawings.
Messy movies:
o We are filming a messy movie based on a messy scenario we have 
already written!
Word distinctions and definitions:
In what ways is messy similar or different to: a) dirty, b) filthy, c) untidy, d) 
unclean, e) mucky, f) muddy, g) chaotic, i) disordered, h) unorganized, k) 
muddled, I) cluttered.
Music:
o Can music be messy?
o What does messy music sound like?
o How would we compose 'messy music'?
Imagine:
o A messy world: How would that be? Draw it.
o A messy situation.
o A messy feeling/ thought.
Mixed activities for different leading ideas
o We take photos capturing the messiness of the class/ playground/ my 
room/ our house's storage room.
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Can we capture anything else apart from messiness in our photos?
What would that be? (e.g. the curiosity of people/ the intensity of the
moment)
Role play: Acting important/ messiness. How would you use your body/
face/ voice to show messiness? Importance?
Compare 'Mop' with Frog from Lionni's book 'Fish is Fish'. What are
their similarities and differences?
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Appendix 3 
A dialogue about the morals of 'Artistic Dust'
Questions:
What made the mop feel so important? Votes: 3
What made you think of a living mop? Votes: 5
Why do some people get treated differently than other people? Votes:
6
What's the moral of the story? Votes: 8
Me: Any ideas, what do you think the moral of the story is? Shall we
go for a round of answers? 
Emma: Two morals really. The first is that you shouldn't treat people
differently to others. The other one...oh I forgot the other one
now.
Me: We can come to you later 
William: I kind of think the same with Emma because anybody shouldn't
be treated differently to other people because this is unfair. 
Rachel: No matter who you are or what you are, you shouldn't be treated
differently to anybody else.
Luke: You have to help each other, like care for each other. 
Ron: I think that the story is about the same as William said, don't
treat people differently 
Kate: You shouldn't be treated differently because we think that we
are more important than others when we are not. 
Lizzy: The moral of the story is treat everybody the same no matter
who you are or what you are.
Sophie: Treat everyone as you like to be treated. 
Me: A very important philosopher said exactly the same. His name is
Kant. 
Thomas: Don't treat anybody differently because inside we are all the
same. 
Me: What I can see is that all of you agree that people should be
treated all the same as you would like to be treated and some
said that we are no more important than the others. But what
does it mean to be important? 
Lizzy: Is the queen more important? 
Emily: Like nobody is important because...erm...because for example
the Queen, she can have the same things with another rich
person who lives here and nobody should be important because
everybody should have the same rights as each other. 
Rachel: I agree with Emily, because the Queen is still a person and even
though she has a higher standing than us she is not really any
more important than us. Royalty is at the same level. 


















Nobody is more important than anybody else because we are
really the same. We are not different.
I think you shouldn't be friends with somebody just because they
are important or use them if they are not and not really bother
with them. You should like them for who they are and not what
they have got.
So it matters who we are, but not what we have got. How do
others understand this?
Erm like for example...me and Lena, we are the same because
we are at the same level. The Queen isn't more important than
whoever, me and she doesn't have more rights to live than me.
I like to agree because if there is somebody really poor or really
rich. It doesn't matter what you have. It's what you do.
What do the others think about it?
I agree that someone can have a really big house but be really
horrible and you could just like them for all their stuff. But there
could be a person who is really, really poor and lives in a shed
for example, but is a really good person.
I agree with Sophie, because in Roman times they judged
people by what they did and not who they were.
A question to all of you following on from Rachel. You said that it
is important who we are and not what we have, but do you think
that sometimes what we have might influence who we are?
What do you think?
Some people might have parents and they have the right to be
good and some people don't have parents and they are
naughty.
I don't really know because if you have too much stuff you can
be really spoiled. Sometimes it does matter what you have got
to make friends if you are new.
I don't agree with William because he said that if people have
parents they are good but it doesn't work like that. Because you
can have somebody living in a foster home and be really good
and somebody who has a normal family and they could not care
for anything.
William gave an example with which you don't agree. Can you
find another example?
If you are poor or say your mum and dad do not earn as much
money as other people, so when you go to the shops you don't
get the same stuff as anybody else, you might live in the same
type of house but have different things and be treated differently.
What you have judges what you are. If you came from a
different country and you really want to make friends, the things
you have could make people want to be friends with you. But
then...coming back to what Sophie said if you are a poor person
and go to a shop you can't have what others have, like
chocolate and like that but you still can be really, really happy
with what you have got.
Going on from what Rachel said, if you are poor and you don't
have what everybody else has you may be treated differently.
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You should judge somebody on their personality and not on how
they look. 
Joanna: Following on from what has been said, you should not make
friends with people based on how they look because they might
have a good personality. 
Anna: If somebody looks really horrible on the outside they could be
really nice on the inside or look nice on the outside but be really
horrible on the inside. 
Vana: If someone is new, say from Africa, they can bring their own
culture to the new culture. To make friends they could use their
old culture. 
Me: Is there anybody who has not spoken yet who would like to add
something? 
Luke: Well, we have this anti-bulling scheme in school so we don't
judge people by what they look like.
Rachel: You can still be happy if you don't have many things 
Me: Can you find connections between important things and things
that make us happy? 
Anna: People who are not so fortunate if they have got something
which is really good they could be really happy with it, but
someone with lots of money just keeps wanting more. 
Emma: If you don't have parents you may turn out better than people
who do have parents. 
Me: What makes you believe so? 
Emma: Say you are in a foster home and you don't have any parents,
you could be really nice and good and then you get fostered. 
Anna: I agree with Emma because if you don't have a family they
would want a family. So they can be included in what the family
does. 
Sophie: Some people, say they are rich, what makes them happy, say a
TV makes you happy, so you need a TV to make you happy, but
as long as you have got family and friends these are the things
you really need. You can still be happy. 
Me: So you can be happy with less. We have to wrap our
conversation up because it's time for you to leave. Let's have
our last thoughts. 
Alice: The mop tried to be different. But how would she liked it if the
other things were doing that to her and got used more than her? 
Rachel: For a poor person it doesn't matter how poor you are but how
nice you are. Say you are horrible to others would you like them
to do it back to you? 
Thomas: I think to judge somebody by their personality and no what they
have got.
William: Pass. 
Vana: I think it's good to have friends but you should treat them how
you want to be treated yourself. 
Kate: If you are nice to somebody they will be nice back but if you are
horrible they won't be nice back.
Luke: If you are a spoiled brat you won't have any friends. 
Sophie: Sometimes less is more!
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Emma: Pass.
Anna: Don't judge each other by what we have because it is inside
what matters. 
Joanna: Pass.




Stimuli that comes from children's school life and coutd be used
philosophically1
1. Children working with games that improve their logical and spacial abilities
What makes it corre
Picture 1: Children playing with games that require attention and logical thinking
Is there just one way to complete 
logically these cards?
! The photographs are from my personal archive as a teacher in Greece I had asked for 
permission from the children's parents for using the photographs, which I used to take only for 
research and academic reasons
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Picture 2: Children playing with games that require attention and logical thinking
2. Philosophical discussions that can occur during children's spontaneous 
play
What if the motorbikes we 
long enough to accommodate 
more people?
Picture 3: A motorbike made from blocks
Are there particular 
roles within a family?
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Picture 4: Role play: Taking care of our babies and sharing responsibilities
3. Philosophical discussions that could occur after visits to new places (e.g. 
visit to an olive oil factory)
Is life a very big 
factory?
Picture 5: Visit to a local olive oil factory
4. Philosophical discussions that can occur during children's presentations of 
the books their parents read to them during the weekend.
Picture 6: Presenting to my classmates the book I read at the weekend
377




Am I creating art?
Why are some 
paintings in the 
museum, but some 
others are not?
Picture 7: Creating Art
Picture 8: Creating Art using a PC
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6. Celebrating birthdays
Where do the past 
years go?
Picture 9: Birthday celebration
6. Observing a little snail
Did they ask me if 
I wanted to be 
observed?Picture 10: Observing a snail
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7. Drama activities
Picture 11: At the hospital
Picture 12: Greek Gods chatting about Persefoni
The children in this photo were wondering how to 'grow a beard' for their 
dressing up as ancient Greek Gods. There were no knitting needles available 
so they had to think of alternatives. "What if I use the stapler?" There is 
always a need for thinking critically. "Because you will start bleeding and you 
will hurt yourself answered the other child and finally they thought of using 
the tape. What, however, would happen if none had foreseen the
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consequences of such a deed? What is the facilitator's role and where does 
his/her responsibility lie between thinking philosophically and making sure that 
children's dialoguing will not lead to hurting themselves? Shall we ever take 
for granted that someone can always think critically?
Changing bodies




Picture 13: My new body 
8. Protesting
Does age matter 
when protesting?
Picture 14: Protesting at the central square of the village
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9. Planting and....
Picture 15: Planting flowers
10. ....taking notes of the plants progress
As the flower grows 
does it remain the 
same flower?
Picture 16: Daily notes on flowers' progress
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11. Organizing a school festival
Picture 17: Preparing the scenery for the Christmas school celebrations
Making the preparations for scenes for the Christmas drama play: Working all 
together and being collaborative led children to make the scenery below
Picture 18: Well...our scenery is not bad. It was very artistically done!
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Picture 19: Last preparations for the Christmas drama play
Being collaborative with each other and responsible (children were thinking of 
what we were doing) would reassure a good final result that would make both 
children and their families happy.
Picture 20: Arranglnglhe Christmas photos
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By the end of Christmas school celebration children had to choose and 
negotiate which photos they could take to their houses as souvenirs. This 
activity required:
  Collaboration with each other so as not to start fighting by being greedy 
to grab the photos for themselves.
  Good observation skills so as to see in which photos each child 
appeared.
  Negotiating if two or more children wanted the same photo. Children 
should give good arguments to convince the others. In case the 
arguments were not persuasive enough children should think of other 
alternatives (e.g. asking from the teacher to print a photo more than 
once)
  Being caring and reassuring that all children have about the same 
number of photos
  Being patient and tolerant.
  Respecting each other.
  Children established their own rules: They agreed that those who are 
disrupting this process would go somewhere else until they feel better 
and then come back. It was reassured also that in the phase of picking 
the photos they all would be there to approve them or not.
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12. The classroom labels
Picture 21: Classroom label/ How do I feel today?
Each child had made a petal with their names on it. When children entered 
the classroom they put their petal on the head of the flower that represented 
best their emotions (e.g. happy, angry, bored or sleepy, sad, terrified). 
Throughout the day children could move their petal if their mood had 
changed.
This stimulus had been used a lot during the school year as a way for children 
to identify their emotions and recognise others' emotions. Questions that 
could be treated philosophically had been raised such as:
  Is Georgia's anger the same as mine? (Lena)
  If we change our petal and move it to the happy flower will our mood 
change and become happy? (Suzan)
  What makes us change how we feel?
  If we forget to change our petal does it really matter? (Mike)
Another option could be to negotiate whether some other emotions are not 
represented whereas they could have been.
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Picture 22: The scale of responsibility
Each step (with the accompanying face) represents a different level of 
responsibility. From bottom to top: not responsible/ I am trying to become 
responsible (a little bit responsible)/ I am about to become very responsible 
(responsible)/ I am perfectly responsible (very responsible). Children had 
made a cartoon representation of themselves and everyday they placed their 
cartoon at the level they thought they were, according to their own evaluation 
but also listening to others opinions. The place for each cartoon on the scale 
was not fixed and could change during the day. At the bottom of the page 
were the cartoons of the students who were absent.
This stimulus had raised a lot of questions and led to many discussions often 
very philosophical. Here are some examples of the questions raised:
  What does it mean to be responsible? (Maria)
  Is it always good to be extremely responsible? (Me)
  Can you ever be perfectly responsible?
  Are the teachers perfectly responsible all the time? (Costis)
  How can I know if I am responsible? (Rhodi)
  Who decides how responsible we are? (Nasos)
  What if the cartoons are responsible but not us? (Rhodi)
  If I lose my cartoon then I am not responsible, am I? (Helen)
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• How is it possible one day to be very responsible and the next day to 
be at the bottom of the scale? (Vasilis)
• Is Miss Sofia responsible when she teases us? (Costis)
We had discussed with the children the positives and the negatives of being 
responsible and there was an agreement that being extremely responsible is 
not necessarily something very good. Therefore, it is not too bad not to be at 
the top of the scale! Below are some of children's ideas about what it means 
to be responsible and what are the positives and negatives of being 
responsible
What does responsible mean?
• We tidy up the room before we play with new toys (Helen)
• We don't interrupt others when they talk and we listen to each other 
(Suzan)
• We help our mother and out teachers (Lena)
• We don't punch and spit on others even if we want it so much (Costis)
• We are not noisy (Maria)
Positives of being responsible
• We can do a lot of things because we don't waste time in shouting 
(Rhodi)
• We do not have our teachers to pull us together (Costis)
• We feel nice (Helen)
• There is less noise and more work (Mike)
• If people were not responsible then there would be many robberies 
(Vasilis)
Negatives of being responsible
• It's boring sometimes (Costis)
• It does not have any fun (Vasos)
• If I am ill then it's ok if I am not too responsible (Vasos)
• Sometimes it's ok if there is a bit of noise and the teachers shout at us. 
It's fun again (Rhodi)
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13. Questions that emerge spontaneously in the classroom. Below, there are 
some examples from questions that have been raised by children aged 4-6.
Picture 23: What if it never rained?
What would happen if it never rained?
• We wouldn't have any water (George)
• We wouldn't need umbrellas but we would need to water the flowers 
(Rhodi)
• We wouldn't be able to put out the fires (Vasos)
• The plants would get dry and the animals wouldn't find food and water 
(Georgia)
• People wouldn't have food like lentils, potatoes and fruits (Suzan)
• We wouldn't have water to drink (John)
• We wouldn't have sausages because the animals we get the sausages 
from would have died (Maira)
• Birds would die (Vasilis)
• People would die also (Vicky)
Note: This is a question that came from the children and allowed them to think 
critically and creatively. What matters is to write down children's ideas with 
their names beside. Usually, these questions can be a stimulus for a further 
philosophical discussion afterwards if children are still interested). Also writing 
down children's questions and sticking them on a wall functions as a mapping 
of the initial stimulus that is always 'there' for the children to revisit if they feel 
so. Therefore, the same stimulus has the opportunity for being further 
'opened'.
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Picture 24: What was the best deed I have done for someone lately?
• I helped Georgia to cut something that she struggled with (Maria)
• I helped my mother with housework (Maria)
• I helped Costas to tidy up the room after we played together (Nasos)
• That I am a friend of most of my classmates (Rhodi)
• I helped once my grandmother to feed the rabbits (Stella)
• I helped my grandmother to tidy up my room! (Zoe, Vasilis, Viron)
• I helped Gina with her Easter art craft (Lena)
• I taught Leo how to cycle (Linos)
• To look after my baby brother (Helen)
• I always help my mother (Georgia)
• I arranged the pens by colour (Michael)
Note: This activity could be repeated and slightly changed, referring this time 
to the best deed ever done. A potential philosophical dialogue about what 
makes a deed good could take place. Still, having written down children's
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answers we have created a mapping for the particular stimulus that can 
always be extended in the future.
Picture 25: What makes the teachers angry?
The teachers of our class get angry when:
• we make a lot of fuss and don't listen to others (many children)
• we fight with each other and cause accidents to others (many children)
• we talk without taking turns (Maria)
• we punch each other (Georgia)
• we bring unnecessary things from our homes to school (Mike)
• we tear up our drawings (Maria)
• we start a new play without having first tidied up the place and the 
items we occupied before (Nasos)
• the teachers ask us twice or more to come to the cycle but we ignore 
them and keep on with what we are doing (Costis)
• we put in the wrong order the days of the week (Orion)
• when we throw things for fear that we might cause any accident 
(Rhodi)
• when we throw away our food when other people do not have food to 
eat (Rhodi)
• when we are naughty (Vasos)
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Note: This activity allows much reflection for both teachers and the children. 
Each statement was occasionally revisited to remind to children behaviours 
that make the teachers angry without the need for the teacher to get 
immediately angry. It was also tested whether there are really good reasons 
for the teachers to get angry in these cases. Furthermore, each statement 
was an opportunity for the teachers to reflect and possibly self correct in case 
they got angry when it was not really necessary.
There was further debate for some statements. For instance, why should the 
teacher get angry if the children bring something from their house? Do the 
children have not the right to bring objects from their houses that make them 
feel more comfortable in the school? Is it not a good idea for children to bring 
stimuli from their house that could be used somehow in the classroom? The 
counter argument that children brought, without my need to interfere was that 
sometimes these objects might be stolen or broken by other children which 
can make the children upset. Also, sometimes the objects children bring are 
too distractive and do not allow children to pay attention to other activities in 
the school. A whole discussion about what makes an activity important or 
what makes an object distractive took place. There were also suggestions 
about what items children could bring to the school without causing distraction 
(e.g. books, puzzles but not our mothers' cosmetics which possibly are not 
good enough for children's skin!),
What this activity shows is how philosophy can blend with everyday dilemmas 
and how to seek solutions so as to live better (achieve a state of temporary 
eudemonia). It would be interesting if this activity was flipped around and the 
teachers were asked what is it that makes children angry. Such a question 
would also offer moments for reflection and self correction.
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Appendix 5 
Stimuli that the children produce which can be used philosophically
a) Children's drawings: My ideal house
These drawings took place after having discussed with children about 
people's houses, what materials they need to build them, how are the exterior 
and interior spaces of a house, what is each room's function and so on. 
Children started describing their houses, some of them had also brought 
photographs of their houses. We discussed about the differences that houses 
have (e.g. different types of houses: flats, semi-detached houses, different 
numbers of rooms and floors etc). Some children were not that happy with 
their house so I asked them to think how their ideal house would be. This 
gave some food to imaginative thinking and later on to some artistic activities 
as they were willing to draw their ideal houses for me. Below, there are the 
children's drawings with a few descriptions as they explained them to me.
Picture 26: Orion's ideal house
Orion's house has a new orange stable outdoors ladder on the right and a 
black old one on the left that is broken and bent. There is also an interior 
ladder. The roof of the house is multicoloured with nice little lights. The 
family's dormitories are on the second floor. When Orion drew his ideal house 
the other members of his family were sleeping.
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Picture 27: Rhodi's invisible house among a great garden with lots of flowers and birds
Picture 28: Vasos' ideal house.
Picture 28 shows two slopes that are available with this house; an easy one 
and a stepped one with a really dangerous red point for more exciting 
moments. Mum is hidden in the kitchen, Vasos is in the garden, the baby is 
sleeping on the second floor and dad is on the balcony bending and fixing one 
of the two outdoors ladders that lead to the roof.
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Picture 29: Maria's house is situated in the suburbs and there are lots of flowers and 
butterflies surrounding it. Also, the door has a system that allows father's smoke to get out of 
the house without getting cold inside
395
b) Children's constructions
Picture 30: The former twin towers in New York
^^^^^••^^•il^H^^^HM^HII^H^HiM^H^^
Picture 31: Living in a Palace. (The cones serve as machines for making ice-cream.) The 
wheels serve as wheels if one needs to move the palace somewhere else
c) Children's art crafts
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Picture 32: Children used all the same materials to decorate their Christmas cards yet the 
outcomes are all so different!
Picture 33: Can you tell the real mobile from the crafts?
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Observing the details can give birth to spontaneous discussions that push 
thinking further
What if the mobiles had letters instead of
numbers?
Would that make us press the name and call
directly the person we would like to speak to?
What if we had in our entries more people with
the same name?
Picture 34: Mobile Model 1
• "There is a camera and antenna but still 
my mobile is not real. I like it though!" 
(Helen)
Picture 35: Mobile Model 2
• What if mobiles had more than 0-9 
numbers? Why should we exclude 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, and 15?
• How does a painted navigation menu 
be of any help?
• Do you like my screen saver?
Picture 36: Mobile Model 3
In what ways are your mobiles not 'real'?
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"My dad can change the photos on his phone screen because it is real.
Mine is not real, that's why only this drawing can appear" (Rhodi
explaining in what ways their mobiles are not real)
"It's paper made" (Vasos)
"It has an antenna but it's not a real one" (Vasilis)
"You can not really dial anybody. You can only pretend that you are
speaking on the phone (Rhodi)
d) Decorating Windows
Picture 37: Winter window decorations made by children
When children had cut and decorated their houses and trees they had to stick 
them on the windows. It was suggested to them to stick on their crafts, then 
go a bit back and see how they fit in with the 'big picture' they have in their 
mind. If it didn't fit, they were allowed to change place. Aesthetics in this case 
was not a discussion but already incorporated into children's everyday life. As 
for the tree on top of the window well..."it was too windy and the air blew it 
away...and also there was not enough place down there" (Maira).
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e) Cooking activities
Picture 38: Preparing cookies and discussion time
Cooking gives many opportunities for talking philosophically about:
o Transformations: 'How from olive oil, salt, flower, orange juice and
cinnamon do you get dough?', 
o Identity: 'Is the final cookie something more than its ingredients? Am I
more than my parts?' 
o Aesthetics: 'What makes a cookie nice; its flavour, its shape, both,
something else?' 
o Perception: 'What makes a cookie delicious?', 'Why is this cookie
delicious for me but not for you?'
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f) Children's own books and possible discussion plans that can 
occur
1 sample: The book below is illustrated and written by Teresa (age 5). She 
was narrating and I was writing her story.
Picture 39: Front page Title of the book: Snow White's child 
Writer: Teresa
Picture 40: Once upon a time a child (Snow White's child) found a little rabbit.
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Picture 41: Snow White's child went back home with the little rabbit but the mother (Snow 
White) sent the rabbit away.
Picture 42: The rabbit went back to the forest and its mother punished it because she thought 
that she had lost her child forever. The little rabbit promised to its mother that it would never 
go away again. They lived happy ever after.
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>nd
2'u sample: The book below is illustrated and written by Manos (age 4). 
Manos was narrating after he finished his drawing and I was writing his story.
Picture 43: Front page Title of the book: The little mouse 
Illustration: A dolphin 
Writer: Manos
Picture 44: Once upon a time there was a kitten. The cat found the mice and ate them. One
mouse, however, the little one, managed to hide itself from the kitten.
(The illustration points where exactly the eaten mice are in the kitten's belly).
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Picture 45: The little mouse escaped from the kitten. It climbed on her. The cat went to her 
house and there she discovered the little mouse because it slipped and fell in front of the cat's 
paws. Still though the mouse hid in the cat's house.
(The illustration shows the cat's house. The up arrow shows where exactly the mouse has 
hidden itself).
^^^^^^HI^H^H^^^H^^M^^^^^^^M^^^"^^M^^^^^^H^^^H|^^HI^^^H>^^^H^^^HI^^^^^^^
Picture 46: When the cat fell asleep the mouse went out to the balcony of the cat's house and
jumped so high up to the sun
(The black line is the balcony, below is the cat's house. The blue little line shows the mouse's
jump!)
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Picture 47: The sun was happy to have the mouse's company. To show how happy sun was, 
he put on the sky a big rainbow.
Picture 48: At that moment the mouse slipped from the sky and the sun so it went back home 
and lived with the other mice happily ever after.
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3r sample: The book is written and illustrated by Maria (age 4)
HHffiSr "
Picture 49: Front page title: A heart for the little girl 
Writer: Maria
Picture 50: Once upon a time there was a girl living in a house but somehow she got lost one 
day. Her mother and father started looking around for their daughter but they couldn't find her 
anywhere.
406
Picture 51: The girl had gone to the sea. Her father and mother finally found her at the sea 
and they asked her not to leave them again. Her parents gave some presents to their little 
child. Even her godmother gave presents to the child.
{^^^^^^^^•••^^^^^^^^^^•^^^^^^•i^^^^^^^^^HBB^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Picture 52: Here are some of the presents the girl got whose name was Maria: a) a car, b) a 
smiley heart and c) a fake sea
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Picture 53: Maria was happy so she made a nice drawing for her parents. They lived happy
ever after.
(The black and white shape represents Maria's heart when she was lost at sea)
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Appendix 6
Examples that show possible ways of elaborating further (and 
philosophically) on the stimuli that children produce
1) Questions that may occur from Maria's book (appendix 5. Sample 
3) and could possibly lead the group of children to a philosophical 
dialogue:
Discussion Plan
• Can we select where to get lost?
• Did the girl know she was lost?
• Can we be lost without knowing it?
• When we hide ourselves are we lost?
• Why did the girl go to the sea?
• What does giving presents mean?
• Why do we give presents?
• Do we need to do something in order to get a present?
• What makes a sea fake?
• What makes something fake/ real?
• Can a bag be a fake? (Ask your mum!)
• Is something fake not real?
• How does a fake sea appear?
• In what ways is a fake sea different to a real sea?
• What does it mean for a heart not to have any colours? Why?
• Is there any difference between things that are lost with things that are 
	forgotten?
• Is there any difference between things that are lost and things that are 
	hidden?
Possible activities regarding the idea of fake:
Observations:
• Find things in the classroom that are fakes. In what ways are they 
fake?
• Are maps fake?
• Are the doll's clothes fake?
• Are the plastic fruits fake?
Drawings:
• Drawing real and fake things. Inviting others to tell the fake ones from 
the real




How is it to be a present yourself? Can you ever be a present? Would 
that be real or fake?
Becoming a fake tree/ sea/ bird and then turning into a real one. How 
can we act these differently?
Logic activities



















Possible activities regarding the idea of lost:
Everyday life
• Tidying up the rooms and collecting all the possible lost things
• Setting rules to avoid losing things
Drama activities
• Acting as if I am lost in a sea, in a busy city centre, in a desert (See 
Burmingham's Would you rather... tor more ideas for children to act 
upon)
• Acting as if I am lost/ hidden/ forgotten somewhere. Where that place 
would be? What would it be like?
• Being lost: Showing my emotions using: a) my face, b) my body, c) a 
mask, d) choosing a piece of music
• Lost and found:
o Pretend you have lost a friend and you find him/her again. How
do you react? 
o You find a lost drawing. How do you react?
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o You find a lost favourite doll. How do you react?
Literature:
• Reading Shaw Tan's The lost thing and discussing
• Remembering characters of traditional fairy tales that were lost (e.g. 
Red Riding Hood, Cinderella, Hansel and Gretel, Snow White etc)
• Writing new stories about something lost.
Geography
• Can an island be lost?
• The lost city of Atlantis: A city lost in the sea. Is it lost or just hidden? Is 
it real or fake?
History
• A lost war. Work out the consequences.
Cooking
Sugar is sweet but still we would like to make a sweet cake. Think of 
























• Playing hide and seek. Is it a form of losing somebody?
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2) Questions that could occur from children's constructions (palace 
and twin towers) See appendix 5
• Can two towers be twin? Can two towers be exactly the same as each 
other?
• Are these towers the same? (For instance: Is there the same number 
of bricks? Do the bricks have the same shape, order, arrangement and 
colour?)
• What makes two things exactly the same?
• Are twin siblings exactly the same?
• How would it be to live in a palace?
• What would be the positives and the negatives of living in a palace?
• What facilities would you like a palace to have?
• How would a modern palace be?
• Who lives in a palace? Why?
• What makes a palace a palace?
• What are the differences between a palace and: a) a castle, b) a villa, 
c) a tower, d) a very rich resort?
• What is it that makes a palace important? (e.g. the people living into it? 
the quality of the materials it is made of?)
• What if the palaces turned into slums and the slums into palaces?
• What if the palaces were portable?
• What would happen if all the palaces had ice-cream making machines?
• What if the palaces were ruled by children/ animals/ criminals?
• Does living in a palace make someone a different person?
Drawings and constructions
• Draw your ideal palace.
• Draw (or construct by using other materials) the facilities you would like 
the palace to have.
• Design the plans for a palace. If a child has a parent that is an architect 
we could ask him/her to bring some designs into school.
Fashion designing
• Designing clothes for people who live in a palace.
• Decorating the interior of a palace
• Flicking through decorative journals and saying our opinions about 
what makes a decoration nice (a whole aesthetic dialogue about what 
is concerned as beautiful may occur)
• Sewing prince clothes for dolls by using tissues that are of no need.
Drama activities:
• Living in a palace
• Working in a palace
• Sleeping in a comfortable bed in a palace
• Arranging a party
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Excursion:
• Arranging a visit to a palace.
• Writing down in advance the questions we would like to ask to 
specialists
• Organizing the questions into categories e.g. factual, specific, open 
questions
• Thinking of the equipment we might need to take with us (e.g. 
notebooks, cameras, recorders)
Geography & history:
o Finding historical places on the maps
o Recognizing the symbols that represent palaces, churches etc 
on a map
Literature
• Thinking of castles, towers and palaces in fairy tales and stories we 
have read in the classroom or elsewhere
414
3) Philosophical discussion that could occur because of Rhodi's 
invisible house
• What is an invisible house?
• What would be the positives and the negatives of an invisible house?
• What if the people who lived in the invisible house were visible?
• Does an invisible thing really exist?
• How can you tell whether an invisible thing really exists?
• Can you name things that are invisible?
• Can people be invisible?
• Is ignoring someone a wayd of treating someone as if s/he is invisible?
• How would life be if we all were invisible?
• Is something invisible a secret?
• If something is invisible can you ever tell whether it is completed or half 
	completed or totally unfinished?
• Is death a way for someone to turn invisible
Drama activities:
• Acting as if I were invisible
Invisible drawings:
Using lemon juice to create our invisible drawing: What will happen if we ask 
our mothers to iron them? Why does this happen?
Imagination:
• What would I do if I were invisible?
• Is an invisible map of any use? Why? Why not?
• If I am invisible, are the things that I carry with me also invisible?
• Can you make a visible song?
Literature
• What happened to the emperor with the invisible clothes?
• Is wearing invisible clothes the same as being naked?
• Harry Potter had as a present a cape that when he wore it could make 




More examples of analysis of picture-books
In the 'Manneken Pis' (Radunsky, 2003) there is use of light and bright 
colours in the beginning to indicate how peace makes a city beautiful before 
the war starts, and how the same city looks ugly in dark colours because of 
the war. ^_____________
Ofi,'\\tiiii M l.i .Minlnl |||,. i
They were 
sohappy.
u-t.1 js, ,-.»> '.- ..,.:.-. ... 
Everv morning ilir litilr l»>
wrnt with lii* 1'allii-r :nnl \loi
to tin- flower market.
Oh. what beautiful fin\\ri-
Figure 5.13: Picture from Radunsky's Manneken Pis (bright colours and smiley happy faces 
during the period of peace).
They fought
and fought.
Day and night, day and night.
Figure 5.14: Picture from Radunsky's Manneken Pis.
The black colour will take over in the next photo. The white colour font is
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neutral so as to highlight the comical expressions of those who fight and 
possibly to indicate ironically the pointlessness of war. People have either 
green or orange faces: the defenders and the enemies. There is no need for 
further colours to depict differences among the faces: in a period of war the 
only useful thing is to separate allies from enemies.
Figure 5.15: Picture from Radunsky's Manneken Pis. The black background shows the 
sadness of the war. It also shows how small the city looks now
The dark colours as depicted in Anthony Browne's, Gorilla (p.5-6) along with 
the picture details (e.g. the girls stillness and nervousness depicted in the 
crossing of her fingers behind her back) indicate an upsetting situation, whilst 
the use of green and purple for the dance of the girl with the gorilla may 
indicate a more dreamy, calm and natural situation (Graham, 1990).
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Fiaure 5.20: Picture from Browne's Gorilla
Figure 5.21: Picture from Browne's Gorilla.
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Figure 5.22: Picture from Browne's Gorilla.
The use of shadows can help the reader create many thoughts. An example 
will illustrate this point. In 'Gorilla' (1985, p.6), the main character, Hanna, is 
alone in an empty room in a corner with a plate of toast in front of a television. 
The only light comes from the television. There are bright colours on the wall, 
tapestry that is illuminated, but the rest of the room is depicted dark with 
figures of mysterious and maybe scary animals, such as wolves and other 
animals that have horns and wild eyes. There is a picture of Africa too: the 
'dark' continent and the country of origin for gorillas. The light bulb of the room 
which is switched off could also be interpreted as a dark moon. Does the dark 
indicate the emotional state of the lonely girl? Does the lack of any furniture 
and commodity indicate the loneliness of the girl and the need for another 
person rather than equipment? Is television a good companion for people who 
feel alone?2 Is Hanna abandoned and neglected by the adults in her life?
The contrast between the simple colours used to describe the adults world 
and the rich colours to describe children's imaginary world is evident in John 
Burningham's 'Time to get out of the bath, Shirley'. The pages with the text 
describe the realistic world, at least as it is perceived by Shirley's mother, and 
the pages with the colourful images depict the imaginary world of Shirley while 
she is having a bath. In each case careful observation of the details in images 
provoke questioning aesthetic responses, as well as many other philosophical 
questions.
2 The lack of any furniture helps the reader focus on the child's figure, which seems to be 
small and isolated in the corner of a room. The realistic representations blend with the 
symbolic significances that people who read the book bring to it. Through the blending of 
realistic and symbolic strategies Browne implies questions such as "Where is the girl's 
mother?" (Bradford, 1998)..
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e s water everywhere!
Figure 5.23: Pictures from Burningham's, Time to get out of the bath, Shirley.
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Appendix 8
Abstract from my research diary that shows how philosophy as an 
evaluative and generative force becomes a way of life:
At the corner there was a fountain. Many signs were pointing to this particular 
corner but even if you had not noticed them, which I very much doubt, the 
crowd of tourists taking photos of it spoke on its own that there was something 
worth seeing over there. I walked closer and stood on my toes to see what it 
was all about. All I saw was a statue of a child urinating, the famous 
Manneken Pis which I had already seen in cards, posters and its chocolate 
version at tourists shops. While looking at the statue and a group of young 
Japanese tourists laughing, posing and taking photos, I heard the guide 
explaining the different versions of Manneken Pis' history; that a child was 
relieving himself at this corner and he didn't notice that his water went directly 
onto a bishop's head walking by this place. What, however, struck me was 
that there was somewhere in the city a whole museum with the costumes that 
every year during the carnival the Manneken Pis was dressed in. A whole 
museum with costumes! This was certainly something I wouldn't like to miss. 
Fortunately, all the sightseeing in Brussels is within a walkable distance so I 
would be able to visit it before setting back for the UK. (22/11/2009 Visit 
Brussels)
I had never expected that my visit to Brussels and particularly the Manneken 
Pis statue and the museum of the Manneken Pis costumes would become a 
stimulus for further philosophical thinking. Below, I present all the questions 
that were swimming around in my mind after my visit to the Manneken 
Museum as I wrote them down in my notebook when I had a cup of hot 
chocolate and some little Belgian bars of chocolate.
Some thoughts on Manneken Pis:
How a symbol can be created? There are many versions and different 
myths for the Manneken Pis apart from the one described in the book I 
bought from the museum. According to a version, the comer where the 
Manneken Pis statue is situated was a place where a child regularly 
relieved himself. Another version claims that a child once peed on a 
bishop's beard, ft could be just an accident but a whole myth created 
out of it which remained throughout history until today. 
Why does the Manneken Pis appeal so much to people today? 
Does it indicate the child's innocence? (Because it came from a child 
who didn't know how important was the person they offended). 
What does the peeing indicate?
o Is it to show the child's cuteness, childishness or freedom to 
express oneself under no conventions?
o Is it a convention to hide physical needs or pleasures?
o Is it fun?
o Is it a form of approved disrespect?
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o Why has Manneken Pis become such a big issue for Brussels? Is it 
because Brussels does not have a long history so as a nation it tries to 
create history?
o Manneken Pis is part of Brussels': a) history, b) tourist attraction, c)
economy industry (tourists'souvenirs, chocolate shaped as Manneken Pis, 
costumes, books).
o Why are there costumes for the Manneken Pis? Is it people's attempts to 
hide its nudity (is it conservatism?) and that's why they created costumes 
for it?
o So far there are 705 costumes created for Manneken Pis. These costumes 
leave just a hole for the manneken to use. They are of very good quality 
and well tailored. The themes of the costumes: a) national costumes from 
all over the world (e.g. Greek euzonas, Indian, Italian, English etc), b) 
Special costumes for celebrating (e.g. African dances), c) costumes of 
certain people in history (e.g. Napoleonic costume), d) entertainment 
industry (e.g. EMs Presley costume), e) fun costumes (e.g. Ovelix), f) 
seasonal costumes (e.g. beach attire), g) sport industry (e.g. footballer's 
kit) etc. During carnival there is an offer for a new costume for the 
manneken and the new costume is revealed to Belgians during athe 
celebrations. People clap and drink beer.
o The offering of costumes to the manneken has its own autonomous 
history! It is amazing to think how the history and the folk tradition of 
something are created!
o The manneken looks differently in a costume. Does the manneken change 
identity according to which costume it wears?
o Multiple images of the manneken in the different suits: Does that indicate 
multiple identities as well?
o What does the Manneken Pis represent when dressed as Napoleon for 
instance? Or an Indian? Or Policeman? Does the urinating identity of the 
Manneken Pis match with the identity of the person that the dressed 
manneken represents? Is it offensive for the country to know that there is a 
Manneken Pis wearing its national costume? Does the manneken change 
identity?
o Does the manneken (dressed or not) represent the same idea as the first 
time it was made?
o Museum with the different costumes of the Manneken Pis. It shows how: 
o a whole history of costume designing for a statue is created 
o a symbol is the base on which a costume tradition is built on 
o the costumes acquired their own identity and history 
o richness (of textiles, designes, creative ideas according to the
themes of the costumes) is developed. 
o Manneken Pis becomes a symbol that can draw the attention of
people from different fields e.g. history, science, or fashion design.
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o Urinating as relieving self/ getting rid of the unnecessary in a way that is
straight forward/no camouflage/inability to hold something that is not
useful anymore. 
o What does it mean for a country to have as cultural symbol a boy
urinating? Is it a symbol of rebellion? a symbol of freedom? 
o If there was an adult's urinating instead of a child's what would be
different? 
o If the child hadn 't urinated on the bishop !s beard would this legend have
survived? What makes something important? 
o What makes something survive in history and become historical? 
o What makes somebody known/ unknown? Why?
Greece is a country full of history. However, bits of its history are not so much 
advertised (IDEA: Too much stimulation may cause things to be left aside). 
Belgium, on the contrary, is a country with not so rich a history. However, 
Belgium makes the most in many different ways (economy, tourism, history, 
culture) out of a detail such as the Manneken Pis.
Stimulation:
o Too much stimulation can lead to losing or not giving attention or
leaving aside things. 
o Not too much may lead to concentrating better to one aspect and
giving it more depth (22/11/2009 Visit in Brussels)
Later on that week gazing at the children's books in the library I came across 
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